

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

California Chamber of Commerce,  
  
Plaintiff,  
  
v.  
  
Xavier Becerra in his official capacity as  
Attorney General of the State of California,  
  
Defendant.

No. 2:19-cv-02019-KJM-EFB  
  
ORDER

The California Chamber of Commerce contends California has compelled businesses to display misleading warnings about the dangers of acrylamide, a carcinogen. It seeks a preliminary injunction barring the California Attorney General and anyone else from filing new lawsuits against businesses that do not display the warning.

The Council for Education and Research on Toxics, or “CERT,” joins the State as a defendant in this case. CERT is an intervening nonprofit organization that often files lawsuits against businesses that do not display warnings about acrylamide. CERT moves for summary judgment against the Chamber of Commerce. It argues its right to prosecute private enforcement actions is protected by the First Amendment.

//////

1 The court held a hearing by videoconference on December 11, 2020. Trenton Norris and  
2 S. Zachary Fayne appeared for the Chamber of Commerce. Joshua Purtle and Harrison Pollak  
3 appeared for the State. Raphael Metzger and Scott Brust appeared for CERT. As explained in  
4 this order, **the Chamber of Commerce’s motion is granted, and CERT’s motion is denied.**  
5 The State has not shown that the cancer warnings it requires are purely factual and  
6 uncontroversial. Nor has it shown that Proposition 65 imposes no undue burden on those who  
7 would provide a more carefully worded warning. CERT, for its part, has not shown it is entitled  
8 to judgment as a matter of law.

9 **I. BACKGROUND**

10 Acrylamide is a toxic chemical. It is produced industrially for use in plastics, grouts,  
11 water treatment products, and cosmetics. *See, e.g.*, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., “Acrylamide  
12 Questions and Answers” (Sept. 25, 2019), Norris Decl. Ex. E, ECF No. 95-7.<sup>1</sup> It is also found in  
13 cigarette smoke. *Id.* And in 2002, it was detected in food. Maier Decl. at 16 ¶ 44, ECF No. 95-  
14 24,<sup>2</sup> Solomon Decl. ¶ 18, ECF No. 101-1.<sup>3</sup>

15 Although acrylamide was first detected in food in 2002, it has likely always been a part of  
16 many foods. *See* Acrylamide Questions & Answers, *supra*. Sometimes it occurs naturally.  
17 Maier Decl. ¶ 44. Often, however, it forms as a result of a reaction between sugars and the amino  
18 acid asparagine, which naturally occur in many foods. *See* Acrylamide Questions & Answers,  
19 *supra*. Roasting, baking, frying, or otherwise cooking food at a high temperature appears to cause  
20 acrylamide to form, whether at home or at industrial scale. *Id.*; Solomon Decl. ¶ 18; Letter from

21 //

---

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.fda.gov/food/chemicals/acrylamide-questions-and-answers>, last visited Mar. 24, 2021. *See also* U.S. Food & Drug Admin., “Survey Data on Acrylamide in Food” (Sept. 27, 2019), <https://www.fda.gov/food/chemicals/survey-data-acrylamide-food>, last visited Mar. 24, 2021.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Andrew Maier is a toxicologist with a Ph.D. in molecular toxicology and a principal science advisor at Cardno ChemRisk, a consulting firm. Maier Decl. ¶¶ 4–6, 13. The Chamber of Commerce retained him to offer opinions on its behalf. *See id.* ¶ 13.

<sup>3</sup> Dr. Gina Solomon is a medical doctor with an expertise in environmental health who teaches at the University of California San Francisco Medical School. Solomon Decl. ¶ 5 & Ex. A. The State retained her to offer opinions on its behalf. *See id.* ¶ 17.

1 Lester Crawford, Deputy Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. at 2 (July 14, 2003), Norris Decl.  
2 Ex. G, ECF No. 95-9.

3 Acrylamide is most commonly found in foods made from plants. *See* Acrylamide  
4 Questions & Answers, *supra*. Dairy products, meat, and fish do not usually contain acrylamide  
5 after they are cooked at high temperatures, and when acrylamide is found in these foods, it forms  
6 at lower levels. *Id.* According to the U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA), the foods that  
7 contribute the most acrylamide to the American diet are baked and fried starchy foods like french  
8 fries, chips, crackers, donuts, pancakes, and toast. Solomon Decl. ¶ 19 (citing Eileen Abt et al.,  
9 “Acrylamide Levels and Dietary Exposure from Foods in the United States, An Update Based on  
10 2011-2015 Data,” 36 Food Additive Contamination Part A 1475–90 (July 18, 2019)). Coffee also  
11 contains acrylamide, *see id.*, as do almonds, olives, and asparagus, Maier Decl. at 16 ¶ 44; Nat’l  
12 Cancer Institute, “Acrylamide and Cancer Risk” (Dec. 5, 2017).<sup>4</sup>

13 For decades, experiments have shown that when mice and rats eat or drink food or water  
14 containing acrylamide, they develop cancerous tumors in many parts of their bodies, including in  
15 their lungs, stomachs, skin, brains, and reproductive organs. *See* Solomon Decl. ¶ 33 (citing,  
16 among other materials, Keith A. Johnson, et al., “Chronic Toxicity and Oncogenicity Study on  
17 Acrylamide Incorporated in the Drinking Water of Fischer 344 Rats,” 85 Toxicology & Applied  
18 Pharmacology 154–68 (Sept. 15, 1986)). The greater the quantity of acrylamide the animals  
19 ingest, the more cancer is found in the tested group. *Id.* ¶ 34.

20 Administering toxic chemicals to people is, of course, highly unethical, so the most  
21 powerful and reliable clinical tools for testing the effects of food-borne acrylamide, such as  
22 double-blind clinical trials, are impossible. *See* Lipworth Decl. ¶ 17,<sup>5</sup> ECF No. 95-20; *see also*  
23 Michael D. Green, et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in Federal Judicial Center Reference  
24 Manual on Scientific Evidence at 555 (3d ed. 2011). Animal studies are the main source of data

---

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causes-prevention/risk/diet/acrylamide-fact-sheet>, last visited Mar., 24, 2021.

<sup>5</sup> Dr. Lauren Lipworth is an epidemiologist and professor at the Vanderbilt University School of Medicine. Lipworth Decl. ¶ 6–8. The Chamber of Commerce retained her to offer opinions on its behalf. *See id.* ¶ 15.

1 for assessing whether chemicals are safe or dangerous to people. *See, e.g.*, Solomon Decl. ¶ 24.  
2 Public health authorities commonly rely on them. *See, e.g., id.* ¶¶ 27–28. As a result of these  
3 experiments, many public health authorities have concluded that exposure to acrylamide probably  
4 increases the risk of cancer in people. *See id.* ¶¶ 37–40. The U.S. National Toxicology Program,  
5 for example, has said that acrylamide is “reasonably anticipated to be a human carcinogen.” *See*  
6 *id.* ¶ 37; U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Nat’l Toxicology Program, Report on  
7 Carcinogens, “Acrylamide” (12th ed. 2011).<sup>6</sup> The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has  
8 found that acrylamide is “likely to be carcinogenic in humans.” Solomon Decl. ¶ 39; U.S. Env’t  
9 Protection Agency, Acrylamide Integrated Risk Assessment (Mar. 22, 2010).<sup>7</sup> And a World  
10 Health Organization (WHO) committee that includes representatives from the FDA has  
11 concluded that acrylamide is carcinogenic. Solomon Decl. ¶ 20; J. Agric. Org. & Expert Comm.  
12 on Food Additives, “Evaluation of Certain Contaminants in Food” (Feb. 16–25, 2010).<sup>8</sup>

13 Animal experiments have limitations. When researchers study the effects of a chemical  
14 on animals in a laboratory, they must frequently use very large doses to compensate for small  
15 study groups and limited timeframes, and these doses usually do not approximate a person’s real-  
16 world exposure. *See* Solomon Decl. ¶ 26; Maier Decl. ¶¶ 78–83, 87; *see supra* note 1, “Survey  
17 Data.” According to an expert retained by the Chamber of Commerce, a person would have to eat  
18 more than ninety large bags of potato chips every day to consume an equivalent dose of  
19 acrylamide. *See* Maier Decl. ¶ 82. Some researchers also believe that rats and mice react  
20 differently to acrylamide. *See id.* ¶ 58. Acrylamide changes to glycidamide when it is broken  
21 down in the body, and glycidamide reacts more potently with DNA to cause cancer. *See id.*; *see*  
22 *also* Solomon Decl. ¶¶ 43–44, 48. Mice and rats may metabolize acrylamide into glycidamide  
23 more efficiently than people, so they may be more sensitive to acrylamide. *See* Maier Decl. ¶ 58.

---

<sup>6</sup> <https://ntp.niehs.nih.gov/ntp/roc/content/profiles/acrylamide.pdf>, last visited Mar. 24, 2021.

<sup>7</sup> [https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/iris/iris\\_documents/documents/subst/0286\\_summary.pdf#nameddest=woe](https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/iris/iris_documents/documents/subst/0286_summary.pdf#nameddest=woe), last visited Mar. 24, 2021.

<sup>8</sup> [https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/44514/WHO\\_TRS\\_959\\_eng.pdf;jsessionid=B264F817F200B900E810643F558BD16D?sequence=1](https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/44514/WHO_TRS_959_eng.pdf;jsessionid=B264F817F200B900E810643F558BD16D?sequence=1), last visited Mar. 24, 2021.

1 The National Cancer Institute offers similar cautions about animal experiments. *See supra*  
2 Acrylamide and Cancer Risk (“[T]oxicology studies have shown that humans and rodents not  
3 only absorb acrylamide at different rates, they metabolize it differently as well.”). Some of the  
4 studies of acrylamide were authored by researchers with financial connections to the food and  
5 beverage industries, however, and many experts disagree with their conclusions. *See Solomon*  
6 Decl. ¶¶ 49–58.

7 Experiments on animals are not the only tool researchers can use to evaluate the danger of  
8 acrylamide for people. For example, researchers can and have exposed human cells to  
9 acrylamide and glycidamide in a laboratory setting. *See id.* ¶ 44; U.S. Env’tl Protection Agency,  
10 “Toxicology Review of Acrylamide” at 168 (Mar. 2010), Purtle Decl. Ex. G, ECF No. 101-11.  
11 They observed that these chemicals react with human DNA and may become permanently  
12 attached. *See Solomon Decl.* ¶ 44. These attachments are called “adducts,” and they are known  
13 to cause breaks and mutations in chromosomes, *id.*, which can in turn cause cancer if the  
14 damaged cells proliferate, *id.* ¶ 59.

15 Researchers have also found that glycidamide leaves a unique genetic signature when it  
16 causes mutations in human cells. *See id.* ¶ 64 (citing Maria Zhivagui et al., “Experimental and  
17 Pan-Cancer Genome Analyses Reveal Widespread Contribution of Acrylamide Exposure to  
18 Carcinogenesis in Humans,” 29 *Genome Res.* 521–31 (Apr. 2019)). The International Agency for  
19 Research on Cancer (IARC) maintains a database of 1,600 human tumor genomes, and scientific  
20 researchers scanned that database to see how many tumor genomes could be matched with the  
21 unique glycidamide signature. *See id.* According to the scientists who published the results of  
22 this analysis, about one third of the tumor genomes could be connected to glycidamide and thus to  
23 acrylamide. *See Zhivagui, supra*, Abstract; *see also Solomon Decl.* ¶ 64. This may mean that a  
24 large portion of human cancer is connected to acrylamide exposure. *See Solomon Decl.* ¶ 64.

25 Epidemiology also offers well-known statistical tools for investigating whether people are  
26 at greater risk of cancer as a result of acrylamide exposure. *See Lipworth Decl.* ¶ 31.  
27 Epidemiologists can, for example, collect data about human consumption of foods that contain  
28 relatively high amounts of acrylamide. *See id.* ¶¶ 19, 44; Green, *supra*, at 557–59. A “food

1 frequency questionnaire” is a common survey tool for that purpose. Researchers ask participants  
2 how often they eat or drink various foods and beverages and then categorize the participants by  
3 their levels of likely acrylamide consumption. *See* Lipworth Decl. ¶¶ 44, 46, 48; Solomon Decl.  
4 ¶¶ 82–83. If people in low-exposure groups later report lower average cancer rates, and if people  
5 in higher-exposure groups report higher average cancer rates, then it could be that eating foods  
6 with more acrylamide increases the risk of cancer, assuming other causes can be excluded and the  
7 data is free of errors and biases. *See* Lipworth Decl. ¶ 19.

8 Dozens of epidemiological studies conducted in Europe, the United States, and Asia have  
9 investigated whether acrylamide in food causes cancer in humans. *See id.* ¶¶ 35–43, 57–58. An  
10 epidemiologist retained by the Chamber of Commerce reviewed these studies. She found none  
11 showing that eating food with acrylamide increases the risk of cancer. *See id.* ¶¶ 141, 144. In her  
12 opinion, “there is no consistent or reliable evidence to support a finding that dietary exposure to  
13 acrylamide increases the risk of any type of cancer in humans.” *Id.* ¶ 144. “In fact,” she  
14 concludes, “most cancer-specific relative risks have been close to or below the null value.” *Id.*  
15 ¶ 141. That is, statistical tests do not reveal any increase in cancer risk among people who report  
16 greater consumption of acrylamide in food and drinks. *Id.* The National Cancer Institute reports  
17 a similar assessment of this research. *See supra* Acrylamide and Cancer Risk (“[A] large number  
18 of epidemiologic studies . . . in humans have found no consistent evidence that dietary acrylamide  
19 exposure is associated with the risk of any type of cancer.”).

20 Aside from a brief note that some data do show correlations, *see* Cal. Opp’n Prelim. Inj. at  
21 8, ECF No. 101, the State does not contest the epidemiological analysis above. It argues instead  
22 that epidemiological studies are poorly suited to investigating the effects of acrylamide in food.  
23 *See id.* at 6. Cancer caused by acrylamide may not surface for decades, and if it does not, then the  
24 absence of a statistical relationship may prove only that a study did not last long enough. *See*  
25 Solomon Decl. ¶ 70. Data might also be inaccurate. Food frequency questionnaires, for example,  
26 may not reliably estimate acrylamide exposure if people cannot consistently remember what they  
27 ate, when, and how often. *See id.* ¶¶ 70, 84–88. If measurements of acrylamide exposure are  
28 unreliable, studies that rely on those measurements might systematically underestimate the effects

1 of acrylamide. *See id.* ¶¶ 72–73; Lipworth Decl. ¶ 52. But that is not always so. *See* Lipworth  
2 Decl. ¶ 55.

3 Epidemiological studies must also contend with the ubiquity of acrylamide. It may be  
4 impossible to find a truly low-exposure group. *See* Solomon Decl. ¶ 76. Acrylamide exposure is  
5 also relatively uniform. *See id.* If everyone in a study is exposed at similar rates, then everyone  
6 in that study can be expected to experience similar outcomes. *See id.* So epidemiological studies  
7 that reveal no relationship between acrylamide and cancer might not be meaningful.

8 Despite these uncertainties in the epidemiological evidence, many government authorities  
9 have concluded, as noted above, that acrylamide “probably” causes or is “likely” to cause cancer  
10 in humans. But none of these authorities has urged people to avoid foods that contain acrylamide.  
11 At most they voice “concern.” *See* Purtle Decl. Ex. O, ECF No. 101-19. Some, such as the FDA,  
12 have also offered guidance for reducing acrylamide consumption and production. *See* U.S. Food  
13 & Drug Admin., “You can Help Cut Acrylamide in Your Diet (Mar. 14, 2016)<sup>9</sup>; U.S. Food & Drug  
14 Admin., “Guidance for Industry: Acrylamide in Foods” (Mar. 2016).<sup>10</sup>

15 At the end of the day, however, because acrylamide is found in so many foods, it is  
16 probably impossible to avoid it completely. *See* U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Statement from  
17 Comm’r Scott Gottlieb, M.D. (Aug. 29, 2018), Norris Decl. Ex. H, ECF No. 95-10.<sup>11</sup> Both  
18 federal and state public health authorities in fact recommend eating foods that may contain  
19 acrylamide. The FDA advises Americans not to attempt removing fried, roasted, and baked foods  
20 from their diets. *See* Acrylamide Questions and Answers, *supra*. Its best advice is to eat a variety  
21 of healthy foods. *Id.* (citing U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. & U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture,  
22 “2015–2020 Dietary Guidelines” (8th ed. Dec. 2015)). California public health authorities have  
23 also decided not to warn against acrylamide exposure in coffee. *See* Cal. Env’tl Protection

---

<sup>9</sup> <https://www.fda.gov/consumers/consumer-updates/you-can-help-cut-acrylamide-your-diet>, last visited Mar. 24, 2021.

<sup>10</sup> <https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/guidance-industry-acrylamide-foods>, last visited Mar. 24, 2021.

<sup>11</sup> <https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/statement-fda-commissioner-scott-gottlieb-md-fdas-support-exempting-coffee-californias-cancer>, last visited Mar. 24, 2021.

1 Agency, Office of Env'tl Health Hazard Assessment, Final Statement of Reasons on Adoption of  
2 New Section 25704, Purtle Decl. Ex. C, ECF No. 101-7. The State found “inadequate evidence  
3 for the carcinogenicity of drinking coffee” in “a very large number of human studies”; in fact, the  
4 State found “inverse associations—decreasing risk with increasing coffee consumption—for  
5 [some] human cancers.” *Id.* at 5.

6 Sources of acrylamide other than coffee, however, remain subject to the warning  
7 requirements of California’s Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, more  
8 commonly known as “Proposition 65,” the initiative that put the act on the books, *see AFL-CIO v.*  
9 *Deukmejian*, 212 Cal. App. 3d 425, 429 (1989). Under Proposition 65, businesses must not  
10 knowingly or intentionally expose people to chemicals “known to the state to cause cancer or  
11 reproductive toxicity” without a “prior clear and reasonable warning.” *Id.* at 431 (citing Cal.  
12 Health & Safety Code § 24249.6). A chemical is “known” to cause cancer or reproductive  
13 toxicity if it meets one of three statutory criteria:

- 14 • “[I]n the opinion of the state’s qualified experts it has been clearly shown through  
15 scientifically valid testing according to generally accepted principles to cause cancer  
16 or reproductive toxicity”;
- 17 • “[A] body considered to be authoritative by such experts has formally identified it as  
18 causing cancer or reproductive toxicity”;
- 19 • “[A]n agency of the state or federal government has formally required it to be labeled  
20 or identified as causing cancer or reproductive toxicity.”

21 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25249.8(a)–(b).

22 The list of chemicals “known to cause cancer” must also include, “at a minimum,” any  
23 substances listed in California Labor Code subsections 6382(b)(1) and (d), which define  
24 “hazardous substances” under California’s Hazardous Substances Information and Training Act.  
25 Those subsections refer to “[s]ubstances listed as human or animal carcinogens by [IARC]” and  
26 “any substance within the scope of the federal Hazard Communication Standard” as specified by  
27 federal regulation. *See* Cal. Labor Code § 6382(d) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200). The cited

28 //



1 federal regulation refers again to chemicals identified by IARC and the National Toxicology  
2 Program. *See Deukmejian*, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 435 (citing 29 C.F.R § 1910.1200 App’x A & B).

3 A few years after Proposition 65 was passed, a California Court of Appeal interpreted  
4 Health & Safety Code 25249.8(a)–(b), Labor Code section 6382, and the regulations they cite as  
5 requiring the list of chemicals to include “not only those chemicals that are known to cause  
6 cancer in humans, but also those that are known to cause cancer in experimental animals.” *Baxter*  
7 *Healthcare Corp. v. Denton*, 120 Cal. App. 4th 333, 345 (2004) (citing *Deukmejian*, 212 Cal.  
8 App. 3d at 436). A chemical “must be listed even if it is known to be carcinogenic or a  
9 reproductive toxin only in animals.” *Am. Chemistry Council v. Office of Env’tl Health Hazard*  
10 *Assessment*, 55 Cal. App. 5th 1113, 1142 (2020). In Proposition 65 enforcement litigation over  
11 acrylamide in potato chips, California has agreed that a chemical may be listed as “known to the  
12 state to cause cancer” even if the State does not “know” in the colloquial sense “that acrylamide  
13 causes cancer in humans.” Norris Decl., Ex. L at 2 ¶ 4, ECF No. 95-14 (Joint Stipulation of  
14 Undisputed Facts, *People v. Frito-Lay, Inc.*, No. BC 338956 (Cal. Sup. Ct. L.A. Cty., filed  
15 July 28, 2008)). That finding is simply not required. *See id.*

16 Proposition 65 does not specify what warning is necessary for chemicals “known” to  
17 cause cancer; it requires only that the warning be “clear and reasonable.” Cal. Health & Safety  
18 Code § 25249.6. Regulations promulgated by the California Office of Environmental Health  
19 Hazards Assessment require warnings to name the chemical and to be displayed “prominently,”  
20 “with such conspicuousness” that they are “likely to be seen, read, and understood by an ordinary  
21 individual.” *See* Cal. Code Regs. tit. 27 § 25601(b)–(d). A warning may include more  
22 information than this, but only if the addition “identifies the source of the exposure or provides  
23 information on how to avoid or reduce exposure.” *Id.* § 25601(e). The regulations also offer a  
24 model warning that serves as a safe harbor against liability for food warnings: “Consuming this  
25 product can expose you to [name of one or more chemicals], which is [are] known to the State of  
26 California to cause cancer. For more information go to [www.P65warnings.ca.gov/food](http://www.P65warnings.ca.gov/food).” Cal.  
27 Code Regs. tit. 7, § 25607.2(a)(2) (bracketed phrases in original).

28 ////

1 California has permitted more nuanced warnings about acrylamide in at least some foods  
2 in settlement agreements. It permitted a warning about acrylamide in the potato chip litigation to  
3 say the chips “contain acrylamide, a substance identified as causing cancer under California’s  
4 Proposition 65.” Purtle Decl. Ex. E at 10, ECF No. 101-9 (Consent J. as to Frito-Lay at 10,  
5 *People v. Frito-Lay, Inc., supra* (filed Aug. 1, 2008)). The State also permitted the potato chip  
6 warning to explain that foods other than chips contain acrylamide and that acrylamide is not  
7 added to these foods, but rather is “created when these and certain other foods are browned.” *Id.*  
8 The State further permitted the chip warning to say the “FDA has not advised people to stop  
9 eating potato crisps and/or potato chips . . . or any foods containing acrylamide as a result of  
10 cooking.” *Id.*

11 The penalties under California law for a failure to warn are “severe.” *Deukmejian*,  
12 212 Cal. App. 3d at 430. Violations are subject to civil penalties of up to \$2,500 “per day for  
13 each violation.” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25249.7(b)(1). Proposition 65 also permits  
14 injunctions against both existing violations and conditions “in which there is a substantial  
15 probability that a violation will occur.” . *See id.* §§ 25249.7(a), 25249.11(e). State and local  
16 prosecutors can bring enforcement actions for failures to warn, *id.* § 25249.7(c), as can private  
17 litigants, *see id.* § 25249.7(d). Successful private enforcers can recover a quarter of the civil  
18 penalty imposed and their reasonable attorneys’ fees. *See id.* § 25249.12(d); Cal. Civ. P. Code  
19 § 1021.5.

20 Proposition 65 does include some safeguards against overzealous or frivolous private  
21 enforcement. For example, a private litigant must give sixty days’ notice of the alleged violation  
22 both to the alleged violator and to the prosecutor in whose jurisdiction the violation is alleged.  
23 *See id.* § 25249.7(d)(1). That notice must include a “certificate of merit” stating the private  
24 enforcer “has consulted with one or more persons with relevant and appropriate experience or  
25 expertise who has reviewed facts, studies, or other data regarding the exposure to the listed  
26 chemical.” *Id.* The certificate must then confirm the private enforcer believes “there is a  
27 reasonable and meritorious case for the private action.” *Id.*

28 //

1 The warning requirement is also subject to exceptions and affirmative defenses.  
2 Proposition 65 grants businesses an affirmative defense if they can prove the alleged exposure  
3 “poses no significant risk assuming lifetime exposure at the level in question.” *See* Cal. Health &  
4 Safety Code § 25249.10(c). The defendant must prove that fact using “evidence and standards of  
5 comparable scientific validity” to the evidence and standards that led to the inclusion of that  
6 substance on the Proposition 65 list. *See id.* A business can also make that showing preemptively  
7 in a declaratory judgment action. *See Baxter*, 120 Cal. App. 4th at 344. Under the terms of this  
8 exception, the California Office of Environmental Health Hazards Assessment has determined  
9 that an exposure of 0.2 micrograms of acrylamide per day “poses no significant risk.” *See* Cal.  
10 Code Regs. tit. 27, § 25705(c)(2). That Office has also published regulations permitting higher  
11 levels of exposure in some circumstances, including when “chemicals in food are produced by  
12 cooking necessary to render the food palatable or to avoid microbial contamination.” *Id.*  
13 ¶ 25703(b)(1). A business can also ask the Office for a formal opinion about whether a warning  
14 is necessary (a “safe use determination”). *See* Cal. Code Regs. tit. 27, § 25204. And finally, as is  
15 clear from the record on this matter, businesses could urge the Office to create an exception for a  
16 specific food or drink as it did for acrylamide in coffee.

17 Despite these safeguards and exceptions, a successful defense might be impossible to  
18 mount, practically speaking. It is a defendant’s burden to prove an exposure poses no significant  
19 risk under section 25249.10(c), so a plaintiff need not plead or prove that an exposure did or  
20 could cause cancer. *See Consumer Defense Group v. Rental Housing Industry Members*, 137 Cal.  
21 App. 4th 1185, 1214–15 (2006). And given the high standard of scientific proof required by  
22 section 25249.10(c), “it may take a full scale scientific study to establish the amount of the  
23 carcinogen is so low that there is no need for a warning.” *Id.* at 1215. One state appellate court  
24 has observed that this allocation of burdens, when combined with other provisions of the private  
25 enforcement regime, sets up a framework that may permit unscrupulous attorneys to “shake  
26 down” vulnerable targets” wielding dubious claims of carcinogenic exposure. *See id.* at 1215–19.

27 Acrylamide was added to the Proposition 65 list in 1990, long before the publication of  
28 research showing acrylamide was present in food. *See* Norris Decl. Ex. L at 2. After acrylamide

1 was discovered in food, CERT—the intervenor defendant in this case—was one of the first  
2 plaintiffs to file a private enforcement action. *See Metzger Decl.* ¶ 5, ECF No. 93. Its early  
3 lawsuits resulted in consent judgments in Los Angeles County Superior Court. *Id.* French fry  
4 manufacturers agreed to display warnings, potato chip manufacturers agreed to reduce acrylamide  
5 levels in chips, and the defendants paid more than \$2 million in penalties and attorneys’ fees.  
6 *See id.*

7 CERT also pursued Proposition 65 litigation through multiple cases against coffee roasters  
8 and retailers after the California Office of Environmental Health Hazards Assessment published  
9 opinions about the risks of acrylamide in coffee. *See id.* ¶¶ 6–13; *see also* Cal. Off. of Env’tl  
10 Health Hazards Assessment, “Characterization of Acrylamide Intake from Certain Foods at 11–  
11 12 (Mar. 2005).<sup>12</sup> These cases were consolidated and tried in several phases. *See Metzger Decl.*  
12 ¶¶ 10–13; *Norris Decl.* ¶¶ 5, 12–15. Some of the defendants settled after unsuccessfully  
13 attempting to prove exposures to acrylamide in coffee did not elevate the risk of cancer and to  
14 show Proposition 65 was unconstitutional because it compelled false cancer warnings. *See*  
15 *Metzer Decl.* ¶ 12. CERT secured an award of more than \$1.8 million in attorneys’ fees. *Id.*  
16 Other defendants continued in the litigation. While the case was still pending, the Office of  
17 Environmental Health Hazards Assessment proposed to change its Proposition 65 regulations to  
18 make an exception for coffee. The FDA supported the proposed change. *See supra* *Gottlieb*  
19 *Statement*, ECF No. 95-10. The exception was eventually adopted, as described above. On the  
20 coffee roasters’ and retailers’ motion, the California court then granted summary judgment to the  
21 defendants remaining in the case, and CERT appealed. *See Metzger Decl.* ¶ 14; *Norris Decl.* ¶ 5  
22 & Ex. Q. The appeal is pending, as are many other private enforcement actions about acrylamide  
23 in food, which have multiplied in recent years. *See Sixth Not.*, ECF No. 111.

24 The Chamber of Commerce filed this case in October 2019 while the coffee litigation was  
25 ongoing. Its legal claim is simple: the First Amendment prohibits California from forcing  
26 businesses to make false statements, so because California does not “know” that eating food with

---

<sup>12</sup> <https://oehha.ca.gov/media/downloads/crn/acrylamideintakereport.pdf>, last visited Mar. 24, 2021.

1 acrylamide causes cancer in people, Proposition 65 is unconstitutional if it mandates that  
2 assertion. *See generally* Compl., ECF No. 1. The Chamber named one defendant, the Attorney  
3 General in his official capacity, and asserted one claim for declaratory relief. *See id.* ¶¶ 13, 73–  
4 84. CERT moved to intervene as a defendant, and the court approved the parties’ stipulation to  
5 permit the intervention. *See* Stip. & Order, ECF No. 29. The court then granted the State’s and  
6 CERT’s motions to dismiss. *See* Order, ECF No. 56. It declined to assert jurisdiction over the  
7 Chamber’s claim in light of the pending litigation in state court, described above. *See id.* at 3–6  
8 (applying *Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co.*, 316 U.S. 491 (1942)). The Chamber’s request for relief  
9 was also partially retrospective, so the court found dismissal was appropriate under the Anti-  
10 Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. *See id.* at 6–8.

11 The Chamber then amended its complaint to add a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to  
12 request only prospective relief. *See* First Am. Compl., ECF No. 57. California and CERT both  
13 moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and under the abstention doctrine  
14 described in *Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States*, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).  
15 The court denied these motions. ECF No. 84. The case is thus proceeding on the First Amended  
16 Complaint, ECF No. 57, which again names only the Attorney General as a defendant, with  
17 CERT remaining a defendant in intervention.

18 The Chamber now asks the court to enter a preliminary injunction. Chamber’s Mot., ECF  
19 Nos. 95 & 95-1. CERT has moved for summary judgment to the extent the Chamber’s claims  
20 would prohibit private enforcement of Proposition 65. CERT Mot., ECF No. 93. CERT argues  
21 those claims are barred by the *Noerr–Pennington* doctrine. *See E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr*  
22 *Motor Freight, Inc.*, 365 U.S. 127 (1961); *United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington*, 381 U.S.  
23 657 (1965). The court addresses CERT’s motion first.

## 24 **II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

25 A court may grant summary judgment only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any  
26 material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
27 Here, the parties dispute none of the relevant facts. CERT’s motion rests on a legal question:

28 //

1 whether the Chamber’s claims are barred by the *Noerr–Pennington* doctrine because those claims  
2 burden CERT’s First Amendment right to petition.

3 “Under the *Noerr–Pennington* doctrine, those who petition all departments of the  
4 government for redress are generally immune from liability.” *Empress LLC v. City & Cty. of San*  
5 *Francisco*, 419 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005). “Although the *Noerr–Pennington* doctrine  
6 originally immunized individuals and entities from antitrust liability, *Noerr–Pennington*  
7 immunity now applies to claims under § 1983 that are based on the petitioning of public  
8 authorities.” *Id.* It also protects “conduct incidental to the prosecution of the suit,” such as  
9 demand letters and related prelitigation communications. *Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc.*, 437 F.3d 923,  
10 935–36 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). In practical effect, however, the doctrine is one of  
11 constitutional avoidance: courts should “construe federal statutes so as to avoid burdening  
12 conduct that implicates the protections afforded by the Petition Clause unless the statute clearly  
13 provides otherwise.” *Id.* at 931.

14 The Ninth Circuit has derived a three-step “analysis” for evaluating *Noerr–Pennington*  
15 defenses from the Supreme Court’s decision in *BE & K Construction Co. v. NLRB*, 536 U.S. 516  
16 (2002). *See Sosa*, 437 F.3d at 930–31. First, would an adverse decision impose a burden on the  
17 defendant’s alleged petitioning activity? Second, is there at least a “substantial question” whether  
18 the statute that imposes this burden conflicts with the Constitution? And third, can the statute be  
19 construed in a way to avoid the burden? If so, then that construction should prevail; if not, then  
20 the court must decide whether the statute cannot be enforced because it would deprive the  
21 defendant of a constitutional right.

22 This analysis is easier to understand when expressed in more concrete terms. In *Sosa*, for  
23 example, DirecTV had sent more than a hundred thousand demand letters to people who bought  
24 “smart cards” that allowed them to intercept DirecTV’s satellite signals without paying. *See id.* at  
25 926. Several of the recipients then sued DirecTV for extortion and unfair business practices in  
26 California state court, and DirecTV successfully moved to strike the complaint. *Id.* at 927. Some  
27 of the unsuccessful state-court plaintiffs then filed a lawsuit in federal district court, claiming  
28 DirecTV had violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. *Id.* DirecTV

1 moved to dismiss, citing the *Noerr–Pennington* doctrine, and prevailed. *Id.* The Ninth Circuit  
2 affirmed. First, the federal lawsuit sought “to impose RICO liability on DirecTV for sending the  
3 demand letters,” so it burdened the petitioning activity, *id.* at 932–33; second, that burden  
4 implicated the Petition Clause, which at least arguably protects “reasonably based prelitigation  
5 settlement demands,” *id.* at 933–39; and third, the RICO statute could be interpreted to permit  
6 legitimate prelitigation demand letters. *Id.* at 939–42. For that reason, the Ninth Circuit  
7 concluded that the trial court had correctly dismissed the claims against DirecTV. *See id.* at 942.

8 Here, as in *Sosa*, the answer to the first question is clear. If the Chamber of Commerce  
9 ultimately succeeds in this lawsuit, CERT would no longer be able to enforce Proposition 65’s  
10 warning requirements against businesses that sell food and drink containing acrylamide. The  
11 Chamber’s claims thus impose a burden on CERT’s attempts to petition California courts.

12 But in answer to the second question, the burden imposed does not weigh on a right  
13 protected by the Petition Clause. The Petition Clause prohibits Congress from making laws that  
14 abridge “the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S.  
15 Const. First Am. The court is aware of no authority interpreting the First Amendment as  
16 preserving a person’s right to enforce a state law that contradicts the Constitution, which is the  
17 effect of CERT’s argument here. The court declines to read the Petition Clause as CERT would  
18 have it. Doing so would permit states to insulate their unconstitutional laws from constitutional  
19 challenges by permitting private parties to enforce them.

20 Another way to express this reasoning is in terms of liability, as the Chamber argues  
21 persuasively. It points out, for example, that CERT is not named in the Chamber’s complaint and  
22 will not face any liability if the Chamber prevails. *See Opp’n Summ. J.* at 6–12. The Chamber’s  
23 goal in this case is not to punish CERT. Nor is its purpose to obtain compensation for an injury  
24 CERT caused or to discourage CERT from petitioning for relief under Proposition 65. It is  
25 instead to vindicate the constitutional rights of the Chamber’s own members. The *Noerr–*  
26 *Pennington* doctrine is a defense against claims “based on the petitioning of public authorities,”  
27 *Empress LLC*, 419 F.3d at 1056, not claims based on the proponent’s own constitutional rights,  
28 *see Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Beccela’s Etc., LLC*, 403 F. Supp. 3d 813, 825 (N.D. Cal. 2019)

1 (“Defendants’ declaratory judgment claim is not seeking to hold [the plaintiff] liable for its  
2 protected activity . . . . [T]he claim seeks a declaration that *Defendants* are *not* liable for  
3 infringement under the Lanham Act. The claim thus is outside the ambit of *Noerr–Pennington*.”  
4 (emphasis in original)). The *Noerr–Pennington* defense is thus unavailable to CERT.

5 This is not to say the *Noerr–Pennington* doctrine never offers a defense to requests for  
6 equitable relief, including in a declaratory judgment action. “[A]n action seeking a declaratory  
7 judgment . . . may force a citizen who petitions the government to incur the expense of defending  
8 his position in court and may therefore have precisely the sort of chilling effect on protected  
9 petitioning activity that the *Noerr–Pennington* doctrine is designed to prevent.” *Westlands Water*  
10 *Dist. Distribution Dist. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 276 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1054 (E.D. Cal.  
11 2003). This court’s decision in *B&G Foods North America, Inc. v. Embry* is a rare example of  
12 exactly such a case. *See* No. 20-0526, 2020 WL 5944330 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2020). The plaintiff  
13 in *B&G Foods*, a food manufacturer, sued a consumer who had herself filed a Proposition 65  
14 enforcement action in state court the day before. *See generally* Compl., No. 20-0526 (E.D. Cal.  
15 filed Mar. 6, 2020).<sup>13</sup> The food manufacturer even sued the attorney who was representing the  
16 consumer in state court. *See id.* As a result, the federal lawsuit’s burden on the defendant’s right  
17 to petition was clear even though the claims were, on their face, equitable constitutional claims.  
18 Here, by contrast, the Chamber is not litigating concurrently against CERT in state court, did not  
19 sue CERT or CERT’s attorneys, and did not even name CERT in its complaint. CERT became a  
20 defendant by its own choice when it moved to intervene.

21 Granting CERT’s motion could also lead to an absurd result. The State does not argue it  
22 is entitled to a defense under the *Noerr–Pennington* doctrine. CERT implies the State would  
23 remain a defendant in this case even if CERT is entitled to summary judgment. *See* Reply Summ.  
24 J. at 2, ECF No. 105 (suggesting Chamber of Commerce “could litigate solely against [Attorney  
25 General] Becerra”). If this implication were correct, CERT and others would be free to pursue

---

<sup>13</sup> The court takes judicial notice of this document, its filing, and its allegations (but not their truth). *See Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc.*, 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record.”).



1 private enforcement actions, but this case could continue. And if the Chamber eventually  
2 prevailed, the State itself could not enforce Proposition 65. This would leave consumers free to  
3 file enforcement actions even though the same enforcement actions would be unconstitutional if  
4 filed by the State. CERT has cited no authority that could justify such an improbable outcome,  
5 and the court is aware of none. If anything, California law appears to favor public enforcement of  
6 Proposition 65, not private enforcement, while not precluding the latter. *See, e.g., Yeroushalmi v.*  
7 *Miramar Sheraton*, 88 Cal. App. 4th 738, 750 (2001) (concluding that Proposition 65 notice  
8 letters are intended to encourage public enforcement).

9 CERT is not entitled to a defense under the *Noerr–Pennington* doctrine. Its motion for  
10 summary judgment is denied.

### 11 **III. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

12 The Chamber of Commerce moves for a preliminary injunction barring the State and any  
13 private litigant from enforcing Proposition 65 against businesses who do not warn consumers that  
14 acrylamide in food is “known to the State of California to cause cancer.” It seeks prospective  
15 relief only; it asks the court to enjoin only “new lawsuits.” *See* Chamber’s Mot. at 20. It does not  
16 ask the court to prohibit notices of alleged Proposition 65 violations, to enjoin existing suits, to  
17 prohibit settlements or consent decrees, or to bar CERT from continuing its litigation about  
18 acrylamide in coffee. *See* Chamber’s Reply at 14–15.

19 The State and CERT both oppose the motion. Each argues separately that the Chamber  
20 has not met its obligation to show a preliminary injunction should be granted under the test in  
21 *Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7 (2008). *See* Cal. Opp’n at 9–20,  
22 ECF No. 101; CERT Opp’n at 17, ECF No. 100. CERT also contends, more ardently, that a  
23 preliminary injunction would be an unconstitutional prior restraint on its First Amendment rights.  
24 *See* CERT Opp’n at 8–16. The court addresses that argument first.

#### 25 **A. Prior Restraint**

26 A “prior” or “previous” restraint is an administrative or judicial order “forbidding certain  
27 communications” before those communications occur. *Alexander v. United States*, 509 U.S. 544,  
28 550 (1993) (citation, quotation marks, and emphasis omitted). Preliminary injunctions barring

1 speech “are classic examples of prior restraints.” *Id.* They are almost always improper; the  
2 Supreme Court has described the “constitutional freedom from previous restraint” as an  
3 “immunity” against “censorship” rooted deeply in American and English legal history. *See Near*  
4 *v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson*, 283 U.S. 697, 716, 720 (1931). There is “a heavy  
5 presumption” against the validity of a prior restraint on speech. *Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe*,  
6 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

7 Not all orders that make expression more difficult, expensive, or less effective are prior  
8 restraints. An order forfeiting a publisher’s assets, for example, is not a prior restraint even if it  
9 prevents the publisher from selling its magazines. *See Alexander*, 509 U.S. at 550–51. If the  
10 publisher could find new funding, it could continue publishing. *See id.* at 551. Nor is an order  
11 closing a bookstore necessarily a prior restraint. *See Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.*, 478 U.S. 697,  
12 706–07 (1986). The store could move to a new building. *See id.* at 706.

13 If the Chamber of Commerce were requesting a preliminary injunction against pre-suit  
14 demand letters, settlement negotiations, or notices of violations, it would likely be requesting a  
15 prior restraint. These are “communications” under *Alexander*, 509 U.S. at 550. But the Chamber  
16 is not asking for that relief. As confirmed at hearing, at this stage it is asking only for an  
17 injunction against future lawsuits while this case is pending. An injunction barring enforcement  
18 through litigation would admittedly dull the teeth of a demand letter or notice for the injunction’s  
19 duration. Without a legal threat, a recipient may not negotiate or even respond. But the  
20 injunction the Chamber requests today would not forbid letters and demands, so it would not be a  
21 prior restraint on speech. *See id.* at 550–51 (holding that order was not prior restraint because it  
22 did not “*forbid* petitioner from engaging in any expressive activities in the future” (emphasis in  
23 original)). The court need not and does not consider now whether some broader or more  
24 permanent form of relief might be an unconstitutional prior restraint.

25 What remains, then, is CERT’s argument that a preliminary injunction against future  
26 enforcement actions and nothing more would still be an impermissible prior restraint. CERT cites  
27 no decision denying a preliminary injunction against likely unconstitutional private litigation  
28 because the injunction would amount to a prior restraint. This court’s own searches have

1 uncovered no such case. To the contrary, the All Writs Act permits federal courts to “issue all  
2 writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions,” 28 U.S.C. § 1651, and the  
3 Anti-Injunction Act permits “injunctions against the institution of state court proceedings,”  
4 *Dombrowski v. Pfister*, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965), which implies that a federal court may  
5 enjoin new state court lawsuits if necessary and appropriate, *see, e.g., In re Baldwin-United*  
6 *Corp.*, 770 F.2d 328, 335–36 (2d Cir. 1985). Federal courts have indeed enjoined lawsuits  
7 preemptively in many circumstances, for example to quiet post-settlement donnybrooks,<sup>14</sup> to  
8 resolve class actions<sup>15</sup> and multidistrict litigation,<sup>16</sup> to consolidate admiralty claims in a single  
9 venue,<sup>17</sup> and to sanction vexatious litigants or prevent frivolous lawsuits,<sup>18</sup> among other reasons.<sup>19</sup>  
10 In rare circumstances, district courts in this circuit can even enjoin a litigant from pursuing claims  
11 in another country.<sup>20</sup>

---

<sup>14</sup> *See, e.g., Flanagan v. Arnaiz*, 143 F.3d 540, 544–45 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming injunction against “filing any action in the courts of any state” related to settlement agreement because “federal injunctive relief may be necessary to prevent a state court from so interfering with a federal court’s consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair the federal court’s flexibility and authority to decide that case.” (quoting *Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. B’hood of Locomotive Eng’rs*, 398 U.S. 281, 295 (1970))).

<sup>15</sup> *See, e.g., Nitsch v. Dreamworks Animation SKG Inc.*, No. 14-04062, 2016 WL 4424965, at \*8 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2016) (enjoining any lawsuits by members of proposed settlement class).

<sup>16</sup> *See, e.g., Baldwin-United*, 770 F.2d at 331 (affirming injunction against “persons having actual knowledge of” injunction from “commencing any action or proceeding” against any defendants in multidistrict litigation that “may in any way affect the right of any plaintiff or purported class member in any proceeding under” multidistrict litigation).

<sup>17</sup> *See, e.g., In re Complaint of Ross Island Sand & Gravel*, 226 F.3d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (describing Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 183, which permits district courts to enjoin related actions against owner of vessel).

<sup>18</sup> *See, e.g., Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc.*, 705 F.2d 1515, 1523 (9th Cir. 1983) (“A United States District Court hearing a particular case possesses the power to enjoin the filing of related lawsuits in other federal courts.”); *De Long v. Hennessey*, 912 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[T]here is strong precedent establishing the inherent power of federal courts to regulate the activities of abusive litigants by imposing carefully tailored restrictions under the appropriate circumstances.” (citation omitted)).

<sup>19</sup> *See, e.g., Orange Cty. v. Air California*, 799 F.2d 535, 537 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming district court’s decision to bar intervention after explaining the district court had enjoined “filing [of] new CEQA actions in state court”).

<sup>20</sup> *See, e.g., Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. Nat’l Hockey League*, 652 F.2d 852, 855 (9th Cir. 1981) (“A federal district court with jurisdiction over the parties has the power to enjoin

1 That said, the Supreme Court has suggested that “enjoining a lawsuit could be  
 2 characterized as a prior restraint.” *BE & K*, 536 U.S. at 530. An injunction against future  
 3 litigation “carries at least some risk” of violating the First Amendment’s Petition Clause. *Jones v.*  
 4 *Rd. Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669, U.A., AFL-CIO*, No. 13-3015, 2013 WL 5539291, at  
 5 \*2 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2013). In this respect, CERT’s prior restraint argument echoes its *Noerr–*  
 6 *Pennington* argument. Both rest on CERT’s claim to a First Amendment right to pursue  
 7 Proposition 65 litigation in state court regardless of any constitutional implications of that  
 8 litigation. As explained in the previous section, CERT’s argument leads to an absurd conclusion.  
 9 In addition, if the Chamber is correct that Proposition 65 lawsuits about acrylamide in food are  
 10 inconsistent with the First Amendment, private enforcement actions targeting acrylamide would  
 11 run head-on into a constitutional prohibition. And “if the lawsuit seeking to be enjoined ‘has an  
 12 illegal objective,’ it is ‘not protected by the Petition Clause.’” *Id.* (quoting *Small v. Operative*  
 13 *Plasters’ Local 200*, 611 F.3d 483, 493 (9th Cir. 2010), in context of retaliatory labor claims); *see*  
 14 *also Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB*, 461 U.S. 731, 737 n.5 (1983) (holding that suit with “an  
 15 objective that is illegal” may be enjoined without violating First Amendment).

16 In sum, if the presumption against prior restraints protects a Petition Clause right to file  
 17 new lawsuits, it would not bar the relief the Chamber seeks here. The court thus considers  
 18 whether the Chamber is likely to succeed on the merits of its First Amendment claim.

19 **B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits**

20 “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, never awarded as of right.” *Winter*,  
 21 555 U.S. at 24. In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, courts must consider  
 22 (1) whether the moving party “is likely to succeed on the merits” (2) whether it is “likely to suffer  
 23 irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,” (3) whether “the balance of equities tips in  
 24 [its] favor, and” (4) whether “an injunction is in the public interest.” *Id.* at 20. The moving party

25 //

---

them from proceeding with an action in the courts of a foreign country, although the power  
 should be used sparingly.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)); *Sun World, Inc. v. Lizarazu*  
*Olivarria*, 804 F. Supp. 1264, 1270 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (same).

1 has the burden of proving an injunction is warranted by “a clear showing.” *See Mazurek v.*  
2 *Armstrong*, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (citation, quotation marks, and emphasis omitted)).

3 The court begins with Chamber’s potential for success on the merits of its First  
4 Amendment claim. “The First Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth  
5 Amendment, prohibits laws that abridge the freedom of speech.” *Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life*  
6 *Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra*, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018). Laws that target speech “based on  
7 its communicative content” are unconstitutional unless the government shows the laws survive  
8 strict scrutiny in that they are “narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.” *Reed v.*  
9 *Town of Gilbert, Ariz.*, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015). The government must also satisfy this test  
10 when it compels people to say something they would not otherwise say, as Proposition 65 does  
11 here, because these types of regulations necessarily change what a person says. *See NIFLA*, 138  
12 S. Ct. at 2371; *Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N. Carolina, Inc.*, 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988).

13 Although strict scrutiny is the “ordinary” rule in such cases, the Supreme Court has  
14 sometimes “applied a lower level of scrutiny” to regulations of commercial speech. *NIFLA*,  
15 138 S. Ct. at 2372. “Commercial speech” is “expression related solely to the economic interests  
16 of the speaker and its audience.” *Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New*  
17 *York*, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). Under *Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel*, “the  
18 government may compel truthful disclosure in commercial speech as long as the compelled  
19 disclosure is ‘reasonably related’ to a substantial governmental interest.” *CTIA—The Wireless*  
20 *Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, Cal.*, 928 F.3d 832, 845 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 140 S. Ct. 658 (2019)  
21 (quoting 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)). The required disclosure must be “limited to ‘purely factual  
22 and uncontroversial information.’” *NIFLA*, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (quoting *Zauderer*, 471 U.S. at  
23 651). Although *Zauderer* itself concerned the government’s interest in preventing deception, *see*  
24 471 U.S. at 651, the Ninth Circuit has held that the *Zauderer* test also applies when “the  
25 disclosure does not protect against deceptive speech,” *CTIA*, 928 F.3d at 843–44.

26 The parties agree Proposition 65 compels commercial speech. *See Cal. Opp’n* at 9 n.4;  
27 Chamber’s Mot. at 9. This leaves the court to decide whether, under *Zauderer*, the compelled  
28 warning (1) requires the disclosure of purely factual and uncontroversial information only, (2) is

1 justified and not unduly burdensome, and (3) is reasonably related to a substantial government  
2 interest. *See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of San Francisco*, 916 F.3d 749, 756 (9th Cir.  
3 2019) (en banc). The court may consider these requirements in any order. *See id.* The State  
4 bears the burden to show each element of this test is likely to be resolved in its favor, both in  
5 response to a motion for a preliminary injunction and on the merits. *See id.*; *Thalheimer v. City of*  
6 *San Diego*, 645 F.3d 1109, 1115–16 (9th Cir. 2011), *overruled in part on other grounds by Bd. of*  
7 *Trustees of Glazing Health & Welfare Tr. v. Chambers*, 941 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc).

8 In analyzing whether the Chamber is likely to succeed, the safe harbor warning described  
9 in the regulations implementing Proposition 65 is the natural place to start. In this case, the safe-  
10 harbor warning would read: “Consuming this product can expose you to [acrylamide], which is  
11 . . . known to the State of California to cause cancer. For more information go to  
12 [www.P65warnings.ca.gov/food](http://www.P65warnings.ca.gov/food).” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 27, § 25607.2(a)(2).

13 At this stage of the case, the State has not shown this warning is purely factual and  
14 uncontroversial. By asserting vaguely that consuming a product can “expose” a person to  
15 acrylamide—a chemical most people have likely never used in preparing food or even heard of—  
16 the warning implies incorrectly that acrylamide is an additive or ingredient. The safe harbor  
17 language is also only “factual” if consumers can discern its underlying logic:

- 18 • Animals more frequently develop cancerous tumors when they consume doses of  
19 the chemical many hundreds of times larger than the amounts in the food.
- 20 • Toxicologists presume that chemicals causing cancer in experimental animals also  
21 cause cancer in people, even in much smaller doses, absent evidence to the  
22 contrary, and
- 23 • As a result, following a cascade of self-referential state and federal regulations, the  
24 chemical is, by definition, “known” to cause cancer in humans. *See* Cal. Opp’n at  
25 12–13.

26 Such discernment is unlikely. People who read the safe harbor warning will probably believe that  
27 eating the food increases their personal risk of cancer. *See id.* at 2 (citing Nowlis Decl. ¶ 54, ECF  
28 No. 95-25).

1           Some evidence does support such an inference, including laboratory experiments with  
2 mice and rats, in vitro studies of human cells, and statistical investigations of tumor genomes.  
3 But dozens of epidemiological studies have failed to tie human cancer to a diet of food containing  
4 acrylamide. Nor have public health authorities advised people to eliminate acrylamide from their  
5 diets. They have at most voiced concern. California has also decided that coffee, one of the most  
6 common sources of acrylamide, actually reduces the risk of some cancers. And that decision  
7 rested in part on a review of epidemiological evidence similar to the evidence the Chamber cites  
8 now. *See* Norris Decl. Ex. N at 5. In short, the safe harbor warning is controversial because it  
9 elevates one side of a legitimately unresolved scientific debate about whether eating foods and  
10 drinks containing acrylamide increases the risk of cancer. *Cf. CTIA*, 928 F.3d at 845  
11 (distinguishing *NIFLA*, 138 S. Ct. at 2372).

12           The State cannot escape these uncertainties by redefining what it means for California to  
13 “know” that acrylamide causes cancer, *see Nat’l Ass’n of Manufacturers v. S.E.C.*, 800 F.3d 518,  
14 529–30 (D.C. Cir. 2015), or by showing the warning contains no affirmative falsehoods, *CTIA—*  
15 *The Wireless Ass’n v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, Cal.*, 827 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1062–63 (N.D.  
16 Cal. 2011), *aff’d in relevant part*, 494 F. App’x 752 (9th Cir. 2012) (unpublished). Statements  
17 are not necessarily factual and uncontroversial just because they are technically true. Courts in  
18 this Circuit have reached that conclusion many times with respect to Proposition 65 and other  
19 regulations. Another judge of this court recently enjoined a Proposition 65 warning about what  
20 was “known” to California because the warning was only correct if the reader understood the  
21 “complex web of statutes, regulations, and court decisions” behind Proposition 65. *Nat’l Ass’n of*  
22 *Wheat Growers v. Becerra*, 468 F. Supp. 3d 1247, 1259–60 (E.D. Cal. 2020). A Northern  
23 District court found similarly that a warning about radiation from cell phones went too far  
24 because it could leave “the uninitiated” with a “misleading impression” about the dangers they  
25 actually faced. *CTIA*, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 1062–63. And the Ninth Circuit rejected California’s  
26 argument that a label about a video game age ratings was uncontroversial and factual because the  
27 scheme invited incorrect conclusions about what was legal and what was not. *See Video Software*  
28 */////*

1 *Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger*, 556 F.3d 950, 966–67 (9th Cir. 2009), *aff’d sub nom. Brown v.*  
2 *Entm’t Merchants Ass’n*, 564 U.S. 786 (2011).

3 The problems posed by the safe harbor warning could have been avoided. The State could  
4 allow businesses to explain that acrylamide forms naturally when some foods are prepared. It  
5 could permit businesses to say that California has listed acrylamide as a chemical that “probably”  
6 causes cancer or is a “likely” carcinogen or that the chemical causes cancer in laboratory animals.  
7 It could permit businesses to say that acrylamide is commonly found in many foods and that  
8 neither the federal government nor California has advised people to cut acrylamide from their  
9 diets. The State indeed permitted a more circumspect warning as a result of the *Frito Lay*  
10 litigation. *See* Consent J. as to Frito-Lay at 10, Purtle Decl. Ex. E.

11 According to the State, an alternative warning along these lines is already available to any  
12 California business. *See* Cal. Opp’n at 15–16. And the Chamber concedes California regulations  
13 no longer require warnings to state that “the chemical in question is known to the state to cause  
14 cancer.” *See* Chamber’s Mot. at 5. The Attorney General’s current regulations also permit the  
15 parties to a private enforcement action to agree for a defendant to warn that a product “may”  
16 cause cancer. *See* Cal. Code Regs. tit. 11, § 3202(b).

17 Other regulations, by contrast, appear to contradict the State’s position. The Attorney  
18 General’s regulations do not permit warnings that the chemical itself “may” cause cancer. *See id.*  
19 Regulations bar all but a few limited additions and clarifications. *See* Cal. Code Regs. tit. 27  
20 § 25601(e); *id.* tit. 11 § 3202(b). California courts have overruled demurrers and denied motions  
21 for summary adjudication in enforcement actions about warnings similar to those the State  
22 accepted in the *Frito Lay* litigation, leading to years-long litigation. *See* Norris Decl. ¶¶ 34–41.  
23 Defending the resulting litigation can then be cost-prohibitive, as described above. As a result,  
24 when recent Proposition 65 settlements have resulted in an agreed warning, rather than, for  
25 example, a reformulation or cessation of business, they have almost uniformly used the safe  
26 harbor language that is likely misleading. *See id.* ¶¶ 17–23. On this basis, the Chamber argues  
27 that only the safe harbor warning is actually useable in practice. *See* Chamber’s Mot. at 11–12;  
28 Chamber’s Reply at 8–9, ECF No. 106.



1 On this record, the Chamber’s argument is persuasive. The State cannot “put the burden  
2 on commercial speakers to draft a warning that both protects their right not to speak and complies  
3 with Proposition 65.” *Wheat Growers*, 468 F. Supp. 3d at 1261. If the seas beyond the safe  
4 harbor are so perilous that no one risks a voyage, then the State has either compelled speech that  
5 is not purely factual, or its regulations impose an undue burden. *See Am. Beverage Ass’n*, 916  
6 F.3d at 757 (holding State did not carry its burden because warning “‘effectively rule[d] out the  
7 possibility of having an advertisement in the first place’” and that the disclosure “fail[ed] for that  
8 reason alone” (quoting and citing *NIFLA*, 138 S. Ct. at 2378 (other alterations omitted)); *cf. CTIA*,  
9 928 F.3d at 848 (finding disclosure regulation not unduly burdensome in part because it permitted  
10 businesses to disclose “additional information”). The State has not carried its burden to show  
11 Proposition 65 warnings about acrylamide in food are constitutional under *Zauderer*.

12 The State relies primarily on two cases to urge the opposite conclusion. Both are readily  
13 distinguishable from this one. First, it cites the Second Circuit’s decision in *National Electric*  
14 *Manufacturers’ Association v. Sorrell*, 272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001). The compelled speech at  
15 issue in that case was a Vermont statute requiring manufacturers to inform consumers if a product  
16 contained “mercury added during manufacture.” *Id.* at 107 n.1. The warning was required to  
17 “clearly inform the purchaser or consumer that mercury is present” and that the product “may not  
18 be disposed of . . . until the mercury is removed and reused, recycled, or otherwise managed.” *Id.*  
19 The statute did not appear to permit any private enforcement scheme analogous to that created by  
20 Proposition 65. *See id.* at 107–08. The Second Circuit agreed with Vermont that this warning did  
21 not violate the manufacturers’ First Amendment rights. *See id.* at 115–16. The manufacturers did  
22 not dispute that the warning was factual and uncontroversial under *Zauderer*. *See id.* The Second  
23 Circuit focused instead on the relationship between the warning and Vermont’s interest in  
24 reducing mercury pollution. *See id.* It found that relationship to be obvious. *Id.* at 115. Here, by  
25 contrast, the State has not shown that the safe-harbor acrylamide warning is purely factual and  
26 uncontroversial, and Proposition 65’s enforcement system can impose a heavy litigation burden  
27 on those who use alternative warnings.

28 /////

1           Second, the State relies on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in *CTIA v. City of Berkeley*, 928  
2 F.3d 832. Berkeley required cell phone retailers to give the following warning:

3           To assure safety, the Federal Government requires that cell phones meet radio-  
4 frequency (RF) exposure guidelines. If you carry or use your phone in a pants or  
5 shirt pocket or tucked into a bra when the phone is ON and connected to a wireless  
6 network, you may exceed the federal guidelines for exposure to RF radiation. Refer  
7 to the instructions in your phone or user manual for information about how to use  
8 your phone safely.

9           *Id.* at 838 (quoting Berkeley Mun. Code § 9.96.030(A) (2015)). The city permitted retailers to  
10 add “other information” to the warning at their discretion “as long as that information is distinct  
11 from the notice language.” *Id.* (quoting Berkeley Mun. Code § 9.96.030(B) (2015)). The  
12 plaintiffs argued that the warning was neither factual nor uncontroversial because it implied  
13 incorrectly that cell phones emit dangerous radiation. *See id.* at 846. The Ninth Circuit disagreed  
14 and upheld the warning under *Zauderer*. *See id.* at 843–49.

15           California’s acrylamide warning differs from Berkeley’s radiation warning in three ways  
16 that, on this record, show that the State’s warning is unlikely to survive the Chamber’s First  
17 Amendment challenge. First, here, although Berkeley’s warning hinted at potential dangers, for  
18 example by referring vaguely to “safety,” *cf. id.* at 853–55 (Friedland, J., dissenting), its text was  
19 a purely factual summary of federal regulation about radio frequency radiation. The cell phone  
20 retailers did not even argue that the radiation disclosure was “controversial as a result of  
21 disagreement about whether radio-frequency radiation can be dangerous to cell phone users.” *Id.*  
22 at 848. The State’s acrylamide warning language, by contrast, states without qualification that the  
23 acrylamide in the particular food identified is “known to cause cancer.” The truth of that  
24 statement is the subject of controversy. The State urges this court to draw a contrast between the  
25 hot political and moral controversy at issue in *NIFLA*, abortion, and the Chamber’s disagreement  
26 about whether acrylamide causes cancer, along the lines of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in *CTIA*.  
27 *See Opp’n Prelim. Inj.* at 14 (citing 928 F.3d at 845). The court declines to draw that distinction.  
28 A controversy may prevent *Zauderer* from applying even if it is not political. *See, e.g., Nat’l*  
29 *Ass’n of Mfrs.*, 800 F.3d at 530 (holding compelled warnings about whether mineral was “conflict  
30 free” were controversial).

1           Second, in *CTIA*, federal regulations had already required cell phone manufacturers to  
2 disclose the same or similar information as the Berkeley ordinance required of retailers. *See*  
3 928 F.3d at 840–41. Here, no other public health body has warned that acrylamide in food causes  
4 cancer in people or has even reached that conclusion. No regulatory or public health authority  
5 has advised against consuming foods with acrylamide.

6           Third, unlike the Berkeley ordinance, Proposition 65 does not permit businesses to add  
7 information to the required warning at their discretion, and thus prevents them from explaining  
8 their views on the true dangers of acrylamide in food. That prohibition exacerbates the effect of  
9 the warning. It threatens to “drown out” a business’s “messaging” addressing the claimed  
10 dangers of acrylamide in food. *See id.* at 849.

11           The court thus concludes the Chamber of Commerce is likely to show the acrylamide  
12 warning required by Proposition 65 is controversial and not purely factual. The warning is  
13 therefore unlikely to be permissible under *Zauderer*.

14           It is unclear whether a further analysis under some other more stringent constitutional test  
15 is necessary. On the one hand, in *American Beverage Association*, the Circuit held that the  
16 plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits immediately after deciding that the defendant had not  
17 carried its burden under *Zauderer*. *See* 961 F.3d at 757–58. But on the other hand, in a footnote,  
18 the Circuit suggested that an analysis under a “higher standard” was still necessary, although it  
19 left little doubt that if a claim does not meet the “lower standard” of *Zauderer*, it could not meet  
20 any “higher standard” either. *See id.* at 757 n.5. It is also unclear what that “higher standard”  
21 would be. The Chamber and the State both assume the correct test is the one described in *Central*  
22 *Hudson*. *See* Chamber’s Mot. at 16–18; State Opp’n at 16–17. But in *CTIA*, the Circuit made  
23 clear that “*Central Hudson*’s intermediate scrutiny test does not apply to compelled, as distinct  
24 from restricted or prohibited, commercial speech.” 928 F.3d at 842.

25           This court assumes without deciding that an analysis under a heightened standard of  
26 constitutional scrutiny is necessary and that the correct constitutional test is the “intermediate”  
27 level of scrutiny described in *Central Hudson*: “the government may restrict or prohibit  
28 commercial speech that is neither misleading nor connected to unlawful activity, as long as the

1 governmental interest in regulating the speech is substantial.” *CTIA*, 928 F.3d at 842 (citing  
2 447 U.S. at 564). “The restriction or prohibition must ‘directly advance the governmental interest  
3 asserted,’ and must not be ‘more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.’” *Id.* (quoting  
4 447 U.S. at 566).

5 “There is no question that protecting the health and safety of consumers is a substantial  
6 government interest.” *CTIA*, 928 F.3d at 845. California therefore has a substantial interest in  
7 protecting its citizens from substances that cause cancer. But at this stage of the litigation, the  
8 Chamber has shown the warning the State demands likely does not “directly advance” that  
9 interest and is “more extensive than necessary.” *Cent. Hudson*, 447 U.S. at 566. As discussed  
10 above, the safe harbor warning is incorrect, and it implies misleadingly that the science about the  
11 risks of food-borne acrylamide is settled. In setting the statewide rules applicable to all, state  
12 regulators have also rejected alternative, less controversial language than the safe harbor  
13 language. If a business decides not to use the safe harbor warning, it risks expensive and lengthy  
14 litigation against private enforcers or the State, and defendants carry heavy evidentiary burdens if  
15 they attempt to show their products contain permissibly small quantities of acrylamide. The State  
16 also has many alternatives to compelled private speech at its disposal. It can fund scientific  
17 research and pursue public awareness campaigns, for example. Regulators could also modify safe  
18 harbor warnings to eliminate inaccuracies and controversial statements.

19 The Chamber is thus likely to show the Proposition 65 acrylamide warning falls short of  
20 the *Central Hudson* test. If a law fails the “intermediate” test of *Central Hudson*, it also fails the  
21 more stringent test that applies to content-based restrictions in general. *See NIFLA*, 138 S. Ct. at  
22 2375. The Chamber is likely to succeed on the merits of its First Amendment claims.<sup>21</sup>

### 23 C. Harms and the Public Interest

24 A likelihood of success on the merits does not alone entitle the Chamber to a preliminary  
25 injunction. It must also show it would suffer irreparable harm if new Proposition 65 enforcement

26 //

---

<sup>21</sup> The court does not reach the Chamber’s facial challenge. *See Chambers Mem.* at 18.

1 actions can be filed while this lawsuit is pending and that this harm outweighs the State’s and the  
2 public’s interest in those enforcement actions. *See Winter*, 555 U.S. at 20.

3 “Irreparable harm is relatively easy to establish in a First Amendment case.” *CTIA*,  
4 928 F.3d at 851. Because the Chamber has a “colorable First Amendment claim,” it has  
5 demonstrated it “likely will suffer irreparable harm” if Proposition 65 warnings against  
6 acrylamide can be enforced while this litigation is pending. *Am. Bev. Ass’n*, 916 F.3d at 758.

7 California argues the Chamber cannot show it would suffer any irreparable harm because  
8 its members have known for so long that acrylamide is found in foods. *See State Opp’n* at 18–19.  
9 As the Chamber points out, however, its decision to file this lawsuit now is in response to a recent  
10 increase in private enforcement actions. *See Chamber’s Mot.* at 8 (“[S]ince [the Chamber] filed  
11 its complaint, private enforcers have served 391 pre-litigation notices and filed 43 new  
12 Proposition 65 lawsuits in state courts for alleged exposures to acrylamide in food.”); Chamber’s  
13 Reply at 12–13 (“In 2019 alone, there were 205 notices (up from 147 notices in 2018), and  
14 private enforcers show no signs of slowing down, serving more than 400 notices to date in  
15 2020.”); *see also* ECF Nos. 15, 37, 58, 86, 97, 111 (collecting new notices and private  
16 enforcement actions). The cases the State cites are also not comparable to this one. The Chamber  
17 of Commerce is not in the same position as a person who waits several months to assert a  
18 copyright claim after she finds the allegedly infringing video on the internet. *Cf. Garcia v.*  
19 *Google, Inc.*, 786 F.3d 733, 746 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). Nor is it in the position of a newspaper  
20 that inexplicably delays in asserting a claim that its rival stole its subscribers and harmed its  
21 reputation. *Cf. Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co.*, 762 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir.  
22 1985). And unlike the plaintiff in *Lydo*, the Chamber has shown it has likely suffered a First  
23 Amendment injury. *Cf. Lydo Enters. v. Las Vegas*, 745 F.2d 1211, 1213–14 (9th Cir. 1984).

24 As for the balance of harms and the public interest, although a state “suffers a form of  
25 irreparable injury” any time it is “enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes,” *New Motor*  
26 *Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co.*, 434 U.S. 1345, 1351 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., Circuit  
27 Justice), the Ninth Circuit has “consistently recognized the significant public interest in upholding  
28 First Amendment principles,” *Am. Bev. Ass’n*, 916 F.3d at 758 (quoting *Doe v. Harris*, 772 F.3d

1 563, 583 (9th Cir. 2014)). “[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s  
2 constitutional rights.” *Id.* (quoting *Melendres v. Arpaio*, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012)).

3 The injunction requested here is also quite narrow, as noted above. It leaves private parties and  
4 the State with many tools for increasing public awareness about the risks of acrylamide in foods.  
5 CERT and other private enforcers can send demand letters and notices of violations. They can  
6 litigate existing claims and pursue appeals. They can pursue public relations campaigns. They  
7 can fund research. They can buy advertisements.

8 The State argues a preliminary injunction would create uncertainty because businesses  
9 might argue it permits them to modify consent decrees already in place. *See* Cal. Opp’n at 20  
10 (citing *3750 E. Foothill Blvd., Inc. v. City of Pasadena*, 912 F. Supp 1257, 1260 (C.D. Cal. 1995)  
11 (explaining injunctions that “change the status quo are viewed with hesitancy and carry a heavy  
12 burden of persuasion” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). The Chamber does not request  
13 that relief, however. *See* Chamber’s Reply at 13. The court sees no reason to award it. This  
14 order does not alter existing consent decrees, settlements, or other agreements. For example, this  
15 order does not permit businesses that have already agreed to display a certain warning do take  
16 those warnings down, and businesses that have agreed to reformulate their products to reduce  
17 acrylamide content are not permitted by this order to breach those agreements.

18 Finally, the State cautions that enjoining an aspect of Proposition 65, even preliminarily,  
19 would invite challenges to other regulations about carcinogens and reproductive toxins. *See* Cal.  
20 Opp’n at 20; *see also Nat’l Elec. Mfrs.*, 272 F.3d at 116 (“Innumerable federal and state  
21 regulatory programs require the disclosure of product and other commercial information.”). The  
22 risk of misinterpretation or misuse of an order is not lost on this court. California has a  
23 substantial and likely compelling interest in protecting people from exposure to dangerous  
24 chemicals, including chemicals that have been shown to cause cancer or reproductive harm in  
25 experimental animals, even if epidemiological evidence is inconclusive. Health and safety  
26 warnings have “long been considered permissible.” *NIFLA*, 138 S. Ct. at 2376. The State may  
27 ultimately show the Chamber is not entitled to a permanent injunction. It may also move to

28 /////

1 dissolve the preliminary injunction, perhaps to permit the enforcement of alternative warnings.  
2 But given the record before the court at this juncture, these are questions for another day.

3 **IV. CONCLUSION**

4 The Chamber of Commerce’s motion for a preliminary injunction is **granted**. CERT’s  
5 motion for summary judgment is **denied**.


6 While this action is pending and until a further order of this court, no person may file or  
7 prosecute a new lawsuit to enforce the Proposition 65 warning requirement for cancer as applied  
8 to acrylamide in food and beverage products. This injunction applies to the requirement that any  
9 “person in the course of doing business” provide a “clear and reasonable warning” for cancer  
10 before “expos[ing] any individual to” acrylamide in food and beverage products under California  
11 Health & Safety Code § 25249.6. It applies to the Attorney General and his officers, employees,  
12 or agents, and all those in privity or acting in concert with those entities or individuals, including  
13 private enforcers under section 25249.7(d) of the California Health & Safety Code.

14 This order does not alter any existing consent decrees, settlements, or other agreements  
15 related to Proposition 65 warning requirements.

16 This order resolves ECF Nos. 93 and 95.

17 IT IS SO ORDERED.

18 DATED: March 29, 2021.  
19  
20

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE