Annual Report
2026

January 30, 2026

RACIAL AND IDENTITY PROFILING ADVISORY BOARD

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RONALDO "RONNIE" VILLEDA, Executive Director, Hoops 4 Justice; *Appointed by the Attorney General of California*

[*] *Denotes former Board members*

The RIPA Board would like to thank Attorney General Rob Bonta for his continued support of the work of the RIPA Board.

The RIPA Board would like to thank the following staff from the California Department of Justice for their assistance and contributions to this report:

The RIPA Board appreciates the participation of community members, advocates, members of law enforcement, researchers, and other stakeholders. Public participation is essential to this process, and the RIPA Board thanks all Californians who have attended meetings, submitted letters or emails, written reports, and articles, and otherwise engaged with the work of the Board. We look forward to continuing to receive the invaluable input from the public and welcome everyone to participate.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

California's Racial and Identity Profiling Act (RIPA) Advisory Board (Board) is pleased to release its ninth annual report in furtherance of its legislative mandate to eliminate racial and identity profiling and improve diversity and racial sensitivity in law enforcement. This year's report explores the relationship between racial and identity profiling and public safety and examines factors that may contribute to public safety.

The report analyzes approximately 5.1 million stops and 13,000 civilian complaints reported by 533 law enforcement agencies in 2024 to understand the extent and nature of racial and identity profiling in California. As shown in the 2026 Report, this data demonstrates, consistent with past reports, that racial and identity profiling in California remains a concern that must be addressed. The 2024 data show continued disparities in the number and nature of stops for individuals perceived as Black, Native American, and Hispanic/Latine(x), and a very low rate of sustained complaints of racial and identity profiling.

As discussed more fully in the 2026 Annual Report, the Board analyzes the most recent stop data and civilian complaint data to identify whether there are any trends relating to racial and identity profiling, and whether the data reveal systemic issues in need of reform. The Board's analysis covers a wide range of topic areas, including the effective use of civilian oversight agencies, the success of policies limiting pretextual stops, and the use of surveillance technologies, such as automated license plate readers. The report also includes an updated analysis of Senate Bill (SB) 2 officer decertification data collected by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST). Based on these analyses, the Board makes nine recommendations to the Legislature, local policymakers, POST, and civilian oversight agencies to address the disparities identified over the course of the Board's work.

The work of the Board is especially important in light of recent federal immigration enforcement actions. While RIPA prohibits racial and identity profiling in state and local law enforcement agencies, this prohibition does not apply to federal law enforcement officers. The absence of such restrictions on *federal* law enforcement highlights the vital need for the Board to assist *state and local* law enforcement law enforcement agencies to navigate the environment that our residents find themselves in, as well as ways to reduce or eliminate such profiling in state and local law enforcement agencies. In October 2025, the Board met to discuss these developments, review the duty to intervene when constitutional rights are violated, and explore ways to support state and local law enforcement officers in protecting California's diverse population, more than a quarter of whom are immigrants. The 2026 Annual Report reflects the Board's commitment to these and all California citizens, and to finding actionable, evidence-based solutions to reduce or eliminate racial and identity profiling within California.

Stop Data Analysis

The 2026 RIPA Report begins with an analysis of stop data collected by California law enforcement agencies during the 2024 calendar year. In total, 533 California law enforcement agencies conducted a total of 5,065,428 stops, representing an increase in the total number of stops but a decrease in the number of reporting agencies compared to 2023.[1] The vast majority of stops were officer-initiated stops (91.13% of all stops), as opposed to calls for service (8.87% of all stops). Most stops were initiated due to traffic violations (84.18% of stops), followed by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity (11.13% of all stops) and other reasons[2] (collectively, 4.69% of all stops).

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1   There are yearly fluctuations in the number of agencies that report RIPA stops for several reasons. For instance, some agencies are very small and do not have any stops to report, while other agencies fail to submit data by the reporting deadline.

2   When reporting the reason for a RIPA stop, officers must select from a list of ten options, including traffic violations and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(14).) For purposes of this report, "other reasons" is defined as the remaining eight reasons an officer can select as the "reason for stop," including: knowledge that the person stopped is on parole/probation/post-release community supervision/mandatory

Officers reported that they perceived most individuals stopped in 2024 to be Hispanic/Latine(x) (43.31% of people stopped), followed by White (31.28%), Black (12.09%), Asian (5.87%), Middle Eastern/South Asian (5.43%), Multiracial (1.23%), Pacific Islander (0.53%), and Native American (0.26%).

Percent of All Stops by Perceived Race/Ethnicity

Percent of All Stops

Comparing the perceived demographics of people stopped to the residential population demographics in California demonstrates notable disparities. For example, individuals perceived as Black were stopped 127.87% more often than expected, and individuals perceived as Pacific Islander were stopped 57.53% more often than expected, given the population of the State. These findings are roughly equivalent to the RIPA Board's findings in the 2025 Report.

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supervision; knowledge of outstanding arrest warrant/wanted person; investigation to determine if the person stopped is truant; consensual encounter and search; possible conduct warranting discipline under Education Code; determining if a student violated school policy; probable cause to arrest or search; and probable cause to take into custody under Welfare and Institution Code section 5150.

Stop Disparities by Perceived Race and Ethnicity

The Board noted additional disparities in actions taken during stops, with officers reporting taking the highest average number of actions in stops of individuals perceived to be Black and Native American. Officers reported taking no action most often during stops of individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian or Asian, and least often in stops of individuals perceived as Native American and Black. Compared to other perceived races and ethnicities, officers reported using force more often in stops of individuals perceived as Native American, Black, or Hispanic/Latine(x).

Most stops in 2024 resulted in a citation (46.96%), followed by a written or verbal warning (34.58%), and arrest (12.42%). Less than 6% of stops resulted in no action being taken. Officers reported the highest arrest rates for individuals perceived to be Native American (24.32%, 3,231 stops) and Black (16.41%, 100,500 stops), compared to the other perceived races or ethnicities. Officers also reported taking no action most often in stops of individuals perceived to be Black (7.24%, 44,322 stops) and Native American (6.91%, 918 stops), and least often in stops of individuals perceived to be Middle Eastern/South Asian (2.88%, 7,923 stops) and Asian (3.31%, 9,831 stops).

In addition to perceived race and ethnicity, this Report analyzes the reasons for stops, actions taken during stops, and outcome of stops by perceived gender, age, disability status, English fluency, sexual orientation, and, for the first time, perceived housing status. The 2024 data show notable disparities throughout stops of individuals perceived as unhoused. In particular, people perceived as unhoused were stopped for reasonable suspicion more than any other demographic group (64.80% of stops of individuals perceived as unhoused). Officers also reported taking more actions during stops of individuals perceived as unhoused, compared to other demographic groups, and reported more uses of force against individuals perceived as unhoused. Additionally, officers reported that nearly half of stops of individuals perceived as unhoused ended in arrest (47.32% of stops), meaning individuals perceived as unhoused were arrested more than any other demographic group.

The Report also contains several other analyses of the 2024 RIPA stop data, including:

- **Mode of travel** — An analysis of the mode of travel of people stopped (i.e., vehicle, bicycle, or pedestrian), showing that the experience of persons stopped varied between modes of transportation, with disparities across perceived race or ethnicity in the types of actions taken during stops and in search discovery rates depending on the mode of travel;

- **Consent searches** — An analysis of the frequency of consent searches, the reported bases of consent, and the discovery rate of consent searches, showing that:

  o Consent-only searches were most frequent in stops of individuals perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x) (15.12% of searches, 36,045 stops) and Asian (13.85%, 1,670 stops), and least common among individuals perceived as Native American (7.39%, 175 stops) and Black (9.39%, 9,042 stops);[3]

  o In general, consent searches yielded lower discovery rates (20.30%) than non-discretionary searches (26.40%); and

  o Officers reported the lowest discovery rates in consent searches of individuals perceived as Black (16.59%) and Native American (18.29%) and highest for individuals perceived as Pacific Islander (25.26%) and White (24.16%);

- **Officer-initiated stops vs. calls for service** — A comparison of stop outcomes for calls for service and officer-initiated stops, showing that, overall, arrests occur more frequently in stops initiated by a call for service (53.02% of calls for service stops, 238,201 stops) compared to stops that are officer-initiated (8.47% of officer-initiated stops, 391,124 officer-initiated stops);

- **The relationship between actions taken during a stop and the stop outcome** — An analysis of the relationship between actions within stops (a "co-occurrence" analysis), examining how different elements of a stop relate to one another across demographic groups. For example, while persons perceived to be Black are generally more likely to be arrested following a stop, persons perceived to be Black are searched and handcuffed significantly more than what would be expected even when considering the greater likelihood of arrest;

- *Terry* **frisks** — An analysis of the perceived demographics of *Terry* frisks[4] in 2024. The 2024 stop data show that officers performed *Terry* frisks in approximately 1.75% of all stops. They were conducted most frequently in stops of individuals perceived as Black and Hispanic/Latine(x). Among other demographic groups, *Terry* frisks were also most common for individuals perceived to be transgender men/boys, between the ages of 10-17, LGB+, or as having a disability, limited English fluency, or being unhoused.

- **Stop duration** — An analysis of the average duration of stops where no action was taken during the stop and where no action was taken as a result of the stop, broken down by perceived demographic (race/ethnicity, gender, age, disability, sexual orientation, housing status, and English fluency). In general, both types of stops were longest for individuals perceived to be Native American, Pacific Islander, transgender, 10-17 years old, or as having a disability, or being unhoused. People perceived as LGB+ or as having limited English fluency were stopped for roughly the same length of time as people perceived as straight when no action was taken during the stop, but were stopped longer when an action was taken as the result of the stop.

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3   Notably, and as mentioned in the Report, individuals perceived to be Asian have a lower chance of being *asked for consent* to search (1.19% of all stops, 3,523 stops) compared to individuals perceived to be Black (3.52% of all stops, 21,528 stops) or Hispanic/Latine(x) (3.39% of all stops, 74,295 stops).

4   A *Terry v. Ohio* pat/frisk (hereafter *Terry* frisk) is a weapons pat-down, occurring when an officer pats down an individual's clothing to determine whether based on the officer's reasonable suspicion the individual is armed. (See *Terry v. Ohio* (1968) 392 U.S. 1.)

- **Perceived English fluency** — An analysis of disparities based on perceived English fluency by perceived racial and identity group to better understand how language barriers may impact interactions with law enforcement. The Board's analysis is particularly relevant this year as it considers the impact of federal immigration enforcement actions on California citizens. In short, the 2024 stop data show that officers perceived individuals as having limited or no English fluency most frequently in stops of individuals perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x), Asian, cisgender men/boys, 1-9 years old, straight, or as having a disability or being unhoused.

- **Stop outcomes by agency and region** — An analysis of the RIPA stop data by agency and region to understand how agency and regional characteristics impact stops. The Board looks first at the intersections of race, region, and agency type, then at the intersections of actions taken during and because of stops by region, and finally uses of limited force by region and agency type. The 2024 stop data show, in part, that:

    o **Type of agency.** The perceived race or ethnicity of individuals stopped, rate of consent searches, and actions taken during stops varied by type of agency (i.e., police department, sheriff's department, K-12, college, etc.).

        ▪ Individuals perceived as Black, Hispanic/Latine(x), or White were also stopped at different rates depending on the type of agency. Individuals perceived as Black are overrepresented among stops for police, K-12 schools, and colleges, compared to sheriff's departments. Police departments tend to have a greater overrepresentation of stops of individuals perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x) than sheriff's departments, holding all else constant. On the other hand, college police departments tend to have a lower share of their stops occur for Hispanic/Latine(x) individuals than the percentage of their counties that are Hispanic/Latine(x).

        ▪ Consent-only searches only showed significant differences within agency type, not by region. Specifically, police departments, K-12 schools, colleges, and other agencies each had lower rates of consent-only search than sheriff's departments.

        ▪ Holding all else constant, police departments reported more stops where an action was taken compared to sheriff's departments in 2024.

    o **Agency size.** There was also variation in the perceived race or ethnicity of individuals stopped depending on agency size.

        ▪ Large police departments, regardless of type, stopped a disproportionate share of individuals perceived as Black. In addition, in larger departments, a larger share of their stops tended to be of individuals perceived as Black than the percentage of Black individuals in their counties.

        ▪ Larger police departments tended to report more stops where at least one action was taken.

        ▪ Larger police departments tended to use force in a larger share of cases, holding all else constant.

        ▪ Larger police departments tended to report a higher percentage of stops ending in arrest in 2024, holding agency and regional characteristics constant.

    o **Regional differences.** The Board also found significant differences in demographics of stops across regions as well.

        ▪ **Counties in Northern California and Southern California.** Individuals perceived as Black were stopped at a higher rate than their share of the population would predict most often in

the Bay area, while counties in Southern California tended to stop a disproportionately high number of individuals perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x), relative to their county populations. Counties in Northern California tended to stop a disproportionate share of individuals perceived as White, while areas of the Bay Area and further south tended to stop a disproportionately lower share of individuals perceived to be White.

- **Stops by county.** The number of actions taken during a stop varied widely across counties throughout the state. Arrest rates also varied widely across the entire state, with higher arrest rates in the Northern Coast compared to other areas of the state. However, consent searches were distributed fairly evenly across counties. With respect to uses of force, three counties on the Northern Coast (Trinity, Del Norte, and Humboldt) had the highest rates of stops featuring limited force (the most common type of force reported in 2024), each reporting limited force in over 30% of stops where force was used.

- **Population size.** Agencies in counties with a larger total share of Black population tended to see a greater overrepresentation in stops, though the effect is only slightly significant. In general, agencies in counties with larger populations tended to use force less frequently and tended to report a lower share of stops ending in arrest.

  On the other hand, agencies in micropolitan areas see individuals perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x)s underrepresented among their stops, compared to metropolitan statistical areas.[5] Additionally, agencies in counties within micropolitan statistical areas tended to report more stops where at least one action was taken, use force in a lower share of stops, and report higher arrest rates compared to agencies in metropolitan statistical areas.

- **Median income.** Agencies in counties with higher median incomes tended to stop individuals perceived as Black at a higher rate. In addition, agencies in counties that have higher median incomes also tended to use force at lower rates and report a lower share of stops ending in arrest than counties with lower median income.

Given the importance of the RIPA data, and the many analyses community members may be interested in, the Board concludes this chapter by recommending that the California DOJ create a RIPA data dashboard that is accessible to the public.

Civilian Complaints

This chapter of the report analyzes the number and outcome of civilian complaints received by California law enforcement agencies in 2024. In general, there was a decrease in the number of complaints received in 2024, despite a steady number of reporting agencies:

- A total of 13,004 complaints were reported by 526 law enforcement agencies in 2024, compared to 2023 when 526 agencies reported receiving 14,444 complaints.

- Approximately 17.5 percent of those complaints (2,282 complaints) contained allegations of racial or identity profiling, representing a sizeable increase from 2023 when approximately 9.7 percent of all complaints (1,405 complaints) contained allegations of racial or identity profiling.

- Most profiling complaints received in 2024 (1,803 complaints, or 79% of profiling complaints) alleged profiling on the basis of race or ethnicity.

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5   Metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas are defined by the United State Census Bureau. "Metropolitan statistical areas" are urbanized areas with a population of over 50,000 residents and the surrounding counties with strong commuting ties. "Micropolitan statistical areas" are urban clusters with 10,000-49,999 residents in that cluster, and the surrounding counties.

Notably, profiling complaints were sustained at a lower rate than general complaints — while approximately 9.64 percent of all complaints (939 complaints) were sustained, only 0.19 percent of profiling complaints (3 complaints) were sustained in 2024. This is consistent with, but slightly lower than, the rate of sustained profiling complaints in 2023 (0.32% of profiling complaints, or 4 profiling complaints, were sustained).

Disposition Distribution of 2024 Complaints

Total Complaints Reaching a Disposition in 2024

Racial and Identity Complaints Reaching a Disposition in 2024

The Board is concerned by the low number of sustained complaints—in particular, of profiling complaints—and intends take a closer look at RIPA agencies' internal processes for collecting, investigating, and deciding the outcome of these complaints in a future report, to determine what factors may be contributing to this disparity.

Deterrent Language in Complaint Forms

This chapter concludes with an update to the Board's prior recommendations to accept anonymous complaints and eliminate deterrent language in civilian complaint forms. Specifically, in past reports, the Board has expressed concern that Penal Code section 148.6, subdivision (a) — which directs law enforcement agencies to require that complainants read and sign a written statement advising, in part, that: "IF YOU MAKE A COMPLAINT AGAINST AN OFFICER KNOWING THAT IT IS FALSE, YOU CAN BE PROSECUTED ON A MISDEMEANOR CHARGE" (original emphasis) — may deter individuals from filing legitimate complaints against law enforcement. This year, the California Supreme Court found Penal Code section 148.6, subdivision (a) unconstitutional (*Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles*, Cal. Case No. S275272). Given the recency of this decision, the Board intends to examine its impact, and the potential need for further recommendations, in a future report.

State and Local Racial and Identity Profiling Policies

This year, the Policies chapter examines how racial and identity profiling by law enforcement impacts public safety. The Board defines public safety holistically as "the collective experience of being safeguarded or protected from threats to one's life or wellbeing," and explains ways in which racial and identity profiling can impact public safety (including impacts on public health, economic costs, and civic engagement). In short, research shows that discretionary investigative stops by law enforcement can lead to negative health consequences, which disproportionately impact communities of color; that racial and identity profiling can result in increased public costs, such as legal settlements or increased budgets to support a larger police presence, which may not lead to reform or a reduction in crime; and that negative, discretionary investigative stops by law enforcement can lead to feelings of mistrust, which in turn can lead to unwillingness to report crimes or participate as a witness in the criminal justice system. Each of these consequences can reduce a community's experience of public safety.

Next, this chapter examines how the practice of oversaturation policing, which has roots in racial profiling, can reduce public safety. After providing a brief overview of the nature and origins of oversaturation policing, the Board examines two mechanisms by which it is implemented: (1) alternative enforcement technologies; and (2) pretextual stops.

- **Alternative enforcement technologies.** First, the Board discusses how alternative enforcement technologies, such as automated license plate reader (ALPR) systems, gunshot detection devices, biometric technologies such as facial recognition, and predictive policing software have been presented as a means to reduce racial disparities in police encounters, but may actually exacerbate problems of bias in policing. For example, gunshot detection technology may exacerbate issues of over-policing, to the extent it is placed in areas that were previously deemed "high crime areas." Additionally, of note in light of the federal government's immigration raids in 2025, alternative enforcement technologies, such as ALPR data, may put certain communities at risk of over-policing and/or deportation. This section concludes by discussing the costs of alternative enforcement technologies, relative to their contributions to public safety.

- **Pretextual stops.** The Board then discusses how eliminating pretextual stops can improve public safety. Building on its past reports, the Board examines consent searches within traffic stops in 2024 by perceived race or ethnicity, and finds that, consistent with prior years, in 2024, officers asked for consent to search individuals perceived as Black and Hispanic/Latine(x) more frequently in traffic stops, compared to any other racial or ethnic group. And, as in prior years, searches of individuals perceived as Black based solely on consent were least likely to lead to the discovery of contraband, in comparison with consent-only searches of individuals of other racial and ethnic groups. The RIPA data suggest that pretextual stops do not lead to a reduction in crime and can instead negatively impact communities' experience of safety.

The Board expands on this analysis by examining some of the consequences, both direct and indirect, of pretextual stops, including officer shootings during traffic stops and in-direct deaths caused by police pursuits, then looking at the impact of policies limiting pretextual stops across different jurisdictions. Specifically, the Board identifies several jurisdictions that have introduced policies limiting pretextual stops (including San Francisco, Berkeley, and West Hollywood) and provides an updated review of policy changes limiting pretextual stops in Los Angeles, North Carolina, and Virginia. In short, research shows that the policies limiting pretextual stops in Los Angeles, North Carolina, and Virginia were effective, increasing public safety while at the same time reducing instances of racial and identity profiling. The demonstrated successes of these policies support the Board's recommendation to limit or eliminate pretextual stops in California.

Accountability

The Accountability chapter builds on past RIPA Reports to discuss the role of civilian oversight agencies in public safety and analyzes updated data regarding peace officer decertification actions under Senate Bill 2 (SB 2).

Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement

The chapter begins by providing an overview of the purposes of civilian oversight, its evolution over time, the modern types of civilian oversight agencies (COAs), and a landscape overview of civilian oversight in California, identifying which of the fifteen largest law enforcement agencies have civilian oversight bodies and what those bodies are empowered to do. The chapter also identifies potential strengths and weaknesses of each type of COA, including their impact on racial and identity disparities in law enforcement and feelings of public safety,[6] as well as general principles that may contribute to effective oversight and the elimination of racial and identity profiling by law enforcement.[7] Of note, the Report identifies that RIPA data is a standardized data set that could allow COAs to assess and improve policing practices related to racial and identity bias.

Board Recommendations for Civilian Oversight Agencies

Based on this discussion, the Board makes several recommendations to COAs to incorporate the elimination of racial and identity profiling into their mission, evaluate their structure in light of the principles of effective oversight, ensure that they have timely and unfettered access to RIPA stop data and complaint data, and analyze and monitor the data to identify areas for policy changes:

1. COAs should explicitly incorporate the elimination of racial and identity profiling as part of efforts to increase public safety.

2. COAs should assess whether they possess the qualities of an effective civilian oversight entity, particularly the features of a robust COA that correlate with the elimination of racial and identity group bias in both high- and low-discretion interactions and expand or implement those factors consistent with their own model.

3. COAs should have timely and unfettered access to their agency's RIPA data and citizen complaint data, both in relation to all vehicle and pedestrian stops and citizen complaints alleging racial and identity profiling, and other information related to the matter being reviewed, with all appropriate confidentiality protections in place.

4. COAs should analyze RIPA data to identify any racial and identity disparities in policing practices and, if any exist, propose changes to policies and practices aimed at remedying these disparities and continue to monitor those disparities over time.

5. COAs should develop additional ways to use the RIPA data in a way that is consistent with their model and mission and look for ways to strengthen their existing model.

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6   In general, research shows that all types of civilian oversight are correlated with decreased racial and identity disparities in high-discretion policing actions (such as disorderly conduct arrests). However, only more robust COAs (such as COAs with the authority to conduct independent investigations, make investigative findings, and recommend discipline) are correlated with decreased racial and identity disparities in low-discretion policing actions (such as police shootings of civilians).

7   Those principles include: (1) independence from law enforcement, political actors, or other special interests; (2) clearly defined and adequate jurisdiction and authority to achieve their organizational goals; (3) timely and adequate access to records and facilities; (4) full cooperation of the law enforcement agency overseen by the COA, to conduct investigations and obtain sufficient information; (5) sustained stakeholder support; (6) adequate funding and operational resources; (7) analysis of policies, patterns, and practices in relation to complaint investigations; and (8) confidentiality, anonymity, and protection from retaliation.

SB 2 Officer Decertification

The Accountability chapter then builds on last year's Report by providing updated analyses of SB 2 officer decertification actions, including new actions initiated in 2025. In short, the data show that:

From January 1, 2023, to December 1, 2025, POST received 41,586 reports of officer misconduct from law enforcement agencies and public complaints submitted directly to POST.

- Within those reports, there were 47,363 separate allegations of misconduct. Approximately 30.73 percent of those allegations pertained to a demonstration of bias. The remainder were for physical abuse/excessive force (41.01%), abuse of power (17.95%), dishonesty (8.60%), egregious or repeated acts that violate the law (7.64%), sexual assault (4.53%), conviction of a felony (1.63%), and other serious misconduct (1.79%).

- As of December 1, 2025, POST has initiated certification actions against 651 officers, including temporary suspensions that were later withdrawn. 285 of those include some described category of misconduct. Of those described categories of misconduct, 68.49 percent of decertification included egregious or repeated acts that violate the law and only 4.21 percent described demonstration of bias. The remaining misconduct described is for physical abuse/excessive force (12.98%), dishonesty (10.53%), sexual assault (9.12%), abuse of power (4.91%), and failure to cooperate (0.70%). An officer has never been suspended for participation in a law enforcement gang or failure to intercede when present and observing force that is clearly unnecessary.

- Since last year's Report, there has been significant progress in closing these cases. As of December 1, 2025, approximately 90 percent of cases have been assigned to POST investigators, 77.94 percent of which have been closed. By comparison, in 2023, only 20.64 percent of assigned cases had been closed.

The Board will continue to monitor trends in officer decertification actions in future reports.

POST Training and Recruitment

The POST chapter of this year's report provides updates on the Board's past recommendations to the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST), discusses the Board's participation in POST workshops related to the development of racial and identity profiling guidelines and the definition of "biased conduct" for purposes of officer decertification, and begins the Board's review of POST's Field Training Program.

Updates on the 2025 RIPA Recommendations

With respect to the Board's recommendations in the 2025 RIPA Report, the POST Commission partially agreed to two recommendations: first, to "[f]ormally evaluate Learning Domain (LD) 3, *Principled Policing in the Community*, and LD 42, *Cultural Diversity/Discrimination*, in the Regular Basic Course comprehensive module tests;" and second, to "[d]evelop guidelines to assist law enforcement agencies in developing procedures to conduct adequate investigations into complaints alleging bias and guidelines that assist law enforcement agencies with aligning their policies with Penal Code § 13510.8." This year, POST representatives updated the Board on the progress of implementing these recommendations during the development of this report and indicated, in short, that implementation is in progress. The Board will continue to monitor implementation of these recommendations.

Board Engagement with POST to Develop "Guidelines on Racial and Identity Profiling" and Define "Biased Conduct" for Purposes of Officer Certification

This report also provides an update on Board members' participation in POST workshops related to racial and identity profiling. RIPA Board members attended three workshops in 2024 and 2025, focused on the development of POST's Guidelines on Racial and Identity Profiling. Two of those workshops focused on the development of POST's "Guidelines on Racial and Identity Profiling," following the Board's 2023 recommendation to develop guidance for all POST trainings related to RIPA. POST hosted two workshops in 2024 to develop these guidelines, which Board members attended as subject matter experts. This year, in September 2025, POST informed the Board that it had revised and approved "Guidelines on Racial and Identity Profiling." While these guidelines demonstrate progress, the Board notes that it did not have an opportunity to review the final guidelines before they were presented to the POST Commission for approval. The Board looks forward to reviewing the final version of the guidelines and POST's implementation plan in its 2027 Report, to ensure that the guidelines apply broadly to all racial and identity profiling courses as the Board previously recommended. The Board also notes the importance of measuring course effectiveness and providing guidance to law enforcement agencies, and expresses interest in continuing to work with POST to explore ways to achieve these goals.

Board members attended a third POST workshop in 2025, focused on developing a definition of "biased conduct" for purposes of officer certification, pursuant to Assembly Bill 443. Board members worked with other attendees, largely consisting of law enforcement representatives, to define "biased conduct" as: "Any action or inaction by a peace officer, whether on duty or off-duty, that is motivated by bias, whether implicit or explicit, toward a person's actual or perceived protected class or characteristic(s)." Despite the consensus achieved at this workshop, the POST staff elected not to present this definition to the POST Commission for adoption and, instead, provided the Commission with two alternative definitions. The POST Commission ultimately adopted one of the alternative definitions, which provides that:

> Pursuant to Penal Code § 13510.6(a), when investigating any bias-related complaint or incident that involves possible indications of officer bias, a law enforcement agency shall determine whether the conduct being investigated constitutes 'biased conduct,' using the following definition:
>
> Biased conduct includes any conduct, including, but not limited to, conduct online, such as social media use, engaged in by a peace officer in any encounter with the public, first responders, or employees of criminal justice agencies, as defined in [Penal Code] § 13101, motivated by bias toward any person's protected class or characteristic, whether actual or perceived, that is described in subdivision (b) of Section 51 of the Civil Code.
>
> For purposes of this definition:
>
> (a) Biased conduct may result from implicit and explicit biases.
>
> (b) Conduct is biased if a reasonable person with the same training and experience would conclude, based upon the facts, that the officer's conduct resulted from bias towards that person's membership in a protected class described in paragraph (1) of Penal Code § 13510.6(a).
>
> (c) An officer need not admit biased or prejudiced intent for conduct to be determined to be biased conduct.

While the Board is disappointed that the POST Commission did not adopt the language and definition developed in the AB 443 workshop, it is hopeful that an explicit definition of "biased conduct" and revamped pre-employment background investigations involving bias assessments will help law enforcement agencies improve their decision-making in recruitment and reduce potential legal challenges

or reputational harm from hiring peace officers who then engage in prohibited conduct. The Board also hopes that consistency and transparency in internal affairs investigations regarding allegations of biased conduct will send a strong message that biased conduct will not be tolerated in LEAs, improve community trust and partnerships, and encourage officers to report biased conduct without fear of retaliation, contributing to a culture of accessibility and ethical behavior.

Review of the POST Field Training Program

This year, the Board began its two-year review of POST's Field Training Program (FTP). The FTP is a continuation of the Basic Academy intended to facilitate a peace officer's transition from the academic setting or custody assignment to the performance of uniformed patrol duties. According to POST, field training is "the most effective influence on the future direction of a department. The law enforcement department head and their field training staff must be certain that their FTP not only develops the necessary technical skills but also reflects the policing philosophy of the department and the community it serves."

POST's FTP covers at least 18 core "competency areas," including officer safety, use of force, report writing, search and seizure, crisis intervention, community relations, and more. It also includes components that relate to training about prohibitions on racial and identity profiling and the reduction or elimination of bias. New officers are assigned to a Field Training Officer (FTO) to engage in supervised field work and real-world policing scenarios through actual calls for service. The trainee's performance is evaluated by the FTO and monitored by the Field Training Program Supervisor, Administrator, or Coordinator (FTO SAC) through daily and/or weekly reviews.

Given the size and importance of POST's FTP, the Board will review this program over a two-year period. This year, the Board focuses on (a) the materials comprising POST's FTP, (b) the role of the FTO, and (c) research related to field training. The Report provides an overview of the FTP's purpose, requirements, structure, and materials. This overview was developed by DOJ experts Rebecca Hetey, Ph.D., and Retired Chief Daniel Hahn (Sacramento PD), who reviewed materials identified by POST, the RIPA statute and regulations, and alternative law enforcement FTP materials including best practices, manuals, and scholarly articles. Based on those materials, the experts developed a course-rating rubric, which RIPA Board members will use next year to record their independent reviews and comments on the FTP. The experts also developed field interview questions for law enforcement agencies who use POST's FTP materials, then interviewed representatives from a number of mid- and large-sized LEAs throughout California and POST representatives overseeing the FTP, to understand how the POST FTP guidelines are being implemented throughout the state. The 2026 Report summarizes this information and notes that Board members will review POST's FTP next year, with specific consideration as to: (1) what values the FTP teaches and whether they align with the goals of RIPA; (2) how well the FTP materials cover potential for bias and racial and identity profiling (including consideration of how trainees learn about bias-reducing police tactics and community engagement, and how trainees are evaluated on eliminating bias and engaging with the community); and (3) how well FTP materials and training align with academy training in LD 3 (Principled Policing in the Community) and LD 42 (Cultural Diversity/Discrimination).

The chapter concludes by noting that, to strengthen to Board's partnership with POST, RIPA Co-Chair Angela Sierra attended the September 9, 2025, POST Commission meeting to present an overview of RIPA, examples of findings in past Reports, and an overview of the current work of the Board related to the Field Training Program, and to take questions and receive input. Additionally, the Board will further collaborate with POST regarding requests for input on guidelines, regulations, and racial and identity profiling training courses being developed and updated, and the Board hopes to engage in more targeted outreach to law enforcement agencies and work with POST to provide better access to resources that will address concerns from LEAs about RIPA.[8]

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8   For example, law enforcement has repeatedly expressed concern that officers could be identified through RIPA data. However, officer identification numbers are unique identifying information (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a) (14)) and are redacted from publicly available RIPA data.

Legislative Update

The 2026 Report concludes with a brief update on legislation enacted in 2025 that may impact the Board's work towards eliminating racial and identity profiling by state and local law enforcement. In 2025, the California Legislature enacted one bill related to the Board's work.

Senate Bill No. 734 (2025-2026 Reg. Sess.) prohibits a peace officer from being subject to punitive actions or discipline based on a court finding under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (RJA) and would prohibit those court findings from being introduced for any purpose in any administrative appeal of a punitive action. SB 734 further prohibits the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) from decertifying a peace officer based on a court finding under the RJA. However, a peace officer may be subject to punitive action, discipline, or decertification because of the underlying conduct forming the basis of the court's finding, and agencies may consider the actions and evidence upon which the court relied in making a finding under the RJA when deciding whether to discipline or decertify an officer.

INTRODUCTION

California is the most diverse state in the nation. Over 67 percent of all Californians are people of color. California is also home to nearly 11 million immigrants — nearly 27 percent of our population, many of whom are people of color. In fact, diversity is central to California's values and is the source of our strength as a community. The State's diversity is also why we, the Racial and Identity Profiling Act (RIPA) Advisory Board, are deeply committed to ending racial and identity profiling in California. The concept that more than two-thirds of our state's citizens are at a heightened risk of racial profiling runs counter to the very fabric of what makes California great.

The enactment of RIPA in 2015 codified California's commitment to protecting our diverse communities by prohibiting racial and identity profiling by state and local law enforcement. To accomplish this, the Legislature tasked the RIPA Board with identifying trends relating to racial and identity profiling within stops and civilian complaints reported by state and local law enforcement agencies, reviewing law enforcement training related to racial and identity profiling, and considering how applicable state and local policies may reduce or eliminate racial profiling. The Board has issued annual reports since 2019 for that purpose.

Recent events demonstrate that the Board's work is more important than ever. While the Board continues to stand proudly on the right side of history in denouncing practices rooted in racial and identity profiling and remains committed to eliminating profiling by state and local law enforcement across the state, unfortunately, in recent months the federal government has taken the opposite view: that the divisive and destructive practice of racial profiling should not be denounced but encouraged; that it should not be eliminated as contrary to public policy, but expressly implemented in furtherance of it. On July 11, 2025, White House "Border Czar" Tom Homan enthusiastically endorsed the practice of racial profiling in federal immigration enforcement, telling reporters that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents could and should consider factors such as an individual's "physical appearance" when deciding whether to detain them.[9] Although he later walked back those comments, in September 2025, the United States Supreme Court issued an order from its emergency docket permitting federal immigration officers in Los Angeles to use race and other profiling factors in their enforcement actions.[10]

It is not clear at the time of this writing whether or how the courts will limit racial profiling by federal law enforcement. What is clear is that California's residents are at serious risk of racial profiling by federal law enforcement officers. The lack of accountability for *federal* law enforcement officers who racially profile individuals in California highlights the critical need for the Board to find ways to assist *state and local* law enforcement agencies navigate the environment that our residents find themselves in, as well as ways to reduce or eliminate such profiling by state and local law enforcement agencies. Californians deserve to live their lives free from fear. They deserve to be protected by peace officers in whom they can reliably and credibly place their trust. Public safety depends on public trust, which is eroded when community members feel they are targeted because of their race or identity. The work of the RIPA Board is to try to end profiling altogether.

This year, in the RIPA Board's ninth report, the Board presents its analysis of stop data and civilian complaints reported by state and local law enforcement agencies in 2024, and issues policy recommendations which — if implemented — would contribute to a reduction or elimination of racial and identity profiling in law enforcement stops in California.[11] The Board's focus this year is on the

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9   Ferguson, *Trump Border Czar Confirms Racial Profiling Is Now Law of the Land* (Jul. 11, 2025) New Republic <https://tinyurl.com/mrm9wv5r> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

10   *Noem et al. v. Vasquez Perdomo et al.* (2025) __ U.S. __, 2025 WL 2585637; see also Mansfield, *Supreme Court said ICE can stop you based on race, accent, job and location. What we know*, USA Today (Sep. 10, 2025) <https://tinyurl.com/56ajtrse> [as of Dec. 18, 2025]; Ryan et al., *The Supreme Court clears the way for ICE agents to treat race as grounds for immigration stops*, NPR (Sep. 13, 2025) <https://tinyurl.com/379j4kbr> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

11   Pen. Code, § 15319.4, subd. (j)(3).

pernicious effects of racial and identity profiling on the community's feeling of public safety, which the Board has defined broadly as the collective experience of being safeguarded or protected from threats to one's life or wellbeing.[12] The Board's recommendations, based on the available research and evidence-based approaches to this issue, aim to reduce profiling and improve public safety for all Californians. The Board builds upon and reelevates its prior assessments and recommendations in prior reports, as they complement those found in this year's report. While the data analyses in this report are limited to stops reported by state and local law enforcement in the 2024 calendar year, the Board intends to examine the 2025 RIPA data in depth next year to identify trends and recommendations to address concerns about state and local law enforcement's response to federal immigration enforcement actions.

2024 Stop Data Analysis

RIPA requires California law enforcement agencies to report information about stops from start to finish, including the primary reason for a stop, any actions taken during a stop, and the outcome of a stop, as well as the reporting officer's perception of the person stopped.

The 2024 RIPA stop data show continuing disparities in stops by racial and identity group. As shown in the Stop Data chapter of this year's report, individuals perceived to be Black were stopped 127.87 percent, or more than twice as often, than would be expected given the state's population. Indeed, law enforcement officers stopped individuals perceived to be Hispanic/Latine(x), Middle Eastern/South Asian, and Pacific Islander all more often than expected given the population of the state; in contrast, officers stopped individuals perceived to be Asian, Multiracial, and White less often than expected given the population. Other metrics in the data show similar disparities,[13] and unfortunately, these disparities are consistent with prior reports.

The Stop Data chapter also contains the first analyses of new data elements that were added to the RIPA data in 2024. One of these new data elements, requiring officers to report the perceived housing status of the person stopped, shows stark disparities in how law enforcement officers stop individuals perceived to be unhoused when compared to those they perceive to be housed.

In addition, the Board has analyses this year to reveal how an individual's perceived demographics, including one's housing status, influence the steps and actions taken during a stop — that is, how perceived demographics (for example, an officer's perception the individual is unhoused) change the likelihood of certain actions being during a stop (for example, whether the officer uses force to restrain the individual), and whether those actions change the likelihood that a stop will result in a particular outcome, such as an arrest. These more nuanced analyses help the Board and the public to dig deeper into the data and assist the Board in developing targeted policy recommendations to address hidden or unconscious biases that may negatively affect public safety.

Civilian Complaints

As noted above, the Board is also statutorily mandated to review all civilian complaints received against state and local law enforcement agencies in California, assessing whether there are trends or data related to those complaints that demonstrate systemic issues in need of reform. In this year's report, the Board highlights the extremely low number of sustained complaints of racial and identity profiling in the 2024 data — specifically, of the 1,552 racial or identity profiling complaints reported by law enforcement agencies in 2024, just 3 were sustained. The Board notes that such a concerningly low percentage of sustained complaints must be assessed more thoroughly in future reports if the Board, and the public, wish to reduce or eliminate racial and identity profiling.

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12   Please see the Policies chapter of this year's report, beginning on page 128, for more information about the Board's definition of public safety.

13   For example, officers used force the most often in stops of individuals perceived to be Native American, Black, and Hispanic/Latine(x); in contrast, officers used force the least often in stops of individuals perceived to be White.

Additionally, the Civilian Complaints chapter provides an update on the Board's prior recommendations to eliminate or amend Penal Code section 148.6, which mandates that law enforcement agencies require complainants to read and sign an advisory regarding false complaints, and to accept anonymous complaints. Of note, a recent decision by the California Supreme Court has found Penal Code section 148.6, including the advisory requirement, unconstitutional. Given the significant impact this decision will have on the complaint forms and processes of California law enforcement agencies, the Board may examine this issue in more detail in future reports.

State and Local Racial and Identity Profiling Policies

In addition to the statutorily mandated analyses, the Board is tasked with developing policy recommendations to reduce or eliminate racial and identity profiling by law enforcement. As always, the Board's policy recommendations are informed by the available research, and by the work of cities, counties, and other jurisdictions that have, like the Board, sought to reduce or eliminate racial and identity profiling through effective policy reform. This year, the Policies chapter explores how law enforcement practices such as oversaturation, or the concentrated presence of law enforcement officers in a community, affect the sense of public safety within that community, and how limiting or prohibiting such practices can both reduce racial and identity profiling and improve public safety. The Board also looks at how some alternative enforcement technologies, such as the use of face recognition technology, gunshot detection, and predictive policing, may exacerbate the deleterious effects of practices such as oversaturation, leading to decreased public safety and continued racial and identity profiling in those communities.

This year's report also revisits the issue of pretextual stops, and how jurisdictions in California and elsewhere have improved public safety — and reduced racial and identity profiling — by limiting or eliminating such stops entirely. The Board has explored this topic in prior reports,[14] and is encouraged to see how data from these jurisdictions now show the clear benefits of policies proposed by the Board in those prior reports. The successes of cities such as San Francisco, West Hollywood, Los Angeles, and states such as North Carolina and Virginia are a testament to the effectiveness of the Board's findings that policies limiting pretextual stops contribute to a reduction in racial and identity profiling.

POST Training and Recruitment

The Board also recognizes that the policy recommendations it has advanced in this year's report are only part of the puzzle. The Legislature, in enacting RIPA, understood that effective training of law enforcement officers on the effects of racial and identity profiling is an important first step to the elimination of such practices. The Board continues to work with the California Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training (POST) to identify ways to improve law enforcement training relating to racial and identity profiling — to train officers not just on the law's prohibition against profiling, but on how profiling can decrease the safety of both the officer in the community and the individuals they serve within that community.

In prior years, the Board has reviewed POST courses relating to racial and identity profiling and has made recommendations to improve the effectiveness of those courses in educating law enforcement officers on their responsibilities under RIPA. This year, the Board begins a two-year review of the Field Training Program (FTP), which POST has identified as "the most effective way to evaluate and measure a recruit on the topic of bias."[15] At 440 hours, the FTP comprises nearly 40 percent of a law enforcement officer's initial training on their duties and responsibilities in the field. It is a vital portion of any officer's education, and the Board's decision to review this course over this and next year's report reflects the Board's acknowledgement of the import of such training on the reduction of racial and identity profiling. The Board

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14   Prior analysis of racial disparities in pretextual stops can be found primarily in the 2023 and 2024 RIPA Reports. (See Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2023), pg. 61-107 <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/ripa-board-report-2023.pdf> [as of Dec. 18, 2025]; Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2024), pg. 52-166 <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/ripa-board-report-2024.pdf> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].)

15   Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *POST Commission March 5, 2025 Agenda*, p. 494 <https://tinyurl.com/29a83akv> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

looks forward to continuing to assist POST in shaping the next generation of law enforcement officers and contributing to POST's work in reducing racial and identity profiling in the future.

Accountability

Lastly, the Board looks at the degree to which law enforcement officers are held accountable for their actions and misconduct which affect the community's sense of public safety. To that end, the Board continues its exploration of the impact of civilian oversight agencies (COAs) on law enforcement agencies they oversee, and how the presence of COAs contribute to a reduction in racial and identity profiling in those agencies. The issue of accountability is an important one for the Board and the public at large, and the research presented in this year's report demonstrates how both law enforcement officers and the individuals they stop benefit from robust accountability efforts to address law enforcement misconduct and officer bias. In California, officers engaging in serious misconduct, including by demonstrating bias and racial and identity profiling, can be subject to decertification and removed from the force pursuant to Senate Bill 2, enacted in 2021.[16] The Board continues its review of the SB 2 process in this year's report to identify trends in how the law is being implemented and whether improvements can be made to further reduce bias and profiling going forward.

The Board's Meeting to Address Federal Immigration Actions

On October 9, 2025,[17] the Board held a meeting specifically to address the recent incursion of federal officers into California and the attack on California's values and commitment to diversity, equity, and inclusion. RIPA Co-Chair Andrea Guerrero and Retired Chief of Police Manuel Rodriguez provided an overview of the frequency and impact of federal immigration enforcement actions in 2025; the safeguards available under California law, as well as their limitations; and ways in which state and local law enforcement officers could respond to federal immigration actions, including their duty to intervene to protect the public when federal agents abuse their power and violate rights. The Board also invited Attorney General Rob Bonta to speak about the work of the DOJ and its commitment to our state's marginalized communities. The Board's discussion at the meeting was both insightful and illuminating, and the Board thanks the Attorney General for his leadership on this issue. In next year's report, the Board will be able to assess the RIPA data from 2025 and determine whether these recent policy changes at the federal level have negatively affected law enforcement interactions at the state and local level. If so, it will be incumbent on the Board to find ways to remedy those effects and keep the promise of RIPA alive.

The Continuing Need for RIPA in 2026

The Board remains steadfast in its commitment to finding actionable, evidence-based solutions to the ongoing issues of racial and identity profiling in law enforcement interactions, and to working with all stakeholders — representatives from law enforcement, civil rights organizations, faith- and community-based organizations, and other subject matter experts knowledgeable about these issues — to reduce or eliminate racial and identity profiling within California.

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16   Stats. 2021, c. 409 (S.B.2) eff. Jan. 1, 2022.

17   More information about the Board's October 9, 2025 meeting, including the minutes from that meeting, the materials presented, and a recording of the meeting can be found on the Board's website. (See Cal. Dep't. of Justice, *Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board Meetings* https://oag.ca.gov/ab953/meetings [as of Dec. 18, 2025].)

STOP DATA

I. Introduction

The Racial and Identity Profiling Act of 2015 (RIPA) requires peace officers in California to record information for each stop they make, including the perceived demographic information of the person stopped, the events leading the stop, actions taken by officers during the stop, and the outcome of the stop.[18] This data is collected to document law enforcement interactions with the public and to determine whether certain identity groups experience disparate treatment during stops.

In this year's report, the Board analyzes the stop data collected in the 2024 calendar year. As in prior reports, the Board assesses this data to determine whether there are racial and identity disparities in police stops. The Board looks at all data elements collected, such as stop rates, search patterns, and use of force incidents. This chapter also analyzes modes of travel, consent searches, and the differences between stops that are officer-initiated or based on a call for service. The chapter also contains an analysis of the relationships of events and qualities within a stop (a co-occurrence analysis), as well as other analyses addressing particular data elements, such as the use of *Terry v. Ohio* pats/frisks (hereafter *Terry* frisks) — occurring when an officer pats down an individual's clothing to determine whether based on the officer's reasonable suspicion the individual is armed[19] — disparities in perceived English fluency, and a review of agency and regional analyses on stop outcomes. The Appendix also provides stop data analyses on a variety of topics.

II. Description of Overall Stop Data

In 2024 — the seventh year of RIPA stop data reporting — a total of 533 agencies reported 5,065,428 stops. This includes stops reported by all city and county law enforcement agencies, all law enforcement agencies of California public schools and universities, and the California Highway Patrol.[20]

This data can show the perceived categories of identity of who is stopped, why a stop was initiated, the reason for the stop, the actions an officer takes during the stop, the result of the stop, and duration of the stop.[21] These elements are described below, then applied to different identity groups to analyze the 2024 stop data in greater detail.

A. Perceived Categories of Identity of Who Is Stopped

> *RIPA requires officers to report their <u>perception</u> of the person stopped, including their race or ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, age, English fluency, disability status, and housing status.*

RIPA requires officers to report various demographic data regarding each person stopped, including the perceived race or ethnicity of the person stopped, their perceived gender, perceived sexual orientation, perceived age, perceived English fluency, perceived disability status, and whether the person stopped is perceived to be unhoused.[22]

Officers enter RIPA data based on their perception of individuals,[23] and not on how individuals may

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18   For purposes of RIPA, a "stop" is defined as "any detention by a peace officer of a person, or any peace officer interaction with a person in which the peace officer conducts a search, including a consensual search, of the person's body or property in the person's possession or control." (Gov. Code § 12525.5, subd. (g)(2).)
19   See *Terry v. Ohio* (1968) 392 U.S. 1.
20   Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.224, subd. (a)(17).
21   Additional analyses can be found in the Appendix of this year's report.
22   Gov. Code § 12525.5, subd. (b)(7); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(5)-(11).
23   *Ibid*.

self-identify.[24] This distinction is important because racial and identity profiling occurs based, in part, on an officer's perception of an individual's race and identity. Some of the demographic characteristics reported (e.g., race, ethnicity, or age) may be more perceivable based on visible factors. Other identity characteristics (e.g., sexual orientation or disability status) may not be as apparent and, therefore, may be perceived less consistently with how stopped individuals self-identify or could be influenced by factors unassociated with appearance (e.g., location of stop).

B. What Initiates a Stop

RIPA also requires officers to report context for the events that led to a stop, including the date, time, and location of a stop, whether the stop was made in response to a call for service or was officer-initiated, and the primary reason the stop was initiated.[25]

This report examines the proportion of stops that are made in response to a call for service, compared to those that are officer-initiated. *Calls for service* can indicate that the community is requesting an officer to stop an individual or respond to a situation,[26] while *officer-initiated* stops indicate when an officer decides to stop an individual at the officer's discretion. As such, differences between the proportion of stops that are officer-initiated compared to calls for service may indicate areas where officers or the community direct their attention.

> ### *Key Terms*
>
> ***Call for service*** *— A stop made in response to a 911 call, radio call, or dispatch*
>
> ***Officer-initiated*** *— A stop resulting from the officer's observation, not in response to a call for service*

In 2024, the majority of stops (91.13%, 4,616,103 stops) were officer-initiated, while 8.87 percent of stops (449,325) were due to a call for service.

C. Reason for Stop

Officers must report the primary reason for a stop by selecting from a set of ten options, broadly encompassing: traffic violations; reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; probable cause, either to arrest or search the person, or to take them into custody under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150; stops based on knowledge that the person is on parole, probation, post-release or mandatory supervision, or subject to an arrest warrant; truancy; and consensual search encounters.[27] This report focuses on the two most common reasons: stops for traffic violations[28] and stops for reasonable suspicion. The remaining eight reasons available to officers (known to be on parole/probation/post-release community supervision/mandatory supervision, knowledge of outstanding arrest warrant/wanted person, investigation to determine if person is truant, consensual encounter and search, possible conduct warranting discipline under Education Code, determine if student violated school policy, probable cause to arrest or search, probable cause to take into custody under Welfare and Institution Code section 5150) are examined collectively as "other reasons."

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24   The RIPA regulations explicitly prohibit officers from asking stopped persons for their race or ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and age. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(5)-(8).)

25   Gov. Code § 12525.5, subd. (b)(1)-(3); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subds. (a)(3)-(4), (a)(12)-(15).

26   See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(12).

27   Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(14).

28   Traffic violations are further separated into three types: moving, equipment, and non-moving violations. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(14)(1)(a)-(c).) "Moving violations" involve a violation of traffic laws regulating driver behavior while operating a vehicle, such as speeding or reckless driving. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(14)(1)(a).) "Equipment violations" include a violation of the duties outlined in traffic laws related to the proper maintenance of a vehicle, such as a broken taillight or missing license plate. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(14)(1)(b).) "Non-moving violations" include a violation of traffic laws unrelated to vehicle maintenance or operation and aimed at regulating other traffic laws, such as expired registration tabs, or regulating behavior of pedestrians on or around roadways. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(14)(1)(c).)

In the 2024 RIPA data, 84.18 percent of stops (4,263,835 stops) were initiated due to traffic violations, 11.13 percent of stops (564,003 stops) were initiated due to reasonable suspicion, and 4.69 percent of stops (237,590 stops) were initiated due to other reasons.

Figure 1. Reason for Stop

Percent of Stops

Traffic Violation   Reasonable Suspicion   Other Reason

D. Actions Taken During Stop

RIPA also requires officers to report all actions enumerated in the RIPA regulations that are taken by the officer during a stop, including all force-related and non-force related actions, such as searches and detentions.[29] Officers report this by selecting one or more of 36 actions taken or by reporting that no action was taken during a stop.[30] Officers must report all actions taken during a stop, meaning multiple actions may be reported during a single stop.[31] This year's analyses of actions taken during stops include the prevalence of no actions taken, the frequency of use of force actions,[32] the most common actions during stops (in the 2024 RIPA data, these are: searches and *Terry* frisks,[33] handcuffing, detention on a curbside or in a patrol car, and asking about parole status[34]), and the average number of actions taken during stop.

In 2024, 12.17 percent of all stops (616,407 stops) involved detention curbside or in a patrol car, 12.00

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29   Gov. Code § 12525.5, subd. (b)(8); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(16)-(17).
30   Actions taken during a stop include: Admission/Written Statement Obtained from Student, Asked for Consent to Search Person, Asked for Consent to Search Property, Asked Whether Person is on Parole, Probation, or Other Mandatory Supervision, Curbside Detention, Field Sobriety Test, Patrol Car Detention, Canine Search, Person Photographed, Removed from Vehicle by Order, Property Seized, Ran Passenger's Name, Searched Person, Searched Property, *Terry* Frisk, Vehicle Impounded, Search Person Consent Given, Search Property Consent Given, Handcuffed, Baton Drawn, Baton Used, Chemical Spray, Electronic Control Device Pointed, Electronic Control Device Used in Drive-Stun Mode, Electronic Control Device Used in Dart Mode, Firearm Point, Firearm Discharge, Impact Projectile Point, Impact Projectile Discharge, Canine Compliance, Canine Bite, Removed from Vehicle by Physical Contact, Physical Compliance, Use of Vehicle in Apprehension of Person, No Action Taken. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(16)(B), (a)(17) (A).)
31   Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(16)-(17).
32   Actions defined as a "use of force" include: Handcuffed, Baton Drawn, Baton Used, Chemical Spray, Electronic Control Device Pointed, Electronic Control Device Used in Drive-Stun Mode, Electronic Control Device Used in Dart Mode, Firearm Point, Firearm Discharge, Impact Projectile Point, Impact Projectile Discharge, Canine Compliance, Canine Bite, Removed from Vehicle by Physical Contact, Physical Compliance, and Use of Vehicle in Apprehension of Person. Use of force actions are further categorized as: lethal force, less-lethal force, and limited force. "Lethal force" includes discharging a firearm. "Less lethal force" includes baton use, canine bites, use of a chemical spray, use of electronic control device, pointing a firearm, and impact discharge. "Limited force" includes handcuffing, other contact, and removal from a vehicle with physical contact. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(17); see Pen. Code, § 16780, subd. (a).)
33   A *Terry v. Ohio* pat/frisk (hereafter *Terry* frisk) is a weapons patdown, occurring when an officer pats down an individual's clothing to determine whether based on the officer's reasonable suspicion the individual is armed. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(16)(B)(9); *Terry v. Ohio* (1968) 392 U.S. 1.) A *Terry* frisk only requires the officer to have a reasonable suspicion the person is armed and dangerous. (See *Terry v. Ohio*, *supra* note 19, 392 U.S. 1.) The Board has previously recommended that officer have probable cause for all stops or searches, including *Terry* frisks. (See Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2023) ("*2023 Report*"), p. 96 fn. 326 <https://oag. ca.gov/system/files/media/ ripa-board-report-2023.pdf> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].)
34   RIPA requires that officers report asking whether the stopped person was on parole, probation, post-release community supervision, or some other form of mandatory supervision. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(16)(B)(7).)

percent (607,762 stops) involved a search or *Terry* frisk, 9.67 percent (489,800 stops) involved handcuffing the person stopped, and 3.42 percent (173,377 stops) involved asking the person stopped about parole status.

Figure 2. Top 4 Actions Taken During Stop

Percent of Stops with an Action Taken

Legend: Asked Parole Status | Detained | Handcuffed | Search & *Terry* Frisk

Values shown: 12.00%, 9.67%, 12.17%, 3.42%

E. Results of Stop

Lastly, RIPA requires officers to report the outcome of a stop, including whether the person stopped was arrested, issued a citation or warning, property was seized or no action was taken.[35] When entering stop data, officers can select up to 14 different options to document the result of a stop.[36] Officers may select multiple results when necessary (e.g., an officer cited an individual for one offense and warned them about another).

In 2024, stops were most often reported to result in individuals being issued a citation (46.96%, 2,378,532 stops), followed by a written or verbal warning (34.58%, 1,751,279 stops), and arrest (12.42%, 629,325 stops). Officers reported taking no actions as the result in under six percent of stops (289,735 stops). Each of the remaining results of stops represented less than five percent of the data.

Figure 3. Most Frequent Results of Stop

Percent of Stops with a Result of Stop

Legend: No Action | Warning | Citation | Arrest

Values shown: 5.7%, 34.6%, 47.0%, 12.4%

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
35   Gov. Code § 12525.5, subd. (b)(4); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(18).
36   Results of stop include: Written Warning, Verbal Warning, Citation, In-Field Cite and Release, Custodial Arrest Pursuant to an Outstanding Warrant, Custodial Arrest without Warrant, Field Interview Card, Noncriminal Transport, Contact Legal Guardian, Psychiatric Hold, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Referral, School Administrator Referral, School Counselor Referral, and No Action. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(18). See also CJIS 2000 form in Appendix H.)

III. Stop Data Analysis by Perceived Demographic

In this section, the Board analyzes the reasons stops were initiated (including whether stops were initiated by a call for service), the number and type of actions taken during stops, and the outcome of stops by perceived demographic group to illustrate the experiences of different demographic groups, as documented by the 2024 stop data.

A. Race and Ethnicity

Officers must report their perception of a stopped person's race or ethnicity by selecting all data values that apply from a list of seven broad groups (Asian, Black/African American, Hispanic/Latine(x), Middle Eastern or South Asian, Native American, Pacific Islander, and White), based on their observation only.[37] In 2024, officers perceived most individuals stopped to be Hispanic/Latine(x) (43.31% of all stops, amounting to 2,193,617 stops), followed by White (31.28% of all stops, or 1,584,354 stops), Black (12.09%, 612,443 stops), Asian (5.87%, 297,395 stops), Middle Eastern/South Asian (5.43%, 275,106 stops), Multiracial[38] (1.23%, 62,479 stops), Pacific Islander (0.53%, 26,748 stops), and Native American individuals (0.26%, 13,286 stops).

Figure 4. Percent of All Stops by Perceived Race/Ethnicity

Percent of All Stops

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
37   Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(5).
38   For purposes of this analysis, persons who were perceived by the officer as more than one race or ethnicity are categorized as "Multiracial."

1. Residential Population Comparison

Comparing the perceived racial demographics of the individuals stopped in 2024 to the residential population demographics of California in 2023[39] demonstrates notable disparities. Individuals perceived to be Black were stopped 127.87 percent more often than expected, and individuals perceived to be Pacific Islander 57.53 percent more often than expected, given the population of the state. Conversely, individuals perceived to be Multiracial were stopped 76.39 percent less often than expected, and individuals perceived to be Asian were stopped 51.86 percent less often than expected, given the population of the state.

> *In California, individuals perceived to be Black and Pacific Islander were stopped 127.87% and 57.53% more often than expected based on residential population share.*

Figure 5. Stop Disparities by Perceived Race and Ethnicity

2. Calls for Service

Across all races and ethnicities, officer-initiated stops were far more common than calls for service in 2024. Individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian had the highest rate of officer-initiated stops (96.55% of all stops of individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian were officer-initiated, amounting to 265,621 stops), followed by individuals perceived as Asian (95.42% of all stops of individuals perceived as Asian, or 283,788 stops). Alternatively, individuals perceived to be Native American (85.41% of all stops of individuals perceived as Native American, or 11,348 stops) and Black (86.81% of all stops of individuals perceived as Black, or 531,638 stops) had the lowest rate of officer-initiated stops.

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39   The residential population demographics data are downloaded from Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). 2023 data are used instead of 2024 because Census microdata is released at a later date than the Census' American Community Survey data. More detailed information on methodology for this analysis can be found in Appendix D.

Individuals perceived as Native American had the highest rate of stops initiated by a call for service (14.59%, 1,938 stops), followed by individuals perceived as Black (13.19%, 80,805 stops). Alternatively, individuals perceived to be Middle Eastern/South Asian (3.45%, 9,485 stops) and Asian (4.58%, 13,607 stops) had the lowest rate of stops initiated by a call for service.

3. Reason for Stop

Across all races and ethnicities, traffic violations were the most common reason for stop in 2024, followed by reasonable suspicion, and then other reasons. Moving violations were the most common type of traffic violation for all races and ethnicities. Individuals perceived to be Asian (74.58% of all stops of individuals perceived as Asian, amounting to 206,278 stops) and Middle Eastern/South Asian (73.19% of all stops of individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian, or 190,930 stops) were stopped for moving violations most frequently, and individuals perceived to be Native American (57.67% of all stops of individuals perceived as Native American, or 5,664 stops) and Black (58.80% of all stops of individuals perceived as Black, or 272,433 stops) the least frequently for moving violations.

For all races/ethnicities except for individuals perceived to be Asian, equipment violations were the second most common traffic violation, followed by non-moving violations. Officers stopped individuals perceived to be Native American (25.46%, 2,501 stops) and Hispanic/Latine(x) (23.90%, 445,149 stops) the most frequently for equipment violations, and individuals perceived to be Asian (12.54%, 34,690 stops) and Middle Eastern (14.02%, 36,561 stops) the least frequently for equipment violations. Individuals perceived to be Black (17.75%, 82,234 stops) and Pacific Islander (17.06%, 3,892 stops) were stopped the most frequently for non-moving violations, and individuals perceived to be Middle Eastern/South Asian (12.79%, 33,375 stops) and Asian (12.88%, 35,634 stops) the least frequently for non-moving violations.

Officers stopped individuals perceived to be Black (18.02%, 110,375 stops) and Native American (16.25%, 2,159 stops) more often for reasonable suspicion compared to other races and ethnicities. Officers stopped individuals perceived to be Middle Eastern/South Asian (3.77%, 10,361 stops) and Asian (4.77%, 14,183 stops) the least frequently for reasonable suspicion.

4. Actions Taken During Stop

a. Action vs. No Action

Officers reported taking "no action" most often in stops of individuals perceived to be Middle Eastern/ South Asian (90.88% of all stops of individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian, amounting to 249,966 stops) and Asian (89.12% of all stops of individuals perceived as Asian, or 264,933 stops). Officers reported taking no action least often during stops of individuals perceived to be Native American (66.36% of all stops of individuals perceived as Native American, or 8,816 stops) and Black (66.89% of all stops of individuals perceived as Black, or 409,582 stops).

b. Use of Force

Officers used any type of force the most often in stops of individuals perceived to be Native American (17.50% of all stops of individuals perceived as Native America, amounting to 2,325 stops), Black (16.62% of all stops of individuals perceived as Black, or 101,749 stops), and Hispanic/Latine(x) (10.80% of all stops of individuals perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x), or 236,951 stops).[40] Force was reported the least

A stop involving a person perceived to be Black was more likely to involve lethal or less-lethal force than a stop involving a person perceived to be another racial or ethnic group.

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40   Actions defined as a "use of force" include the use of a baton, canine bites, use of chemical sprays, use of electronic control device, discharging a firearm, pointing a firearm, handcuffing, impact discharge, removal from vehicle with physical contact, and other contact. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(17); see also Pen. Code, § 16780, subd. (a).)

often in stops of individuals perceived to be Middle Eastern/South Asian (3.20% of all stops of individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian, or 8,794 stops), Asian (4.03% of all stops of individuals perceived as Asian, or 11,969 stops), and White (8.76% of all stops of individuals perceived as White, or 138,779 stops).

In 2024, officers reported using limited, less-lethal, and lethal force most often against individuals perceived to be Native American, Black, or Multiracial.[41] Officers reported using limited force most often in stops of individuals they perceived as Native American (16.76%, 2,227 stops) and Black (15.63%, 95,726 stops), and least often in stops of individuals they perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian (3.02%, 8,305 stops) and Asian (3.84%, 11,402). Less-lethal force was reported to be used most often in stops of individuals perceived as Black (0.98%, 6,001 stops) and Multiracial (0.83%, 518 stops), and least often in stops of individuals perceived to be Middle Eastern/South Asian (0.18%, 486 stops) and Asian (0.19%, 564 stops).

Officers reported few instances of lethal force overall (< 0.01%, 122 stops across all racial and ethnic groups) but reported using lethal force most often in stops involving individuals perceived to be Black (< 0.01%, 22 stops) and Multiracial (< 0.01%, 2 stops). Additionally, officers reported no instances of lethal force in stops of individuals they perceived as Native American and Pacific Islander.

Figure 6. Most Severe Use of Force by Perceived Race/Ethnicity

c. **Top 4 Actions During Stop**

As noted above (see Section II.D, *supra*), across all stops, the top four actions taken by officers during a stop are: (1) searches/*Terry* frisks; (2) handcuffing; (3) detainment curbside or in a patrol car; and (4) asking the parole status of the person stopped. Officers reported the highest rates of searches and *Terry* frisks, handcuffing, and detainment curbside or in a patrol car in stops for individuals perceived to be Native American (19.16% of all stops of individuals perceived as Native American, amounting to 2,546 stops involving searches/frisks; 17.11%, 2,273 stops involving handcuffing; 17.20%, 2,285 stops involving detainment) and Black (19.04% of all stops of individuals perceived as Black, amounting to 116,628 stops involving searches/frisks; 16.02%, 98,109 stops involving handcuffing; 17.60%, 107,806 stops involving detainment). Officers reported the lowest rates of searches and *Terry* frisks, handcuffing, and detainment curbside or in a patrol car in stops for individuals perceived to be Middle Eastern/South Asian (3.61% of all stops of individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian, amounting to 9,932 stops involving searches/

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41 Use of force actions are further categorized into lethal force, less lethal force, and limited force. "Lethal force" includes discharging a firearm. "Less lethal force" includes baton use, canine bites, use of a chemical spray, use of electronic control device, pointing a firearm, and impact discharge. "Limited force" includes handcuffing, other contact, and removal from a vehicle with physical contact. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(17); see Pen. Code, § 16780, subd. (a).)

frisks; 3.07%, 8,443 stops involving handcuffing; 4.58%, 12,605 stops involving detainment) and Asian (4.56%, 13,557 stops involving searches/frisks; 3.85%, 11,454 stops involving handcuffing; 5.58%, 16,591 stops involving detainment). Officers asked the parole status of individuals perceived to be Black (5.18% of all stops of individuals perceived as Black, amounting to 31,738 stops) and Multiracial (4.34% of all stops of individuals perceived as Multiracial, or 2,709 stops) at the highest rates, and individuals perceived to be Asian (1.31% of all stops of individuals perceived as Asian, or 3,896 stops) and Middle Eastern/South Asian (1.23% of all stops of individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian, or 3,393 stops) at the lowest rates.

Figure 7. Top 4 Actions During Stop by Perceived Race/Ethnicity

d. Average Number of Actions

Officers reported taking the highest average number of actions in stops of individuals perceived to be Black (0.94 actions per stop, SD[42]= 1.72, range= 1-17 actions) and Native American (0.93, SD= 1.68, range= 1-12).

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42   When reporting an average value of a set of data, we will additionally report the standard deviation (SD) and range of the underlying set. The standard deviation is a measure of how dispersed the data are in relation to the average. A larger standard deviation indicates the data points are more spread out, while a smaller standard deviation indicates the data points are clustered more closely around the average. It is found by calculating the square root of the squared difference from the average. For example, if there are five stops of length 2 minutes, 4 minutes, 7 minutes, 11 minutes, and 16 minutes, the average stop length is 8 minutes. The difference from the average for each stop is -6, -4, -1, -3, and 8, and the square of those differences is 36, 16, 1, 9, and 64. The average of those numbers is 25, which means that the standard deviation would be about 5. If the five stops were all the same length, the standard deviation would be zero. The range states the lowest and highest value in the set.

The lowest number of actions were reported in stops of individuals perceived to be Middle Eastern/South Asian (0.21, SD= 0.86, range= 1-15) and Asian (0.26, SD= 0.96, range= 1-17).

Figure 8. Average Number of Actions Taken During Stop by Perceived Race/Ethnicity: All Stops

5. Results of Stop

Among stops of individuals perceived to be Asian, Hispanic/Latine(x), Middle Eastern/South Asian, Multiracial, Pacific Islander, and White, citation was the most common result of stop, followed by warning, and arrest. Among individuals perceived to be Black and Native American, warning was the most common result of stop, followed by citation, then arrest.[43]

Officers reported the highest arrest rates for individuals perceived to be Native American (24.32% of all stops of individuals perceived as Native American, amounting to 3,231 stops) and Black (16.41% of all stops of individuals perceived as Black, or 100,500 stops), compared to the other racial/ethnic groups. Officers also reported taking no action most often in stops of individuals perceived to be Black (7.24% of all stops of individuals perceived as Black, or 44,322 stops) and Native American (6.91% of all stops of individuals perceived as Native American, or 918 stops), and least often in stops of individuals perceived to be Middle Eastern/South Asian (2.88% of all stops of individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian, or 7,923 stops) and Asian (3.31% of all stops of individuals perceived as Asian, or 9,831 stops).

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43   Please see Appendix Tables A19 and A20 for more detailed counts and percentages.

Figure 9. Most Frequent Results of Stop and No Action Rates by Perceived Race/Ethnicity

Percent of Stops with a Result of Stop

Legend: No Action · Warning · Citation · Arrest

Race/Ethnicity	No Action	Warning	Citation	Arrest
Asian	3.3%	31.1%	60.2%	5.8%
Black	7.2%	37.2%	37.0%	16.4%
Hispanic/Latine(x)	6.0%	33.2%	47.4%	13.2%
Middle Eastern/South Asian	2.9%	31.4%	62.0%	4.5%
Multiracial	6.5%	35.3%	46.8%	12.3%
Native American	6.9%	35.4%	32.7%	24.3%
Pacific Islander	5.3%	35.2%	46.9%	12.2%
White	5.7%	36.6%	45.2%	12.3%

B. Gender

Most stops in 2024 (98.81% of all stops, amounting to 5,004,808 stops) involved persons perceived as cisgender.[44] In 2024, officers perceived most stopped individuals to be cisgender men/boys (70.96%, 3,594,195 stops), followed by individuals perceived to be cisgender women/girls (27.85%, 1,410,613 stops). The remaining 1.19 percent of stops (60,620 stops) involved persons perceived as nonbinary (0.80%,[45] 40,419 stops), transgender men/boys (0.26%, 12,938 stops), and transgender women/girls (0.14%, 7,263 stops).

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44   "Cisgender" means a person whose gender identity and gender expression align with the person's assigned gender identity at birth, whereas "transgender" means a person whose gender identity and gender expression do not align with the gender assigned at birth. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(6)(B).)

45   Starting with this year's data collection (2024), the term "gender nonconforming" was changed to "nonbinary person." This change was a part of legislation which mandated changes to RIPA regulations. See more information here: https://oag.ca.gov/ab953/regulations#amend.

Figure 10. Percent of All Stops by Perceived Gender

Percent of All Stops

It is important to note, however, that some transgender persons report being able to "pass" as cisgender, broadly meaning they are not perceived by strangers as transgender.[46] For example, a 2015 survey of transgender persons in the United States found that 40 percent of transgender persons interacted with police or other law enforcement in the past year, but 65 percent of those persons believed that none of the officers thought or knew they were transgender.[47] Thus, the number of people perceived as transgender among the 2024 stop data may be lower than expected.

1. Calls for Service

For all perceived gender identities, officer-initiated stops were far more common than calls for service. Individuals perceived as cisgender women/girls (91.87% of all stops of individuals perceived as cisgender women/girls, amounting to 1,295,922 stops) and cisgender men/boys (90.93% stops of perceived cisgender men/boys, or 3,268,085 stops) had the highest rate of officer-initiated stops. Alternatively, individuals perceived as transgender women/girls (78.33% of stops of perceived transgender women/girls, or 5,689 stops) and transgender men/boys (80.54% of stops of perceived transgender men/boys, or 10,420 stops) had the lowest rate of officer-initiated stops.

However, individuals perceived to be transgender had about double the rate of stops initiated by calls for service (21.67%, 1,574 stops of transgender women/girls and 19.46%, 2,518 stops of transgender men/boys), compared to nonbinary individuals (10.97%, 4,432 stops), cisgender men/boys (9.07%, 326,110 stops), and cisgender women/girls (8.13%, 114,691 stops).

2. Reason for Stop

Across all genders, traffic violations were the most common reason for stop, followed by reasonable suspicion. Officers stopped individuals perceived to be transgender about twice as often for reasonable suspicion (25.13% of stops of individuals perceived as transgender women/girls, amounting to 1,825 stops and 22.77% of stops of perceived transgender men/boys, or 2,946 stops) compared to other genders. Individuals perceived to be cisgender were stopped least frequently for reasonable suspicion (8.83% stops

46   Thomas J. Billard, *"Passing" and the Politics of Deception: Transgender Bodies, Cisgender Aesthetics, and the Policing of Inconspicuous Marginal Identities*, in The Palgrave Handbook of Deceptive Communication (Tony Docan-Morgan ed. 2019), at p. 467.

47   Herman et al., *The Report of the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey* (2016) National Center for Transgender Equality, at p. 184 <https://tinyurl.com/bdv7zkw7> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

of perceived cisgender women/girls, or 124,524 stops and 11.96% of stops of perceived cisgender men/boys, or 429,870 stops).

Figure 11. Reason for Stop by Perceived Gender

For all genders, officers stopped individuals for moving violations most commonly, followed by equipment violations, and then non-moving violations. Stops of persons perceived to be nonbinary (67.96% of all stops of perceived nonbinary individuals, amounting to 22,234 stops) and cisgender women/girls (67.51 % of all stops of perceived cisgender women/girls, or 830,391 stops) were most often for moving violations, and stops of persons perceived to be transgender men/boys (54.16% of all stops of perceived transgender men/boys, or 4,625 stops) and transgender women/girls (57.28% of all stops of perceived transgender women/girls, or 2,592 stops) were least often for moving violations. Officers stopped individuals perceived to be transgender most commonly for equipment violations (26.96%, 1,220 stops of perceived transgender women/girls and 31.04%, 2,651 stops of perceived transgender men/boys), whereas stops of persons perceived to be cisgender were least often for equipment violations (16.71%, 205,542 stops of perceived cisgender women/girls and 22.13%, 661,141 stops of perceived cisgender men/boys). Individuals perceived to be cisgender women/girls (15.78%, 194,094 stops) and transgender women/girls (15.76%, 713 stops) were stopped most frequently for non-moving violations, and individuals perceived to be nonbinary (9.85%, 3,224 stops) and transgender men/boys (14.80%, 1,264 stops) were stopped least frequently for non-moving violations.

3. Actions Taken During Stop

a. Action vs. No Action

Officers reported taking no action most often in stops of individuals perceived to be cisgender women/girls (82.48% of all stops of perceived cisgender women/girls, amounting to 1,163,271 stops) and nonbinary individuals (74.87% of all stops of individuals perceived as nonbinary, or 30,253 stops). No action was reported least often in stops of individuals perceived to be transgender women/girls (60.25%, 4,374 stops) and transgender men/boys (61.43%, 7,948 stops).

b. Use of Force

Officers used force most often in stops of individuals perceived to be transgender (20.13% of all stops of individuals perceived as transgender women/girls, amounting to 1,461 stops and 19.45% of all stops

of perceived transgender men/boys, or2,526 stops), and least often in stops of individuals perceived to be cisgender women/girls (6.94% of all stops of perceived cisgender women/girls, or 97,867 stops) and nonbinary (10.74% of all stops of individuals perceived as nonbinary, or 4,341 stops).

In 2024, officers reported using limited and less-lethal force more often in stops of individuals perceived to be transgender and nonbinary, compared to people perceived to be cisgender. Officers used limited force most often in stops of individuals they perceived as transgender women/girls (19.49%, 1,415 stops) and transgender men/boys (18.64%, 2,412 stops), and least often in stops of individuals they perceived as cisgender women/girls (6.65%, 93,829 stops) and nonbinary (10.03%, 4,054). Officers used less-lethal force most often in stops of individuals perceived as transgender men/boys (0.80%, 103 stops) and nonbinary (0.71%, 286 stops), and least often in stops of cisgender women/girls (0.29%, 4,028 stops) and cisgender men/boys (0.58%, 20,921 stops).

While officers reported few instances of lethal force, lethal force was reported most often most often in stops of individuals perceived as transgender men/boys (0.01%, 1 stop) and cisgender men/boys (0.00%, 110 stops). Officers reported 0 instances of lethal force in stops of individuals they perceived as transgender women/girls.

Figure 12. Most Severe Use of Force by Perceived Gender

c. **Top 4 Actions During Stop**

> *In 2024, individuals perceived to be transgender were stopped in response to a call for service about twice as often as other perceived gender identities (between 19 % to 22% compared to between 9% to 11%).*
>
> *Stops of people perceived as transgender resulted in an arrest around twice as often as other perceived gender identities (around 24% compared to between about 10% to 14%).*

Officers reported the highest rates of each of the most common actions (search and *Terry* frisk, handcuffing, detainment curbside or in a patrol car, and asked about parole status) in stops of transgender men/boys (20.84% of all stops of perceived transgender men/boys, amounting to 2,696 stops involving searches/frisks; 18.81%, 2,433 stops involving handcuffing; 19.98%, 2,585 stops involving detainment; 4.65%, 601 stops involving asking about parole status) and transgender women/girls (19.48% of all stops of perceived transgender women/girls, amounting to 1,415 stops involving searches/frisks; 19.55%, 1,419 stops involving handcuffing; 21.48%, 1,560 stops involving detainment; 4.10%, 298 stops involving asking about parole status). The lowest rates of search and *Terry* frisk, handcuffing, and asking about parole

status were reported for individuals perceived to be cisgender women/girls (7.34% of all stops of perceived cisgender women/girls, amounting to 103,502 stops involving searches/frisks; 6.68%, 94,269 stops involving handcuffing; 2.12%, 29,848 stops involving asking about parole status) and nonbinary (11.46% of all stops of individuals perceived as nonbinary, amounting to 4,631 stops involving searches/frisks; 9.84%, 3,977 stops involving handcuffing; 3.13%, 1,263 stops involving asking about parole status). Officers reported the lowest rate of detainment curbside or in a patrol car for individuals perceived to be cisgender women/girls (9.45% of all stops of perceived cisgender women/girls, or 133,348 stops) and cisgender men/ boys (13.15% of all stops of perceived cisgender men/boys, or 472,714 stops).

Figure 13. Top 4 Actions Taken During Stop by Perceived Gender

d. Average Number of Actions

Officers took the highest average number of actions in stops of individuals perceived to be transgender women/girls (1.03 actions, SD= 1.70, range= 1-12 actions) and transgender men/boys (1.02, SD= 1.71, range= 1-14). The lowest number of actions were reported in stops of individuals perceived to be cisgender women/girls (0.42, SD= 1.18, range= 1-17) and nonbinary (0.64, SD= 1.46, range= 1-16).

4. Results of Stop

Officers took no action most often in stops of individuals perceived to be transgender men/boys (11.69% of all stops of perceived transgender men/boys, amounting to 1,511 stops) and nonbinary (10.24% of all stops of individuals perceived as nonbinary, amounting to 4,137 stops), and least often in stops of individuals perceived to be cisgender women/girls (5.00% of all stops of perceived cisgender women/girls, amounting

to 70,564 stops) and cisgender men/boys (5.92% of all stops of perceived cisgender men/boys, amounting to 212,816 stops). Among individuals perceived to be cisgender and nonbinary, officers issued a citation at the highest rate, followed by warning, and then arrest. For individuals perceived to be transgender, officers reported warnings as the most common result of stop, followed by citation for transgender women/girls (23.93%, 1,738 stops) and arrest for transgender men/boys (23.50%, 3,039 stops).[48]

Figure 14. Most Frequent Results of Stop and No Action Rates by Perceived Gender

Percent of Stops with a Result of Stop

No Action   Warning   Citation   Arrest

C. Age

Most individuals stopped in 2024 were perceived to be between 25-34 years old (30.68% of all stops, amounting to 1,553,919 stops), followed by 35-44 (24.64%, 1,247,911 stops), and 18-24 (15.15%, 767,349 stops). Officers least often stopped youth perceived as 1-9 years old (0.09%, 4,377 stops), 10-14 (0.27%, 13,659 stops), and 15-17 (1.42%, 72,041). Other perceived age categories were 45-54 years (15.51%, 785,631 stops), 55-64 years (8.25%, 417,913 stops), and 65+ years (4.00%, 202,628 stops).

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48   Please see Appendix Tables A19 and A20 for more detailed counts and percentages.

Figure 15. Percent of All Stops by Age

Percent of All Stops

1. Calls for Service

Among all age groups, officer-initiated stops were far more common than calls for service. However, youth perceived to be 10-14 (45.65% of all stops of individuals perceived to be 10-14 years old, amounting to 6,236 stops) and 15-17 (23.29% of all stops of individuals perceived to be 15-17 years old, or 16,777 stops) had the highest rates of stops initiated by a call for service amongst all age groups. Individuals perceived to be 18-24 (6.38%, 48,976 stops) and 65+ years (6.55%, 13,278 stops) had the lowest rates of stops initiated by a call for service. Individuals perceived to be 18-24 (93.62%, 718373 stops) and 65+ years (93.45%, 189,350 stops) had the highest rates of officer-initiated stops and youth perceived to be 10-14 (54.35%, 7,423 stops) and 15-17 years (76.71%, 55,264 stops) had the lowest rates of officer-initiated stops.

2. Reason for Stop

For all age groups — except youth perceived to be 10-14 years old — traffic violations were the most common reason for stop,[49] followed by reasonable suspicion, and then other reasons. Officers reported the highest rates of stops based on reasonable suspicion for youth perceived to be 10-14 (37.41% of stops of individuals perceived to be 10-14, amounting to 5,110 stops), followed by youth perceived to be 15-17 (25.90%, 18,657 stops of individuals perceived to be 15-17 years old). Officers stopped individuals perceived to be 65+ (6.76%, 13,707 stops) and 18-24 (8.34%, 63,992 stops) least often for reasonable suspicion compared to the other age groups.

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49   A passenger, including a child ages 1-9, may be recorded as the subject of a traffic stop. For example, if an officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation and subsequently orders all occupants, including children, to exit the vehicle and sit on the curb, the officer would generally report the stop of the child in RIPA. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.227, subd. (b)(1) (B).) The officer would record the reason for the stop of the passengers as the traffic violation.

Figure 16. Reason for Stop by Perceived Age

Under 18 Age Group

	Traffic Violation	Reasonable Suspicion	Other Reason
1-9 Years	77.9%	11.7%	10.4%
10-14 Years	34.3%	37.4%	28.3%
15-17 Years	61.3%	25.9%	12.8%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

All Age Groups

	Traffic Violation	Reasonable Suspicion	Other Reason
Under 18 Years	58.0%	27.0%	15.0%
18-24 Years	88.8%	8.3%	2.8%
25-34 Years	84.2%	11.2%	4.6%
35-44 Years	81.7%	12.7%	5.6%
45-54 Years	84.0%	11.2%	4.8%
55-64 Years	86.2%	9.8%	4.0%
65+ Years	90.0%	6.8%	3.3%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Percent of All Stops

■ Traffic Violation ■ Reasonable Suspicion ■ Other Reason

Moving violations were the most frequent type of traffic violation for all age groups. Officers stopped individuals perceived to be 65+ (73.95%, 134,812 stops) and youth perceived to be 15-17 years old (69.89%, 30,886 stops) were stopped most frequently, and youth perceived to be 1-9 (59.00%, 2,012 stops) and 10-14 years old (59.63%, 2,796 stops) were stopped the least frequently for moving violations. For all age groups except those perceived to be 65+ years old, equipment violations were the second most common traffic violation, followed by non-moving violations. Officers stopped youth perceived to be 1-9 (31.06%, 1,059 stops) and 10-14 years old (28.43%, 1,333 stops) the most frequently, and individuals perceived to be 65+ (12.71%, 23,175 stops) and 55-64 years old (17.24%, 62,059 stops) the least frequently for equipment violations. Officers stopped individuals perceived to be 35-44 (17.17%, 175,1365 stops) and 45-54 years old (16.46%, 108,602 stops) the most frequently, and youth perceived to be 15-17 (9.49%, 4,193 stops) and 1-9 years old (9.94%, 339 stops) the least frequently for non-moving violations.

3. Actions Taken During Stop

a. Action vs. No Action

Officers reported taking no action least often in stops involving youth perceived to be 10-14 (45.92% of all stops of individuals perceived to be 10-14 years old, amounting to 6,271 stops) and 15-17 (57.02%, 41,070 stops of individuals perceived to be 15-17 years old). Officers took no action most often in stops involving individuals perceived to be 65+ (87.79%, 177,840 stops) and 55-64 years old (82.63%, 345,275 stops).

b. Use of Force

Officers used any type of force most often in stops of youth perceived to be 10-14 years old (25.02% of all stops of individuals perceived to be 10-14 years old, amounting to 3,417 stops) and 15-17 years old (20.25%, 14,581 stops of individuals perceived to be 15-17 years old), and the least often in stops of individuals they perceived to be 65+ (4.17%, 8,452 stops) and 55-64 years old (6.69%, 27,933 stops).

The age group with highest proportion of stops initiated by a call for service was youth perceived to be ages 10-14 and 15-17. Stops for those two age groups were also the most likely to involve limited and less-lethal force, detention, handcuffing, and searches.

In 2024, officers reported using limited, less-lethal, and lethal force at higher rates in stops of youth perceived to be 17 years old or younger compared to other age groups. Among all age groups, officers used limited force most often in stops of youth perceived to be 10-14 (23.34%, 3,187 stops) and 15-17 (18.62%, 13,410 stops), and least often in stops of individuals perceived to be 65+ (4.00%, 8,110 stops) and 55-64 (6.42%, 26,839 stops). Officers used less-lethal force most often in stops of youth they perceived as 10-14 (1.68%, 230 stops) and 15-17 (1.62%, 1166 stops), and least often in stops of individuals perceived to be 65+ (0.17%, 341 stops) and 55-64 (0.26%, 1,090 stops).

Officers reported few instances of lethal force, but used lethal force most often in stops involving youth perceived to be 1-9 (0.02%, 1 stop) and 15-17 (0.01%, 5 stops). Officers reported no instances of lethal force in stops of youth perceived to be 10-14 years old.

Figure 17. Most Severe Use of Force by Perceived Age

c. Top 4 Actions During Stop

Officers reported the highest rates of searches and *Terry* frisks, handcuffing, and detainment curbside or in a patrol car in stops of youth perceived to be 10-14 (26.35% of all stops of individuals perceived to be 10-14 years old, amounting to 3,598 stops involving searches/frisks, 24.19%, 3,303 stops involved handcuffing, 31.74%, 4,335 stops involved detainment) and 15-17 years old (23.43%, 16,875 stops of individuals perceived to be 15-17 years old involved searches/frisks, 19.39%, 13,963 stops involved handcuffing, 23.95%, 17,255 stops involved detainment). Additionally, officers asked parole, probation and other forms of mandatory supervision status most often in stops of individuals perceived to be 35-44 (3.94%, 49,147 stops) and 25-34 years old (3.81%, 59,146 stops).[50] Officers reported the lowest rates of searches and frisks and handcuffing in stops of youth they perceived to be 1-9 (7.58%, 330 stops involved searches/frisks, 6.11%, 266 stops involved handcuffing) and individuals perceived to be 65+ years old (4.96%, 10,058 stops involved searches/frisks and 4.01%, 8,127 stops involved handcuffing). Officers detained individuals perceived to be 65+ (6.40%, 12,966 stops) and 55-64 years old (9.49%, 39,671 stops) curbside or in a patrol car the most frequently, and individuals perceived to be 65+ (1.21%, 2,445 stops) and youth perceived to be 10-14 (2.01%, 275 stops) least frequently.

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50   As used through this report, RIPA records an officer asking parole and other mandatory supervisions beyond parole, including probation and post-release community supervision. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(16)(B) (7).) For brevity, this may be referred to as an officer asking about parole status.

Figure 18. Top Four Actions Taken During Stop by Perceived Age Group

1-9 Years
- 7.58%
- 6.11%
- 13.6%
- 2.09%

10-14 Years
- 26.35%
- 24.19%
- 31.74%
- 2.01%

15-17 Years
- 23.43%
- 19.39%
- 23.95%
- 3.46%

18-24 Years
- 10.86%
- 8.30%
- 10.53%
- 3.31%

25-34 Years
- 13.25%
- 10.85%
- 12.72%
- 3.81%

35-44 Years
- 13.69%
- 11.10%
- 13.73%
- 3.94%

45-54 Years
- 10.63%
- 8.44%
- 11.69%
- 3.18%

55-64 Years
- 8.00%
- 6.48%
- 9.49%
- 2.25%

65+ Years
- 4.96%
- 4.01%
- 6.40%
- 1.21%

X-axis: Percent of Stops with an Action (0% to 40%)

Legend: Asked Parole Status | Detained | Handcuffed | Search & *Terry* Frisk

d. Average Number of Actions

Officers took the highest average number of actions in stops of youth perceived to be 10-14 years old (1.23 actions, SD= 1.61, range= 1-12 actions) and 15-17 years old (1.12, SD= 1.75, range= 1-15) and the lowest number of actions in stops of individuals perceived to be 65+ years old (0.27, SD= 0.92, range= 1-16) and 55-64 years old (0.43, SD= 1.19, range= 1-14).

4. Results of Stop

Officers reported taking no action most often in stops of youth perceived to be 1-9 (26.76% of all stops of individuals perceived to be 1-9 years old, amounting to 1,165 stops) and 10-14 (13.14%, 1,794 stops of individuals perceived to be 10-14 years old) , and least often in stops of individuals perceived to be 65+ (3.60%, 7,301 stops) and 55-64 (4.29%, 17,923 stops). For youth perceived to be 1-9, the most common result of stop reported was warning (32.25%, 1,404 stops), followed by citation (28.21%, 1,228 stops), and then arrest (7.01%, 305 stops). For youth perceived to be 10-14, officers reported warning as the most common result of stop (24.90%, 3,400 stops), followed by arrest (22.35%, 3,053 stops), and then citation (13.74%, 1,877 stops). For individuals perceived to be 15 and older, officers reported citations (47.07%, 2,375,427 stops) as the most common result of stop, followed by warning (34.60%, 1,746,475 stops), and then arrest (12.40%, 625,967 stops).

Figure 19. Most Frequent Results of Stop and No Action Rates by Age

D. Disability Status

Officers reported that they perceived stopped individuals to have a disability in 1.04 percent (52,651 stops) of all stops in 2024. Of the remaining 1.04 percent of stops (52,651 stops), the most common perceived disability was mental health (58.44% of stops with a perceived disability, 30,770 stops), followed by

"other"[51] (16.84%, 8,869 stops), speech impairment (7.97%, 4,198), deafness (5.83%, 3,067), multiple disabilities (5.70%, 3,001), developmental (3.59%, 1,892), blindness (1.56%, 820), and hyperactivity (0.06%, 34).

Figure 20. Percent of Stops by Disability Type Among Individuals with a Perceived Disability

Percent of All Stops of an Individual
with a Perceived Disability
1.04% of All Stops

1. Calls for Service

Persons with a perceived disability is the only category of perceived identity where the majority of stops in 2024 are not reported as officer-initiated. The majority of stops of individuals with a perceived disability were initiated by a call for service (57.20% of all stops of individuals perceived to have a disability, amounting to 30,117 stops), while the opposite was true for individuals without a perceived disability (8.36% of all stops of individuals perceived as not having a disability, amounting to 419,208 stops initiated by a call for service).

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51   The discrete "other disability" category allows an officer to report they perceived a disability not within one of the discrete categories.

Figure 21. Calls for Service by Perceived Disability Status

No Disability 91.6% 8.4%
Disability 42.8% 57.2%

Percent of Stops

■ Officer Initiated ■ Calls for Service

2. Reason for Stop

Officers most often reported traffic violations as the reason for stopping individuals perceived as having no disability (84.78% of all stops of individuals perceived as not having a disability, amounting to 4,249,967 stops), followed by reasonable suspicion (10.87%, 544,808 stops), and then other reasons for stops (4.35%, 218,002 stops). For individuals perceived to have a disability, officers reported other reasons as the most common reason for stop (37.20% of stops of individuals perceived as having a disability, amounting to 19,588 stops), followed by reasonable suspicion (36.46%, 19,195 stops), and then traffic violations (26.34%, 13,868 stops).

Figure 22. Reason for Stop by Perceived Disability Status

No Disability 84.8% 10.9% 4.3%
Disability 26.3% 36.5% 37.2%

Percent of All Stops

■ Traffic Violation ■ Reasonable Suspicion ■ Other Reason

3. Actions Taken During Stop

a. Action vs. No Action

Officers reported taking no action more than twice as often in stops of individuals perceived as having no disability (77.25% of all stops of individuals perceived as having no disability, or 3,871,537 stops), compared to stops of individuals perceived to have a disability (34.34% of all stops of individuals perceived as having a disability, or 18,076 stops).

b. Use of Force

Officers reported higher rates of any type of force in stops of individuals perceived to have a disability (43.27% of all stops of individuals perceived as having a disability, amounting to 22,775 stops) compared to stops of individuals perceived to not have a disability (9.71% of all stops of individuals perceived as not having a disability, or 486,371 stops). Officers reported higher rates of lethal (0.01%, 3 stops), less-lethal

(1.67%, 878 stops), and limited force (41.60%, 21,894 stops) in stops of individuals perceived to have a disability compared to stops of individuals perceived to not have a disability (<0.01%, 119 stops involved lethal force, 0.49%, 24,506 stops involved less lethal force, 9.21%, 461,746 stops involved limited force).

Figure 23. Most Severe Use of Force by Perceived Disability Status

c. Top 4 Actions During Stop

Officers searched and conducted a *Terry* frisk, handcuffed, detained curbside or in a patrol car, and asked about parole status in stops of individuals perceived to have a disability (40.53% of all stops of individuals perceived to have a disability, amounting to 21,338 stops involved searches/frisks, 42.23%, 22,227 stops involved handcuffing, 36.71%, 19,324 stops involved detainment, 4.28%, 2,255 stops involved asking about parole status) more frequently compared to stops of individuals perceived to not have a disability (11.70% of all stops of individuals perceived as not having a disability, or 586,424 stops involved searches/frisks, 9.33%, 467,573 stops involved handcuffing, 11.91%, 597,083 stops involved detainment, 3.41%, 171,122 stops involved asking about parole status).

Figure 24. Top Four Actions Taken During a Stop by Perceived Disability Status

d. Average Number of Actions

Officers reported taking almost three times as many actions during stops of individuals perceived to have a disability (1.77 actions, SD= 1.84, range= 1-16 actions), compared to stops of individuals perceived to not have a disability (0.61, SD= 1.45, range= 1-18).

4. Results of Stop

Officers reported taking no action in stops of individuals perceived to have a disability at higher rates (8.82% of all stops of individuals perceived as having a disability, amounting to 4,645 stops) than individuals perceived to have no disability (5.69% of all stops of individuals perceived as not having a disability, or 285,090 stops). Among stops of individuals perceived to have a disability, officers reported arrest as the most common result of stop (29.03%, 15,284 stops), followed by warning (18.99%, 9,999 stops), and citation (12.21%, 6,430 stops). Among stops of individuals perceived to not have a disability, officers reported citation as the most common result of stop (47.32%, 2,372,102 stops), followed by warning (34.74%, 1,741,280 stops), and arrest (12.25%, 614,041 stops).

*Figure 25. Most Frequent Results of Stop and No Action Rates by Perceived Disability Status*

E. English Fluency

In 2024, officers reported that they perceived the stopped individual to have English fluency in 93.26 percent (4,723,857) of all stops. In the remaining 6.74 percent (341,571) of stops, the officer perceived the individual as having limited or no English fluency.

1. Calls for Service

Officer-initiated stops were far more common than calls for service for both individuals perceived as having English fluency and individuals perceived to have limited/no English fluency. Although individuals perceived to be fluent in English had a lower rate of stops initiated by a call for service (8.81% of stops of individuals perceived to be fluent in English, amounting to 416,038 stops) than those perceived to have limited/no English fluency (9.75% of stops of individuals perceived to have limited or no English fluency, or 33,287 stops), that difference was less than one percentage point. Individuals perceived to be fluent in English had a higher rate of officer-initiated stops (91.19%, 4,307,819 stops) compared to individuals perceived to have limited/no English fluency (90.25%, 308,284 stops).

2. Reason for Stop

For both individuals perceived to be fluent in English and those perceived to have limited/no English

fluency, traffic violation was the most common reason for stop (84.14%, 3,974,517 stops of individuals perceived to be English fluent and 84.70%, 289,318 stops of individuals perceived to have limited/no English fluency), followed by reasonable suspicion (11.13%, 525,661 stops for English fluent and 11.23%, 38,342 stops for limited/no English fluency), and then other reasons (4.74%, 223,679 stops for English fluent and 4.07%, 13,911 stops for limited/no English fluency). There were negligible differences between these two groups' reason for stop rates.

3. Actions Taken During Stop

a. Action vs. No Action

Officers reported taking no action at similar rates during stops of both individuals perceived to be fluent in English (77.04% of stops of individuals perceived to be English fluent, amounting to 3,638,573 stops) and those perceived to have limited/no English fluency (73.51% of stops of individuals perceived to have limited or no English fluency, or 251,040 stops).

b. Use of Force

Officers reported higher rates of any type of force in stops of individuals perceived to have limited/no English fluency (11.95% of stops of individuals perceived to have limited or no English fluency, or 40,806 stops) compared to stops of individuals they perceived to be fluent in English (9.91% of stops of individuals perceived to be English fluent, or 468,340 stops). Officers reported using less-lethal and limited force more frequently in stops of individuals they perceived to have limited/no English fluency (0.51%, 1,747 stops involved less lethal force, 11.44%, 39,051 stops involved limited force) compared to stops of individuals they perceived to be fluent in English (0.50%, 23,637 stops involved less lethal force and 9.41%, 444,589 stops involved limited force). However, they used lethal force at a higher rate in stops of individuals fluent in English (<0.01%, 114 stops) compared to stops of individuals with limited/no English fluency (<0.01%, 8 stops).

Figure 26. Most Severe Use of Force by Perceived English Fluency

c. Top 4 Actions During Stop

Officers reported higher rates of searches and *Terry* frisks, handcuffing, detainment curbside or in a patrol car, and asks about parole status in stops of individuals perceived to have limited/no English fluency (13.71% of all stops of individuals perceived to have limited or no English fluency, amounting to 46,831 stops involved searches/frisks, 11.53%, 39,390 stops involved handcuffing, 12.31%, 42,034 stops involved detainment, 3.49%, 11,932 stops involved asking about parole status) compared to stops of individuals perceived to be fluent in English (11.88% of all stops of individuals perceived to be English fluent,

amounting to 560,931 stops involved searches/frisks, 9.54%, 450,410 stops involved handcuffing, 12.16%, 574,373 stops involved detainment, and 3.42%, 161,445 stops involved asking about parole status).

*Figure 27. Top Four Actions During a Stop by Perceived English Fluency*

Percent of Stops with an Action

Legend: Asked Parole Status | Detained | Handcuffed | Search & *Terry* Frisk

d. Average Number of Actions

Officers reported taking more actions during stops of individuals perceived to have limited/no English fluency (0.74 actions, SD= 1.59, range= 1-15 actions) in 2024, compared to stops of individuals perceived to be fluent in English (0.62, SD= 1.45, range= 1-18).

4. Results of Stop

Officers reported taking no action as a result of stops at a slightly higher rate for individuals perceived to be fluent in English (5.79% of all stops of individuals perceived to be English fluent, amounting to 273,425 stops) compared to those perceived to have limited/no English fluency (4.78% of all stops of individuals perceived as having limited or no English fluency, or 16,310 stops). For both groups, citation was the most common result of stop (47.13%, 2,226,158 stops for English fluent and 44.61%, 152,374 stops for limited/ no English fluency), followed by warning (36.24%, 123,781 stops for English fluent and 34.45%, 1,627,498 stops for limited/no English fluency), and then arrest (12.25%, 568,638 stops for English fluent and 14.84%, 50,867 stops for limited/no English fluency).

Figure 28. Most Frequent Results of Stop and No Action Rates by Perceived English Fluency

Percent of Stops with a Result of Stop

Legend: No Action | Warning | Citation | Arrest

F. Sexual Orientation

In 2024, 53,359 stops (1.05% of all stops) involved persons perceived by the reporting officer as lesbian, gay, bisexual, and all other sexual orientations other than heterosexual (LGB+). Of note, perceived transgender identity is discussed in the perceived gender identity section above (see Section III.B, *supra*), instead of the following section regarding perceived sexual orientation, in accordance with the updated RIPA regulations.[52]

1. Calls for Service

Overall, across all perceived sexual orientation groups, officer-initiated stops were far more common than calls for service. However, there was a significant disparity in rates between those perceived to be LGB+ and those perceived to be straight/heterosexual. Officers reported 20.74 percent of stops (11,064 stops) involving individuals perceived to be LGB+ were initiated due to a call for service, compared to 8.74 percent of stops (438,261 stops) of individuals perceived to be straight/heterosexual. Individuals perceived to be LGB+ (79.26%, 42,295 stops) had a lower rate of officer-initiated stops compared to straight/heterosexual individuals (91.26%, 4,573,808 stops).

2. Reason for Stop

For both individuals perceived to be LGB+ and those perceived to be straight/heterosexual, traffic violation was the most common reason for stop, followed by reasonable suspicion, and then other reasons. However, officers reported stopping individuals they perceived to be LGB+ for reasonable suspicion (21.73% of all stops of individuals perceived as LGB+, amounting to 11,593 stops) almost twice as often as they stopped individuals perceived to be straight/heterosexual (11.02% of all stops of individuals perceived as straight or heterosexual, amounting to 552,410 stops).

Figure 29. Reasons for Stop by Perceived Sexual Orientation

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3. Actions Taken During Stop

a. Action vs. No Action

Officers reported taking no action more often during stops of individuals they perceived to be straight/ heterosexual (76.97% of stops of individuals perceived as straight/heterosexual, or 3,856,824 stops), compared to stops of individuals perceived to be LGB+ (61.46% of stops of individuals perceived as LGB+, or 32,789 stops).

b. Use of Force

Officers used any type of force almost twice as frequently in stops of individuals perceived to be LGB+ (18.31% of stops of individuals perceived as LGB+, or 9,770 stops) compared to stops of individuals perceived to be straight/heterosexual (9.97% of stops of individuals perceived as straight/heterosexual, or 499,376 stops). Officers used lethal (0.01%, 6 stops), less-lethal (0.72%, 386 stops), and limited force (17.58%, 9,378 stops) more often in stops of individuals perceived to be LGB+, compared to stops of individuals perceived to be straight/heterosexual (<0.01%, 116 stops involved lethal force, 0.50%, 24,998 stops involved less lethal force, 9.46%, 474,262 stops involved limited force).

Figure 30. Most Severe Use of Force by Perceived Sexual Orientation

c. Top 4 Actions During Stop

Officers reported higher rates of searches and *Terry* frisks (19.55%, 10,429 stops), handcuffing (17.63%, 9,404 stops), detainment curbside or in a patrol car (20.98%, 11,193 stops), and parole status inquiries (4.92%, 2,624 stops) in stops of individuals perceived to be LGB+ compared to stops of individuals perceived to be straight/heterosexual (11.92%, 597,333 stops involved searches/frisks, 9.59%, 480,396 stops involved handcuffing, 12.08%, 605,214 stops involved detainment, and 3.41%, 170,753 stops involved parole status inquiries).

Figure 31. Top 4 Actions Taken During Stop by Sexual Orientation

Legend: Asked Parole Status · Detained · Handcuffed · Search & *Terry* Frisk

X-axis: Percent of Stops with an Action Taken (0% to 30%)

Straight/Heterosexual:
- Search & Terry Frisk: 11.92%
- Handcuffed: 9.59%
- Detained: 12.08%
- Asked Parole Status: 3.41%

LGB+:
- Search & Terry Frisk: 19.55%
- Handcuffed: 17.63%
- Detained: 20.98%
- Asked Parole Status: 4.92%

d. Average Number of Actions

Officers took more actions during stops of individuals perceived to be LGB+ (1.04 actions, SD= 1.75, range= 1-18 actions) compared to stops of individuals perceived to be straight/heterosexual (0.62, SD= 1.45, range= 1-17).

4. Results of Stop

Officers reported taking no action as a result of stops at almost twice the rate for individuals perceived to be LGB+ (10.16% of stops of individuals perceived as LGB+, or 5,422 stops) compared to individuals perceived to be straight/heterosexual (5.67% of stops of individuals perceived as straight/heterosexual, or 284,313 stops). For stops involving individuals perceived to be LGB+, officers reported warnings as the most common result of stop (31.98%, 17,064 stops), followed closely by citation (31.60%, 16,861 stops), and then arrest (23.28%, 12,424 stops). Additionally, officers arrested individuals perceived to be LGB+ at almost twice the rate as individuals they perceived to be straight/heterosexual. For stops involving individuals perceived to be straight/heterosexual, officers reported citations as the most common result of stop (47.12%, 2,361,671), followed by warnings (34.60%, 1,734,215 stops), and then arrests (12.31%, 616,901 stops).

Figure 32. Most Frequent Results of Stop and No Action Rates by Perceived Sexual Orientation

Legend: No Action · Warning · Citation · Arrest

X-axis: Percent of Stops with a Result of Stop (0% to 50%)

Straight/Heterosexual:
- No Action: 5.7%
- Warning: 34.6%
- Citation: 47.1%
- Arrest: 12.3%

LGB+:
- No Action: 10.2%
- Warning: 32.0%
- Citation: 31.6%
- Arrest: 23.3%

G. Housing Status

As of January 1, 2024, officers are required to report the perceived housing status of persons they stop. In 2024, officers reported that they perceived the individuals they stopped to be unhoused in 3.58 percent of all stops (181,407 stops).

1. Calls for Service

For both individuals perceived to be unhoused and individuals perceived to be housed, officer-initiated stops were far more common than calls for service. Still, individuals perceived to be unhoused had stops initiated by a call for service far more frequently (41.47% of stops of individuals perceived as unhoused, or 75,238 stops) than individuals perceived to be housed (7.66% of stops of individuals perceived as housed, or 374,087 stops).

Figure 33. Calls for Service by Perceived Housing Status

2. Reason for Stop

Sixty-four percent of stops (64.80%, 117,550 stops) involving persons perceived to be unhoused were on the basis of reasonable suspicion – the highest rate of reasonable suspicion-based stops across all demographic groups. Officers reported stopping individuals perceived to be unhoused for reasonable suspicion about seven times more than individuals perceived to be housed (9.14% of stops of individuals perceived as housed, or 446,453 stops).

Figure 34. Reasons for Stop by Perceived Housing Status

Among traffic violations, individuals perceived as housed were stopped more frequently for moving violations (64.10%, 2,717,608 stops) than individuals perceived to be housed (34.57%, 8,258 stops). However, individuals perceived to be unhoused were stopped for equipment violations (33.35%, 7,966 stops) and non-moving violations (32.08%, 7,663 stops) more frequently than individuals perceived to be housed (20.52%, 869,848 equipment violation stops and 15.39%, 652,486 non-moving violation stops).

Figure 35. Traffic Violation Type by Perceived Housing Status

3. Actions Taken During Stop

a. Action vs. No Action

Officers reported taking no action during stops more than three times as often in stops of individuals perceived to be housed (78.76% of stops of individuals perceived as housed, amounting to 3,845,774 stops), compared to stops of individuals perceived to be unhoused (24.17% of stops of individuals perceived as unhoused, or 43,839 stops).

b. Use of Force

Officers used all types of force approximately four times as frequently in stops of individuals perceived to be unhoused (38.68% of stops of individuals perceived as unhoused, or 70,137 stops) compared to individuals perceived to be housed (8.99% of stops of individuals perceived as housed, or 439,009 stops). Officers used lethal (<0.01%, 7 stops), less-lethal (1.40%, 2,535 stops), and limited force (37.28%, 67,595 stops) more frequently in stops of individuals perceived to be unhoused compared to stops of individuals perceived to be housed (<0.01%, 115 stops involved lethal force, 0.47%, 22,849 stops involved less lethal force, and 8.52%, 416,045 stops involved limited force).

*Figure 36. Most Severe Use of Force by Perceived Housing Status*

c. Top 4 Actions During Stop

Officers reported higher rates of searches and *Terry* frisks, handcuffing, detainment curbside or in a patrol car, and asking about parole status in stops of individuals perceived to be unhoused (43.00% of stops of individuals perceived as unhoused involving searches/frisks, amounting to 77,987 stops; 37.90%, 68,719 stops involving handcuffing; 49.22%, 89,271 stops involving detainment; 11.99%, 21,742 stops involving asking about parole status) compared to stops of individuals perceived to be housed (10.85% of stops of individuals perceived as housed involving searches/frisks, amounting to 529,775 stops; 8.62%, 421,081 stops involving handcuffing; 10.79%, 527,136 stops involving detainment; 3.11%, 151,635 stops involving asking about parole status).

Figure 37. Top 4 Actions Taken During Stop by Perceived Housing Status

d. Average Number of Actions

Officers took almost four times as many actions during stops of individuals perceived to be unhoused (2.10 actions, SD= 1.94, range= 1-15 actions) compared to stops of individuals perceived to be housed (0.57, SD= 1.41, range= 1-18).

Figure 38. Average Number of Actions Taken During a Stop by Perceived Housing Status

4. Results of Stop

Officers reported taking no action as the result of the stop almost twice as often for individuals perceived to be unhoused (10.62% of stops of individuals perceived as unhoused, amounting to 19,260 stops) compared to individuals perceived to be housed (5.54% of stops of individuals perceived as housed, or 270,475 stops). Additionally, compared to every demographic group presented in this chapter, officers reported the highest arrest rates for individuals they perceived to be unhoused. Officers arrested almost half of all stopped individuals they perceived to be unhoused (47.32%, 85,844 stops). Alternatively, officers gave citations to almost the same proportion of individuals they perceive as housed (48.43%, 2,365,262 stops).

Figure 39. Most Frequent Results of Stop and No Action Rates by Perceived Housing Status

IV. Additional Stop Data Analyses

This year, the Board includes several additional analyses of the 2024 stop data, including intersectional analyses of the different modes of travel (i.e., vehicle, bicycle, or pedestrian) by perceived race or ethnicity and consent searches by demographic group, a closer analysis of stops resulting from calls for service, and a co-occurrence analysis examining the interaction of different data elements. This section also includes analyses of disparities in *Terry* frisks by perceived demographic group, the duration of stops by perceived demographic group, and an intersectional analysis of disparities experienced by individuals perceived as having limited or no English fluency. Lastly, this section concludes with an examination of stop data trends by region and agency size throughout the state. Each of these analyses provides greater insight into policing practices across the state, as well as the resulting experiences of the people who are subjected to them.

A. Mode of Travel Analysis

Beginning in 2024, a new data element was added for "Type of Stop," requiring officers to categorize a stop as a "Vehicle Stop," a "Bicycle Stop," or a "Pedestrian Stop."[53] Previously, it was not always possible to determine in the RIPA data whether a stop involved a vehicle, bicycle, or pedestrian.

For this element, a "vehicle stop" is defined as "any interaction that involves stopping an individual in a vehicle."[54] A "bicycle stop" is defined as "any interaction that involves stopping an individual on a bicycle."[55] Any other stop constitutes a "pedestrian stop," including stopping passengers on a bus, a train, or a skateboard.[56] Any analysis of pedestrian stops should consider that transit riders — who may be subject to fare inspection, or stopped on suspicion of fare evasion or other activity prohibited on a public transportation system — are considered to be pedestrians for the purposes of RIPA reporting.[57]

This new data element is of particular interest in determining if there is a difference in stops depending on the mode of transportation and race or ethnicity of the person stopped. For example, in 2021, a Los Angeles Times investigation found that Los Angeles County Sheriff's deputies disproportionately used minor traffic infractions to stops to initiate searches of bicyclists, particularly of Latinos.[58] The investigation found that 85 percent of bicyclists stopped were searched, four times more often than other stops, despite a lower instance of citations or arrests.[59] The investigation raised concerns that these were pretextual stops, that bicyclists were being treated systematically different than motorists or pedestrians, and that Latino bicyclists were disproportionately stopped by the practice.[60]

Transportation usage in California varies by race and ethnicity. For example, the American Community Survey provides an estimate for the primary method of transportation for working adults in California in 2023.[61] Excluding persons who work from home, the survey estimates that:

- Hispanic or Latino persons (91.54%) and persons identifying as two or more races (91.80%) are the group of Californians most likely to commute to work via car, truck, or van, while Black (87.05%) or Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islanders (87.57%) persons are least likely to commute via car, truck, or van;[62]

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53 Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(2).
54 *Ibid*. A vehicle is further defined in the code as "motor vehicles as defined in Vehicle Code section 670; motorcycles, mopeds, and motorized scooters as defined in Vehicle Code sections 400, 406, and 407.5, respectively; and any motorized vehicles, including boats." (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, Section § 999.224, subd. (a)(24).)
55 Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(2).
56 *Ibid*.
57 See Cal. Pen. Code, § 640.
58 Tchekmedyian et al., *L.A. sheriff's deputies use minor stops to search bicyclists, with Latinos hit hardest*, LA Times (Nov. 4, 2021) <https://tinyurl.com/y9cmv4u4> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].
59 *Ibid*.
60 *Ibid*.
61 U.S. Census, American Community Survey (2023) <https://tinyurl.com/467tn384> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].
62 *Ibid*.

- Black (6.57%) and Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander (6.12%) Californians were most likely to use public transportation to travel to work, whereas White non-Hispanic (2.65%) and persons identifying as two or more races (3.01%) were least likely to use public transportation for their work commute;[63]

- White non-Hispanic (3.64%) and Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander (3.61%) Californians were most likely to walk to work, whereas Hispanic or Latino persons (2.40%) and persons identifying as two or more races (2.65%) were least likely to walk to work;[64] and

- No more than 3.24 percent of any racial or identity group were stopped on bicycles. However, this was not reported separately from motorcycles and taxicabs, and a more exact use share is not readily available.[65]

The RIPA Board previously analyzed stops connected to a mode of transportation.[66] Because of data limitations, the analysis was limited to bicycle-related violations (not bicycle stops generally) and to pedestrian roadway violations (not pedestrian stops generally).[67] That analysis found an intersection between perceived race/ethnicity and mode of transportation demonstrated by racially disproportionate actions taken during a stop.[68]

The 2024 RIPA stop data show that, across California, vehicle stops were the most common type of stop across all races and ethnicities (85.00% of all stops, amounting to 4,305,565 stops), followed by pedestrian stops (13.39%, 705,637 stops), and then bicycle stops (1.07%, 54,226 stops). More specifically:

- **Vehicle Stops –** Within the group of people perceived as a racial or ethnic identity, officers reported the highest proportion of stops as vehicle stops for individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian (95.08% of stops of individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian, amounting to 261,580 vehicle stops) and Asian (93.05%, 276,735 stops) and the lowest proportion of vehicle stops for individuals perceived as Native American (75.79%, 10,070 stops) and Black (77.63%, 475,444 stops).

- **Pedestrian Stops –** Officers reported the highest proportion of stops as pedestrian stops for individuals perceived as Native American (22.96% of stops of individuals perceived as Native American, amounting to 3,050 pedestrian stops) and Black (21.56%, 132,020 stops) and lowest rates for individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian (4.47%, 12,285 stops) and Asian (6.20%, 18,428 stops).

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63   *Ibid*.
64   *Ibid*.
65   The American Community Survey combines bicycles with motorcycles and taxicabs in reporting 2023 commuting data by race and geography. Additionally, the data product used in this report includes Hispanic or Latino persons in the racial or ethnic categories described in the paragraph, other than White non-Hispanic. The technical race and ethnic category definitions in the American Community Survey vary from those used in RIPA, so the terminology of the American Community Survey is used. For further information, please see the American Community Survey, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs.html.
66   Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *2023 Report*, supra note 33, at pp. 74-78.
67   *Id.* at p. 12. Bicyclists are generally required to obey the California Vehicle Code rules for vehicles (Veh. Code, § 21200), so a common code violation may be either a bicycle or automobile stop. For example, running a stop sign by any vehicle is prohibited by California Vehicle Code section 22450. Bicyclists are also subject to their own set of possible moving violations and equipment requirements under the Vehicle Code, as well as varying local ordinances. For instance, during darkness a bicycle is required to have a white illuminated front lamp and a rear red reflector or light, as well as a reflector on each ankle, foot, or pedal, and a reflector on each wheel. (Veh. Code, § 21201, subd. (d).) A further summary of common vehicle code violations for bicyclists can be found at POST, *Learning Domain 28: Traffic Enforcement - Chapter 3: Common Vehicle Code Violations*, pp. 3-20 –26 <https://tinyurl.com/3u86ndt2> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].
68   Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *2023 Report*, *supra* note 34, at pp. 74-78.

- **Bicycle Stops –** Officers reported the highest proportion of stops as bicycle stops for individuals perceived as Native American (1.25% of stops of individuals perceived as Native American, amounting to 166 bicycle stops) and White (1.23%, 19,507 stops) and the lowest rates of bicycle stops for individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian (0.45%, 1,241 stops) and Pacific Islander (0.74%, 197 stops).

Figure 40. Type of Stop by Perceived Race/Ethnicity

The experience of persons stopped distinctly varied between modes of transportation. At a statewide level, across all races and ethnicities, officers reported the highest search and *Terry* frisk rate for pedestrian stops, followed by bicycle stops, and then vehicle stops. Across each type of stop, officers reported the lowest search and *Terry* frisk rates for individuals perceived to be Middle Eastern/South Asian and Asian except for pedestrian stops, where individuals perceived to be White (42.39% of all stop types of individuals perceived as White, amounting to 103,646 stops) and Asian (42.00% of all stop types of individuals perceived as Asian, amounting to 7,733 stops) have the lowest search and *Terry* frisk rates. Officers reported the highest search and *Terry* frisk rates in pedestrian stops for individuals perceived as Native American (50.95%, 1,554 stops) and Hispanic/Latine(x) (48.07%, 135,941 stops). Officers reported the highest search and *Terry* frisk rates in vehicle stops for individuals perceived as Black (10.93%, 51,941 stops) and Native American (9.39%, 946 stops). Officers reported the highest search and *Terry* frisk rates in bicycle stops for individuals perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x) (41.32%, 10,419 stops) and Pacific Islander (38.07%, 75 stops).

The highest discovery rates across all races and ethnicities were in bicycle stops, followed by pedestrian stops for every race/ethnicity, except individuals perceived to be Native American and White. Officers reported the highest discovery rates in pedestrian stops of individuals perceived to be Multiracial (29.06%,

1,251 stops) and White (28.23%, 29,259 stops), and the lowest rates in stops of individuals perceived to be Middle Eastern/South Asian (22.38%, 1,177 stops) and Asian (23.57%, 1,823 stops). Officers reported the highest discovery rates in vehicle stops of individuals perceived to be White (28.83%, 17,210 stops) and Multiracial (27.73%, 885 stops), and the lowest rates in stops of individuals perceived to be Middle Eastern/South Asian (18.91%, 864 stops) and Hispanic/Latine(x) (21.77%, 30,419 stops). Officers reported the highest discovery rates in bicycle stops of individuals perceived to be Pacific Islander (42.67%, 32 stops) and Multiracial (40.49%, 100 stops), and the lowest rates in stops of individuals perceived to be Middle Eastern/South Asian (31.43%, 33 stops) and Asian (32.79%, 80 stops).

Figure 41. Search, Frisk, and Discovery Rates by Types of Stop and Perceived Race/Ethnicity

This initial analysis highlights how transportation use may heighten disparities experienced by communities. Further exploration of the context and modes of transportation could provide a better understanding of how California communities interact with police and ways to address disparities experienced by communities.

B. Consent Searches and Type of Consent Data Element

A non-discretionary search occurs when the basis for search was either incident to arrest, vehicle inventory, or search warrant.[69] That is, an officer was required to search the person or property due to, for instance, an individual being arrested.

In contrast, a consent-only search occurs when an officer reports that the sole basis for search is the consent of the individual they have stopped.[70] The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requires officers to have a warrant or probable cause to exercise a search. When officers do not have probable cause or a warrant, they can ask for consent to search. In prior reports, the RIPA Board has discussed its concerns about bias in the discretionary decision to ask for consent, and has previously recommended limiting consent searches.[71]

RIPA collects an officer's recording of how consent is obtained, but an officer's honest perception of voluntary consent to a search is not legally conclusive.[72] Generally, consent is provided in the context of a power imbalance between police and civilians during a stop, an imbalance that may be exacerbated by race or other characteristics.[73] A court may consider circumstances like a person's young age when evaluating if consent was validly obtained.[74] Accordingly, some agencies, including a number in California, have reformed the use of consent searches to address concerns that consent searches are more vulnerable to bias or coercive.[75]

Examining consent searches and discovery rates, then, especially in comparison to non-discretionary searches, could lead to important insights in bias in policing. Accordingly, this section analyzes the 2024 RIPA search data as a whole and by perceived demographic group.

1. 2024 Consent Search Data

Overall, consent-only searches accounted for 12.87 percent (66,808 stops) of all searches in 2024.[76] Non-discretionary searches accounted for 50.59 percent (262,532 stops) of all searches. Non-discretionary searches (26.40%, 69,316 stops) yielded higher evidence discovery rates than consent-only searches (20.30%, 13,559 stops). These trends are mirrored in every demographic group described below except for

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69   Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(16)(C)(1).
70   *Ibid*. As described more fully in the Appendix, there are two types of consent searches that are reported in the RIPA data. "Consent-only" searches are searches conducted by law enforcement where the individual's consent is the only basis for the officer's search. "Consent-plus" searches are searches conducted by law enforcement where the individual's consent is one basis for search, along with other one or more bases the officer has selected.
71   See, e.g., Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *2023 Report*, *supra* note 33, at p. 96.
72   See*, e.g., Boitez v. Superior Ct.* (2023) 96 Cal.App. 5th 1213, 1217 (defendant's consent was not voluntarily given where police officer stated, unknowingly falsely, that he had the authority to tow defendant's mother's car, but would not do so if defendant voluntarily consented to search).
73   See Weisburd, *Criminal Procedure Without Consent*, 113 Cal. L. Rev. 697, 719-722 (2025).
74   See, e.g., *In re J.G.* (2014) 228 Cal. App. 4th 402, 410-11 (discussing that age is likely a factor in evaluating the circumstances surrounding voluntary waiver of rights of 4th amendment rights). Further, in some circumstances, a parent or guardian could provide consent to a search of a minor's person or property, even over the objection of the minor. See *In re D.C.* (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 978, 985, 989.
75   See Weisburd, *Criminal Procedure Without Consent, supra* note 73, at pp. 704-708 (explaining that recent "reforms to traditional consent searches occurred against a backdrop of growing concerns about racialized and biased policing, pretextual traffic stops, police harassment, coercion, and uninformed consent"). For example, California Highway Patrol, Berkeley Police Department, Oakland Police Department, Los Angeles Police Department, and San Francisco Police Department have banned or limited uses of consent searches. (*Id.* at p. 793.)
76   In this section, the denominator is not all stops, as it is in most other analyses in this report, but all *searches.* Also, as of the 2024 RIPA data collection, officers are not required to record a basis for search in *Terry* frisks, so this analysis only analyzes stops in which a search of person or property occurred.

individuals perceived as cisgender women/girls and those perceived to be 65+ years old.

The 2024 data also includes a disaggregation of consent searches by consent type (i.e., verbal consent, written consent, and consent implied by conduct).[77] Across the entire dataset for the 120,789 stops with a search type provided, officers reported receiving verbal consent in 97.64 percent of stops (117,936 stops), implied consent in 1.64 percent of stops (1,980 stops), and written consent in 0.72 percent of stops (873 stops). Verbal consent was by far the most common type of consent across all demographic groups, with over 95 percent for every demographic group. However, the slight variation in consent-type proportions may provide insight into stop characteristics for certain demographic groups.

2. Consent Searches by Perceived Race and Ethnicity

Officers reported the highest percentage of consent-only[78] searches in searches of individuals perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x) (15.12% of searches, 36,045 stops) and Asian (13.85%, 1,670 stops), and the lowest rates in searches of individuals they perceive as Native American (7.39%, 175 stops) and Black (9.39%, 9,042 stops). Additionally, officers reported the highest rates of non-discretionary searches in searches of individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian (58.54%, 5,040 stops) and Native American (66.75%, 1,580 stops), and the lowest rates in searches of individuals perceived as Black (46.75%, 45,008 stops) and Multiracial (47.78%, 3,234 stops).

Officers reported receiving verbal consent most often from individuals perceived to be Native American (98.72%, 308 stops) and Pacific Islander (97.96%, 528 stops), implied consent most often from individuals perceived to be Middle Eastern/South Asian (2.22%, 41 stops) and Multiracial (2.11%, 36 stops) and written consent the most often from individuals perceived to be Middle Eastern/South Asian (1.25%, 23 stops) and Asian (1.26%, 37 stops).

Figure 42. Consent Type by Perceived Race/Ethnicity

Discovery rates for non-discretionary searches were higher than discovery rates for consent only searches across all races and ethnicities. In consent-only searches, officers reported the highest discovery rates in stops of individuals perceived to be Pacific Islander (25.26%, 74 stops) and White (24.16%, 4,300 stops) and lowest in stops of individuals perceived to be Black (16.59%, 1,500 stops) and Native American (18.29%, 32 stops). In non-discretionary searches, officers reported the highest discovery rates in stops of individuals perceived to be Multiracial (30.43%, 984 stops) and Black (29.91%, 13,460 stops) and the lowest rates in stops of individuals perceived to be Asian (21.49%, 1,432 stops) and Middle Eastern/South Asian (20.60%, 1,038 stops).

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77   Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(16)(C)(1)(a).
78   As described more fully in the Appendix, there are two types of consent searches that are reported in the RIPA data. "Consent-only" searches are searches conducted by law enforcement where the individual's consent is the only basis for the officer's search. "Consent-plus" searches are searches conducted by law enforcement where the individual's consent is one basis for search, along with other one or more bases the officer has selected.

3. Consent Searches by Perceived Gender

Officers reported the highest percentage of consent-only searches in searches of individuals perceived as cisgender men/boys (13.34%, 55,888 stops) and nonbinary (11.69%, 490 stops), and the lowest in searches of individuals perceived to be transgender women/girls (8.75%, 110 stops) and transgender men/boys (10.87%, 244 stops). Officers reported the highest rate of non-discretionary searches in searches of individuals perceived to be cisgender women/girls (58.66%, 54,156 stops) and transgender women/girls (58.55%, 736 stops) and the lowest rates in searches of individuals perceived to be nonbinary (43.72%, 1,833 stops) and cisgender men/boys (48.84%, 204,596 stops).

Among gender groups, officers received verbal consent the most often from individuals perceived to be cisgender men/boys (97.72%, 98,537 stops) and cisgender women/girls (97.35%, 17,648 stops), implied consent the most often from individuals perceived to be nonbinary (4.22%, 48 stops) and transgender women/girls (3.20%, 7 stops) and written consent the most often from individuals perceived to be transgender men/boys (1.48%, 7 stops) and cisgender women/girls (0.90%, 163 stops).

Figure 43. Consent Type by Perceived Gender

Officers discovered evidence/contraband much more frequently in non-discretionary searches compared to consent-only searches across all genders. In consent-only searches, the highest discovery rates were in searches of individuals perceived to be transgender women/girls (24.55%, 27 stops) and cisgender women/girls (23.79%, 2,397 stops) and the lowest in searches of individuals perceived to be cisgender men/boys (19.66%, 10,988 stops) and nonbinary (20.00%, 98 stops). In non-discretionary searches, the highest discovery rates were in searches of individuals perceived to be transgender men/boys (27.50%, 333 stops) and nonbinary (28.04%, 514 stops) and the lowest were in searches of individuals perceived to be transgender women/girls (26.77%, 197 stops) and cisgender women/girls (22.56%, 12,219 stops).

4. Consent Searches by Perceived Age

Officers reported the highest percentage of consent-only searches for individuals perceived to be 45-54 years old (13.94%, 10,323 stops) and youth perceived to be 1-9 (13.68%, 39 stops) and the lowest for youth perceived to be 10-14 (8.98%, 238 stops) and individuals perceived to be 65+ (10.10%, 909 stops). Officers reported the highest rate of non-discretionary searches in searches of individuals perceived to be age 65+ (63.16%, 5,684 stops) and 55-64 years old (56.83%, 16,973 stops) and the lowest rates in searches of youth perceived to be 15-17 (44.20%, 5,266 stops) and 10-14 (46.68%, 1,237 stops).

Officers received verbal consent most often from individuals perceived to be 18-24 years old (97.88%, 14,840 stops) and least often from youth perceived to be 1-9 (93.33%, 56 stops) and 10-14 years old (95.15%, 451 stops). Rates of implied consent were highest for youth perceived to be 1-9 years old (5.00%, 3 stops) and individuals perceived to be 65+ (2.81%, 47 stops). Additionally, rates of written consent were highest for youth perceived to be 10-14 (2.32%, 11 stops) and 1-9 years old (1.67%, 1 stop).

Figure 44. Consent Type by Perceived Age

Legend: ■ Verbal ■ Written ■ Implied

Age	Verbal	Implied
1-9 Years	93.33%	5.00%
10-14 Years	95.15%	2.53%
15-17 Years	96.68%	2.29%
18-24 Years	97.88%	1.43%
25-34 Years	97.65%	1.68%
35-44 Years	97.75%	1.57%
45-54 Years	97.74%	1.55%
55-64 Years	97.22%	1.83%
65+ Years	95.58%	2.81%

Percent of Consent Searches

Discovery rates for non-discretionary searches were higher than discovery rates for consent-only searches across all perceived age ranges except for those perceived to be 65+ years old. In consent-only searches, the highest discovery rates were in searches of individuals perceived to be 45-54 (23.68%, 2,444 stops) and youth perceived to be 1-9 (23.08%, 9 stops) and the lowest in searches of youth perceived to be 18-24 (13.20%, 1,133 stops) and 10-14 (15.13%, 36 stops). In non-discretionary searches, the highest discovery rates were in searches of individuals perceived to be 1-9 (40.00%, 54 stops) and 15-17 years old (32.74%, 1,724 stops). The lowest discovery rates were in searches of individuals perceived to be 65+ (20.21%, 1,149 stops) and 18-24 (22.66%, 6,948 stops).

5. Consent Searches by Perceived Disability

Officers reported higher rates of consent-only searches of individuals perceived to not have a disability (13.05%, 65,395 stops), compared to individuals perceived to have a disability (7.96%, 1,413 stops), and higher rates of non-discretionary searches for individuals perceived to have a disability (53.17%, 9,434 stops) compared to individuals perceived to not have a disability (50.50%, 253,098 stops).

Officers reported more than twice the rate of implied consent for individuals perceived to have a disability (4.27%, 121 stops) compared to individuals perceived to have no disability (1.58%, 1,859 stops). Officers reported slightly higher rates of verbal consent in stops involving individuals perceived to have no disability (97.69%, 115,233 stops) compared to stops involving individuals perceived to have a disability (95.28%, 2,703 stops). Officers reported relatively similar rates for written consent (0.73%, 860 stops involving individuals perceived to have no disability and 0.46%, 13 stops involving individuals perceived to have a disability).

Figure 45. Consent Type by Perceived Disability

	Verbal	Implied
Disability	95.28%	4.27%
No Disability	97.69%	1.58%

Percent of Consent Searches

Legend: ■ Verbal ■ Written ■ Implied

Officers discovered evidence/contraband more frequently in non-discretionary searches compared to consent-only searches across both groups. Discovery rates for non-discretionary searches of individuals perceived to have a disability were 20.68% (1,951 stops) and 26.62% (67,356 stops) for those perceived to not have a disability. Discovery rates for consent-only searches were 16.07% (227 stops) and 20.39% (13,332 stops) for individuals perceived to have a disability and those perceived to not have a disability, respectively. Likewise, discovery rates for both types of searches are higher in searches of individuals not perceived to have a disability, compared to those perceived to have a disability.

6. Consent Searches by Perceived English Fluency

Officers reported higher rates of both consent-only searches and non-discretionary searches in searches of individuals perceived to have limited/no English fluency (13.88%, 5580 stops and 61.54%, 24,733 stops respectively), compared to individuals perceived to be fluent in English (12.79%, 61,228 stops and 49.67% 237,799 stops respectively).[79]

Officers reported slightly higher rates of verbal consent among stops involving perceived English fluent individuals (97.73%, 108,638 stops) compared to stops involving individuals perceived to have limited/ no English fluency (96.59%, 9,298 stops). Officers reported higher rates of implied and written consent for individuals perceived to have limited/no English fluency (2.11%, 203 stops with implied consent and 1.3%, 125 stops with written consent), compared to individuals perceived to be fluent in English (1.60%, 1,777 stops with implied consent and 0.67%, 748 stops with written consent).

Figure 46. Consent Type by Perceived English Fluency

Discovery rates for non-discretionary searches were higher than discovery rates for consent-only searches across both categories of perceived English fluency. In consent-only searches, discovery rates were higher for individuals perceived to be fluent in English (20.38%, 12,478 stops) compared to individuals perceived to have limited/no English fluency (19.37%, 1,081). In non-discretionary searches, discovery rates were higher in non-discretionary searches of individuals perceived to be fluent in English (26.84%, 63,818 stops) compared to individuals perceived to have limited/no English fluency (22.23%, 5,498).

7. Consent Searches by Perceived Sexual Orientation

Officers performed consent-only searches more frequently in searches of individuals perceived as straight/heterosexual (12.91%, 65,824 stops) and non-discretionary searches less frequently of individuals perceived as straight/heterosexual (50.48%, 257,280 stops), compared to individuals perceived as LGB+ (10.60%, 984 stops of involving consent-only searches and 56.57%, 5,252 stops involving non-discretionary searches).

Officers reported relatively similar consent type rates for individuals perceived to be LGB+ (97.82%, 2,016 stops with verbal consent; 1.84%, 38 stops with implied consent; 0.34%, 7 stops with written consent) and straight/heterosexual (97.63%, 115,920 stops with verbal consent; 1.64%, 1,942 stops with implied consent; 0.73%, 866 stops with written consent).

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79   RIPA records an officer's perception of circumstances surrounding a search, but a court could find that a substantial language barrier precludes valid consent to a search. (See *Commonwealth v. Carmenates* (Pa. Super. Ct. 2021) 266 A.3d 1117, 1125.)

Figure 47. Consent Type by Perceived Sexual Orientation

Bar chart: LGB+ 97.82% Verbal, 1.84% Implied; Straight/Heterosexual 97.63% Verbal, 1.64% Implied. X-axis: Percent of Consent Searches (0% to 100%). Legend: Verbal, Written, Implied.

Discovery rates for non-discretionary searches were higher than discovery rates for consent-only searches across both groups. Discovery rates for consent-only searches were higher for individuals perceived to be LGB+ (22.56%, 222 stops involving consent-only searches compared to individuals perceived to be straight/ heterosexual (20.26%, 13,337). This pattern was reversed with non-discretionary searches: discovery rates for non-discretionary searches were higher for individuals perceived to be straight/heterosexual (26.46%, 68,084 stops) compared to individuals perceived to be LGB+ (23.46%, 1,232 stops).

8. Consent Searches by Perceived Housing Status

Officers reported relatively similar rates of non-discretionary and consent-only searches for both individuals perceived to be housed and unhoused. However, consent-only search rates were slightly higher for individuals perceived to be housed (12.95%, 58,280 stops; 12.36%, 8,528 for individuals perceived to be unhoused), and non-discretionary searches were slightly lower for individuals perceived to be housed (50.42%, 226,849 stops; 51.70%, 35,683 for individuals perceived to be unhoused).

Officers reported relatively similar rates of verbal, implied, and written consent for individuals perceived as housed (97.63%, 102,338 stops with verbal consent; 1.58%, 1,651 stops with implied consent; 0.79%, 832 stops with written consent) compared to individuals perceived as unhoused (97.68%, 15,598 stops with verbal consent; 2.06%, 329 stops with implied consent; 0.26%, 41 stops with written consent).

Figure 48. Consent Type by Perceived Housing Status

Bar chart: Housed 97.63% Verbal, 1.58% Implied; Unhoused 97.68% Verbal, 2.06% Implied. X-axis: Percent of Consent Searches (0% to 100%). Legend: Verbal, Written, Implied.

Officers discovered evidence/contraband more frequently in non-discretionary searches compared to consent-only searches across both individuals perceived to be housed and unhoused. Discovery rates were higher for both search types in searches of individuals perceived to be unhoused (27.37%, 2,334 stops involving consent-only searches and 35.68%, 12,731 stops involving non-discretionary searches) compared to individuals perceived to be housed (19.26%, 11,225 stops involving consent-only searches and 24.94%, 56,585 stops involving non-discretionary searches).

The data shows differences in the use of consent searches and discovery rates between groups. Examining these differences, particularly with consideration with the different contexts the searches occur, could provide further insight into policing practices.

C. Stop Results Between Calls for Service and Officer-Initiated Stops

By their nature, police exercise less discretion in responding to a call for service. Calls for service stops happen when an officer makes a stop during the course of *responding* to a call for service, radio call, or dispatch.[80] Stops that are not in response to a call for service, officer-initiated stops, may at least begin with the officer exercising more discretion. Analyses comparing these two stop categories could provide insights into officer bias.

The data analyses provided above present rates of calls for service and officer-initiated stops broken down for demographic groups. The analysis below compares the results of officer-initiated stops and calls-for-service stops. The first part of the analysis uses all available RIPA data; the second part excludes traffic data, which represent an overwhelming majority of RIPA stops and are distinct from other types of police stops.

Overall, results demonstrate that when traffic data is included, arrest rates are more than five times higher in stops initiated by a call for service (53.02%, 238,201 stops) compared to stops that are officer-initiated (8.47%, 391,124 stops). Stops that are officer-initiated most frequently result in a citation (50.43%, 2,327,853 stops), followed by a warning (34.87%, 1,609,384 stops). When traffic data is excluded, arrest rates for stops initiated by a call for service (57.50%, 221,950 stops) and stops that are officer initiated (44.87%, 186,445 stops) become more equal, though arrests are more frequent in stops initiated due to a call for service.

1. Traffic data included

Stops initiated by a call for service resulted in arrests (53.02%, 238,201 stops), no action (12.30%, 55,277 stops), and "other" results (12.88%, 57,877 stops) at a higher rate compared to officer-initiated stops. Officer-initiated stops resulted in a citation (50.43%, 2327853 stops) and warning (34.87%, 1,609,384 stops) more frequently compared to stops initiated by a call for service.

2. Traffic data excluded

Stops initiated by a call for service resulted in an arrest at a higher rate (57.50%, 221,950 stops) compared to stops initiated by an officer (44.87%, 186,445 stops). The same trend exists for "other" results of stop.[81] Stops initiated by an officer resulted in a citation, no action, and warnings more frequently compared to stops initiated by a call for service.

D. Analysis of Elements Occurring Together, by Perceived Demographic (Interstop Co-Occurrences)[82]

This year, the Board examines which elements of stops tend to occur together and whether each step of a stop (initiation → action during stop → result of stop) is influenced by the previous steps. This section analyzes: 1) what actions are most likely to co-occur during a stop; 2) whether and how demographics change the likelihood of certain actions being taken; and 3) whether and how actions during stop affected the likelihood of certain outcomes of stops when they begin with similar conditions.

As discussed below, a key takeaway is that there seems to be systematic disparities in how actions during a stop are related to the result of the stop. For example, while persons perceived to be Black are generally more likely to be arrested following a stop, persons perceived to be Black are searched and handcuffed significantly more than what would be expected even when considering the greater likelihood of arrest.

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80   Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(12).
81   Other results of stop include field interview card, noncriminal transport, contact legal guardian, psychiatric hold, U.S. Department of Homeland Security referral, school administrator referral, and school counselor referral.
82   The analysis in this section uses multiple regression, as discussed more fully below. While using multiple regression has many benefits, there are also some limitations of the methodology. These analyses do not include every variable that could influence changes in each of the outcome variables. For example, an officer using force could be because the person they stopped was being violent, which the RIPA data does not show.

1. What actions are most likely to co-occur during a stop?

The correlation matrix in Table 1 shows which actions occur together more or less often. Correlation ranges from negative one (-1), where actions never occur together, to zero (0), where there effectively is not a measured relationship between the two actions, to positive one (1), where actions always occur together. For instance, asking for consent and receiving consent share a strong positive relationship with a correlation of .92.

The results revealed interesting relations between actions that commonly occur together. For instance, an officer asking a passenger for identification and running the name of the passenger have a moderately sized correlation, at .40. Detention and searches or frisks are correlated at .45, and detention and use of force are correlated at .42. Search or frisk and property seizure are correlated at .33. See Figure 49 for a visual representation of these correlations, and Table A54 in the Appendix for more detailed information on correlation size.

Figure 49. Correlation Matrix of Actions During Stop

2. How do demographics change the odds of certain actions being taken during a stop?

a. Regression Analysis Methods[83]

Regression analysis can estimate the impact of the change in one variable, all other variables being constant. For instance, a regression examining the impact of an officer perceiving an individual to be Black (the independent variable) can identify how the chances of being handcuffed change compared to an individual perceived to be White individual (the comparison group), when holding all other variables constant. Table 1 shows the variables used in these regression analyses.[84]

Table 1. Independent Variables and Their Comparison Categories

Independent Variable	Comparison Group
Asian; Black; Hispanic/Latine(x); Other Race	White
Cisgender Woman/Girl; Non-Cisgender	Cisgender Man/Boy
Age 1 to 9; Age 15 to 17; Age 18 to 24; Age 25 to 34; Age 35 to 44; Age 45 to 54; Age 55 to 64; Age 65+	Age 10 to 14
Straight/Heterosexual	LGB+
Limited English Fluency	Fluent English
No Disability	Any Disability
Unhoused	Housed
Officer-initiated Stop	Call for Service Stop
Reason for Stop: Traffic; Reason for Stop: Other	Reason for Stop: Reasonable Suspicion

Regressions were conducted to understand how demographics change the odds of certain actions being taken. The five actions during stop (or "outcome variables") are searches and *Terry* frisks, handcuffing, curbside or patrol car detention, asking for consent, and force. The results of these regressions are displayed using bar graphs, with the bar indicating the direction and size of the change in chances that an individual experiences that action. A bar that goes to the left indicates a negative relation in contrast to the comparison group, i.e., the independent variable makes a person less likely to experience that action during a stop.

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83   A more detailed description of methodology for all regression analyses is located in Appendix F.
84   Some variables were combined in these analyses due to low case counts. For race, the Middle Eastern/South Asian, Multiracial, Pacific Islander, and Native American categories were combined into an "Other Race" category. For gender, both transgender categories and the nonbinary category were combined into a "Non-Cisgender" category. The following reasons for stop were combined into an "Other Reason" category: known to be on parole/probation/ post-release community supervision/mandatory supervision, knowledge of outstanding arrest warrant/wanted person, investigation to determine if person is truant, consensual encounter and search, possible conduct warranting discipline under Education Code, determine if student violated school policy, probable cause to arrest or search, probable cause to take into custody under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150.

b. Regression Results[85]

i. Chances to be searched or subject to a *Terry* frisk compared to the related comparison group

Figure 50. Change in Chance of Being Searched or Frisked[86]

Individuals perceived as Black or Hispanic/Latine(x) have a higher chance of being searched or frisked compared to individuals perceived as White. Individuals perceived as Asian or Other Race have a lower chance of being searched or frisked compared to White individuals.

Individuals with no perceived disability have a lower chance of being searched or frisked compared to individuals with a perceived disability. Individuals perceived as having limited/no English fluency have a higher chance of being searched or frisked compared to individuals perceived to be fluent in English. Individuals perceived to be unhoused have increased chances of being searched or frisked compared to individuals perceived to be housed. Individuals perceived to be straight/heterosexual have a lower chance of being searched or frisked compared to individuals perceived to be LGB+.

Individuals perceived to be either cisgender women/girl or non-cisgender have a lower chance of being searched or frisked compared to individuals perceived to be cisgender men/boys.

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85   More detailed methodology and full regression results for every regression in this section can be found in Appendix F.
86   See Table 1, *supra*, for a further explanation of independent variables included in the regression along with what they are being compared to (the comparison group).

Youth perceived to be 1-9 and individuals perceived to be 65+ have a lower chance of being searched or frisked compared to youth perceived to be 10-14, while the rest of the perceived age groups have an increased chance of being searched or frisked compared to youth perceived to be 10-14.

Officer-initiated stops have a lower chance of involving searches or frisks compared to call for service stops. Stops with traffic violation as a reason for stop have lower chances of involving a search or frisk compared to stops initiated for reasonable suspicion. Stops with "Other" as a reason for stop have higher chances of involving a search or frisk compared to stops initiated due to reasonable suspicion.

ii. Chances of being handcuffed compared to the related comparison group

Figure 51. Change in Chance of Being Handcuffed[87]

Individuals perceived as Black or Hispanic/Latine(x) have a higher chance of being handcuffed compared to individuals perceived as White. Individuals perceived as Asian or Other Race have a lower chance of being handcuffed compared to individuals perceived as White. Individuals with no perceived disability have a lower chance of being handcuffed compared to individuals with a perceived disability. Individuals perceived as having limited/no English fluency have a higher chance of being handcuffed compared to individuals perceived to be fluent in English. Individuals perceived to be unhoused have an increased chance of being handcuffed compared to individuals perceived to be housed. Individuals perceived to be straight/heterosexual have a lower chance of being handcuffed compared to individuals perceived to be LGB+.

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87   See Table 1, *supra*, for a further explanation of independent variables included in the regression along with what they are being compared to (the comparison group).

Being perceived as either a cisgender woman/girl or non-cisgender lowers the chances of being handcuffed compared to individuals perceived as cisgender men/boys.

Youth perceived to be 1-9 and individuals perceived to be 65+ have a lower chance of being handcuffed compared to youth perceived to be 10-14, while the rest of the perceived age groups have a higher chance of being handcuffed compared to youth perceived to be 10-14 years old.

Stops that are officer-initiated have a lower chance of involving handcuffing compared to call for service stops. Stops with traffic violation as a reason for stop have a lower chance of involving handcuffing compared to stops initiated for reasonable suspicion. Stops with "Other" as a reason for stop have a higher chance of involving handcuffing compared to stops initiated due to reasonable suspicion.

iii. Chances of being detained compared to the related comparison group

Figure 52. Change in Chance of Being Detained[88]

Individuals perceived to be Black or Hispanic/Latine(x) have a higher chance of being detained compared to individuals perceived to be White. Individuals perceived to be Asian or Other Race have a lower chance of being detained compared to individuals perceived to be White. Individuals with no perceived disability have a higher chance of being detained compared to individuals with a perceived disability. Individuals perceived as having limited/no English fluency have a higher chance of being detained compared to individuals perceived to be fluent in English. Individuals perceived as unhoused have a higher chance of

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88   See Table 1, *supra*, for a further explanation of independent variables included in the regression along with what they are being compared to (the comparison group).

being detained compared to individuals perceived to be housed. Individuals perceived to be straight/heterosexual have a lower chance of being detained compared to individuals perceived to be LGB+.

Being perceived as a cisgender women/girl decreases the chance of being detained compared to cisgender men/boys. Being perceived as a non-cisgender individual increases the chance of being detained compared to cisgender men/boys.

Youth perceived to be 1-9 and individuals perceived to be 45-54, 55-64, and 65+ have a lower chance of being detained compared to youth perceived to be 10-14, while the rest of the perceived age groups have an increased chance of being detained compared to youth perceived to be 10-14.

Stops that are officer-initiated have a lower chance of including detainment compared to call for service stops. Stops with traffic violation or "Other" as the reason for stop have a lower chance of involving detainment compared to stops initiated for reasonable suspicion.

iv. Chances of being asked for consent to search compared to the related comparison group

Figure 53. Change in Chance of Being Asked to Search[89]

Individuals perceived to be Black or Hispanic/Latine(x) have a higher chance of being asked for consent to search compared to individuals perceived to be White. Individuals perceived to be Asian or Other Race have a lower chance of being asked for consent compared to individuals perceived to be White.

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89   See Table 1, *supra*, for a further explanation of independent variables included in the regression along with what they are being compared to (the comparison group).

Individuals with no perceived disability have a higher chance of being asked for consent compared to individuals with a perceived disability. Individuals perceived as having limited/no English fluency have a higher chance of being asked for consent compared to individuals perceived to be fluent in English. Individuals perceived to be unhoused have a higher chance of being asked for consent compared to individuals perceived to be housed. Individuals perceived to be straight/heterosexual have a lower chance of being asked for consent compared to individuals perceived to be LGB+.

Being perceived as a cisgender woman/girl or a non-cisgender individual decreases the chance of being asked for consent compared to being perceived as cisgender man/boy.

Youth perceived to be 1-9 and 65+ have a lower chance of being asked for consent compared to youth perceived to be 10-14 years old, while the rest of the perceived age groups have a higher chance of being asked for consent compared to youth perceived to be 10-14.

Stops that are officer-initiated have a lower chance of being asked for consent compared to call for service stops. Stops with traffic violation as a reason for stop have a lower chance of being asked for consent to search compared to stops initiated for reasonable suspicion. Stops with "Other" as a reason for stop have a higher chance of being asked for consent to search compared to stops initiated for reasonable suspicion.

i. Chances of experiencing use of force compared to the related comparison group

Figure 54. Change in Chance of Use of Force[90]

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90   See Table 1, *supra*, for a further explanation of independent variables included in the regression along with what they are being compared to (the comparison group).

Individuals perceived as Black or Hispanic/Latine(x) have a higher chance of experiencing force during a stop compared to individuals perceived as White. Individuals perceived as Asian or Other Race have a lower chance of experiencing force compared to individuals perceived as White.

Individuals with no perceived disability have a lower chance of experiencing force compared to individuals with a perceived disability. Individuals perceived as having limited/no English fluency have a higher chance of experiencing force compared to individuals perceived to be fluent in English. Individuals perceived to be unhoused have a higher chance of experiencing force compared to individuals perceived to be housed. Individuals perceived to be straight/heterosexual have a lower chance of experiencing force compared to individuals perceived to be LGB+.

Being perceived as a cisgender woman/girl or non-cisgender increases the chances of experiencing force compared to individuals perceived to be a cisgender man/boy.

Youth perceived to be 1-9 and individuals perceived to be 65+ have a lower chance of experiencing force compared to youth perceived to be 10-14, while the rest of the perceived age groups have a higher chance of experiencing force compared to youth perceived to be 10-14.

Officer-initiated stops have a lower chance of involving force compared to call for service stops. Stops with traffic violation as a reason for stop have a lower chance of involving force compared to stops initiated for reasonable suspicion. Stops with "Other" as a reason for stop have a higher chance of involving force compared to stops initiated for reasonable suspicion.

3. How do actions impact the odds of certain outcomes of stops when they begin with similar conditions?

a. Correlations

The general methods used to answer the first research question were used to answer this question. Correlations between the actions explored in the preceding analysis and the results of stop were calculated. Compared to the other results of stop, arrest had the strongest relationship with each of the actions. The strongest correlation was between handcuffing and arrest (.60), followed by force (.60),[91] searches and frisks (.52), detention (.39), and then asked for consent (.16).

Table 2. Correlations between Actions During Stop and Results of Stop

	Searched or Frisked	Handcuffed	Detention	Asked for Consent	Use of Force
Arrest	0.522	0.597	0.390	0.164	0.596
Citation	-0.311	-0.286	-0.271	-0.157	-0.290
No Action	0.061	-0.004	0.049	0.074	0.000
Other	0.151	0.137	0.138	0.069	0.139
Warning	-0.113	-0.156	-0.053	-0.007	-0.154

b. Regression Methods

Because each of the actions described in Table 2 correlated highly with arrest compared to the other reportable actions, what actions predict arrest was further investigated using the regression methods used in the preceding analysis. Force was omitted from the regression because it is a very similar variable to handcuffing and having such similar variables in one regression can lead to inaccurate results.

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91   This is expected because 96.20 percent of the cases of force are due to handcuffing.

Two regressions were conducted. The first analyzed the impact of demographics and characteristics of stop initiation on the chances of arrest. The second included all of the same variables from the first regression and adds the actions that were explored in the previous analysis. This strategy was used to better highlight the role of the variables of interest (the actions taken during stop) in the chances of arrest.

c. Regression Results

i. Change in the chance of being arrested, excluding actions during stop

Figure 55. Change in Chance of Being Arrested, Actions During Stop Excluded[92]

Individuals perceived to be Black or Hispanic/Latine(x) have a higher chance of being arrested compared to individuals perceived to be White. Individuals perceived to be Asian or Other Race have a lower chance of being arrested compared to individuals perceived to be White.

Individuals with no perceived disability have a higher chance of being arrested compared to individuals with a perceived disability. Individuals perceived as having limited/no English fluency have a higher chance of being arrested compared to individuals perceived to be fluent in English. Individuals perceived to be unhoused have a higher chance of being arrested compared to individuals perceived to be housed. Individuals perceived to be straight/heterosexual have a lower chance of being arrested compared to individuals perceived to be LGB+.

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92   See Table 1, *supra*, for a further explanation of independent variables included in the regression along with what they are being compared to (the comparison group).

Being perceived as a cisgender woman/girl or a non-cisgender individual decreases the chance of being arrested compared to individuals perceived to be cisgender men/boys.

Youth perceived to be 1-9, 15-17, 18-24, and individuals perceived to be 55-64, and 65+ have a lower chance of being arrested compared to youth perceived to be 10-14, while the rest of the perceived age groups have a higher chance of being arrested compared to youth perceived to be 10-14.

Stops that are officer-initiated have a lower chance of involving arrest compared to call for service stops. Stops with traffic violation as a reason for stop have a lower chance of involving arrest compared to stops initiated for reasonable suspicion. Stops with "Other" as a reason for stop have a higher chance of involving arrest compared to stops initiated for reasonable suspicion.

ii. Change in the chance of being arrested compared to the related comparison group, actions during stop included

Figure 56. Change in Chance of Being Arrested, Actions During Stop Included[93]

To examine the influence of actions during a stop, a follow up regression was conducted. The follow up regression is identical to the prior one, with the addition of the added actions-during-a-stop variables.

With respect to the newly added actions variables, being searched or frisked, handcuffed, or detained increases the chances of the stop resulting in an arrest. On the other hand, an officer asking for consent to

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93   See Table 1, *supra*, for a further explanation of independent variables included in the regression along with what they are being compared to (the comparison group).

search decreases the chances of the stop resulting in an arrest.

All the general conclusions from the previous regression were the same for the regression after including the actions-during-a-stop variables except for the following: individuals perceived to be 55-64, Black, and non-cisgender. When actions variables are considered, being perceived as Black reduces the chance of arrest compared to individuals perceived to be White. Additionally, being perceived as age 55-64 increases the chance of arrest compared to youth perceived to be 10-14, and being perceived as non-cisgender increases the chance of arrest compared to being perceived as a cisgender man/boy. These switches in direction may be the result of some groups being handcuffed and searched more than others without an arrest following those actions, or, possibly equivalent, that some groups are handcuffed and searched more than others and that results in differences in arrests.[94]

For example, being perceived as Black has a strong positive indirect effect on being arrested *through* being handcuffed (1.12), search (0.54), and detention (0.36), meaning that those events are more likely to happen for Black individuals. In the arrest analysis Black shows a small negative direct effect (-0.22) on being arrested when the actions are included, but overall, the total effect (1.64) of being perceived as Black makes an individual more likely to be arrested. It is possible that the chance of arrest decreases between the two regressions because individuals perceived to be Black are handcuffed and searched more than their White counterparts, without an arrest following those actions. Thus, it is plausible that police handcuff or search individuals perceived to be Black more often in stops that are less likely to result in an arrest. Therefore, when focusing on stops involving handcuffing or searching an individual, individuals perceived to be Black have a lower chance of being arrested than individuals perceived to be White. We can investigate that finding further by including interactions or Black and these four actions to understand whether they affect Black people more or less than other groups.

d. Interaction Between Individuals Perceived as Black and Actions

The previous regression analyses look at the independent effect of one variable at a time. However, this next analysis captures how two factors, race and the action taken, combine to shape the outcome. This model tests whether particular actions impact individuals perceived as Black differently than they impact individuals perceived as White. While all variables included in the earlier regressions were tested, results are only discussed for race and the four interactions, Black*Asked for Consent, Black*Detention, Black*Searched or Frisked, and Black*Handcuffing (Figure 57).

In this regression, we observe when no search, handcuffing, detention, or consent is involved in a stop, individuals perceived as Black have a higher chance of being arrested than a White individual, holding all other variables in the regression constant.

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94   This could be explained as a suppression effect or a mediation effect, and both may be present simultaneously. When suppression occurs, the new variable clarifies the underlying relationship between the old variable and the outcome by reducing noise, clarifying the underlying relationship. No test exists to test for suppression, but the reversal of signs is indicative of suppression. When mediation is present the old variables impact on the outcome runs through a new variable, which tends to decrease the size of the old variables coefficient. In the case of those perceived Black, Sobel tests indicate that mediation is present. The two effects may be *statistically* equivalent in some regression models. (See MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, *Equivalence of the Mediation, Confounding and Suppression Effect* (Dec. 2000) 1 Prevention Sci. 173-81 <https://tinyurl.com/44zxpkx9> [as of Dec. 18, 2025.)

Figure 57. Change in Chance of Arrest, Interactions Included[95]

However, the interactions provide additional information for cases where one of those actions does occur, as shown in Figure 57. In the case of being handcuffed, while individuals perceived as Black are more likely to be arrested when no handcuffing occurs, in cases where handcuffing does occur, that difference is smaller (signaled by the negative sign on the Black*Handcuffing variable). While individuals perceived as Black are still more likely to be arrested, there is a smaller difference when the two are handcuffed. As such, we can infer that individuals perceived as Black who are handcuffed have a higher chance than individuals perceived as White to be released from handcuffed detention afterwards.

The results are similar for search or frisk and detention. In general, the chances of being arrested are higher for an individual perceived as Black than an individual perceived as White. However, when a search/frisk or detention occurs, while the chances of arrest for the individual perceived as Black are still higher, the difference with an individual perceived as White is smaller (again, signaled by the negative sign on each of these interaction terms). In contrast, the interaction term for being perceived as Black and asked for consent is positive. As such, while an individual perceived as Black has a higher chance of being arrested in stops where consent for a search is not asked for, and in those stops where it does occur the chances of arrest is even higher relative to individuals perceived as White.

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95   See Table 2, *supra*, for a further explanation of independent variables included in the regression along with what they are being compared to (the comparison group).

E. Analysis of Disparities in *Terry* Frisks by Perceived Racial and Identity Group

As noted in Section II.D above, a *Terry v. Ohio* pat/frisk (hereafter *Terry* frisk) is a weapons patdown, occurring when an officer pats down an individual's clothing to determine whether based on the officer's reasonable suspicion the individual is armed.[96] *Terry* frisks only require an officer to have a reasonable suspicion the person is armed and dangerous.[97] Even if a law enforcement officer has such reasonable suspicion during a *Terry* frisk, it does not mean that the stop is free from racial or identity profiling. Because there is a possibility that there are demographic disparities in such stops, it is important for the Board to examine any patterns or disparities in *Terry* frisk data.

In 2024, Terry *frisks were most common in stops of individuals perceived to be Black or Hispanic/Latine(x), individuals perceived to be transgender, individuals perceived to be between 10-17 years old, and individuals perceived to be LGB+.*

Terry *frisks were also more common in stops of individuals perceived to have a disability, have limited or no English fluency, or to be unhoused.*

The Board has previously discussed and made recommendations that officers have probable cause for all stops or searches, including *Terry* frisks.[98] This year, the Board analyzes the data behind *Terry* frisks more closely to illuminate the issues surrounding this law enforcement practice and how such actions relate to racial and identity profiling. The Board recognizes that this analysis can help identify potential biases and inform more equitable approaches to public safety.

In 2024, officers performed *Terry* frisks in 88,697 stops (1.75% of all stops, 14.59% of all searches). This section analyzes disparities in *Terry* frisks based on perceived racial and identity factors including race, gender, age, disability status, sexual orientation, housing status, and English proficiency.

1. Race

Officers conducted *Terry* frisks most frequently in stops of individuals perceived to be Black (3.32% of all stops, 17.45% of all searches, 20,347 stops) and individuals perceived to be Hispanic/Latine(x) (2.17% of all stops, 16.66% of all searches, 47,672 stops). *Terry* frisks were less common in stops of individuals perceived to be Middle Eastern/South Asian (0.48% of all stops, 13.31% of all searches, 1,322 stops) and individuals perceived as Asian (0.50% of all stops, 11.03% of all searches, 1,496 stops).

2. Gender

Officers conducted *Terry* frisks most frequently in stops of individuals perceived to be transgender men/boys (3.49% of all stops, 16.73% of all searches, 451 stops), individuals perceived to be transgender women/girls (2.18% of all stops, 11.17% of all searches, 158 stops) and individuals perceived as cisgender males (2.12% of all stops, 15.44% of all searches, 76,494 stops). *Terry* frisks were less common in stops of individuals perceived to be cisgender females (0.79% of all stops, 10.78% of all searches, 11,156 stops) and individuals perceived as nonbinary (1.08% of all stops, 9.46% of all searches, 438 stops). Individuals perceived as cisgender males fell in the middle.

3. Age

Terry frisks were most common in stops of individuals perceived to be ages 10-14 (6.93% of all stops, 26.29% of all searches, 946 stops) and individuals perceived to be 15-17 (6.88% of all stops, 29.38% of all searches, 4,958 stops) and least common in stops of individuals perceived to be 65+ (0.52% of all stops, 10.47% of all searches, 1,053 stops) and individuals perceived to be 55-64 (0.86% of all stops, 10.68% of all searches, 3,573 stops).

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96   Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(16)(B)(9); *Terry v. Ohio* (1968) 392 U.S. 1.
97   See *Terry v. Ohio* (1968) 392 U.S. 1.
98   See Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *2023 Report*, *supra* note 33, at p. 96 fn. 326.

4. Disability

Officers conducted *Terry* frisks more frequently in stops of individuals perceived to have a disability (6.82% of all stops, 16.82% of all searches, 3,589 stops) compared to stops of individuals perceived to not have a disability (1.70% of all stops, 14.51% of all searches, 85,108 stops).

5. Sexual Orientation

Terry frisks were conducted more frequently in stops of individuals perceived to be LGB+,[99] but less frequently as a share of searches (2.14% of all stops, 10.97% of all searches, 1,144 stops) compared to stops of individuals perceived to be straight (1.75% of all stops, 14.66% of all searches, 87,553 stops).

6. Housing Status

Terry frisks were more frequent in stops of individuals perceived to be unhoused (4.93% of all stops, 11.47% of all searches, 8,943 stops) compared to stops of individuals perceived to be housed (1.63% of all stops, 15.05% of all searches, 79,754 stops).

7. English Fluency

Officers conducted *Terry* frisks slightly more frequently in stops of individuals perceived to have limited/ no English fluency (1.94% of all stops, 14.63% of all searches, 6,639 stops) compared to stops of individuals perceived to be fluent in English (1.74% of all stops, 14.18% of all searches, 82,058 stops).

F. Comparison of Stop Duration, Actions Taken During Stop, and Result of Stop by Perceived Racial and Identity Group

The length of a stop can provide insights into whether bias may have affected policing, especially in cases where no action is taken as a result of the stop. For example, longer stops could indicate bias if more actions are taken during a stop, such as curbside detainment or searches, but no action is ultimately taken as a result of the stop, such as an arrest, citation, or warning. Thus, the Board continues to build on its prior work in reviewing the data related to stop duration, including the analysis of duration of stops of youth in the 2025 Report,[100] to analyze stop duration by demographic group for the purpose of understanding of how public safety measures affect groups differently and support equitable law enforcement practices.

In 2024, the average duration of all stops was 19 minutes (SD= 55 minutes, range = 1-1,440 minutes). Stops where no action was taken were generally shorter, lasting an average of 13 minutes (SD= 46 minutes, range= 1-1,1440 minutes). The average duration for stops where no action occurred as a result of stop is 19 minutes (SD= 67 minutes, range = 1,440 minutes).

It is important to note that stop duration can be impacted by several factors, such as the number of actions taken, the types of actions taken, reason for stop, etc. For instance, an analysis of average stop duration for each action taken during stop demonstrated that the more severe actions, such as firearm discharge, were about 10 times longer (131 minutes, SD= 240 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes) than stops where no action was taken during stop (13 minutes, SD= 46 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes). Accordingly, the analyses below include the average stop durations by demographic, as well as the average duration of stops where no action was taken during the stop and where no action was taken as a result of the stop.

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99   As noted above, starting in this year of RIPA data collection (2024), the "LGBT" data element was changed to "LGB+" to add clarity to the reporting of perceived sexual orientation and perceived gender. Officers are required to report perceived sexual orientation and perceived gender in separate data elements in each stop data report. This change was implemented through the 2021-2022 rulemaking related to the data collection that took effect on January 1, 2024. (Cal. Dep't. of Just., *Title 11. Law Division 1. Attorney General Chapter 19. Racial and Identity Profiling Act of 2015 Initial Statement of Reasons*, *supra* note 52, pp. 8-9.)

100   See, e.g., Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2025) ("*2025 Report*"), p. 96 fn. 326 <https://oag. ca.gov/system/files/media/ ripa-board-report-2025.pdf> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

1. Race and Ethnicity

In 2024, the longest average stop durations were reported in stops of individuals perceived to be Native American (27 minutes, SD= 76 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes) and individuals perceived to be Black (22 minutes, SD= 45 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes). The shortest average stop duration was reported in stops of individuals perceived to be Asian (15 minutes, SD= 45 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes) and individuals perceived to be Middle Eastern/South Asian (16 minutes, SD= 53 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes).

No Action During Stop. Stops where no action was taken during the stop were longest for individuals perceived to be Native American (15 minutes, SD= 62 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes) and individuals perceived to be Pacific Islander individuals (15 minutes, SD=66 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes). Stops where no action was taken during the stop were shortest for individuals perceived to be Asian (12 minutes, SD= 38 minutes, range= 1-,1440 minutes), individuals perceived to be Multiracial (12 minutes, SD= 36 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes), and individuals perceived to be White (12 minutes, SD= 48 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes).

No Action As a Result of Stop. Stops where no action was taken as a result of stop were longest for individuals perceived to be Native American (28 minutes, SD= 102 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes) and individuals perceived to be Pacific Islander individuals (28 minutes, SD= 99 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes) and shortest for individuals perceived to be Asian (17 minutes, SD= 47 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes) and individuals perceived to be Multiracial (17 minutes, SD= 51 minutes, 1-1,440 minutes).

2. Gender

Officers reported the longest average stop durations for stops of individuals perceived to be transgender women/girls (29 minutes, SD= 85 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes) and individuals perceived to be transgender men/boys (29 minutes, SD= 81 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes). The shortest average stop durations were reported in stops of individuals perceived to be nonbinary (16 minutes, SD= 44 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes) and individuals perceived to be cisgender female (17 minutes, range= 52 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes).

No Action During Stop. Stops where no action was taken during the stop were longest for individuals perceived to be transgender men/boys (16 minutes, SD= 70 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes) and individuals perceived to be transgender women/girls (15 minutes, SD= 67 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes). They were shortest for individuals perceived to be nonbinary (11 minutes, SD= 32 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes) and individuals perceived to be cisgender females (12 minutes, SD= 43 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes).

No Action As a Result of Stop. Stops where no action was taken as a result of stop were longest for individuals perceived to be transgender men/boys (25 minutes, SD= 98 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes) and individuals perceived to be transgender women/girls (23 minutes, SD= 81 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes). They were shortest for individuals perceived to be nonbinary (16 minutes, SD= 57 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes) and individuals perceived to be cisgender males (19 minutes, SD= 67 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes).

3. Age

Officers reported the longest average stop durations for stops of individuals perceived to be ages 10-14 (40 minutes, SD= 69 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes) and individuals perceived to be 15-17 years old (31 minutes, SD= 66 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes). The shortest average stop durations were reported in stops of individuals perceived to be 65+ (16 minutes, SD= 50 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes) and individuals perceived to be 55-64 years old (17 minutes, SD= 52 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes).

No Action During Stop. Stops where no action was taken during the stop were longest for individuals perceived to be ages 10-14 (25 minutes, SD= 48 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes) and individuals perceived to be 15-17 (17 minutes, SD= 53 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes). They were shortest for individuals perceived to be 65+ (12 minutes, SD= 42 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes) and every age group perceived to be 18-64 (all 13 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes, see table for SDs).

No Action As a Result of Stop. Stops where no action was taken as a result of stop were longest for individuals perceived to be 10-14 (31 minutes, SD= 79 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes) and individuals perceived to be 15-17 years old (29 minutes, SD= 70, range = 1-1,440), and shortest for every perceived age group between 18-65+.

4. Disability

Stops of individuals perceived to have a disability were reported to be more than twice as long (45 minutes, SD= 87 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes) as individuals perceived to not have a disability (19 minutes, SD= 55 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes).

No Action During Stop or As a Result of Stop. In stops where there was no action during stop and no action as a result of stop, officers reported longer stop durations in stops of individuals perceived to have a disability compared to stops of individuals perceived to have no disability. Officers stopped individuals perceived to have a disability for an average of 26 minutes (SD= 75 minutes, range = 1-1,440 minutes) and those perceived to have no disability for an average of 19 minutes (SD = 67 minutes, range = 1-1,440 minutes) when no action was taken as a result of stop. Officers stopped individuals perceived to have a disability for 23 minutes (SD = 70 minutes, range = 1-1,440 minutes) and individuals perceived to not have a disability for 13 minutes (SD = 46 minutes, range = 1-1,440 minutes) when no action was taken during the stop.

5. Sexual Orientation

Officers stopped individuals perceived to be LGB+ (25 minutes, SD= 61 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes) for, on average 6 minutes longer, than individuals perceived to be straight (19 minutes, SD= 55 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes).

No Action During Stop. Officers reported similar average stop lengths for both individuals perceived to be LGB+ and those perceived to be straight in stops where no actions were taken during the stop. Officers stopped individuals perceived to be LGB+ for 13 minutes (SD= 42 minutes, range = 1-1,440 minutes) and individuals perceived to be straight for 13 minutes (SD= 46 minutes, range = 1-1,440 minutes).

No Action As a Result of Stop. Officers reported a slightly longer average stop length in stops where no actions were taken as a result of stop for individuals perceived to be LGB+ (20 minutes, SD= 61 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes) compared to individuals perceived to be straight (19 minutes, SD= 67 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes).

6. Housing Status

Officers reported longer stop durations in stops of individuals perceived to be unhoused (34 minutes, SD= 73 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes) compared to individuals perceived to be housed (18 minutes, SD= 54 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes).

No Action During Stop or As a Result of Stop. In stops where there is no action during stop and no action as a result of stop, officers reported slightly higher stop durations in stops of individuals perceived to be unhoused compared to stops of individuals perceived to be housed. Officers stopped individuals perceived to be unhoused for about 20 minutes (SD = 55 minutes, range = 1-1,440 minutes) and individuals perceived

to be housed for approximately 19 minutes (SD = 68 minutes, range = 1-1,440 minutes) when no actions were taken as a result of stop. Officers stopped individuals perceived to be unhoused for 19 minutes (SD= 46 minutes, range = 1-1,440 minutes) and individuals perceived to be housed for 13 minutes (SD= 46 minutes, range = 1-1,440 minutes) when no actions were taken during a stop.

7. English Fluency

Officers reported relatively similar stop durations for both individuals perceived to be fluent in English and individuals perceived to have limited/no English fluency. However, officers stopped individuals perceived to have limited/no English fluency (21 minutes, SD= 47 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes) for a slightly longer duration compared to individuals perceived to be fluent in English (19 minutes, SD= 55 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes).

No Action During Stop. Officers reported the same average stop length for both individuals perceived to be fluent in English and individuals perceived to have limited/no English fluency in stops where no actions were taken during the stop. Officers stopped individuals perceived to have limited English fluency for 13 minutes (SD= 35 minutes, range = 1-1,440 minutes) and individuals perceived to be fluent in English for 13 minutes (SD= 46 minutes, range = 1-1,440 minutes).

No Action As a Result of Stop. Officers reported a slightly longer average stop length when no actions were taken as a result of stop for individuals with limited/no English fluency (20 minutes, SD= 51 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes) compared to individuals perceived to be fluent in English (19 minutes, SD= 68 minutes, range= 1-1,440 minutes).

G. Analysis of Disparities in Individuals Perceived to Have Limited English Fluency by Perceived Racial and Identity Group

California's population is diverse, with more than 200 languages and dialects spoken in the state. According to the U.S. Census Bureau (2015), almost 44% of California households speak a language other than English, and nearly seven million Californians (19%) report speaking English "less than very well."[101] This year, the Board analyzes disparities based on perceived English fluency by perceived racial and identity group to better understand how language barriers may impact interactions with law enforcement. The Board's analysis is particularly relevant this year as it considers the impact of federal immigration enforcement actions on California citizens.[102]

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101   Cal. Office of the Att'y Gen., *Limited English Proficient Consumers* <https://oag.ca.gov/consumers/limited-english> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

102   As noted in the Introduction, the Board held a Board meeting on October 9, 2025, to explore the impact of federal immigrations enforcement efforts and racial and identity profiling. For more information about this meeting, please see the Introduction of this Report.

Table 3. Limited/No English Fluency Stops by Identity Group

Identity Group	Subgroup	Count	Percent
Race/Ethnicity	Asian	26,996	9.08%
	Black	9,297	1.52%
	Hispanic/Latine(x)	242,089	11.04%
	Middle Eastern/South Asian	21,161	7.69%
	Multiracial	2,993	4.79%
	Native American	515	3.88%
	Pacific Islander	828	3.1%
	White	37,692	2.38%
Gender	Cisgender Woman/Girl	68,716	4.87%
	Cisgender Man/Boy	270,426	7.52%
	Nonbinary Person	1,395	3.45%
	Transgender Man/Boy	716	5.53%
	Transgender Woman/Girl	318	4.38%
Sexual Orientation	LGB+	2,362	4.43%
	Straight/Heterosexual	339,209	6.77%
Age Group	1-9 Years	500	11.42%
	10-14 Years	835	6.11%
	15-17 Years	3,185	4.42%
	18-24 Years	34,773	4.53%
	25-34 Years	93,687	6.03%
	35-44 Years	91,672	7.35%
	45-54 Years	67,829	8.63%
	55-64 Years	34,593	8.28%
	65+ Years	14,497	7.15%
Disability	Disability	4,264	8.1%
	No Disability	337,307	6.73%
Housing Status	Housed	328,150	6.72%
	Unhoused	13,421	7.4%
Total		341,571	6.74%

1. Race

Officers perceived limited or no English fluency most often in stops of individuals perceived to be Hispanic/Latine(x) (11.04%, 242,089) and individuals perceived to be Asian (9.08%, 26,996). Officers reported limited English fluency least often in stops of individuals perceived to be Black (1.52%, 9,297) and individuals perceived to be White (2.38%, 37,692).

2. Gender

Men/boys, whether cisgender (7.52%, 270,426 stops) or transgender (5.53%, 716 stops) were the most likely to be perceived as limited-English speakers, compared to women/girls (4.87%, 68,716 stops of individuals perceived to be cisgender women/girls and 4.38%, 318 stops of indivduals perceived to be transgender) and non-binary individuals (3.45%, 1,395 stops).

3. Age

Across all demographic categories—including race, gender, disability status, sexual orientation, and housing status—individuals perceived to be 1-9 years old were most likely to be perceived as having limited or no English fluency (11.42%, 500 stops). The lowest rate of perceived limited-English speakers was among individuals perceived to be between 15 and 17 years old (4.42%, 3,185 stops).

4. Disability

Individuals with a perceived disability were more likely to be perceived as being limited-English speakers (8.1%, 4,264) compared to those without a perceived disability (6.73%, 337,307).

5. Sexual Orientation

Officers were more likely to perceive limited English fluency for those they perceived to be straight/heterosexual (6.77%, 339,209 stops) than those perceived to be LGB+ (4.43%, 2,362 stops).

6. Housing Status

Individuals perceived to be unhoused were more likely to be perceived as having limited English fluency (7.4%, 13,421 stops) than those that are housed (6.72%, 328,150 stops).

H. Impact of Agency and Regional Characteristics on Stop Outcomes

This year, the Board analyzes the RIPA stop data by agency and region to understand how agency and regional characteristics impact stops.[103] The Board looks first at the intersections of race, region, and agency type, then at the intersections of actions taken during and as a result of stops by region, and finally uses of limited force by region and agency type. These analyses are critical to interpreting stop data and informing effective police practices that promote public safety.

1. Race

The rate of stops for a particular race or ethnicity can be compared to their share of the population in a particular county to measure whether individuals of a certain race or ethnicity are stopped more or less

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103   As multiple agencies exist within counties, which can make their results more similar to each other than to agencies, two-level regression model was used: a first level of agencies and a second level of counties as the grouping variables. This model allows the average outcome to vary between counties while estimating the effect of our predictors across all agencies. The analysis is limited to agencies with 100 or more stops, and accounts for regional differences with separate variables for the percentage of the population that is White alone, percentage of the population that is Black alone, percentage of the population that is Hispanic/Latine(x) alone, and the percentage of the population that is Asian alone. The analysis also included the total county population and the county median income, and whether the county is metropolitan, micropolitan, or rural. More information regarding this regression analysis can be found in Appendix G.

than their share of the population would predict at the county level. Applying this analysis to the 2024 stop data reveals disparities in the rates which individuals perceived to be White, Black, and Hispanic/Latine(x) are stopped in Northern and Southern California.

Specifically, the 2024 stop data show that individuals perceived as Black were stopped at a rate higher than their share of the county population would predict most often in the Bay Area and neighboring counties, particularly Solano (28.84%), Alameda (28.55%), and Sacramento (25.03). Trinity (-5%), Del Norte (-.01%), and Lassen (-.001%) counties each stopped fewer individuals perceived as Black than the share of their county's population.

Figure 58. Difference between County Populations and Stops of Individuals Perceived as Black

Some counties in Northern California show differences from counties in Southern California in the stop rates of individuals perceived to be Hispanic/Latine(x). In some counties in Northern California, individuals perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x) tended to account for a smaller percentage of stops, while some counties in Southern California tended to stop a disproportionately high number of individuals perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x). For example, individuals perceived to be Hispanic/Latine(x) were most overrepresented in stops occurring in Santa Clara County (18.61%), while Del Norte County had the largest under representation of individuals perceived to be Hispanic/Latine(x) in their 2024 stops (-13.42%).

Figure 59. Difference between County Populations and Stops of Individuals Perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x)

Some counties in Northern California show differences from counties in Southern California in stops of individuals perceived as White, while counties in the Bay Area and further south tended to stop a disproportionate lower share of individuals perceived to be White. For example, Lassen (18.07%), Alpine (15.63%) and Del Norte (14.47%) counties stopped individuals perceived as White at the highest rates above their county population, while Marin County (13.81%) stopped individuals perceived to be White the least often compared to their share of the county population.

Figure 60. Difference between County Populations and Stops of Individuals Perceived as White

A regression analysis of the 2024 also shows that individuals perceived as Black, Hispanic/Latine(x), or White are stopped at different rates depending on the type of agency (i.e., police department, sheriff's department, K-12 school, college, etc.). Only results that reach statistical significance will be discussed.

Table 4. Regression results for Race Differences[104]

Variable	White	Black	Hispanic
Police Department	-0.04***	0.02***	0.02*
K-12 School	-0.12**	0.07***	0.09
Colleges	-0.04	0.08***	-0.09**
Other Agency Types	0.04	0.06	-0.07
Unique Officers (logged)	-0.01	0.02***	-0.01
County White Population (%)	-0.36	-0.23	0.36
County Black Population (%)	-0.17	0.63*	-0.38
County Hispanic/Latine(x) Population (%)	-0.37	-0.26	0.35
County Asian Population (%)	-0.34	-0.16	0.76
County Population (logged)	-0.02	0	-0.01
County Median Income (logged)	-0.03	0.03*	-0.03
Micropolitan Statistical Area	0.05	-0.02	-0.04*
Rural	0.01	-0.01	-0.05

Two variables reach statistical significance for the regression analyzing which agencies stop white individuals at a higher rate than their share of the county population would predict. Both police departments and K-12 schools have a lower rate of stopping individuals perceived as White than would be predicted by their populations in the county compared to sheriff's departments.

Regression results indicate that individuals perceived as Black are overrepresented among stops for police, K-12 schools, and colleges, compared to sheriff's departments. Large police departments, regardless of type, also top a disproportionate share of individuals perceived as Black. In larger departments, a larger share of their stops tended to be of individuals perceived as Black than the percentage of Black individuals in their counties.

Regional facts show some significant differences too. Counties with a larger total share of Black population tend to see a greater overrepresentation in stops, though the effect is only slightly significant. In addition, counties with higher median incomes tend to stop individuals perceived as Black at a higher rate.

Police departments tend to have a greater overrepresentation of stops of individuals perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x) than sheriff's departments, holding all else constant. On the other hand, college police departments tend to have a lower share of their stops occur for Hispanic/Latine(x) individuals than the percentage of their counties that are Hispanic/Latine(x). Finally, micropolitan areas[105] see individuals perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x)s underrepresented among their stops, compared to metropolitan statistical areas.

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104   The asterisks in Table 4 and Table 5 represent the p value. The p value represents the level of statistical significance of the finding. In this report, *** represents a p value of ≤ .01, ** represents a p value of ≤ .05, and * represents a p value of ≤ .10. The smaller the p value, the less likely the finding presented has occurred by random chance. For example, if the p value is .04, we can say there is a 4% chance the finding occurred by random chance.

105   Metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas are defined by the United State Census Bureau. "Metropolitan statistical areas" are urbanized areas with a population of over 50,000 residents and the surrounding counties with strong commuting ties. "Micropolitan statistical areas" are urban clusters with 10,000-49,999 residents in that cluster, and the surrounding counties.

Overall, there is little evidence that regional factors impact the racial patterns studied here. In particular, county demographics showed weak and inconsistent results on their correlation with stop dynamics. Only variables related to agency type were significant across two or more regressions. With respect to agency type, the most consistent results arise from police departments. Compared to sheriff's departments, police departments appear to stop more perceived Black and Hispanic/Latine(x) residents, and fewer White residents, than their county populations would predict.

2. Outcomes or Processes of Stops

The 2024 stop data also indicate differences at the county level in the actions taken during stops and the arrest rates resulting from stops.

While one or more actions were taken in less than fifty percent of stops across the state, wide variation is shown across counties. Trinity (81.97%), Del Norte (58.64%), and Lake (57.16%) counties had the highest rates of stops with at least one action when agencies are aggregated to the county level, while Alpine (11.92%) and Napa (14.72%) counties had the lowest.

Figure 61. Percentage of Stops with One or More Actions

Consent-only searches were distributed fairly evenly across counties. Most consent-only searches were concentrated in Mariposa County (12.09%), followed by Lake County (6.87%) and Orange County (6.62%). Sierra and Trinity County each report zero stops involving a consent-only search.

Figure 62. Percentage of Stops with Consent Only Search

Arrest rates varied widely across the entire state. The Northern Coast tended to have higher arrest rates compared to other areas of the state. Trinity (61.48%) and Del Norte (49.31%) counties reported the highest arrest rates, followed by Glenn (34.12%) and Yuba (33.07%) counties. Conversely, agencies across Alpine (3.89%), Imperial (7.91%) and Amador (9.97%) counties reported the lowest arrest rates in 2024.

Figure 63. Percentage of Arrest

3. Percentage of Stops with Limited Force

Limited force[106] was the most common type of force reported in 2024. In total, 15.22 percent of stops in 2024 featured limited force. Three counties on the Northern Coast had the highest rates of stops featuring limited force: Trinity (38.52%), Del Norte (30.6%), and Humboldt (30.01%) County. No other county reported a rate of limited force above thirty percent in 2024. Alpine County reported the lowest rate of limited force in 2024 (2.9%).

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106   As noted above, "limited force" includes handcuffing, other contact, and removal from a vehicle with physical contact. (See note 32, *supra*, citing Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 999.226, subd. (a)(17); see Pen. Code, § 16780, subd. (a).)

Figure 64. Percentage of Stops with Limited Force

Table 5. Results for all 4 sets of regressions on stop outcomes or processes[107]

Variable	Arrest	One or More Actions	Consent Only Search	Use of Force
Police Department	0.01	-0.06**	-0.01**	0.01
K-12 School	0.08	0.04	-0.02***	0
Colleges	-0.03	-0.04	-0.01*	0.02
Other Agency Types	0.02	0.05	-0.02***	0.01
Unique Officers (logged)	0.02**	0.03***	0	0.02***
County White Population (%)	0.53	0.44	0.05	0.47
County Black Population (%)	0.36	-0.35	-0.04	0.82
County Hispanic Population (%)	0.43	0.3	0.06	0.38
County Asian Population (%)	0.61	0.29	0.08	0.54
County Population (logged)	-0.04*	-0.01	0	-0.03**
County Median Income (logged)	-0.08**	-0.08	-0.01	-0.06**
Micropolitan Statistical Area	0.07*	0.14***	0.01	0.08**
Rural	-0.01	0	0.01	0.01

107   The asterisks in Table 4 and Table 5 represent the p value. The p value represents the level of statistical significance of the finding. In this report, *** represents a p value of ≤ .01, ** represents a p value of ≤ .05, and * represents a p value of ≤ .10. The smaller the p value, the less likely the finding presented has occurred by random chance. For example, if the p value is .04, we can say there is a 4% chance the finding occurred by random chance.

Larger police departments tended to report a higher percentage of stops end in arrest in 2024, holding agency and regional characteristics constant. Similarly, agencies in counties with a larger total population or a higher median income tended to report a lower share of stops ending in arrest. In contrast, agencies in counties within micropolitan statistical areas[108] tended to report higher arrest rates than agencies in metropolitan statistical areas.

Holding all else constant, police departments reported more stops where an action was taken compared to sheriff's departments in 2024. Larger police departments tended to report more stops where at least one action was taken. Additionally, agencies in counties within micropolitan statistical areas tended to report more stops where at least one action was taken, compared to agencies in metropolitan statistical areas.

Consent-only searches only showed significant differences within agency type, not by region. Specifically, police departments, K-12 schools, colleges, and other agencies each had lower rates of consent-only search than sheriff's departments.

Use of force showed many similarities to arrest rates in 2024. Larger police departments tended to use force in a larger share of cases, holding all else constant. At the regional level, agencies in counties with larger populations tended to use force less frequently. In addition, agencies in counties that have higher median incomes also tended to use force at lower rates than counties with lower median income. Finally, agencies in counties within micropolitan statistical areas tended to use force in a lower share of stops than agencies located in metropolitan statistical areas.

Taking these analyses together, we see evidence that county demographics and regional factors have an influence on how stops proceed. For instance, stops ending in arrests or the use of force occur at lower rates in counties that have larger populations or have higher median incomes. In addition, micropolitan statistical areas have higher rates of stops ending in arrest, more stops featuring at least one action, and a higher rate of stops with limited force used. Finally, with regard to agency characteristics, sheriff's departments use consent only searches during stops at a higher rate than all other agency types studied.

V. Policy Recommendations

While the RIPA Board strives to provide a report with informative and relevant data analyses, it is aware that both law enforcement agencies and the public would benefit from additional access to the stop data that could be run through additional analysis. To that end, the Board recommends that DOJ create a RIPA data dashboard that is accessible to the public.

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108   As noted above, "micropolitan statistical areas" are urban clusters with 10,000-49,999 residents in that cluster, and the surrounding counties. (See note 105, *supra*.)

CIVILIAN COMPLAINTS

I. Introduction

Each year, the RIPA Report highlights trends and data related to complaints by citizens about law enforcement. This data is significant, because it shows both trends within individual agencies by complaint type and differences in policies across agencies that may impact the complaint process. This section examines complaint data submitted by the 526 agencies subject to RIPA's stop data reporting requirements (hereafter RIPA agencies) and provides a status update on the RIPA Board's past recommendation that law enforcement agencies remove deterrent language from civilian complaint forms.

II. 2024 Civilian Complaint Data

In 2024, as in prior years, the Board reviews the complaint data all of the RIPA agencies, which include municipal and district police departments, county sheriff's departments, the California Highway Patrol, district attorney offices, K-12 school district police departments, University of California law enforcement, California State Universities law enforcement, and California Community Colleges law enforcement.[109] The data reported by these 526 agencies is disaggregated below to identify the total number of complaints reported in 2024, the number and type of profiling allegations reported, and the outcome of the complaints, as well as a cross-year comparison showing the number of complaints reported by different agencies over time.

A. Overall Civilian Complaint Data Reported by RIPA Agencies

The 526 RIPA agencies reported receiving 13,004 total complaints in 2024. Roughly three-quarters of RIPA reporting agencies (407, or 77.38%) reported receiving one or more civilian complaints during 2024, while just under one-fourth of agencies reported that they did not receive any civilian complaints (119, or 22.62%).

Of the 13,004 total complaints against law enforcement reported in 2024, most complaints alleged non-criminal conduct (12,519, or 96.27%), followed by complaints alleging a misdemeanor offense (310, or 2.38%). Complaints alleging a felony offense were the least common (175, or 1.35%).

B. Civilian Complaints Alleging Racial or Identity Profiling Reported by RIPA Agencies

In 2024, a total of 173 RIPA agencies reported data to the California Department of Justice (CA DOJ) receiving civilian complaints alleging racial or identity profiling (32.89% of all reporting RIPA agencies, or 42.51% of agencies receiving one or more complaints). These 173 agencies reported 2,282 complaints alleging racial or identity profiling, constituting 17.55 percent of the total complaints reported by RIPA agencies.

Law enforcement agencies are also required to submit data categorizing profiling complaint allegations into nine categories: age, physical disability, sexual orientation, race/ethnicity, mental disability, gender, religion, gender identity/expression, and nationality. The vast majority of profiling complaint allegations reported in 2024 involved profiling on the basis of race and ethnicity (1,803, or 79%).

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109   For more information on the law enforcement agencies that are required to report under RIPA, see Cal. Code Regs. tit. 11, § 999.225 <https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ripa/stop-data-reg-final-text-110717.pdf > [as of Dec. 19, 2025].

Figure 65. Total Allegations of Racial and Identity Profiling Reported in 2024

C. **Dispositions of Civilian Complaints Reported by RIPA Agencies**

RIPA agencies must also report the disposition (i.e., outcome) of complaints to the DOJ. Complaint dispositions are categorized as: "Sustained," meaning that the investigation disclosed sufficient evidence to prove the truth of the allegation in the complaint by a preponderance of evidence; "Exonerated," meaning the investigation clearly established that the employee's actions that formed the basis of the complaint were not a violation of law or policy; "Not Sustained," meaning the investigation failed to disclose sufficient evidence to clearly prove or disprove the complaint's allegation; and "Unfounded," meaning the investigation clearly established that the allegation is not true.[110]

In 2024, RIPA agencies reported that a total of 9,745 complaints reached a disposition during the calendar year.[111] Among the 9,745 complaints that reached a disposition in 2024, 939 were sustained (9.64%), 1,655 were exonerated (16.98%), 1,162 were not sustained (11.92%), and 5,989 were deemed unfounded (61.46%).

A total of 1,552 racial or identity profiling complaints reached disposition in 2024. Of these, just 3 were sustained (0.19%). Of the remaining 1,549 complaints, 94 were exonerated (6.06%), 166 were not sustained (10.70%), and 1,289 were deemed unfounded (83.05%).

Figure 66 displays the distribution of disposition types within the 2024 data for (1) all complaints that reached disposition and (2) complaints of racial and identity profiling that reached disposition.[112]

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110   Pen. Code, § 13012, subd. (a)(5)(B).
111   It is important to note that not every complaint reached disposition during the same year it was initially reported; therefore, it is possible that at least some complaints that appeared in the 2024 disposition categories were first reported in 2023 or earlier.
112   For an agency-level breakdown of how many profiling complaints reached each disposition type in 2024, see Appendix Table A53.

Figure 66. Disposition Distribution of 2024 Complaints

Total Complaints Reaching a Disposition in 2024

939
9.64%

1,655
16.98%

5,989
61.46%

1,162
11.92%

Racial and Identity Complaints Reaching a Disposition in 2024

3
0.19%

94
6.06%

1,289
83.05%

166
10.70%

Legend:
- Unfounded
- Not Sustained
- Exonerated
- Sustained

The Board is concerned that only three out of the 1,552 racial and identity profiling complaints that reached a disposition in 2024 were sustained. The low number of sustained racial and identity profiling complaints raises questions about RIPA agencies' methods of investigating and adjudicating such complaints. In the coming years, the Board plans take a closer look at RIPA agencies' internal processes for collecting, investigating, and deciding the outcome of these complaints to determine what factors may be contributing to this disparity.

D. Cross-Year Comparison

A cross-year comparison of civilian complaints data can aid law enforcement agencies in monitoring trends from year to year and ascertain the extent to which changes in agency policy or practice can positively or negatively impact the handling of complaints. For example, radical differences in complaints from year to year could result from changes in civilian complaint policies and procedures. However, it is important to note that, because complaint procedures are handled differently in each agency and there is not a uniform definition of what constitutes a civilian complaint, trends in complaint numbers may not necessarily reflect improvements to an agency's complaint processes. For example, a high number of complaints may demonstrate a robust complaint review process at one agency, while, for another, a lower number may be more indicative of failures to make complaints reasonably accessible to members of the public. For these reasons, trends in complaint numbers must be viewed in relation to individual agencies' policies.

1. RIPA Complaint Data by Waves

To assist the large and diverse array of individual law enforcement agencies in California in implementing stop data requirements as smoothly as possible, RIPA structured the collection and reporting of stop and complaint data on a rolling basis, using the number of officers each agency employed in setting the timeline for reporting.[113] These groupings were informally termed "waves" due to the rolling nature of the data collection timeline.[114] This year's Report continues to analyze the RIPA complaint data using the wave designations.[115] This grouping allows for cross-year comparisons by agency size, and gives the Board and the public the ability to observe differences in policies and procedures that may have changed over time. The section below examines the data in these wave designations.

Figures 67 through 72 display the total number of complaints and the total number of complaints alleging racial and identity profiling submitted by all RIPA reporting agencies in Waves 1 through 3, across five years. Given that Wave 4 is over 400 agencies, aggregate cross-year comparisons are provided in the body of this section and the individual agency counts are provided in an appendix table.[116]

a. Wave 1 Agency Total Complaints Reported (2020-2024)

In 2024, Wave 1 agencies reported 6,410 civilian complaints. This constituted a 5.5 percent increase in the total number of civilian complaints reported relative to 2023 (6,076), a 40.76 percent relative to relative to 2022 (4,554), a 39.29 percent increase relative to 2021 (4,602), and 34.44 percent increase relative to 2020 (4,768).

Nevertheless, most Wave 1 agencies (5 out of 8) reported a decrease in the number of civilian complaints received in 2024, compared to 2023. The agency that experienced the largest decrease was San Bernadino County Sheriff's Department (24.00%, from 100 in 2023 to 76 in 2024), whereas the Los Angeles Police Department experienced the largest relative increase (13.74%, from 2,577 in 2023 to 2,931 in 2024).

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113   Gov. Code, § 12525.5, subd. (a)(2).

114   Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2019) ("*2019 Report*") p. 14 <oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ripa/ripa-board-report-2019.pdf> [as of Dec. 19, 2025]; Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, Annual Report (2020) ("*2020 Report*") p. 17 <https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ripa/ripa-board-report-2020.pdf> [as of Dec. 19, 2025]; Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2025) ("*2025 Report*") p. 162 <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/ripa-board-report-2025.pdf> [as of Dec. 10, 2025].

115   Agencies employing more than 1,000 peace officers ("Wave 1") were first required to begin collecting data, followed by agencies employing 667 or more, but less than 1,000, peace officers ("Wave 2"), agencies employing 334 or more, but less than 667, peace officers ("Wave 3"), and agencies employing 1 or more, but less than 334, peace officers ("Wave 4"). (Gov. Code § 12525.5, subd. (a)(2); Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *2019 Report*, *supra* note 114, at p. 14; Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *2020 Report*, *supra* note 114, at p. 18; Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2021) ("*2021 Report*") pp. 8, 22 <https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ripa/ripa-board-report-2021.pdf> [as of Dec. 19, 2025]; Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2022) ("*2022 Report*") p. 27 <oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/ripa-board-report-2022.pdf> [as of Dec. 19, 2025]; Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2023) ("*2023 Report*") pp. 32, 173 <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/ripa-board-report-2023.pdf> [as of Dec. 19, 2025]; Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *2025 Report*, *supra* note 114, at p. 162.) Some agencies assigned to Wave 4 began collecting data early. (See Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *2022 Report*, *supra*, at pp. 13, 17, 147; Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *2023 Report*, *supra*, at p. 32; Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, Annual Report, *2025 Report*, *supra* note 114, at p. 162.)

116   Appendix, Table A52.

Figure 67. Wave 1 Total Complaints Reported (2020-2024)

Legend: 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024

X-axis: Total Annual Complaints Reported

California Highway Patrol: 295, 262, 211, 207, 192
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department: 985, 763, 742, 822, 753
Los Angeles Police Department: 2,097, 2,227, 2,379, 2,577, 2,931
Riverside County Sheriff's Department: 33, 19, 17, 1,181, 1,331
San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department: 118, 98, 109, 100, 76
San Diego County Sheriff's Department: 204, 204, 226, 298, 286
San Diego Police Department: 194, 203, 124, 70, 76
San Francisco Police Department: 842, 826, 746, 821, 765

b. Wave 1 Racial and Identity Profiling Complaints (2020-2024)

In 2024, Wave 1 agencies reported receiving 1,532 racial and identity profiling complaints, representing an 80.87 percent increase from 2023 (847), a 120.75 percent increase from 2022 (694), an 87.29 percent increase from 2021 (818), and a 121.39 percent increase from 2020 (692).

Three quarters of Wave 1 agencies (6 of 8) reported an increase in the number of racial and identity profiling complaints received in 2024, compared to 2023. The Los Angeles Police Department had the largest relative increase (108.52%, from 518 in 2023 to 1,101 in 2024), whereas the San Francisco Police Department went from not reporting any racial and identity profiling complaints in 2023 to 15 reported in 2024. The San Bernadino County Sheriff's Department had the largest relative decrease (56.25%, from 16 in 2023 to 7 complaints in 2024).

Figure 68. Wave 1 Racial and Identity Profiling Complaints Reported (2020-2024)

c. Wave 2 Agency Total Complaints Reported (2020-2024)

Wave 2 agencies reported 1,267 complaints in 2024, representing a 61.58 percent decrease from 2023 (3,298), a 13.10 percent decrease from 2022 (1,458), a 26.12 percent decrease from 2021 (1,715), and a 48.37 percent decrease from 2020 (2,454). However, it is important to note that the percentage change from 2023 to 2024 is not directly comparable, as the totals for 2024 do not include data from the Oakland Police Department which was unable to report complaint data within the reporting timeframe for 2024 due to a cyberattack. Excluding the Oakland PD data to make 2023 and 2024 more comparable, Wave 2 agencies saw a 1.48 percent decrease from 1,286 complaints in 2023 to 1,267 in 2024.[117]

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117   In 2023, Oakland PD reported 2,012 total complaints, accounting for 61.02% of complaints for Wave 2 agencies.

Half of Wave 2 agencies (3 of 6, excluding Oakland PD) experienced an increase in the total number of civilian complaints reported between 2023 and 2024. The agency that saw the largest relative increase was the Long Beach Police Department (29.41%, from 187 in 2023 to 242 in 2024). The Sacramento County Sheriff's Department experienced the largest relative decrease (34.40%, from 250 in 2023 to 164 in 2024).

Figure 69. Wave 2 Total Complaints Reported (2020-2024)

d. Wave 2 Racial and Identity Profiling Complaints (2020-2024)

Wave 2 agencies reported a 2.24 percent increase in racial and identity profiling complaints from 2023 to 2024 (from 134 in 2023 to 137 in 2024). This also marks an increase in racial and identity profiling complaints relative to 2022 (up 24.55% from 110). However, this represents a 33.82 percent decrease (207 complaints) relative to 2021 and a 34.76 percent decrease (210 complaints) relative to 2020.

As previously mentioned, the Oakland PD experienced a cyberattack that prevented the submission of complaints data for the 2024 calendar year. As such, percent change from 2023 to 2024 is not directly

comparable. Excluding the Oakland PD data, Wave 2 agencies saw a 16.10 percent increase, from 118 complaints in 2023 to 137 in 2024.[118]

Half of Wave 2 agencies (3 of 6, excluding Oakland PD) reported an increase in the number of racial and identity profiling complaints between 2023 to 2024. The San Jose Police Department experienced the largest relative increase (92.16%, from 51 in 2023 to 98 in 2024). The Sacramento County Sheriff's Department experienced the largest relative decrease (100.00%, from 20 in 2023 to 0 in 2024).

Figure 70. Wave 2 Racial and Identity Profiling Complaints Reported (2020-2024)

e. Wave 3 Total Complaints Reported (2020-2024)

Wave 3 agencies reported 56 racial and identity profiling complaints in 2024, representing a 7.69 percent increase compared to 2023, a 65.71 percent increase relative to both 2022 and 2021 (both had 34 total racial and identity profiling complaints), and a 27.27 percent increase relative to 2020 (44).

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118   In 2023, Oakland Police Department reported 16 racial and identity profiling complaints, accounting for 13.56 percent of racial and identity profiling complaints for Wave 2 agencies (134 complaints total).

Half of Wave 3 agencies (4 of 8) saw an increase in racial and identity profiling complaints between 2023 and 2024. The agency with the largest relative increase was Stockton Police Department (300.00%, from 1 in 2023 to 4 in 2024). One agency (Alameda County Sheriff's Department) had no change in profiling complaints with zero reported for both 2023 and 2024. The San Francisco County Sheriff's Department reported a 100.00 percent decrease in racial and identity profiling complaints (from 5 in 2023 to 0 in 2024).

Figure 71. Wave 3 Total Complaints Reported (2020-2024)

f. Wave 3 Racial and Identity Profiling Complaints (2020-2024)

Wave 3 agencies reported 56 racial and identity profiling complaints in 2024, representing a 7.69 percent increase compared to 2023, a 65.71 percent increase relative to both 2022 and 2021 (both had 34 total racial and identity profiling complaints), and a 27.27 percent increase relative to 2020 (44).

Half of Wave 3 agencies (4 of 8) saw an increase in racial and identity profiling complaints between 2023 and 2024. The agency with the largest relative increase was Stockton Police Department (300.00%, from 1 in 2023 to 4 in 2024). One agency (Alameda County Sheriff's Department) had no change in profiling complaints with zero reported for both 2023 and 2024. The San Francisco County Sheriff's Department reported a 100.00 percent decrease in racial and identity profiling complaints (from 5 in 2023 to 0 in 2024).

Figure 72. Wave 3 Racial and Identity Profiling Complaints Reported (2020-2024)

g. Wave 4 Total Complaints Reported (2020-2024)

Wave 4 agencies reported 4,510 complaints in 2024. This was a 6.57 percent increase from 2023 (4,232), a 25.14 percent increase from 2022 (3,604), a 34.75 percent increase from 2021 (3,347), and a 40.41 percent increase from 2020 (3,212).[119]

119   The number of Wave 4 agencies exceeds 400. Accordingly, complaint counts for all Wave 4 agencies cannot be displayed

### h. Wave 4 Racial and Identity Profiling Complaints (2020-2024)

Wave 4 agencies reported a 49.73 percent increase in racial and identity profiling complaints from 2023 to 2024 (from 372 in 2023 to 557 in 2024). This also constitutes a relative increase from the three preceding years: a 41.01 percent increase from 2022 (395), a 51.36 percent increase from 2021 (368), and a 67.27 percent increase from 2020 (333).[120]

The Board will continue to monitor reporting agencies' complaint data and recommend that agencies adopt policies that allow for a more robust and effective complaint process, including adopting a universal definition of civilian complaint. For more information on best practices and policies regarding complaints, please see the Civilian Complaints sections of the Board's past reports.

III. Updates on Prior Board Recommendations

A. Remove Deterrent Language from Complaint Forms

The Board has previously expressed concerns that Penal Code section 148.6, requiring complainants to read and sign an advisory acknowledging that they may be charged with a crime for filing a false police report,[121] could have a chilling effect on members of the public seeking to file a complaint.[122] Specifically, the Board is concerned that requiring a complainant to sign a written statement acknowledging that an individual may face criminal liability for filing a false complaint could discourage community members from submitting valid complaints.[123] In light of these concerns, the Board previously recommended that the Legislature delete or amend the language of Penal Code section 148.6 to remove the advisory statement, as well as the requirement that a complaint be signed and in writing.[124]

On November 10, 2025, in the matter of *Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles* (Case No. S275272), the California Supreme Court issued a decision finding Penal Code section 148.6(a) unconstitutional.[125] The requirement that complainants read and sign a written advisory when filing a complaint is therefore no longer allowable. The Board will continue to examine this issue further in a future report.

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within a single graphic in the body of this report. Instead, the cross-year total complaint and racial and identity complaint totals for individual agencies are contained within Appendix Tables A52.

120 Three Wave 4 agencies did not report civilian complaint data in 2024: Rio Vista Police Department, Trinity County District Attorney, and Yuba Community College Police Department. Rio Vista Police Department and Trinity County District Attorney also did not report complaint data in 2023. Yuba Community College Police Department did report complaint data in 2023 but reported a total of 0 complaints in 2023.

121 Specifically, Penal Code section 148.6 provides that a law enforcement agency accepting an allegation of misconduct against a peace officer shall require complainants to read and sign an advisory that states, in part: "IT IS AGAINST THE LAW TO MAKE A COMPLAINT THAT YOU KNOW TO BE FALSE. IF YOU MAKE A COMPLAINT AGAINST AN OFFICER KNOWING THAT IT IS FALSE, YOU CAN BE PROSECUTED ON A MISDEMEANOR CHARGE." (Pen. Code, § 148.6, subd. (a)(2).)

122 See Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *2025 Report*, *supra* note 114, at pp. 170-173; Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2024) pp. 195-196 <oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/ripa-board-report-2024.pdf> [as of Dec. 19, 2025]; Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *2023 Report*, *supra* note 115, at p. 179; Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *2022 Report*, *supra* note 115, at p. 229.

123 Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *2020 Report*, supra note 114, at p. 74; Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *2021 Report*, *supra* note 115, at p. 134, fn. 294; Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *2022 Report*, *supra* note 115, at p. 232; Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *2023 Report*, *supra* note 115, at pp. 182-183.

124 See Racial and Identify Profiling Advisory Board, *2023 Report*, *supra* note 115, at p. 182-183; Racial and Identify Profiling Advisory Board, *2022 Report*, *supra* note 115, at p. 232; Racial and Identify Profiling Advisory Board, *2021 Report*, *supra* note 115, at p. 134, fn. 294; Racial and Identify Profiling Advisory Board, *2020 Report*, *supra* note 114, at p. 74-75.

125 See *Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles*, Cal. Case No. S275272.

IV. Visions for Future Reports

The Board is concerned with the extremely low number of sustained complaints of racial and identity profiling in 2024. As discussed above, only 3 of the 1,552 racial or identity profiling complaints that reached a disposition by RIPA reporting agencies in 2024 were sustained. This disparity in the number of sustained complaints when compared to the total number of complaints reaching a disposition in 2024 warrants further review by the Board. In the coming years, the Board hopes to take an in-depth look at RIPA agencies' processes for reviewing and adjudicating complaints alleging racial and identity profiling to determine what factors may be contributing to this low number of sustained racial and identity profiling complaints and whether there are areas for improvement in RIPA agencies' handling of such complaints.

STATE AND LOCAL POLICIES

I. Introduction

This year marks the tenth anniversary of the Racial and Identity Profiling Act (RIPA). Despite a decade of analysis and recommendations by the RIPA Board, data reported by law enforcement continues to reflect disparities in their treatment of different communities, pointing to the heightened need to adopt recommendations and implement reforms. As in prior years, this year's data show that these continuing disparities are the result of racial and identity profiling, and that profiling continues to be a significant problem in our state.

This year, the Board examines the relationship of racial and identity profiling by law enforcement to public safety, and how reducing or eliminating profiling contributes to public safety. Recognizing that "profiling" and "safety" are broad terms with a range of connotations, the Board aims to contextualize these terms by defining public safety holistically. For purposes of this Report, the Board defines public safety as the collective experience of being safeguarded or protected from threats to one's life or wellbeing.

> *Public safety is broadly defined as the collective experience of being safeguarded or protected from threats to one's life or wellbeing.*
>
> *—RIPA Board*

The Board begins this examination of the relationship between profiling and public safety by providing an overview of factors that contribute to feelings of safety and the impact of racial profiling on those feelings of safety (Section II). Next, the Board analyzes the impact of oversaturation policing — a common police practice with roots in racial and identity profiling — on communities of color, and how alternative enforcement technologies in oversaturation policing, such as facial recognition, predictive policing, and automatic license plate reader data, can reinforce systemic inequalities in those communities and affect their sense of public safety (Section III). The Board also discusses the growing number of studies acknowledging the impacts of pretextual stops on public safety, providing a data-driven analysis of successful policy changes at state and local levels in California and in other states (Section IV). Finally, this chapter concludes with several policy recommendations from the Board to address racial and identity profiling by law enforcement (Section V).

II. Racial and Identity Profiling Is a Public Safety Issue

Public safety is the collective experience of being safeguarded or protected from threats to one's life or wellbeing. This definition is intentionally broad, since the concepts of safety, protection, and wellbeing can mean different things to different groups. For example, research shows that for Black, Brown, LGB+,[126] and other marginalized communities, public safety includes the freedom to exist without fear of violence — both privately and publicly sanctioned — or structural neglect.[127] Indeed, for many in these communities, safety may be defined not by the presence of law enforcement, but by its absence.[128] In other words, when

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126   Starting in this year of RIPA data collection (2024), "LGBT" was changed to "LGB+" to add clarity to the reporting of perceived sexual orientation and perceived gender. Officers are required to report perceived sexual orientation and perceived gender in separate data elements in each stop data report. This change was implemented through the 2021-2022 rulemaking related to the data collection that took effect on January 1, 2024. (Cal. Dep't. of Just. (2021) *Title 11. Law Division 1. Attorney General Chapter 19. Racial and Identity Profiling Act of 2015 Initial Statement of Reasons*, pp. 8-9 <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/isor-ripa-regs-rev-oal.pdf> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].)

127   Goldberg, *Public Safety as a Matter of Public Health* (2020) Neighborhood Data for Social Change <https://tinyurl.com/nhavvyxw> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

128   Hudson, *Building a World Without Police*, 69 UCLA L.Rev. 1648, 1665, 1669-1670 (2023) <https://tinyurl.com/4kphsef9> [as of Dec. 17, 2025] (noting that the "oversurveillance of Black and poor communities creates unsafe conditions" and "limit[s] our expectation of safety from day to day").

communities experience increased police presence, residents may feel surveilled rather than protected,[129] undermining the traditional understanding of public safety. These differences in how public safety is defined demonstrate a pressing need for systemic change, as well as a holistic reconceptualization of public safety.[130]

Viewing public safety more broadly, it becomes apparent that racial and identity profiling may decrease feelings of public safety. When individuals feel that they are being singled out because of race or identity it can foster fear and hesitation toward law enforcement, ultimately reducing the community's sense of safety. In particular, racial and identity profiling can have profound public health and economic consequences on the individuals subjected to profiling and the community as a whole, reduce public trust in law enforcement, and decrease civic engagement, ultimately eroding feelings of public safety. These impacts are discussed in more detail below.

A. Public Health Impacts of Racial and Identity Profiling

Research shows that police encounters can lead to a variety of public health impacts. Persistent and aggressive policing tactics, such as frequent police stops or police-perpetrated violence, have been linked to symptoms of depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), psychological distress, and suicide attempts.[131] Studies across diverse cities have also found that "disproportionate community exposure to physically invasive [law enforcement] surveillance tactics, including frisking," can undermine the health of residents.[132] Even being subjected to repeated law enforcement stops, without more, can result in public health consequences. For example, men who experience a high number of lifetime law enforcement stops are three times more likely to experience PTSD symptoms compared with men who did not experience persistent law enforcement exposure.[133] And, as discussed more fully in the 2025 RIPA Report, the health of adolescents and young adults are particularly affected by police contact.[134]

Communities characterized by concentrated poverty and racial segregation experience a disproportionate burden of routine "aggressive policing strategies, including drug- and gang-suppression efforts, and higher levels of police discrimination and misconduct,"[135] meaning they are subjected to an increased risk of public health consequences from policing. For example, the American Public Health Association has noted that physical and psychological violence by law enforcement "results in deaths, injuries, trauma, and stress

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129   Soss and Weaver, *Police Are Our Government: Politics, Political Science, and the Policing of Race–Class Subjugated Communities* ("*Police Are Our Government*") (2017) 20 Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 565, 579 <https://tinyurl.com/mt4rbdzr> [as of Dec. 17, 2025] ("Police encounters in public spaces function as daily rituals indicating who is suspicious, who can be trusted with freedoms, and who deserves the benefits afforded to citizens in full standing").

130   Catalyst California, *Racial Bias in Policing: An In-Depth Analysis of Stopping Practices by the Long Beach Police Department* (Oct. 2023) <https://tinyurl.com/35ydx29z> [as of Dec. 17, 2025] (noting that one goal of systemic change is "to meaningfully engage the community in finding alternatives to traditional policing approaches" and by investing in communities).

131   Hirschtick et al., *Persistent and Aggressive Interactions with the Police: Potential Mental Health Implications* (2019) 29 Epidemiol. and Psychiatr. Sci. 1, 2 <https://tinyurl.com/3s89ktvk> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

132   Sewell, *The Illness Associations of Police Violence: Differential Relationships by Ethnoracial Composition* (2017) 32 Sociological Forum 1, 2 <https://tinyurl.com/yx9yew9r> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Hirschtick et al., *Persistent and Aggressive Interactions with the Police: Potential Mental Health Implications*, *supra* note 131, at p. 2; see also Muentner et al., *Patterns of Vicarious Police Contact and Youths' Stress and Attitudes About the Police* (2025) 42 Child and Adolescent Social Work J. 701, 702; Johnson et al., *The Group-Based Law Enforcement Mistrust Scale: Psychometric Properties of an Adapted Scale and Implications for Public Health and Harm Reduction Research* ("*Group-Based Law Enforcement Mistrust Scale*") (2022) 19 Harm Reduct. J. 1, 2 <https://tinyurl.com/pb9a4x74> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

133   Hirschtick et al., *Persistent and Aggressive Interactions with the Police: Potential Mental Health Implications*, *supra* note 131, at p. 2.

134   See Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2025) ("*2025 Report*") p. 69 <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/ripa-board-report-2025.pdf> [as of Dec. 17, 2025] (discussing research demonstrating that even witnessing police stops can negatively impact youths' mental health and contribute to diminished mental well-being, depression, and anxiety).

135   American Psychological Association, *APA Resolution on Psychology's Role in Addressing the Impact of, and Change Required With, Police Use of Excessive Force Against People of Color and Other Marginalized Communities in the United States* ("*APA Resolution*") (Aug. 2022) p. 3 <https://tinyurl.com/57wuu94k> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

that disproportionately affect marginalized populations."[136] The impact of these challenging interactions has "led to a long history of trauma and poor relationships regarding policing and public safety in many communities of color in the United States, most directly affecting Black and Latinx communities."[137] Growing evidence suggests that "[r]acial and place-based disparities in policing not only affect communities' perceptions of public safety, but also play a significant role in their overall health and well-being."[138]

Understanding who is stopped most frequently by law enforcement provides important context for examining how racialized and bias policing practices impact everyday life and public health outcomes across California. As discussed in this year's Stop Data chapter, in 2024 law enforcement officers perceived most individuals stopped to be Hispanic/Latine(x). Individuals perceived to be Black were stopped 127.87 percent more often than expected, and individuals perceived to be Pacific Islander 57.53 percent more often than expected, given the population of the state. Additionally, law enforcement officers reported the highest rates of searches and *Terry* frisks,[139] handcuffing, and detainment curbside or in a patrol car in stops for individuals perceived to be Native American and Black.[140] The patterns of police interactions in California highlight the complex relationship between policing, public health, and public safety. Disparities in the frequency and nature of law enforcement contacts can lead to disparities in the health and wellbeing of communities of color, which in turn may impact those communities' feelings of public safety.

B. Consequences of Racial and Identity Profiling on Public Trust, Communication, Seeking Assistance, and Investigation Support

In addition to health consequences, racial and identity profiling can result in mistrust of law enforcement and reduced civic engagement, which in turn can decrease public safety. Research shows that racial and identity profiling fuels mistrust in law enforcement,[141] which is shaped by a history of discriminatory policing, use of excessive force, and lack of accountability.[142] For example, in one study, researchers found that mistrust of law enforcement was higher among Black respondents than among other racial groups.[143] And, more than half of all respondents indicated mistrust for the following items:

- "People of your racial group are treated the same as people of other groups by law enforcement officers."

- "Law enforcement officers sometimes hide information from people who belong to your racial group."

- "People of your racial group should be suspicious of the criminal justice system."

- "People of your racial group receive the same protection from law enforcement officers as people from other groups."

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136   American Public Health Association, *Addressing Law Enforcement Violence as Public Health Issue* (Nov. 12, 2018) <https://tinyurl.com/yr8u8seb> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
137   American Psychological Association, *APA Resolution*, *supra* note 135, at p. 2.
138   Goldberg, *supra* note 127.
139   A *Terry v. Ohio* pat/frisk (hereafter *Terry* frisk) is a weapons patdown, occurring when an officer pats down an individual's clothing to determine whether based on the officer's reasonable suspicion the individual is armed. (See *Terry v. Ohio* (1968) 392 U.S. 1.)
140   For more information regarding this data, please see the Stop Data chapter of this year's report.
141   Johnson et al., *Group-Based Law Enforcement Mistrust Scale*, *supra* note 132, at p. 10; Muentner et al., *Patterns of Vicarious Police Contact and Youths' Stress and Attitudes About the Police*, *supra* note 132, at p. 702; Carr et al., *We Never Call the Cops and Here is Why: A Qualitative Examination of Legal Cynicism in Three Philadelphia Neighborhoods* (2007) 45 Criminology 445 <https://tinyurl.com/3fw5hp64> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Tyler et al., *Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police and Courts* (2002) NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
142   See Hegney, *The "Stop Snitching" Phenomenon: Violence, Justice, & Policy Implications* (2015) Voices: On Difference, Grad. Social Work Dept, West Chester Univ., p. 7 <https://tinyurl.com/4y39244m> [as of Dec. 17, 2025] (noting that police mistrust is an "enduring issue in impoverished, black neighborhoods" and that "community members are averse to relying on a system that is understood as apathetic to or antagonistic towards the needs of the black community").
143   Johnson et al., *Group-Based Law Enforcement Mistrust Scale*, *supra* note 132, at p. 10.

- "Law enforcement officers have the best interests of people of your racial group in mind."[144]

Feelings of mistrust may come not only from direct encounters with law enforcement, but also from the exposures someone may experience from living in a neighborhood where police stops are common. For example, for youth of color residing in urban areas, elevated risks of vicarious police contact can intensify feelings of fear, depression, pessimism, and cynicism toward law enforcement.[145] Knowing more individuals who were stopped by law enforcement is associated with increased avoidance and stress and has been linked to decreased perceptions of police legitimacy.[146]

Racial and identity profiling by law enforcement, and the resulting feelings of mistrust, can lead to decreased civic engagement, including cooperation with law enforcement.[147] For example, research suggests that police violence against marginalized racial groups "may lead to lower civic engagement and cooperation with law enforcement in those communities, exacerbating issues of public safety and community well-being."[148] This occurs when individuals lose trust that law enforcement "will not dominate them, humiliate them, or physically assault them."[149] Even routine encounters with law enforcement may "constitute significant learning experiences with respect to government and one's relationship with it."[150] For example, being stopped by law enforcement in a public space may "suggest public discounting of worth."[151] When legal authorities exercise their power in the form of a stop based on racial or identity profiling, this signals that the stopped "person is not worthy of equality of treatment before the law, a form of democratic exclusion."[152] The resulting feelings of mistrust and demoralization can impair communication with law enforcement and lead to reluctance to seek help or cooperate in investigations.[153] Therefore, and as discussed more fully below, law enforcement practices that can result in racial and identity profiling, including "oversaturation policing" and pretextual stops, may undermine public safety, rather than improve it.

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144   *Id*. at pp. 6-7.
145   Muentner et al., *Patterns of Vicarious Police Contact and Youths' Stress and Attitudes About the Police*, *supra* note 132, at p. 701; see also Geller et al., *Police Contact and Mental Health* (2017) Columbia Pub. Law Research Paper No. 14-571, p. 8-9 <https://tinyurl.com/3ktwsy52> [as of Dec. 17, 2025] ("As negative interactions accrue over time, the weight of these internalized emotions in the context of powerlessness to remedy them or ward them off creates a psychological burden that we hypothesize manifests itself in distinct forms of behavioral and emotional symptoms").
146   Muentner et al., *Patterns of Vicarious Police Contact and Youths' Stress and Attitudes About the Police*, *supra* note 132, at p. 701.
147   Weaver et al., *Withdrawing and Drawing In: Political Discourse in Policed Communities* ("*Withdrawing and Drawing In*") (2020) 5 J. Race, Ethn. & Pol. 604, 606-607 <https://tinyurl.com/3nfwtmsj> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Ben-Menachem and Torrats-Espinosa, *Police Violence Reduces Trust in the Police Among Black Residents* (2024) 19 Pub. Library of Science ONE 1 <https://tinyurl.com/58b9rn6x> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Sullivan and O'Keefe, *Evidence that Curtailing Proactive Policing Can Reduce Major Crime* (2017) 10 Nat. Hum. Behav. 730 <https://tinyurl.com/5yzbdfz8> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Gau and Brunson, *Procedural Justice and Order Maintenance Policing: A Study of Inner-City Young Men's Perceptions of Police Legitimacy* (2009) 27 Justice Quarterly 255 <https://tinyurl.com/2fy9m47r> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
148   Ben-Menachem and Torrats-Espinosa, *Police Violence Reduces Trust in the Police Among Black Residents*, *supra* note 147.
149   Weaver et al., *Withdrawing and Drawing In*, *supra* note 147, at p. 606.
150   Ben-Menachem and Torrats-Espinosa, *Police Violence Reduces Trust in the Police Among Black Residents*, *supra* note 148.
151   Fagan et al., *Street Stops and Police Legitimacy in New York* (2016) Columbia Pub.L. Research Paper No. 14-514, Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 547 in Ross and Delpeuch (eds.), *Comparing the Democratic Governance of Police Intelligence: New Models of Participation and Expertise in the United States and Europe* (2016) 203, 210 <https://tinyurl.com/3bh9ax54> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
152   Geller et al., *Police Contact and Mental Health*, *supra* note 145, at p. 8.
153   Desmond et al., *Police Violence and Citizen Crime Reporting in the Black Community* (2016) 81 Am. Sociol. Rev., 857, 857 <https://tinyurl.com/pp4wzhe6> [as of Dec. 17, 2025] (noting that "[n]umerous studies document stark racial disparities in police maltreatment, finding that black boys and men are disproportionately subject to excessive and sometimes deadly police force, even after accounting for situational factors of the encounter (e.g., resisting arrest) and officer characteristics (e.g., age, training)"); Gau and Brunson, *Procedural Justice and Order Maintenance Policing: A Study of Inner-City Young Men's Perceptions of Police Legitimacy*, *supra* note 147.

III. Oversaturation Policing Disproportionately Harms Marginalized Communities and Undermines Public Safety

As the Board focuses on the ways reducing racial and identity profiling can enhance public safety, it examines how institutional practices that are informed by bias concentrate law enforcement presence in marginalized communities — a practice known as "oversaturation policing."[154] Oversaturation policing specifically affects "race-class subjugated communities," or communities that are "positioned at the intersection of race and class systems" and experience "civic ostracism, social and political oppression, economic marginalization, and state-led governance."[155] When law enforcement resources are concentrated in race-class subjugated communities, officers will naturally identify relatively higher rates of criminal activity in those areas because officers are doing more observation in that community when compared to other communities.[156] This feedback loop reinforces the narrative that more policing is necessary in these communities, leading to an even greater concentration of law enforcement resources.[157]

The Board also examines how the deployment of alternative enforcement technologies within communities affected by oversaturation policing further increases the concentration of law enforcement in these communities. Eliminating such concentration, and all law enforcement practices that rely on racial and identity profiling, can help prevent trauma, can improve law enforcement interactions with the public, and can help create safer and healthier communities.

When law enforcement is disproportionately concentrated in particular communities, individuals in those communities may experience that law enforcement is "everywhere when surveilling people's everyday activity."[158] For example, in a 2019 study of more than 800 recorded and transcribed conversations across neighborhoods in five cities (Baltimore, Chicago, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, and Newark), individuals from race-class subjugated communities described how oversaturation tactics translated to a sense that law enforcement is "extremely attentive to small infractions," "hound[ing] people for minor quibbles," and "overly aggressive" for "minor infractions and seemingly innocuous inquiries."[159]

What these community members perceive is "order maintenance policing."[160] Law enforcement policies built around order maintenance policing encourage officers to crack down against minor, even seemingly innocuous infractions.[161] This approach ensures "a broad warrant for expansions of state authority and controlling interventions into the lives of [race-class subjugated] communities."[162] Studies collecting interviews with young urban residents show that "stop and search practices, coupled with frequent arrests for low-level public-order offenses, are widely viewed as unjust because they are insensitive, harsh or racially selective and potentially based upon prejudice."[163] One researcher noted that these tactics may signal "broad-based and automatic suspicion based on status (gender, race, neighborhood), and

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154   See, e.g., Wendell et al., *"Their help is not helping": Policing as a Tool of Structural Violence against Black Communities* (2022) 12 Psychol. Violence 4, 231-240, p. 4 <https://tinyurl.com/bdhf8596> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Scott, *The Benefits and Consequences of Police Crackdowns* (2003) U.S. Dept. of Just., Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) p. 3 <https://tinyurl.com/23t4fkcw> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Schnelle et al., *Patrol Evaluation Research: A Multiple-baseline Analysis of Saturation Police Patrolling During Day and Night Hours* (1977) 1 J. of Applied Behav. Analysis 10, pp. 33-40 <https://tinyurl.com/4xkvjjrb> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

155   Soss and Weaver, *Police Are Our Government*, *supra* note 129, at p. 567.

156   *Id*. at p. 580 <https://tinyurl.com/yd2xx3wr> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Geller et al., *Police Contact and Mental Health*, *supra* note 145, at pp. 4, 11 (noting that "[a]ggressive policing can aggravate racial disparities in arrests, detentions, convictions and sentences").

157   Soss and Weaver, *Police Are Our Government*, *supra* note 129, at p. 580; see also Geller et al., *Police Contact and Mental Health*, *supra* note 145, at pp. 4, 11.

158   Prowse et al., *The State from Below: Distorted Responsiveness in Policed Communities* ("*The State from Below*") (2019) Urban Aff. Rev. 1, 1 <https://tinyurl.com/4fuw8mp8> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

159   *Id*. at pp. 13-14.

160   Soss and Weaver, *Police Are Our Government*, *supra* note 129, at p. 570; Fagan et al., *Street Stops and Police Legitimacy in New York*, *supra* note 151, at pp. 203, 209.

161   Soss and Weaver, *Police Are Our Government*, *supra* note 129, at pp. 569-570.

162   *Id*. at p. 570.

163   Fagan et al., *Street Stops and Police Legitimacy in New York*, *supra* note 151, at p. 208 (collecting studies).

that the police could therefore be seen as a hostile presence in these neighborhoods."[164] Furthermore, oversaturation policing can aggravate racial disparities in detentions, "compounding the social, psychological and physical health stresses of economic isolation."[165]

Racialized targeting in law enforcement stops turns increasing numbers of people among "the targeted groups into convicted criminals or innocent but distrustful subjects of surveillance who feel treated like criminals," while giving people among the non-targeted groups comparative freedom from such control.[166] Individuals in these police-saturated neighborhoods are disproportionately subject to investigatory stops and learn to deal with the constant emotional burden of "carefully manag[ing] their bodies and words to avoid aggravating police contacts," which in turn shapes their self-identity and conception of social valuation.[167] For example, researchers assessing how health conditions of young men in New York City — a population facing high levels of exposure to law enforcement — might change following contact with law enforcement observed psychological injuries, specifically that individuals who reported experiencing major or minor force during stops, on average, report more anxiety symptoms.[168] Additionally, individuals who reported experiencing multiple stops with some degree of intrusion also reported, on average, multiple PTSD symptoms.[169] Further, "police–citizen encounters routinely feature derogatory remarks and bodily contact, and citizens forced to do humiliating things."[170] As discussed above (*supra*, Section II.A), this leads to negative consequences in the form of mental health and social costs. Even without direct contact, oversaturation policing can do damage; police focus on a particular community can create a sense of "who is a citizen deserving of fairness and justice and who constitutes a group of dangerous others deserving of severe punishment, monitoring, and virtual branding."[171]

Despite all of this, marginalized communities increasingly rely on law enforcement when they encounter actual threats. South Los Angeles, for example, saw a steady increase in 911 emergency calls between 2011 to 2018.[172] However, calls for service do not always translate into responsiveness nor public trust. Interviewed about their interactions with the police, participants in the 2019 Portals conversations, discussed above (*supra*, Section II.A) "wondered aloud why police seemed to be there at a moment's notice to check them for insignificant, technically unlawful things, but withdrawn and reluctant to protect them when actual threats to their person arose."[173] They also "described their communities metaphorically as sometimes being on a tight leash but at other times being in the free fall of abandonment at those key moments in their lives and the lives of those around them when they desperately needed help."[174] Researchers termed this seemingly contrarian phenomenon as *distorted responsiveness* — that is, the phenomenon of "being treated harshly in conjunction with perceived abandonment."[175] Racial bias facilitates distorted responsiveness because it facilitates seeing individuals as a threat and can interfere with compassion and concern.[176]

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164   *Id*. at p. 209.
165   Geller et al., *Police Contact and Mental Health*, *supra* note 145, at p. 4.
166   Epp et al., *Pulled Over: How Police Stops Define Race and Citizenship* (2014), at p. 5.
167   Soss and Weaver, *Police Are Our Government*, *supra* note 129, at p. 582.
168   Geller et al., *Police Contact and Mental Health*, *supra* note 145, at p. 27.
169   *Id*. at pp. 27-28.
170   Weaver and Lerman, *Political Consequences of the Carceral State* (2010) 104 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1, 3 <https://tinyurl.com/55e9epbs> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
171   Soss and Weaver, *Police Are Our Government*, *supra* note 129, at p. 579; see also Del Toro et al., *The Criminogenic and Psychological Effects of Police Stops on Adolescent Black and Latino Boys* (2019) 116 Proc. Nat'l Acad. Sci. 8261, 8266-8267 <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30962370/> [as of Dec. 17, 2025] (noting that "being stopped by police was associated with increased engagement in delinquent behavior," and the more frequent the police stops, the more frequent the delinquent behavior).
172   Miller, *Study: L.A. Communities of Color Rely on Police Yet Are Stopped and Arrested at Higher Rates* (Oct. 7, 2020) USC Today <https://tinyurl.com/5bdrumtf> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
173   Prowse et al., *The State from Below*, *supra* note 158, at p. 14.
174   *Ibid*.
175   *Id*. at p. 20.
176   See Swencionis and Goff, *The Psychological Science of Racial Bias and Policing* (2017) 23 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 398 <https://tinyurl.com/2vuzvx9m> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

Oversaturation policing coupled with distorted responsiveness sows distrust and reduces a civilian's financial, political, and social power. Researchers have concluded that, like redistributive policies such as welfare and social security, criminal justice policies such as oversaturation alter an individual's access to resources.[177] However, unlike welfare or social security, or other redistributive policies that provide resources and promote participation, punitive law enforcement encounters "are likely to depress political action by limiting and diminishing resources. For many, a criminal record results in considerable financial penalties and limited job prospects, diminishing the material resources available for participation in politics."[178] Individuals who have punitive interactions with law enforcement become less likely to seek out government of any kind — including through engagement in the political process.[179]

Oversaturation policing, at its core, is felt by individuals within those communities as near-total surveillance — the sense that law enforcement is "everywhere when surveilling people's everyday activity."[180] Such practices present a host of concerns that undermine a community's sense of safety and increase the likelihood that such tactics will result in racial and identity profiling, to the detriment of those communities. The available research does not demonstrate that oversaturation policing benefits the community by enhancing public safety; instead, the consensus in the research is that these tactics erode trust in law enforcement and harms the individuals who are subject to it. Accordingly, the Board recommends that the Legislature and local policymakers enact legislation to prohibit or limit police agencies from relying on oversaturation of police marginalized communities due to the negative effects of those practices on those communities.

IV. The Deployment of Alternative Enforcement Technologies in Oversaturation Policing Reinforces Systemic Inequalities in Justice, Safety, and Community Well-Being

Law enforcement agencies use a wide range of technologies in their daily work. Increasingly, agencies are turning to alternative enforcement technologies, such as automatic license plate readers, biometric technologies like facial recognition, gunshot detection devices, "predictive policing" software, or other technologies in their daily work.[181] The concentrated layering of multiple types of alternative enforcement technologies, like the prevalence of investigative stops, has emerged as an element of oversaturation policing, leading to an increased sense of constant surveillance and further erosion of trust.[182] In this section, the Board explores how law enforcement agencies can employ such technologies as an element of oversaturation policing, and discusses how these technologies should be further studied and assessed.

Critical for the Board's purposes, alternative enforcement technologies have been proposed as a means to reduce racial disparities in stops and the harms that flow from stops by reducing the frequency of officer-effectuated stops.[183] Many of these technologies, such as social media monitoring and the sharing of private security camera footage, have become commonplace tools in the criminal legal system.[184]

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177   Weaver and Lerman, *Political Consequences of the Carceral State*, *supra* note 170, at p. 3.
178   *Ibid*.
179   *Ibid*.
180   Prowse et al., *The State from Below*, *supra* note 158, at p. 1.
181   See generally Joh, *The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology Companies on Policing* (2017) 92 N.Y. Univ. L.Rev. 19 (discussing technologies); ACLU, *Community Control Over Police Surveillance: Technology 101* (Sept. 16, 2016) <https://tinyurl.com/23w8eyud> [as of Dec. 17, 2025] (discussing technologies).
182   See Moy, *A Taxonomy of Police Technology's Racial Inequity Problems* (2021) 2021 U. Ill. L.Rev. 139 <https://tinyurl.com/9tsxwd56> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Brayne, *Surveillance and System Avoidance: Criminal Justice Contact and Institutional Attachment* (2014) 79 Am. Sociological Rev. 367, 367<https://tinyurl.com/ycx2wppc> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Electronic Frontier Foundation, *Street Level Surveillance* (2023) <https://sls.eff.org/> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
183   See Tang and Hiebert, *The Promises and Perils of Predictive Policing* (May 22, 2025) Centre for Int. Governance Innovation <https://tinyurl.com/yc4muu37> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Heaven, *Predictive Policing Algorithms are Racist. They Need to be Dismantled* (July 17, 2020) MIT Technology Review <https://tinyurl.com/4ddd9jk7> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
184   Electronic Frontier Foundation, *Street Level Surveillance: Social Media Monitoring* (2023) <https://tinyurl.com/55xm9rm2> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]. A 2015 survey by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) found that more than 96 percent of the 553 departments reported using social media in some capacity. (Levinson-Waldman, *Private Eyes, They're Watching You: Law Enforcement's Monitoring of Social Media* (2019) 71 Okla. L.Rev.

Proponents of these technologies generally argue that they can expand law enforcement's capacity to predict, prevent, and respond rapidly and accurately to criminal activity and security threats.[185]

However, some alternative enforcement technologies have been criticized because of concerns about the privacy rights of individuals subject to surveillance and the potential for these technologies to exacerbate existing problems of bias in policing; indeed, some critics of these technologies label them "as a form of tech-washing, where a veneer of objectivity covers mechanisms that perpetuate inequities."[186] Critics also raise questions about the cost of the technologies, their ties to the private companies that distribute them, and their efficacy at achieving their stated goals.

A. Common Types of Alternative Enforcement Technologies

While scholars, activists, and other stakeholders have written about the potential of a variety of technologies to exacerbate bias or be deployed as part of oversaturation policing, the most concern appears to have been raised about facial recognition, gunshot detection, predictive policing, and automated license plate reader (ALPR) systems.

1. Facial Recognition (FRT)

Facial Recognition Technology (FRT) uses algorithms to identify someone by an image of their face.[187] Critics have raised concerns about the use of FRT and bias. For example, studies have consistently found that FRT has higher error rates when identifying individuals with darker skin tones.[188] In particular, women with dark skin tones face the worst rates of inaccuracy — in one 2018 study, FRT classified their gender incorrectly at a rate that was up to 34 percent higher than that of lighter-skinned men.[189] Transgender people experience significant bias in these algorithms as well; computer vision algorithms developed to recognize individuals' genders suffer from bias towards binary gender representation.[190]

Multiple factors contribute to FRT's racial and gender biases, including poor quality images of people of color, since many cameras are not adjusted to capture dark skin; disproportionate numbers of mugshots

997, 998 <https://tinyurl.com/4uc6a2j9> [as of Dec. 17, 2025] (citing International Association of Chiefs of Police, *2015 Social Media Survey Results* (2015) <https://tinyurl.com/pct3mwrn> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]).) At least 85 local law enforcement agencies across California maintain a camera registry. (Electronic Frontier Foundation and Reynolds School of Journalism, *Atlas of Surveillance (filtered for California and Camera Registry)* <https://tinyurl.com/5eanfacm> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].)

185   Strom, *Research on the Impact of Technology on Policing Strategy in the 21st Century* (2017) Police Executive Research Forum, RTI International 2-1 <https://tinyurl.com/5xp7zuzv> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

186   Heaven, *Predictive Policing Algorithms are Racist. They Need to be Dismantled*, *supra* note 183; see also Hao, *In 2020, Let's Stop AI Ethics-Washing and Actually Do Something* (Dec. 27, 2019) MIT Tech. Rev. <https://tinyurl.com/4ce5zfz8> [as of Dec. 17, 2025] (describing the practice of "ethics-washing" in tech as occurring "where genuine action gets replaced by superficial promises," such as creating AI ethics boards with no actual veto power over questionable projects).

187   Electronic Frontier Foundation, *Street Level Surveillance: Face Recognition* (2023) <https://tinyurl.com/2zuye47e> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

188   Arnold et al., *Use of Facial Recognition Technologies for Law Enforcement: A Comparative Analysis* (2025) 26 Or. Rev. Int'l L. 175, 185, citing Wang, *Failing at Face Value: The Effect of Biased Facial Recognition Technology on Racial Discrimination in Criminal Justice* (2022) 4 Sci. & Soc. Res. 29, 31; Yucer et al., *Measuring Hidden Bias Within Face Recognition via Racial Phenotypes* (2022) in IEEE/CVF Winter Conference on Applications of Computer Vision 995; Mittal et al*., Are Face Detection Models Biased?* (2023) in IEEE 17th International Conference on Automatic Face & Gesture Recognition.

189   Arnold et al, *Use of Facial Recognition Technologies for Law Enforcement: A Comparative Analysis*, *supra* note 188, citing Buolamwini and Gebru, *Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification* (2018) in Conference on Fairness, Accountability & Transparency 77; Najibi*, Racial Discrimination in Face Recognition Technology* (2020) Harvard Griffin GSAS Science Policy Group <https://tinyurl.com/yc632jkz> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Scheuerman et al., *How Computers See Gender: An Evaluation of Gender Classification in Commercial Facial Analysis and Image Labeling Services* ("*How Computers See Gender*") (2019) 3 Proc. ACM on Hum.-Comput. Interact. 1, 2 <https://tinyurl.com/msaphbnz> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

190   Scheuerman et al., *How Computers See Gender*, *supra* note 189, at p. 26 <https://tinyurl.com/msaphbnz> [as of Dec. 17, 2025] (noting that "binary gender classification provided by computer vision services performed worse on binary trans images than cis ones, and were unable to correctly classify non-binary genders," partially due to image labeling and preference for binary gender representation).

of Black people in FRT systems, given that Black people are arrested at disproportionate rates; and implicit biases that determine which images compose the databases on which FRT algorithms are trained.[191] As a result, FRT reflects systemic biases against people of color, women, and transgender individuals, contributing to their over-policing. Note that no explicit bias is needed to fuel the exacerbation of inequality in this case. Rather, technologies based on artificial intelligence act as mirrors of the biases that already exist in broader society.

Some also object to collaboration between local law enforcement and federal agencies in the use of FRT. For instance, the U.S. Government Accountability Office found in 2021 that the Department of Homeland Security "had access to at least 24 state, local, and commercial FRT systems for domestic law enforcement, for border and transportation security, and for national security and defense purposes."[192] Federal law enforcement access to local agencies' facial recognition systems could expose communities at increased risk of false positive results to heightened surveillance at the national level.

In response to these concerns, some jurisdictions, such as the City of San Francisco, have banned the use of FRT.[193]

2. Gunshot Detection

Another alternative enforcement technology that may be used in oversaturation policing is gunshot detection technology. Gunshot detection technology uses auditory sensors to identify and alert law enforcement to sounds that may be related to gun fire.[194]

In recent years, communities across the country have led campaigns to end their cities' contracts with providers of gunshot detection technology, with mixed success.[195] In particular, advocates have raised concerns about the use of this technology with respect to the over-policing of racialized communities. As they point out, the placement of these systems depends on law enforcement's

> "Police respond assuming that someone is armed [which] leads to really confrontational types of policing."
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> —Anti-gunshot detection technology activist Freddy Martinez, on gunshot detection technology, Berlatsky, *How Chicago Organizers Managed to Rid the City of Shotspotter* (Dec. 2, 2024) Prism <https://tinyurl.com/yk5znxrk> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

assessment of what constitutes a "high-crime area."[196] In making this determination, law enforcement might exacerbate existing bias towards low-income and majority Black or Brown communities and create a vicious cycle in which disproportionate surveillance of these neighborhoods results in disproportionate law enforcement stops in these communities , which in turn could serve as the justification for the use of surveillance technologies. Gunshot detection technology may also increase the risk of the use of excessive force in highly surveilled neighborhoods as it may prime officers to come in ready to use force against someone wielding a gun.[197] The high rate of false positives caused by sounds like car backfires or fireworks can increase risks to community members when law enforcement officers respond assuming that someone is armed.[198] Oakland activist Brian Hofer found that, according to the city's own data, Oakland's gunshot

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191   Ball, *Facial Recognition in the Eyes of the Law* (2023) B.C. Intell. Prop. & Tech. F., 1, 10-11.

192   U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Facial Recognition Technology: Current and Planned Uses by Federal Agencies* (2021) <https://tinyurl.com/y22xezjk> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

193   Conger et al., *San Francisco Bans Facial Recognition Technology*, The New York Times (May 14, 2019) <https://tinyurl.com/taf72brn> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; San Francisco Board of Supervisors, Admin. Code - Acquisition of Surveillance Technology, no. 0107-19, Section 1(d) <https://tinyurl.com/4vmn6pjw> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

194   Henning, et al., *Reporting Gunshots: Prevalence, Correlates, and Obstacles to Calling the Police* ("*Reporting Gunshots*") (2024) 26 Police Practice and Research 1, 3 <https://tinyurl.com/46pw5trk> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

195   See, for example, recent campaigns to end city contracts with ShotSpotter, a common gunshot detection technology, ending with success in Chicago and failure in Oakland in 2024. (Berlatsky, *How Chicago Organizers Managed to Rid the City of Shotspotter*, (Dec. 2, 2024) Prism <https://tinyurl.com/yk5znxrk> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].)

196   Electronic Frontier Foundation, *Street Level Surveillance: Gunshot Detection* (2023) <https://tinyurl.com/3yydb2wv> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

197   Berlatsky, *supra* note 195.

198   See Henning, et al., *Reporting Gunshots*, *supra* note 194, p. 45.

detection technology (ShotSpotter) had a false positive rate of 78 percent in 2023.[199] Besides compounding problems of hyper surveillance of marginalized communities, false positive rates can divert a police response from an actual emergency, which Hofer says might be a contributing factor in Oakland's poor 911 response times.[200]

Finally, though this technology might facilitate the rapid transport of gunshot victims to emergency care,[201] research has not shown that its use is "associated with longer-term reductions in crime."[202]

3. Predictive Policing

Predictive policing software uses algorithms to predict where crime is likely to occur to direct law enforcement to particular neighborhoods for investigation. Critics label the use of this technology a "self-fulfilling prophecy," in which law enforcement's scrutiny of particular neighborhoods leads to the detection of relatively higher rates of criminal activity in those areas, which becomes part of the data that the algorithm considers the next time that police use it to predict where crime is likely to occur.[203] Social science researchers describe how crime analytics creates suspect populations in the allocation of law enforcement and the concentration of stops:

> Arrest reports and records based on biased street-level decisions that depend heavily on racial [profiling], the use of pretextual or "racial incongruity" stops …, the selective criminalization of substances, and the targeted policing of [race-class subjugated] neighborhoods all construct bodies of numerical knowledge that provide misleading testimony to the public, suggesting that suspicions of [B]lack criminality are reasonable and objectively warranted . . . .[204]

In that sense, "derivative maps purporting to show where future crimes might be committed will disproportionately weigh those neighborhoods already living under the weight of intense police presence."[205] As a result, predictive policing software has the potential to legitimize institutional practices of oversaturation policing or strategies informed by racial bias. In the face of critiques of this kind, the Los Angeles Police Department ended its predictive policing program (LASER, or Los Angeles Strategic Extraction and Restoration) in 2021.[206]

4. Automated License Plate Reader Systems

Automatic license plate readers (ALPR) use cameras and computer software to scan the license plates of automobiles driving by them, logging information about the vehicle, such as the time and date of each scan, the vehicle's GPS coordinates, and pictures of the car.[207]

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199   Berlatsky, *supra* note 195.
200   *Ibid*.
201   Henning, et al., *Reporting Gunshots*, *supra* note 194, p. 4.
202   *Id*. at p. 5.
203   Richardson et al., *Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil Rights Violations Impact Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and Justice* (2019) 94 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 192, 197 <https://tinyurl.com/b92haeru> [as of Dec. 17, 2025] ("'Deploying officers based on crime statistics will simply return them to where they concentrate their time. As a result, the data often push officers into the same over-policed and over-criminalized communities'"); Moy, *A Taxonomy of Police Technology's Racial Inequity Problems*, *supra* note 182, at pp. 154-155; see generally Okidegbe, *When They Hear Us: Race, Algorithms and the Practice of Criminal Law* (2020) 29 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y, 329 <https://tinyurl.com/5yr6ska7> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Selbst, *Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing* (2017) 52 Ga. L.Rev. 109 <https://tinyurl.com/63vtndsc> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Electronic Frontier Foundation, *Street Level Surveillance: Predictive Policing* (2023) <https://tinyurl.com/y4k3j3ak> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
204   Soss and Weaver, *Police Are Our Government*, *supra* note 129, at p. 580 <https://tinyurl.com/yd2xx3wr> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Geller et al., *Police Contact and Mental Health*, *supra* note 145, at pp. 10-11.
205   Electronic Frontier Foundation, *Street Level Surveillance: Predictive Policing*, *supra* note 203.
206   Li, *Artificial Intelligence and Racial Profiling: Emerging challenges for the European Court of Human Rights* (2024) Saar Blueprint, p. 29 <https://tinyurl.com/up8bu9br> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
207   Díaz and Levinson-Waldman, *Automatic License Plate Readers: Legal Status and Policy Recommendations for Law Enforcement Use* ("*Automatic License Plate Readers*") (2020) Brennan Center for Justice <https://tinyurl.com/3s34c3yr> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

ALPR systems can be deployed to target communities of color and other marginalized populations.[208] There is evidence of racial profiling in both decisions about the placement of ALPR cameras and queries made by law enforcement agencies of the data collected and maintained by these systems.[209] Many law enforcement agencies have contracts with vendors that grant them access to private databases containing scans from private ALPRs and from other local and federal law enforcement agencies.[210]

After the ALPR system identifies a license plate number in an image, it automatically compares the number to stored lists of license plate numbers from vehicles of interest, called "hot lists," and issues alerts if the plate number matches an entry on the hot list.[211] Some local agencies generate hot lists and local agencies may request authorization to receive hotlists from the California Department of Justice and/or the Federal Bureau of Investigation.[212] Officers can also perform manual queries of the data maintained in an ALPR system.[213] Many jurisdictions and agencies retain plate information for future use, sometimes indefinitely even if the plate number does not match one on a hot list.[214]

An investigation related to the placement of ALPR cameras in Oakland found that they were "located predominantly in Black and Latino neighborhoods, despite the fact that automobile crimes and offenses predominantly occurred elsewhere."[215] This technology may be layered with other multiple alternative enforcement technologies and in conjunction with investigative stops to produce oversaturation policing.[216] Researchers with the Brennan Center for Justice determined that placement of ALPRs in "high crime" neighborhoods likely reflected "a history of biased and selective enforcement that has already led to the over-policing of communities of color."[217] Based on their findings, these researchers recommend:

> Law enforcement use of ALPRs should be periodically audited in order to protect against disparate impact on historically marginalized communities and constitutionally protected activities. These audits should evaluate the times and locations where ALPRs are used to ensure that they are not being used to disproportionately target particular communities or constitutionally protected activities such as protests. To facilitate this process, law enforcement agencies must keep records that detail the locations where ALPRs are deployed and the areas where historical searches are being run. Audits should also assess the types of investigations that merit a vehicle's inclusion on a hot list to ensure that low-level offenses are not effectively being used to target vulnerable communities. Audits should evaluate the extent to which ALPR data is used with other surveillance technologies — such as predictive policing algorithms or inclusion in gang databases — in a manner that could disproportionately harm historically marginalized groups or constitutionally protected activity.[218]

In addition to concerns about the placement of ALPR cameras, logs of searches by some law enforcement agencies also present some concerns. In a recent example, analysis of audit logs of the nationwide Flock Safety automated license plate reader network showed that between June 2024 and October 2025, more than 80 law enforcement agencies, including seven California law enforcement agencies, used language perpetuating harmful stereotypes against Romani people when running searches through the network

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208   *Ibid*. ("The [New York Police Department] has used license plate readers as part of its widespread surveillance of Muslim communities in the New York and New Jersey area").

209   *Ibid*.; Alajaji and Maass, *License Plate Surveillance Logs Reveal Racist Policing Against Romani People* (2025) Electronic Frontier Foundation <https://tinyurl.com/3km63kwk> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

210   Díaz and Levinson-Waldman, *Automatic License Plate Readers*, *supra* note 207.

211   *Ibid*.

212   Cal. Dep't. of Justice, *California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System: Policies, Practices, and Procedures (and Statutes)* (2025) p. 11, 45 <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/clets-policies-practices-and-procedures.pdf> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Law Enforcement Resources: National Crime Information Center (NCIC)* (2023) <https://tinyurl.com/39emapzw> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

213   Díaz and Levinson-Waldman, *Automatic License Plate Readers*, *supra* note 207.

214   *Ibid*.

215   *Ibid*.

216   *Ibid*.

217   *Ibid*.

218   *Ibid*.

without noting any suspected crime in the reason for the search.[219] Advocates recognize that the ALPR network "didn't create racial profiling", but say that "it industrialized [racial profiling], turning deeply encoded and vague language into scalable surveillance that can search thousands of cameras across state lines."[220] In addition to acknowledging the value of California's restrictions against law enforcement sharing ALPR data with federal authorities or out-of-state agencies, these advocates recommend that policymakers demand a complete audit of all ALPR searches conducted in their jurisdiction and a review of search logs to determine whether their law enforcement agencies participated in discriminatory policing and "what safeguards, if any, exist to prevent such abuse."[221]

Starting in 2022, the Village of Oak Park, Illinois Citizen Police Oversight Committee reviewed searches of the police department's ALPR system as well as the number and type of vehicle alerts that were triggered by the ALPR system, any stops or actions that were conducted in response to those alerts, the demographics of the people stopped in response to those alerts, and stop outcomes.[222] The Oak Park Police Department has 8 ALPR cameras.[223] Between August 2022 through May 2023, there were approximately 3 million camera scans which triggered 42 alerts (39 for "stolen vehicle," two for "fleeing/[eluding]," and one for "connected to other crime").[224] The Oversight Committee reported that the Police Department was unable to intervene with 14 of these vehicles because their driver fled or could not be located, resulting in 28 actual stops based on and ALPR alert during the period.[225] Four of those stops included passengers.[226] As a result of these stops, twelve people were arrested, eight people "were released at the discretion of the lead policing agency," and twelve people "were released because of data not being updated timely."[227] There were stark racial disparities in the stops based on ALPR alerts. Seventy-eight percent of the people stopped based on the ALPR alerts were Black, in a village where Black residents comprise 19 percent of the population, in a county where Black residents comprise 22 percent of the population.[228]

As of the Civilian Police Oversight Committee's most recent report in May 2025, the Oak Park Village Board of Trustees had limited the crime categories for which ALPR alerts could be used to four crimes: violent stolen vehicles/carjacking, stolen plates, violent crimes, and missing/endangered persons.[229] In the more recent period of July 2023 through June 2024, in the same Village, the number of scans by the Villages eight cameras increased to 4 million which triggered 17 alerts (15 for "stolen vehicle," one for "armed robbery," one for "connected to shots fired."[230] The Oversight Committee reported that the Police Department was unable to intervene with eight of these vehicles because their driver fled or could not be located, resulting in nine actual stops based on and ALPR alert during the period.[231] Four of those stops included passengers.[232] As a result of these stops, four people were arrested, three people were released because of "bad data," and two were released for "other reasons."[233] While the number of ALPR alerts and stops based on alerts has decreased when compared with the 2022-2023 period, stark racial disparities

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219   Alajaji and Maass, *License Plate Surveillance Logs Reveal Racist Policing Against Romani People*, *supra* note 209.
220   *Ibid*.
221   *Ibid*.
222   Village of Oak Park Citizen Police Oversight Committee, *Information and Analysis for the Village of Oak Park Board of Trustees: January 2023 to June 2023* ("*January 2023 to June 2023 Report*") (2023), pp. 9-11 <https://tinyurl.com/ph9n2zcw> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Village of Oak Park Citizen Police Oversight Committee, *Information and Analysis for the Village of Oak Park Board of Trustees: July 2023 through June 2024* ("*July 2023 through June 2024 Report*") (2024) p. 11-13 <https://tinyurl.com/374dnd87> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
223   Village of Oak Park Citizen Police Oversight Committee, *January 2023 to June 2023 Report*, *supra* note 222, at pp. 9-11.
224   *Ibid*.
225   *Id*. at p. 10.
226   *Id*. at pp. 9-11.
227   *Ibid*.
228   *Ibid*.; U.S. Census Bureau, *Hispanic or Latino Origin by Race American Community Survey 5-year Estimates (2023)* <https://tinyurl.com/58jscm7u> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
229   Oak Park Police Department, *General Order 4.68* (Nov. 19, 2024) p. 2 <https://tinyurl.com/44vkp2pv> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Village of Oak Park Citizen Police Oversight Committee, *Information and Analysis for the Village of Oak Park Board of Trustees: July 2024 through December 2024* ("*July 2024 through December 2024 Report*") (2024) p. 11 <https://tinyurl.com/3v2x2d9s> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
230   Village of Oak Park Citizen Police Oversight Committee, *July 2023 through June 2024 Report*, *supra* note 222, at p. 12.
231   *Ibid*.
232   *Ibid*.
233   *Ibid*.

persist in the stops based on ALPR alerts. Sixty-seven percent of the people stopped based on the ALPR alerts were Black.[234] This may indicate that the work of the Village of Oak Park Citizen Police Oversight Committee and the Oak Park Village Board of Trustees to study and place limitations on the permitted uses of ALPR systems has brought about change in the problems they have identified. Additional measures are needed to eliminate the disparities in stops based on ALPR alerts.

California law prohibits the sharing of license plate data with federal and out-of-state agencies.[235] In recent years, concerns have arisen that ALPR systems might be misused by federal or out-of-state law enforcement for immigration enforcement and other purposes.[236] In 2023, the CA DOJ issued a bulletin to all California state and local law enforcement agencies reminding agencies that, among other things, Senate Bill 34 prohibits agencies from sharing ALPR information with private entities or out-of-state or federal agencies, including out of state and federal law enforcement agencies.[237] The use of ALPRs raises some concern regarding public safety generally and, in particular, in light of federal immigration enforcement. In 2025, California-based nonprofits and media outlets began to elevate concerns that local law enforcement agencies across the state have been sharing data collected from automatic license plate readers with federal law enforcement agencies, including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP).[238] Under California law, state and local law enforcement agencies are prohibited from sharing data from ALPR systems with federal and out-of-state law enforcement, where the data's use is beyond the reach of California's oversight and regulation.[239] Those prohibited actions would also heighten the risk for immigrant communities that any contact with local law enforcement, including for reasons unrelated to immigration, could render them a target for federal immigration enforcement and ultimately deportation proceedings.

A nonprofit called the "Stop LAPD Spying Coalition" is one of the organizations that has raised concerns in a March 2025 letter to the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners that LAPD was obfuscating the extent of its sharing of ALPR data with federal immigration enforcement agencies.[240] The group pointed to LAPD's participation in fusion centers, which are national data-sharing hubs that tie together federal and local agencies, and in nationally searchable databases of ALPR data maintained by private companies like Palantir and Peregrine Technologies as potential modes of impermissible data-sharing with federal agencies.[241]

A May 2025 report by 404 Media found that local agencies across the country have been conducting immigration-related searches at the request of the federal government in a national database of ALPR data run by the private company Flock.[242] On the heels of this revelation, the citizen watchdog Oakland Privacy filed record requests with several police agencies across California for their ALPR audit logs.[243] In June, the Riverside County Sheriff's Office was the first to respond, and its log from April 28, 2025 to May 30, 2025 revealed a number of searches in the Flock ALPR database that referenced CBP or Homeland Security

234   *Ibid*.
235   Cal. Civ. Code sec. 1798.90.5, *et seq*.
236   Díaz and Levinson-Waldman, *Automatic License Plate Readers*, *supra* note 207; e.g., Cal. DOJ, *Attorney Bonta Sues El Cajon for Illegally Sharing License Plate Data with Out-of-State Law Enforcement* (Oct. 2, 2025) <https://tinyurl.com/464skc7f> [as of Dec. 17, 2025] (press release).
237   Cal. DOJ, *Information Bulletin Re: California Automated License Plate Reader Guidance* (Oct. 27, 2023) p. 2-3 <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/2023-dle-06.pdf> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
238   See, e.g., Johnson and Al Elew, *California Police are Illegally Sharing License Plate Data with ICE and Border Patrol* (June 13, 2025) CalMatters <https://tinyurl.com/5y7y9k9a> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Chien, *SF, Oakland Cops Illegally Funneled License Plate Data to Feds* (Jul. 17, 2025) The San Francisco Standard <https://tinyurl.com/a6p7awpc>[as of Dec. 17, 2025].
239   Cal. DOJ, *Attorney Bonta sues El Cajon for illegally sharing license plate data with out-of-state law enforcement*, *supra* note 236.
240   Khan, *ALPR Letter* (April 7, 2025) Stop LAPD Spying Coalition <https://tinyurl.com/3c6au98w> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
241   *Ibid*.
242   Koebler and Cox, *ICE Taps into Nationwide AI-Enabled Camera Network, Data Shows* (May 27, 2025) 404 Media <https://tinyurl.com/45p6rfsd> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
243   Yadi, *CA Automated License Plate Readers (ALPR) and ICE* (Jun. 16, 2025) Oakland Privacy <https://tinyurl.com/d9n236xn> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

Investigations, a component of ICE, as part of the "reason" given for the search.[244] The Riverside County Sheriff's Office had conducted some of these searches, while outside agencies — including the Los Angeles Police Department — had conducted the others.[245]

In July 2025, *The San Francisco Standard* released the results of its public records request to the Oakland Police Department (OPD) for the log of that agency's ALPR database search history, dating back to when the city had first installed ALPRs in 2024.[246] The records showed that, "[i]n at least one case, the Oakland Police Department fulfilled a request related to an Immigration and Customs Enforcement investigation."[247] Another search in OPD's database conducted in April 2025 by the California Highway Patrol labeled the "reason" for the search as "ICE case," with no further clarification.[248] Overall, the records showed more than 200 searches of OPD's data that used keywords related to federal law enforcement, including the FBI and the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives.[249]

A July article by *The LA Times* illustrates the stake of these instances of potential ALPR data-sharing for communities at risk of deportation.[250] Reviewing recent court filings, *The Times* identified at least 30 people whom immigration agents had detained for illegal re-entry after deportation following an arrest in the few months prior by LAPD.[251] According to *The Times*, the court records showed that in the case of at least one man, his booking had "pinged" an ICE Facility in Orange County.[252] These alleged collaborations could increase the likelihood that members of vulnerable communities are brought to the attention of federal immigration enforcement agencies for deportation proceedings based solely on a chance encounter with local police. As a result, the patterns of racial and other kinds of bias that are often present in local police encounters could bleed into patterns of federal immigration enforcement, which already disproportionately target Latinx people.[253]

The California Values Act (SB 54) places restrictions on California law enforcement in the sharing of ALPR data: the Act prohibits state and local agencies from assisting federal agencies with immigration enforcement, except under limited circumstances.[254] On October 3, 2025, California Attorney General Rob Bonta filed a lawsuit against the City of El Cajon over its refusal to comply with state law prohibiting the sharing of license plate data with federal and out-of-state law enforcement agencies.[255]

B. The Costs of Surveillance Policing Are Increasing, but Such Increases Have Not Led to a Reduction in Racial and Identity Profiling or an Increase in Public Safety

Advanced surveillance policing technologies are a substantial cost to taxpayers. Beyond the initial cost of the technology itself, these technologies often lead to additional expenditures to maintain the technology and store the data obtained through their surveillance.[256] Data storage and maintenance costs can easily

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244   *Ibid*.
245   Johnson & Al Elew, *California Police are Illegally Sharing License Plate Data with ICE and Border Patrol*, *supra* note 238; see also Riverside County Sheriff, *Audit Reports* <https://tinyurl.com/5eewtndn> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
246   Chien, *SF, Oakland Cops Illegally Funneled License Plate Data to Feds*, *supra* note 238.
247   *Ibid*.
248   *Ibid*.
249   *Ibid*.
250   Jany, *How ICE is Using the LAPD to Track Down Immigrants for Deportation* (Jul. 30, 2025) Los Angeles Times <https://tinyurl.com/y5j36aea> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
251   *Ibid*.
252   *Ibid*.
253   See Lopez et al., *Addressing Racial Bias in the Immigration System* (2022) Berkeley Interdisciplinary Migration Initiative <https://tinyurl.com/46m7rnma> [as of Dec. 17, 2025] (finding that in 2018 Latinx people accounted for more than 91 percent of all arrests made by ICE, though they made up only a little over 50 percent of the US foreign-born population); Bier, *One in Five ICE Arrests Are Latinos on the Streets with No Criminal Past or Removal Order* (Aug. 5, 2025) Cato Institute <https://tinyurl.com/cwwtwey8> [as of Dec. 17, 2025] (documenting the steep rise in ICE's street profiling of Latinx people in the months following January 2025).
254   Senate Bill No. 54 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) <https://tinyurl.com/4wxx2mdd> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
255   Cal. DOJ, *Attorney Bonta sues El Cajon for illegally sharing license plate data with out-of-state law enforcement*, *supra* note 236.
256   See generally ACLU, *Community Control Over Police Surveillance: Technology 101*, *supra* note 181.

surpass initial expenditures.[257] The high costs of these programs have prompted some departments to discontinue their use and redirect funds towards more central activities.[258] For instance, in 2020, the Los Angeles Police Department ended its nine-year use of a PredPol predictive policing system to cut costs during the coronavirus pandemic.[259] Additionally, some cities have declined to adopt gunshot detection technology because of its high cost, instead deciding to invest funding in collaborative, anti-violence community partnerships.[260]

The effectiveness of various alternative enforcement technologies is also questionable. For example, a 2021 Report from the Chicago Office of Inspector General found that "ShotSpotter alerts 'rarely produced evidence of a gun-related crime, rarely gave rise to investigatory stops, and even less frequently [led] to the recovery of gun crime-related evidence during a stop.'"[261] Additionally, a 2023 Report by The Markup examined 23,631 predictions made by the "predictive policing" software Geolitica for the Plainfield Police Department in New Jersey and found that the program's success rate was "less than half a percent."[262] Reports have found conflicting evidence about the effectiveness of predictive policing technology.[263]

In addition to their high costs, alternative enforcement technology programs are controversial for several reasons. Predictive policing algorithms, for example, can entrench racial bias because the machine-learning models are trained on biased police data.[264]

Market dominance also raises concerns. A small number of technology manufacturers tend to dominate their markets. For example, the ShotSpotter company had placed almost 17,000 audio sensors in more than 100 municipalities as of 2020, covering approximately 770 square miles, and aimed to expand to 1,400 cities.[265] Accordingly, a small number of private technology companies have substantial influence over tech-based alternative enforcement strategies, but these companies provide limited transparency about the algorithms their programs use to drive policing decisions. Researchers in governance and technology innovation have called for strong privacy protections to ensure that Black and Brown people are not inaccurately or unfairly targeted by the growing use of these alternative enforcement technologies by law enforcement.[266]

C. Further Research Is Needed to Assess and Remedy the Effects of Alternative Enforcement Technologies on Racial and Identity Bias

As noted above, the Board has many concerns regarding the use of oversaturation practices in policing, as they engender feelings of mistrust in law enforcement, concerns about over-surveillance, and undermine a community's sense of public safety. Perhaps most importantly, there is no evidence that such practices reduce or eliminate racial and identity profiling. Indeed, when oversaturation practices are combined with alternative enforcement technologies, such as facial recognition, gunshot detection, and predictive policing, those negative effects can be compounded and can in fact increase the likelihood that racial and identity profiling will occur. The Board is concerned that these practices continue to be employed without consideration of how they contribute to racial and identity profiling and encourages adoption of the recommendations listed below.

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257   See, e.g., Joh, *The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology Companies on Policing*, *supra* note 181, at pp. 32-33.
258   Macaulay, *LAPD Ditches Predictive Policing Program Accused of Racial Bias* (Apr. 22, 2020) TNW <https://tinyurl.com/ywwbzh8x> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
259   *Ibid*.
260   Ebrahimji, *Critics of ShotSpotter Gunfire Detection System Say It's Ineffective, Biased and Costly* (Feb. 24, 2024) CNN <https://tinyurl.com/yj9kyya3> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
261   *Ibid*.
262   Sankin and Mattu, *Predictive Policing Software Terrible at Predicting Crimes* (Oct. 2, 2023) The Markup <https://tinyurl.com/3t5xb3vm> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
263   See Tang and Hiebert, *The Promises and Perils of Predictive Policing*, *supra* note 183.
264   Heaven, *Predictive Policing Algorithms are Racist. They Need to be Dismantled*, *supra* note 183.
265   ShotSpotter, *Investor Presentation* (Nov. 2020) <https://tinyurl.com/ycx7suhb> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
266   See Lee and Chin-Rothmann, *Police Surveillance and Facial Recognition: Why Data Privacy is Imperative for Communities of Color*, The Brookings Institution (Apr. 12, 2022) <https://tinyurl.com/ce7funev> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

V. Eliminating Pretextual Stops Improves Public Safety

A pretextual stop occurs when an officer stops someone for a lawful traffic violation or minor infraction, but intends to use the stop to investigate a hunch that the individual is involved in a different crime, even though the officer does not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe the individual stopped has committed that crime.[267] For example, if an officer sees that a vehicle's brake light is not working, and stops the car because the officer thinks the driver might have drugs — but has no facts to support that assumption — that is a pretextual stop.[268] Because law enforcement can legally initiate vehicle stops to issue citations for traffic infractions, it is difficult to ascertain the exact number of traffic stops initiated for pretextual investigations. California law now requires that officers document the reason for the stop, disclose that reason to the individual,[269] and report both the reason for the stop and the reason given in the RIPA data. However, officers may still engage in pretextual stops, and officers are not required to disclose to the individual that the true purpose of the stop was because of a pretext.

As noted in prior reports,[270] pretextual stops — stops based on hunches that an individual is committing a crime, without basis in reasonable suspicion or probable cause — are susceptible to racial bias.[271] Pretextual investigatory stops are used in stops of "pedestrians by big-city police, stops and searches of vehicles on interstate highways by state patrols, and . . . stops of drivers on city and suburban streets by local police."[272] In addition to their use in oversaturation policing, pretextual investigatory stops are used in the profiling of individuals in what researchers describe as "race-out-of-place" profiling, which occurs when an individual's perceived race is used in relation to the racial composition of a place to either heighten or lessen suspicion of the individual.[273] Both oversaturation policing and "race-out-of-place" profiling are tied to the persistently high levels of residential segregation in the United States.[274]

However, the legality of pretextual stops under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution has been upheld by the United States Supreme Court. In *Whren v. United States*,[275] the Court held that if an officer can point to an objective reason for the stop, then the officer's subjective motives or hunches do not affect the legality of the stop.[276] As noted in prior reports,[277] the Court's ruling in *Whren*, and the practice of pretextual stops specifically, have been criticized because of their potential for subjectivity and racial bias in policing,[278] including by the Board itself.

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267   Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *Annual Report* (2023) ("*2023 Report*") p. 61 <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/ripa-board-report-2023.pdf> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; see also Asirvatham and Frakes, *Are Constitutional Rights Enough? An Empirical Assessment of Racial Bias in Police Stops* ("*Are Constitutional Rights Enough?*") (Aug. 2020) Duke L. School Pub. L. & Legal Theory Series No. 2020-56, p. 5 <https://tinyurl.com/28mhcbwv> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

268   Asirvatham and Frakes, *Are Constitutional Rights Enough?*, *supra* note 267, at p. 5.

269   See Assem. Bill 2773 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) <https://tinyurl.com/abth83bf> [as of Dec. 17, 2025], adding Vehicle Code section 2806.5, subdivision (a) to require a peace officer making a traffic or pedestrian stop — before engaging in questioning related to a criminal investigation or traffic violation — to state the reason for the stop, and to document the reason for the stop on any citation or police report resulting from the stop.

270   See Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2023 Report*, *supra* note 267, at p. 52.

271   Chin and Vernon, *Reasonable but Unconstitutional: Racial Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States* (2015) 83 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 882, 941; see also Haywood, *Ending Race-Based Pretextual Stops: Strategies for Eliminating America's Most Egregious Police Practice* (2022) 26 Rich. Pub. Int. L.Rev. 47, 47-49.

272   Epp et al., *Pulled Over: How Police Stops Define Race and Citizenship*, *supra* note 166, at p. 3.

273   Hannon et al., *Out-of-Place and In-Place Policing: An Examination of Traffic Stops in Racially Segregated Philadelphia* (2021) 67 Crime & Delinquency 868, 869 <https://doi.org/10.1177/0011128720926122> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

274   *Ibid*.

275   *Whren v. United States* (1996) 517 U.S. 806.

276   *Id*. at p. 813.

277   See Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2023 Report*, *supra* note 267, at pp. 61-107; Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2024) ("*2024 Report*") p. 52-169 <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/ripa-board-report-2024.pdf> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

278   Chin and Vernon, *Reasonable but Unconstitutional: Racial Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States*, *supra* note 271, at p. 941 ["*Whren* is in many ways the *Plessy* of its era. It endorsed racial discrimination, and thereby encouraged its spread"]; Haywood, *Ending Race-Based Pretextual Stops: Strategies for Eliminating America's Most Egregious Police Practice*, *supra* note 271, at pp. 47-49 (calling pretextual stops and searches "America's most egregious police practice").

In this year's Report, the Board continues its discussion on how pretextual stops contribute to racial and identity profiling in California and undermine public safety, defined as the collective experience of being safeguarded or protected from threats to one's life or wellbeing.[279] In this report, the Board seeks to answer the following questions: (1) are there benefits to enacting policies limiting or eliminating pretextual stops; and (2) what have been the results in those jurisdictions that have enacted such policies?

A. Research and Data Show Pretextual Stops Do Not Improve Public Safety

In its 2023 Report, the Board recommended that law enforcement agencies eliminate pretextual stops based on research and data showing such practices do not improve public safety, disparately result in racial profiling, and do little to discover or prevent crime.[280] Specifically, the Board relied, in part, on 2019 RIPA data from Catalyst California, showing that 80,000 hours of law enforcement time were spent in one year on traffic stops that did not result in any enforcement of any kind, including warnings, or contraband found.[281]

Despite the Board's recommendation and data analyses consistently showing that the high cost of traffic enforcement is not justified by any corresponding reduction in crime, most counties in California continue to prioritize traffic enforcement.[282] For example, the RIPA data shows that traffic stops comprised 83.7 percent of all stops in 2024,[283] 82.1 percent in 2023,[284] and 86.8 percent in 2022.[285] Similarly, a review of 2019 data by Catalyst California found that the vast majority (84.3%) of officer-initiated stops by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department were for traffic violations; only 11.2 percent of all time was spent on responding to calls for assistance, and only 9.6 percent of stops were based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.[286] These results led Catalyst California to conclude the use of pretextual traffic stops cost Los Angeles approximately $776 million dollars a year for traffic enforcement.[287] The report urged that traffic enforcement costs be reallocated to improving community care and infrastructure.[288]

> "$776.6 million is a rough estimate of what the County spends to allow [the Los Angeles Sheriff Department] to conduct its massive traffic enforcement effort."
>
> —Catalyst California and ACLU of Southern California, *Reimagining Community Safety in California: Los Angeles County* (July 2023) p. 20.

As discussed in previous reports, and in detail below, Los Angeles has heeded calls to improve its policing

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279   Prior analysis of racial disparities in pretextual stops can be found primarily in the 2023 and 2024 RIPA Reports. (See Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2023 Report*, supra note 267, at pp. 61-107; Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2024 Report*, supra note 277, at pp. 52-169.)

280   See generally Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2023 Report*, supra note 267, at pp. 61-107.

281   See Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2023 Report*, supra note 267, at p. 64, citing Catalyst Cal. and ACLU of Southern Cal., *Reimagining Community Safety in California: From Deadly and Expensive Sheriffs to Equity and Care-Centered Wellbeing* ("*Reimagining Community Safety*") (Oct. 2022) <https://tinyurl.com/3zjv7yxz> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

282   See Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2023 Report*, supra note 267, at pp. 64-66, citing Shjarback et al., *De-Policing and Crime in the Wake of Ferguson: Racialized Changes in the Quantity and Quality of Policing Among Missouri Police Departments* (May 2017) 50 J. Crim. Justice 42 <https://tinyurl.com/3b3pbpa7> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Lofstrom et al., *Racial Disparities in Law Enforcement Stops* (Oct. 2021) Public Policy Inst. of Cal. (PPIC) <https://tinyurl.com/yk6zdxxz> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; see also Chohlas-Wood et al., *An Analysis of the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department's Traffic Stop Practices* (Nov. 19, 2018) Stanford Computational Policy Lab <https://tinyurl.com/37sbamye> [as of Dec. 17, 2025] (a 2018 study in Nashville, TN found pretextual stops both inefficient and applied in a racially disparate manner; further, the study found that these stops had no discernible effect on serious crime rates and only infrequently resulted in the recovery of contraband or a custodial arrest).

283   Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *Annual Report Appendix* (2025) p. 2 <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/ripa-appendix-2025.pdf> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

284   Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *Annual Report Appendix* (2024) p. 4 <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/ripa-appendix-2024.pdf> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

285   Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *Annual Report Appendix* (2023) p. 5 <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/ripa-appendix-2023.pdf> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

286   Catalyst California and ACLU of Southern California, *Reimagining Community Safety*, supra note 281, at pp. 10-11.

287   *Id*. at p. 20.

288   *Id*. at p. 30.

and has taken action to limit pretextual stops. The Board examines those policy changes below, along with similar changes in other jurisdictions, to identify potential recommendations for California law enforcement agencies. But first, the Board examines data supporting the need to eliminate pretextual stops in more detail.

1. Data Continues to Show That Ending Pretextual Stops Will Reduce Racially Disparate Consent Searches, and that Consent-Only Searches are Generally Unfruitful

Pretextual stops are often effectuated to search the vehicle and persons in the vehicle, with wide discretion afforded to law enforcement to initiate the contact, considering the vast number of possible traffic infractions at their disposal to justify the stop.[289] By their nature, pretextual stops based on traffic infractions do not provide probable cause to search the vehicle. For instance, in the example discussed above — where an officer stops someone for a broken taillight — there is no reason an officer would need to search the driver or their vehicle to determine whether the taillight is in fact broken. Any search of the driver or their vehicle must therefore be based on probable cause,

> "[L]ess than one half of 1% of all traffic stops result in deputies uncovering any weapons of any kind [in Los Angeles County]."
>
> — Catalyst California and ACLU of Southern California, *Reimagining Community Safety in California: Los Angeles County* (July 2023).

unrelated to the reason the driver was initially stopped. If there is no probable cause, the officer must obtain consent from the driver to search.

RIPA data show that officers ask drivers perceived to be Black and Hispanic/Latine(x) for consent to search more frequently than drivers perceived to be White, yet the discovery rate of weapons or other contraband continues to be minimal.[290]

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289   See *Whren v. United States* (1996) 517 U.S. 806; see also Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2023 Report*, supra note 267, at pp. 67-68.

290   Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2023 Report*, *supra* note 267, at pp. 71-73 (noting that individuals perceived as Black were 4 times as likely, individuals perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x) were 2.4 times as likely, and individuals perceived as Multiracial were 2.2 times as likely to be asked for consent to search during a traffic stop than White individuals, and that officers requested to perform a search of nearly twice as many individuals perceived as Black than White, despite stopping 2.2 times more individuals perceived as White than individuals perceived as Black). These figures are consistent with prior reports. (See Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report Appendix* (2024) pp. 21, 30 <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/ripa-board-report-2024.pdf> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2022) ("*2022 Report*") pp. 100, 104 <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/ripa-board-report-2022.pdf> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2021) ("*2021 Report*") p. 14 <https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ripa/ripa-board-report-2021.pdf> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2020) ("*2020 Report*") pp. 35, 38 <https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ripa/ripa-board-report-2020.pdf> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; see also Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2023 Report*, *supra* note 267, at p. 72 (noting that "the data shows a continued trend from the 2019, 2020, and now 2021 data that during stops where officers perform consent only searches, officers are least likely to find contraband in the possession of those perceived as Black").)

Figure 73. Percent of Traffic Stops where Officer Asked for Consent Search by Perceived Race/Ethnicity

Across all RIPA data, officers asked for consent to search person or property in 1.98% (84,218) of stops. Officers reported the highest rates of asking for consent to search in stops of individuals perceived as Black (3.14%; 14,563 stops) and Hispanic/Latine(x) (2.59%; 48,235 stops). Officers reported the lowest rates of asking for consent to search in stops of individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian (0.46%; 1,201 stops) and Asian (0.61%; 1,694 stops).

Figure 74. Percent of Traffic Stops with a Consent Only Search by Perceived Race/Ethnicity

Across all RIPA data, officers reported conducting consent only[291] searches in 0.79% (33,817) of traffic stops. Officers reported the highest rates of consent only searches in traffic stops of individuals perceived as Black (1.09%; 5,069 stops) and Hispanic/Latine(x) (1.08%; 20,100 stops). Officers reported the lowest rates of consent only searches in traffic stops of individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian (0.21%; 536 stops) and Asian (0.27%; 753 stops).

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291   A "consent only" search is defined in the 2023 RIPA Report as "searches in which the only basis provided by the officer is 'consent given.'" (Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2023 Report*, *supra* note 267, at p. 15.)

Figure 75. Percent of Traffic Stops where Officer Asked for Consent Search by Traffic Violation Type and Perceived Race/Ethnicity

Across all races and ethnicities, officers asked for consent to search most frequently in stops initiated due to an equipment violation, followed by non-moving violation, and then moving violations. Among equipment violations, officers reported the highest rates of asking for consent to search in stops of individuals perceived to Black (6.45%; 7,016 stops) and Hispanic/Latine(x) (5.51%; 24,529 stops) and the lowest rates of asking for consent to search in stops of individuals perceived to be Middle Eastern/South Asian (1.49%; 544 stops) and Asian (2.33%; 810 stops). Among non-moving violations, officers reported the highest rates of asking for consent to search in stops of individuals perceived to be Black (3.15%; 2,592 stops) and Native American (3.08%; 51 stops) and the lowest rates of asking for consent to search in stops of individuals perceived to be Middle Eastern/South Asian (0.57%; 191 stops) and Asian (0.63%; 226 stops). Among moving violations, officers reported the highest rates of asking for consent to search in stops of individuals perceived to be Black (1.82%; 4,955 stops) and Hispanic/Latine(x) (1.47%; 16,653 stops) and the lowest rates of asking for consent to search in stops of individuals perceived to be Middle Eastern/South Asian (0.24%; 466 stops) and Asian (0.32%; 658 stops).

Figure 76. Percent of Traffic Stops Involving Consent Only Searches by Traffic Violation Type and Perceived Race/Ethnicity

Across all races and ethnicities, officers performed consent only searches the most frequently in stops initiated due to an equipment violation, followed by non-moving violation, and then moving violations. Among equipment violations, officers reported the highest rates of consent only searches in stops of individuals perceived to Hispanic/Latine(x) (2.36%; 10,519 stops) and Black (2.26%; 2,459 stops) and the

lowest rates of consent only searches in stops of individuals perceived to be Middle Eastern/South Asian (0.71%; 259 stops) and Asian (1.16%; 404 stops). Among non-moving violations, officers reported the highest rates of consent only searches in stops of individuals perceived to be Native American (1.57%; 26 stops) and Black (1.22%; 1,001 stops) and the lowest rates of consent only searches in stops of individuals perceived to be Asian (0.25%; 90 stops) and Middle Eastern/South Asian (0.26%; 87 stops). Among moving violations, officers reported the highest rates of consent only searches in stops of individuals perceived to be Black (0.59%; 1,609 stops) and Hispanic/Latine(x) (0.59%; 6,635 stops) and the lowest rates of consent only searches in stops of individuals perceived to be Middle Eastern/South Asian (0.10%; 190 stops) and Asian (0.13%; 259 stops).

Despite that officers reported consent only searches of individuals perceived as Black and Hispanic/Latine(x) most frequently, officers reported discovery of contraband more frequently in searches of individuals perceived as Pacific Islander and White, as shown in the charts below.

Figure 77. Contraband Discovery Rate for Traffic Stops with a Consent Only Search by Perceived Race/Ethnicity

On average, officers reported finding contraband in 15.66% (5,297) of all traffic stops where they conducted a consent only search. Officers reported the highest contraband discovery rates in traffic stops of individuals perceived as Pacific Islander (23.48%; 31 stops) and White (22.29%; 1,508 stops) where the officer conducted a consent only search. Officers reported the lowest contraband discovery rates in traffic stops of individuals perceived as Black (10.83%; 549 stops) and Multiracial (13.62%; 53 stops) where the officer conducted a consent only search.

Figure 78. Contraband Discovery Rate for Traffic Stops Involving Consent Only Searches by Traffic Violation Type and Perceived Race/Ethnicity

Among non-moving violations, officers reported the highest contraband discovery rates in consent only searches of individuals perceived as White (25.53%; 358 stops) and Middle Eastern/South Asian (21.84%; 19 stops) and the lowest contraband discovery rates in consent only searches of individuals perceived as Multiracial (7.94%; 5 stops) and Black (10.69%; 107 stops). Among equipment violations, officers reported the highest contraband discovery rates in consent only searches of individuals perceived as Pacific Islander (25.00%; 17 stops) and White (21.56%; 778 stops) and the lowest contraband discovery rates in consent only searches of individuals perceived as Black (11.92%; 293 stops) and Multiracial (12.70%; 24 stops). Among moving violations, officers reported the highest contraband discovery rates in consent only searches of individuals perceived as Native American (27.27%; 3 stops) and Pacific Islander (25.00%; 10 stops) and the lowest contraband discovery rates in consent only searches of individuals perceived as Black (9.26%; 149 stops) and Hispanic/Latine(x) (12.69%; 842 stops).

These findings are consistent with the findings in prior reports,[292] and demonstrate that consent only searches, and the low rate at which they yield results, are unlikely to contribute to public safety.

In contrast, when law enforcement bases a search on articulable facts to warrant the search, their success rates climb and disparate treatment declines. For instance, 35.46 percent of searches of individuals perceived to be Black yielded discovery of contraband when the search was based on consent *and* there was a factual justification for the search.[293] This trend applies to the whole data set — i.e., regardless of the perceived demographics of the individual stopped — since consent-plus basis searches result in discoveries

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292   For example, the 2023 RIPA Report found the rate of contraband discovery during traffic stop consent searches was *lowest* among individuals perceived to be Black (6.8%), Pacific Islander (9.1%), or Hispanic/Latine(x) (10.3%). (Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2023 Report*, *supra* note 267, at pp. 71-73.)

293   The 2023 RIPA Report highlighted a 26.5 percent discovery rate when of searches of individuals perceived to be Black were obtained based on consent plus a factual justification for the search, versus 9.1 percent of consent only searches of the same population. (Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2023 Report*, *supra* note 267, at p. 36.)

at nearly double the rate of consent-only searches (36.88% vs. 20.3%), regardless of identity group.[294]

Accordingly, the 2024 RIPA data show, consistent with prior reports, that if the search is based on more than just consent, there is a higher likelihood the officer will discover contraband, improving public safety. In contrast, there is a lower likelihood that consent only searches will yield discovery of contraband; at most, such searches have a negligible effect on public safety. Further, because individuals perceived to be of color are asked for consent at a disproportionately higher rate than individuals perceived to be White, and as consent-only searches of individuals perceived to be of color are less fruitful than consent only searches of individuals perceived to be White, these pretextual stop searches lead to both a lower likelihood of discovery of contraband *and* increased racial and identity profiling.

2. Ending Pretextual Stops Will Contribute to the Reduction of Numbers of Racially Disparate Direct and Indirect Deadly Police Interactions

a. Direct Deadly Interactions

Numerous studies show that law enforcement trainings and police culture create a heightened "presumption of peril" in traffic stops, despite data analysis showing a very small statistical likelihood of harm to law enforcement conducting the stops.[295] Penal Code section 835, subdivision (a) restricts an officer's force to only what is reasonable under the circumstances.[296] In 2019, a review of 10 years of traffic stops by more than 200 law enforcement agencies in Florida found little statistical risk of serious harm to officers, quantifying it as a 1 in 6.5 million chance of being killed during a stop for a traffic infraction and a 1 in 3.6 million chance of being killed during a vehicle stop.[297]

In contrast, the risk of serious bodily harm or death to drivers and passengers in traffic stops are much higher. From 2015 to 2024, *The Washington Post* collected data of 10,429 civilians who have been shot and killed by on duty police officers.[298] *The New York Times*, analyzing a subset of that data from 2016 to 2021, looked at 400 instances of police killings resulting from traffic stops where the civilians "were not wielding a gun or knife" and "were not under pursuit for a violent crime."[299] In those 400 cases, the investigation found that the police officer's perception of harm created a tense and overstated sense of risk, resulting in officers acting upon those perceived threats with physical violence and shootings of civilians.[300] In approximately 12 percent of civilian deaths reviewed, officers fired on motorists believing the driver had or was reaching for a weapon.[301] The investigation suggested many officer threats were a result of officers standing in front of fleeing vehicles, reaching inside windows, or acting aggressively in response to disrespect or disobedience.[302] Three-quarters of deaths were caused by officers shooting motorists attempting to flee.[303] As noted in a subsequent article related to the investigation, "[p]olice culture and court precedents significantly overstated the danger to officers, encouraging aggression in the name of self-defense and impunity from prosecutors and juries."[304]

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294   In the 2023 Report, consent-plus basis searches result in discoveries at nearly double the rate of consent-only searches (27.5% vs. 14.5%), regardless of identity group. (Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2023 Report*, *supra* note 267, at p. 36.)

295   See Levenson, *Pulled Over: What to Know About Deadly Police Traffic Stops* (Nov. 8, 2021) The New York Times <https://tinyurl.com/33ktkjy7> [as of Dec. 17, 2025] ("'All you've heard are horror stories about what could happen . . . It is very difficult to try to train that out of somebody'"); Kirkpatrick et al., *Why Many Police Traffic Stops Turn Deadly* (Nov. 30, 2021) The New York Times <https://tinyurl.com/49957swk> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; see also Woods, *Policing, Danger Narratives, and Routine Traffic Stops* (2019) 117 Mich. L.Rev. 635, 676, 683 <https://tinyurl.com/2dm3rc6t> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

296   For more information about the use of force, and how such "low discretion" events are influenced by civilian oversight agencies (COAs), see the Accountability chapter of this year's Report.

297   Woods, *Policing, Danger Narratives, And Routine Traffic Stops*, *supra* note 295, at p. 676.

298   The Washington Post, *Fatal Force: Police Shootings Database* (Dec. 31, 2024) <https://tinyurl.com/58f9ffrh> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

299   Kirkpatrick et al., *Why Many Police Traffic Stops Turn Deadly*, *supra* note 295.

300   *Ibid*.

301   *Ibid*.

302   *Ibid*.

303   *Ibid*.

304   *Ibid*.

b. Indirect Deadly Interactions: High-Speed Chases

Researchers since the 1980s have found that most high-speed pursuits stem from traffic violations, not serious felony offenses.[305] High-speed vehicle pursuits carry a significant risk of severe injury and death for officers, passengers, drivers, and bystanders, and as a result, risk the wellbeing of anyone in the community when their mere presence in the vicinity of a high-speed chase puts their life at risk.[306] Policing experts suggest that, given how often officers stop individuals for minor infractions, limiting pretextual stops could help reduce chases and the resulting deaths and injuries.[307]

In 2023, the United States Department of Justice (USDOJ) and the Police Executive Research Forum reviewed pursuit policies from 48 law enforcement agencies in 27 states, including California.[308] The USDOJ report concluded, in the case of a high-speed chase, there is a much higher chance that the suspect is fleeing because of a minor offense than a serious crime.[309] The USDOJ report resulted in 65 separate recommendations to further protect public safety from deadly high-speed chases.[310] Many recommendations focused on reducing the situations where law enforcement officers believe a high speed chase is necessary or warranted.[311] For example, one recommendation is that law enforcement policies "should direct officers not to engage in a vehicle pursuit if the suspect's identity is known, the suspect can be apprehended later, and delayed apprehension does not significantly increase the risk to the community."[312]

Long before RIPA, California law mandated that all law enforcement agencies report motor vehicle pursuit data to the California Highway Patrol, who then submits a yearly report to the Legislature.[313] The report form lists 30 required data points, including the time of day, length of the pursuit, speeds, collisions, and injuries involved in the pursuit. Though the form requires law enforcement to "indicate the ethnicity that most clearly resembles the driver,"[314] this data point does not appear to be analyzed or reported to the Legislature in its yearly Police Pursuits Report.

The most recent publicly released Police Pursuits Report analyzed the 11,985 police pursuits in California in 2022.[315] In that year, 19 percent of police pursuits resulted in a crash; of those crashes, 35 percent resulted in injury crashes, and 1.4 percent of pursuits resulted in fatal crashes, which took 34 lives.[316] Data from 2021 revealed an even higher number of police pursuits, with 12,513 pursuits reported and a 20 percent crash rate.[317] Injury rates were also higher in 2021, with 35 percent of crashes leading to injuries, and 1.7 percent of crashes resulting in fatal crashes, or 52 people dying as a result of the pursuit.[318] Traffic infractions were three of the top five reasons for initiating stops that resulted in pursuits in 2022.[319] Specifically, speeding was identified as the top reason for stops (18.3% of stops), followed by possession of a stolen vehicle

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305   Alpert and Anderson, *The Most Deadly Force: Police Pursuits* (1986) 3 Justice Q. 1, 9-10.
306   *Id*. at p. 3.
307   Neilson and Gollan, *Thrown from His Moped by a Car Fleeing Police: One Man's Death Reflects a Shocking Disparity* (Dec. 12, 2024) San Francisco Chronicle <https://tinyurl.com/53mr9z5s> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
308   Police Executive Research Forum and Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice, *Vehicle Pursuits: A Guide for Law Enforcement Executives on Managing Associated Risks* (2023) p. 23 <https://tinyurl.com/546rh885> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
309   *Id*. at p. 16.
310   *Id*. at pp. 2-10.
311   *Id*. at pp. 2-10, 16.
312   *Id*. at p. 2.
313   Veh. Code, § 14602.1. See also State of California, Department of California Highway Patrol, *Allied Agency Pursuit Report* <https://tinyurl.com/573vwv6n> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]. Yearly reports to the Legislature can be accessed on the California Highway Patrol's website. (See California Highway Patrol, Office of Special Representative <https://tinyurl.com/2dve59tp> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].)
314   State of California, Department of California Highway Patrol, *Allied Agency Pursuit Report, supra* note 313.
315   Cal. Highway Patrol, *Report to the Legislature: Senate Bill 719, Police Pursuits (June 2023)* p. 20 <https://tinyurl.com/mpuhk42v> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
316   *Id*. at p. iii.
317   *Id*. at p. 20.
318   Cal. Highway Patrol, *Report to the Legislature: Senate Bill 719, Police Pursuits (June 2022)* <https://tinyurl.com/537j458p> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
319   Cal. Highway Patrol, *Report to the Legislature: Senate Bill 719, Police Pursuits (June 2023), supra* note 318, at p. 8.

(14.8%), license plate/registration (10%), failure to stop at a stop sign (6.3%), and reckless driving (5.2%).[320]

The statewide trends identified by CHP are also reflected at the local level. For example, a review of pursuit data in San Diego County from 2019-2024 showed that 60.7 percent of pursuits began with stops based on traffic infractions, and 75.3 percent of pursuits ending in a crash resulted in some form of injury.[321] Similarly, in Los Angeles, 25 percent of pursuits by LAPD from 2018-2023 resulted in a death or injury.[322]

Though only a small portion of stops for traffic infractions lead to high-speed chases, most high-speed chases come from stops for traffic infractions.

Figure 79. Percent of Stops Involving Evasion of Law Enforcement by Reason for Stop Offense Code Charge

Percent of Stops Involving Evasion of Law Enforcement
with at Least One Reason for Stop Offense Code Present

Reason for Stop Offense Charge: ■ Felony ■ Misdemeanor ■ Infraction ■ Other

Across all traffic stops that involved evasion of law enforcement as at least one result of stop code, officers stopped individuals for infractions (55.79%; 3,013 stops) the most frequently, followed by misdemeanors (22.96%; 1,240 stops), felonies (21.00%; 1,134 stops), and then Other charges (0.26%; 14 stops).

The 2024 RIPA data also show racial and ethnic disparities in the initial reason for stop of stops involving evasion of law enforcement.

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320   Cal. Highway Patrol, *Report to the Legislature: Senate Bill 719, Police Pursuits (June 2023)*, *supra* note 318, at p. 8.
321   San Diego Commission on Police Practices, *S.D.P.D. Pursuits 2019-2024 Totals* (2024) pp. 6-11 <https://tinyurl.com/34c43tta> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
322   Board of Police Commissioners, *Vehicle Pursuit Analysis 2018-2022* (2023) p. 5 <https://tinyurl.com/23zfn8ht> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

Figure 80. Percent of Traffic Stops Involving Evasion of Law Enforcement by Reason for Stop Offense Charge and Perceived Race/Ethnicity

Percent of Stops Involving Evasion of Law Enforcement
with at Least One Reason for Stop Offense Code Present

Reason for Stop Offense Charge: ■ Felony ■ Misdemeanor ■ Infraction ■ Other

In traffic stops where evasion of law enforcement is at least one result of stop, officers stopped individuals perceived as Pacific Islander (34.29%; 12 stops) and Black (26.67%; 268 stops) the most frequently for felonies and individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian (9.09%; 13 stops) and Native American (14.29%; 4 stops) the least frequently for felonies. Officers stopped individuals perceived as Native American (32.14%; 9 stops) and Middle Eastern/South Asian (30.07%; 43 stops) the most frequently for misdemeanors and individuals perceived as Pacific Islander (8.57%; 3 stops) and Black (18.51%; 186 stops) the least frequently for misdemeanors. Officers stopped individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian (60.84%; 87 stops) and Asian (58.40%; 73 stops) the most frequently for infractions and individuals perceived as Native American (50.00%; 14 stops) and Multiracial (53.06%; 52 stops) the least frequently for infractions. Officers stopped individuals perceived as Native American (3.57%; 1 stop) and White (0.39%; 5 stops) the most frequently for Other charges[323] and did not stop any individuals perceived as Pacific Islander, Multiracial, Middle/Eastern/South Asian, or Asian for Other charges.

The 2024 RIPA data also show clear racial and ethnic disparities in stops involving evasion of law enforcement, as shown in the chart below.

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323 "Other" offenses include a variety of offense categories that do not fall within the categories of infraction, misdemeanor, or felony. Some are offense codes that authorize authorities to take custody of a person without necessarily triggering arrest/citation. Others include penalty enhancements or just legal statuses such as sex offender and arson registration.

Figure 81. Percent of Traffic Stops Involving Evasion of Law Enforcement by Perceived Race/Ethnicity

Of all traffic stops that involved evasion of law enforcement as at least one result of stop, officers reported stopping individuals perceived as Hispanic/Latine(x) (49.41%; 2,787 stops) and White (24.00%; 1,354 stops) the most frequently and individuals perceived as Native American (0.53%; 30 stops) and Pacific Islander (0.66%; 37 stops) the least frequently.

The 2024 RIPA data also show racial and ethnic disparities in the use of force during stops involving evasion of law enforcement, as shown below.

Figure 82. Use of Force in Traffic Stops Involving Evasion of Law Enforcement by Perceived Race/Ethnicity

Of all traffic stops that involved evasion of law enforcement as at least one result of stop, officers used force the most frequently in stops of individuals perceived as Black (81.58%; 859 stops) and Multiracial (78.64%; 81 stops) and the least frequently in stops of individuals perceived as Asian (72.87%; 94 stops) and Native American (73.33%; 22 stops). Officers reported discharging their firearm the most frequently in stops of individuals perceived as Black (0.09%; 1 stop) and Hispanic/Latine(x) (0.07%; 2 stops) and reported no firearm discharge in stops of individuals perceived to be any other race. Officers reported pointing their firearm the most frequently in stops of individuals perceived as Black (35.14%; 370 stops) and Multiracial (31.07%; 32 stops) and the least frequently in stops of individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian (26.35%; 39 stops) and Pacific Islander (27.03%; 10 stops). Officers reported unholstering their firearm the most frequently in stops of individuals perceived as Black (27.07%; 285 stops) and Native American (26.67%; 8 stops) and the least frequently in stops of individuals perceived as Middle Eastern/South Asian (10.14%; 15 stops) and Pacific Islander (13.51%; 5 stops).

c. Conclusion

As noted above, it is difficult to ascertain the exact number of traffic stops that are pretextual stops from the available data. The RIPA data also do not show how many stops involving evasion of law enforcement also involved a high-speed chase, although all high-speed chases also necessarily involve evasion of law enforcement. As such, the RIPA data is an indirect measurement of the proportion of high-speed chases arising from pretextual stops.

However, the data show that traffic stops involving evasion of law enforcement are most commonly stops for traffic infractions — the types of offenses in pretextual stops — and not serious or violent crimes, felonies, or even misdemeanor offenses. The data also show clear racial and ethnic disparities in stops involving evasion of law enforcement, both in the perceived demographics of individuals stopped, and in the actions taken during the stop, such as the use of force or the use of a firearm. Thus it is likely that the enactment of policies that reduce or eliminate pretextual stops will also reduce the number of high-speed chases overall, as most high-speed chases arise from infractions, not more serious crimes, increasing public safety. Policies limiting such chases are consistent with the research in this area.[324] Further, reducing or eliminating pretextual stops would reduce racial and ethnic disparities when those stops involve evasion of law enforcement or high-speed chases.

The Board recognizes this is the beginning of the discussion of police pursuits and its relationship to racial and identity profiling. However, as the 2024 data provides an additional reason to reduce or eliminate pretextual stops — i.e., that when those pretextual stops become a high-speed chase, those stops also show racial and ethnic disparities — the Board reiterates its recommendations to eliminate pretextual stops for that reason. Additionally, the Board supports further analysis of the data, to assess how many pursuits were initiated from traffic infractions, what are the demographics of those stops and pursuits, and whether and how these risks disparately impact communities of color. Continued assessment and analysis should drive future discussions regarding improving the safety and efficacy of pursuits policies.

B. Jurisdictions That Have Reduced or Eliminated Pretextual Stops Have Demonstrated Reductions in Racial and Identity Profiling and Improved Public Safety

As a result of data reflecting racial disparities in traffic stops and the ineffectiveness of traffic stops in preventing crime and improving public safety, the Board has previously recommended ending the widespread and costly use of pretextual stops in California.[325] The 2022 California Committee on Revision of

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324   See, e.g., Police Executive Research Forum and Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice, *Vehicle Pursuits: A Guide for Law Enforcement Executives on Managing Associated Risks*, *supra* note 308, at p. 16.

325   See Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2023 Report*, *supra* note 267, at p. 89. In that report, the Board made four specific recommendations related to the elimination of traffic stops: (1) Limiting enforcement of traffic laws and minor offenses that pose a low risk to public safety and show significant disparities in the rate of enforcement; (2) Limiting armed law enforcement responses only to stops if there is a concern for public safety; (3) Prohibiting certain searches,

the Penal Code also recommended a prohibition on traffic infraction related stops, weighing their limited public safety benefit against the potential of a prohibition to "help to alleviate racial disparities, improve perceptions of the fairness of our criminal legal system, and encourage the development of more effective policing strategies."[326]

The concept of policing without pretextual traffic stops has also gained traction from police departments, sheriff departments, district attorney's offices, cities, and states.[327] These agencies and jurisdictions have acknowledged the negative impact of pretextual stops on public safety, and, in response, have limited or eliminated the ability of law enforcement to use traffic stops as a pretext for suspicion-less investigations.[328] The success of those jurisdictions in limiting and ending pretextual stops to improve public safety and reduce racial profiling provides further support for the Board's recommendations as a means of achieving similar results on a state-wide scale.[329]

State and Local Policies Limiting Non-Safety Related Traffic Stops[330]

Policy Type	Jurisdictions	Policy Summary
Legislation – State	California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Vermont, Virginia	State legislatures passed laws limiting or prohibiting non-safety related traffic stops. California Vehicle Code section 5204 allows a one month grace period on registration expiration, and Government Code section 12525.5 requires officers to state the reason for the stop before engaging in questioning related to a traffic violation or criminal investigation. Oregon Senate Bill No. 1510 permits an officer to issue a citation for a lighting violation only if the officer has already stopped the driver for a separate traffic violation or other offense.
Legislation – City	Berkeley, CA Ann Arbor, MI East Lansing, MI Philadelphia, PA	City councils passed local ordinances targeting non-safety stops. Ann Arbor (2023) and East Lansing (2024) passed measures to deprioritize stops for secondary traffic violations.

such as consent searches or supervision searches, during traffic stops and instead requiring probable cause for any search; and (4) Eliminating all pretextual stops and subsequent searches and ensuring that a stop or search is based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause, respectively. (See also Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2024 Report*, *supra* note 277, at p. 68 (citing continued advocacy of 2023 Recommendations).)

326   Technical traffic citations which would no longer warrant police contact were vehicle or equipment registration, positioning or number of license plates, lighting equipment, window tints or obstructions, and bicycle equipment and operation. (Committee on Revision of the Penal Code, *2022 Annual Report*, pg. 33 <https://tinyurl.com/6dukvdrr> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].)

327   See, e.g., Assem. Bill No. 256 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) <https://tinyurl.com/2235xdd9> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Assem. Bill No. 2773 (2021-22 Reg. Sess.) <https://tinyurl.com/mc6jjcem> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Or. Senate Bill No. 1510 (81st Leg. Assem. Reg. Sess. 2022) <https://tinyurl.com/7x3eddn6> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Va. House Bill No. 5058, Spec. Sess. I. (2020) <https://tinyurl.com/4mf7nskc> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Va. Senate Bill No. 5029, Spec. Sess. I. (2020) <https://tinyurl.com/y2btdfau> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Ill. House Bill No. 2389, 103rd Gen. Assem. (2023) <https://tinyurl.com/43j69nn9> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; N.Y. Assem. Bill No. A7599 (2021-22 Reg. Sess.) <https://tinyurl.com/4d82m667> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; NJ Rev. Stat. § 39:3-76.2n & 76.2f (2024) <https://tinyurl.com/5c6v3d5v> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Md. Transp. Code § 13-411(c) (2024) <https://tinyurl.com/yc7yskbp> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Oh. Rev. Code § 4511.043 (2024) <https://tinyurl.com/yc79njcv> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Conn. Pub. Act No. 25-19 (2025) <https://tinyurl.com/3hsb584k> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; 23 Vt. Stat. Ann. § 615(b) (2024) <https://tinyurl.com/yc6p974a> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

328   Kirkpatrick et al., *Cities Try to Turn the Tide on Police Traffic Stops* (Apr. 15, 2022) The New York Times <https://tinyurl.com/3bb9hxur> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

329   Raim, *Police Are Stopping Fewer Drivers — and It's Increasing Safety* (Jan. 11, 2024) Vera Institute <https://tinyurl.com/y47a9bym> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

330   Data compiled from Vera Institute of Justice, *Redefining Public Safety Initiative: Sensible Traffic Ordinances for Public Safety* (Oct. 23, 2025) <https://tinyurl.com/5n7nu66c> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Gov. Code § 12525.5.

Law enforcement directive	Los Angeles, CA San Francisco, CA Carrboro, NC Chapel Hill, NC Denver, CO Lansing, MI Mecklenburg County, NC Minneapolis, MN Seattle, WA	Police and sheriffs' departments issued internal directives to deprioritize or prohibit non-safety related stops. The LAPD's 2022 directive restricts stops for minor infractions unless there is "articulable information in addition to the traffic violation, which may or may not amount to reasonable suspicion, regarding a serious crime,"[331] while a police officer of Minneapolis Police Department may not initiate a traffic stop solely based on nonmoving, secondary violations, unless there is an articulable risk to public safety.
Legislative resolution	West Hollywood, CA Chapel Hill, NC Shaker Heights, OH Ypsilanti, MI	City councils adopted resolutions to guide enforcement away from low-level traffic violations. West Hollywood declared that vehicle registration, license plates, and lighting were minor, low-level traffic offenses and of low priority for enforcement by the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department.
Prosecutor directive	Chittenden County, VT Ingham County, MI Ramsey County, MN Washtenaw County, MI	County prosecutors issued policies declining to prosecute cases stemming from non-safety stops. Washtenaw County Prosecutor's Office states that the office will no longer prosecute contraband cases that arise from pretext stops, while Ramsey County Attorney's Office will decline to prosecute cases when the charge is solely the product of a non-safety related traffic stop.
Executive or executive agency order	Philadelphia, PA	Mayoral executive order on driving equality policy directed Philadelphia Police Department to only conduct vehicle stops in circumstances where the violations create a risk of danger.

In the 2023 RIPA Report, the Board noted numerous police agencies, municipalities, and even states that have begun to craft legislation aimed at limiting pretextual stops to reduce their racially disparate impact and ineffectiveness in promoting public safety.[332] This year, the Board seeks to further this policy discussion by assessing current stop data with pretextual stop reforms discussed below.

1. Early Reform Efforts and State-Level Approaches

a. Fayetteville, North Carolina

Reform efforts in Fayetteville, North Carolina illustrate the importance of policy changes to eliminate pretextual stops. Following the resignation of the city's police chief in 2012, in part due to data showing 75 percent of all civilians stopped by law enforcement were Black,[333] the newly installed Chief of Police, Harold Medlock, sought in 2013 to reduce high crash rates and assuage community concerns regarding racial profiling.[334] The city of Fayetteville asked the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services' and Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance to review their police department, which, in turn, provided empirical evidence supporting residents' reports of racial profiling in pretextual traffic stops.[335]

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331   Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners, Policy 240.06, *Policy – Limitation on Use of Pretextual Stops* (Mar. 1, 2022) <https://tinyurl.com/3zxnwfcn> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

332   Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2023 Report, supra* note 267, at pp. 66, 88-89.

333   Barnes, *Medlock at Peace with Decision to Step Down as Chief* (Aug. 28, 2016) The Fayetteville Observer <https://tinyurl.com/2xxs5pea> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

334   Kirkpatrick et al., *Cities Try to Turn the Tide on Police Traffic Stops, supra* note 328.

335   Thompson, *Fayetteville Police Department Receives Recommendations for Improvement from Department of Justice*

1) The Policy

In response to statistical connections between pretextual stops and racial profiling and to community concerns of lived experiences of racial profiling, in 2013, Fayetteville imposed restrictions on stops for traffic-related infractions and focused officers instead on safety-related stops such as impaired and reckless driving.[336]

2) The Results

A study conducted by researchers at the University of North Carolina compared the data from stops and vehicle accidents from 2002 to 2016 of Fayetteville and eight other North Carolina police agencies and highlighted key successes of Fayetteville's restrictive pretextual stop policies in their reduction of vehicular accidents and racial profiling.[337] The ultimate conclusion of the report found that "re-prioritization of traffic stop types by law enforcement agencies may have positive public health consequences both for motor vehicle injury and racial disparity outcomes while having little impact on non-traffic crime."[338]

> "Everything good that could happen, did happen."
>
> —Chief Harold Medlock, as quoted in Kirkpatrick et al., *Cities Try to Turn the Tide on Police Traffic Stops*, The New York Times (Apr. 15, 2022).

The Chief of Police stated, more specifically, that "crime went down, fatalities went down, crashes went down, uses of force went down, injuries to officers and the public went down. There was a general feeling that things were safer and there was a better relationship. The anecdotal things I am sharing … are really backed up by the data."[339] Law enforcement officers subject to the policy change in Fayetteville echoed these observations of positive community engagement and trust. The assistant chief described the improvement to community relations as "night and day," resulting in an increased willingness of community members to assist in other areas of law enforcement and include law enforcement in community events, stating, "[e]verybody now wanted to be associated with the Fayetteville Police Department."[340]

3) Current Practices

Fayetteville can serve as both a lesson in positive data-driven changes—and more recently, a cautionary tale of what happens when those data driven changes are abandoned.[341] Chief Medlock, who played a crucial role in reforming the department's pretextual stop policies, retired in December of 2016, and subsequent police chiefs ushered in new priorities and policies, largely reversing the reformed policies.

In 2023, under the reversed pretextual stop policies, Fayetteville's crime statistics showed a 53 percent increase in traffic stops, with law enforcement stopping and searching Black drivers at twice the rate of White drivers in the city.[342] The new statistics drew comparisons from pre-2013 reforms, when disparate stop-and-search rates created the impetus for the policy reforms that proved successful from 2013-2016.[343]

(Dec. 22, 2015) Up & Coming Weekly <https://tinyurl.com/3673bjvx> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

336   Kirkpatrick et al., *Cities Try to Turn the Tide on Police Traffic Stops*, *supra* note 328.

337   Fliss et al., *Re-Prioritizing Traffic Stops to Reduce Motor Vehicle Crash Outcomes and Racial Disparities* (Jan. 2020) 7 Inj. Epidemiol. 1, 1 <https://tinyurl.com/2uhwu6bz> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

338   *Ibid*.

339   Pitts, *Fayetteville Police Chief Who Drew National Attention for Reform is Still at It* (Feb. 25, 2021) The Fayetteville Observer <https://tinyurl.com/33hemw6r> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

340   Raim, *Police Are Stopping Fewer Drivers — and It's Increasing Safety*, *supra* note 329.

341   Riley, *National Groups Say Fayetteville is Stopping More Black Drivers Than It Was a Decade Ago* (Nov. 11, 2024) The Fayetteville Observer <https://tinyurl.com/4nedtaxd> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

342   Weisblat *Council Votes Against Motion for Committee to Address Traffic Stop Racial Disparities,* (Mar. 10, 2024) City View, <https://tinyurl.com/4k2uas2w> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

343   Riley, *National Groups Say Fayetteville is Stopping More Black Drivers Than It Was a Decade Ago*, *supra* note 341.

Fayetteville North Carolina's racial disparity rate in pretextual stops is now even higher than in 2012, when reforms ushered in a new era.[344]

In 2024, the city council was briefed on the successes of the prior policies by the Vera Institute of Justice. The Vera Institute informed council members that prior reform policies restricting pretextual traffic stops decreased crashes with serious injuries by 23 percent and decreased traffic fatalities by 28 percent, while also decreasing racial disparities in stops by 21 percent.[345] The group further advised that "data suggests that Fayetteville could be effective in stopping dangerous driving and decreasing fatalities and injuries if it focuses on dangerous driving instead of low-level traffic violations where there are racial disparities."[346] Whether Fayetteville is currently willing to make similar changes that proved successful from 2013-2016 remains to be seen.

b. Virginia's State-Wide Limitation on Pretextual Stops

1) The Policy

As noted in the 2023 RIPA Report, Virginia was the first state to enact a state-wide limitation on pretext stops.[347] The Virginia policy created a two-tier traffic enforcement system, limiting officer discretion and only allowing stops for specified offenses considered to impact public safety. The bill also prohibits the introduction of any evidence discovered or obtained due to an impermissible stop at any trial, hearing, or other legal proceeding.[348] Virginia's data reporting requirements for law enforcement agencies require critical data points to assess racial disparities, including perceived "race, ethnicity, age, [and] gender" of the person subject to police contact.[349]

2) The Results

Initial analysis of data gathered in 2023 shows that searches "plummeted" as a result of the limitation on pretextual stops and additional limitations on searches based on the scent of marijuana and other infractions.[350] However, disparities persist in stops of individuals perceived to be Black and Hispanic/Latine(x), with individuals perceived to be Black facing the most statistically significant disparities.[351]

More recently, a report analyzing stop data from July of 2020 to September of 2023 by county found that arrest and search rates continue to show disparities in Virginia, with Black individuals more than 350% more likely to face arrest and 500% more likely to be searched than White individuals.[352] While stressing a continuing need to reduce high disparities in policing, particularly with regard to Black drivers, the report found a decline in three racially disparate areas of policing from 2020 to 2023: "person searches, vehicle searches, and traffic violation outcomes."[353]

The results of this study indicate that racial disparities in "person searches" during police stops have declined since the implementation of the law.[354] The report acknowledged improvements in racial disparities, but recommended a number of additional policy changes for consideration, including: 1)

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344   *Ibid*.
345   *Ibid*.
346   *Ibid*.
347   See Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2023 Report*, *supra* note 267, at p. 100, citing H 5058, Va. Acts of Assembly (2020 Special Sess.) <https://tinyurl.com/f6a27957> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
348   H 5058, Va. Acts of Assembly (2020 Special Sess.).
349   HB 1250, Virginia Traffic Stop Data Collection, Section 52-30.2 Collection of Data <https://tinyurl.com/3mjuunm9> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
350   Paviour, *Black Drivers in Virginia Still More Likely to Be Stopped as Searches Drop* (Aug. 3, 2023) NPR <https://tinyurl.com/2w6xbuba> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
351   *Ibid*.
352   Miere and De Silva, *Disparate Impact: A Statistical Analysis of Virginia Police Stop Outcomes* (Sept. 2024) Julian p. 5 <https://tinyurl.com/595dsaxd> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
353   *Ibid*.
354   *Id*. at p. 31.

improved data collection, 2) increased reliance on the data by defense attorneys during litigation, 3) pattern-and-practice investigations conducted by the Attorney General of Virginia, 4) further legislative reform, and 5) continued research in disparate impacts of policing.[355]

2. Reform Efforts in California

As discussed in the Board's 2024 Report, Los Angeles enacted a policy limiting pretextual stops by the Los Angeles Police Department in 2022. Three other California jurisdictions have recently enacted policies limiting officer discretion and pretextual stops in certain circumstances. The Board will continue to monitor the data from these jurisdictions to determine whether, and to what extent, these policy changes have affected the rates of racial and identity profiling going forward.

a. Los Angeles

Amid growing community dissatisfaction with policing and calls for the disbandment of the Metro Task Force, the Los Angeles Police Commission asked the Los Angeles Inspector General to conduct a review of law enforcement stops conducted by the Los Angeles Police Department in 2019.[356] The Inspector General's comparison of LAPD's 2019 RIPA stop data against a sample of video recordings from officers' bodycam footage showed significant racial disparities in stops, with individuals perceived to be Black overrepresented and White or Asian individuals "significantly underrepresented" in stops, even when taking into consideration the racial makeup of the communities where the police contact occurred.[357] Video review of the stops also showed that officers did not document 23 percent of stops and searches seen on video reviews for mandated RIPA reporting, leading the Inspector General to consider LAPD's stop-and-search data to be significantly underreported.[358]

Even with limited reporting, the Inspector General found that the searches reviewed proved to be "of limited effectiveness in identifying evidence of illegal firearms or other serious crimes."[359] Specialized units like the Metro Task Force, gang units, and other crime suppression teams were the greatest drivers of racially disparate policing.[360] The highest racial disparities in stop types were related to non-safety stops, such as "equipment or regulatory violations."[361] The report recommended the LAPD reduce disparities by ending pretextual and discretionary stops based on traffic-related infractions and minor equipment or regulatory violations, which more heavily impact low-income communities.[362] Instead, the report urged the department to focus its resources on activities "directly related to increasing public safety."[363]

1) The Policy

In 2022, the Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners enacted a law enforcement directive, Policy No. 240.06, which limited all traffic stops absent a public safety concern.[364] If conducting a pretextual stop, officers must record the specific public safety or other concern on their body-worn camera.[365] The policy defines a pretextual stop as "one where officers use reasonable suspicion or probable cause of a minor traffic or code violation . . . as a pretext to investigate another, more serious crime that is unrelated to that

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355   *Id*. at p. 6.
356   Jany and Poston, *Minor Police Encounters Plummet After LAPD Puts Limits on Stopping Drivers and Pedestrians* (Nov. 14, 2022) LA Times <https://tinyurl.com/4t2f8dme> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Office of the Inspector General, *Los Angeles Police Commission Review of Stops Conducted by the Los Angeles Police Department in 2019* ("*Los Angeles Police Commission Review*") (Oct. 27, 2020) <https://tinyurl.com/mbvbv4uv> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
357   Office of the Inspector General, *Los Angeles Police Commission Review 2019, supra* note 356.
358   *Ibid*.
359   *Ibid*.
360   *Ibid*.
361   *Ibid*.
362   *Ibid*.
363   *Ibid*.
364   Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners, Policy 240.06, *supra* note 331.
365   *Ibid*.

violation."[366] The policy and need for change drew support from Police Chief Michel Moore, who told the New York Times, "[w]e want to fish with a hook, not a net."[367]

Since the LAPD policy took effect in March of 2022, RIPA analysis has focused on data with a time range of March to December for each year's stop data to account for variables such as crime trends, tourism, holidays, weather, or other unknown factors.[368]

Monthly Stop Totals

Once Los Angeles limited the scope of stops, the number of total stops declined correspondingly by 21 percent between the months of March and December, 2022, compared to the same period in 2021. There were 14.56 percent fewer stops in 2023 between the months of March and December (297,277 stops) than during the comparison period in 2021. There were 16.34 percent fewer stops in 2024 between the months of March and December (291,094 stops) than during to the comparison period in 2021. Though stops increased in 2024 compared to the previous year, stops in 2024 remain lower under the pretextual stop ban than before the ban was issued.

Figure 83. LAPD Monthly Stops (all stops)

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
366   *Ibid*.
367   Kirkpatrick et al., *Cities Try to Turn the Tide on Police Traffic Stops*, *supra* note 328.
368   Police practices may vary by time of year due to crime trends, tourism, holidays, weather, or other unknown factors. In particular, the COVID-19 pandemic-related shutdowns were widespread in 2020, making that year of RIPA data unique in many aspects. For these reasons, we summarized differences in stop totals and characteristics between the months of March and December in 2021 (before the pretext policy) and March and December in 2022, March and December in 2023, and March and December in 2024 (after the pretext policy). We refer to March through December 2021 as the "comparison period."

Traffic infraction stops decreased

Figure 84. LAPD Pretext Policy Stop Counts by Violation Type (Top 100 RFS Traffic Codes Only)

This figure presents the number of stops that involved the 100 most common traffic violation reason for stop codes at LAPD, from 2021 to 2024, separated by month, year, and traffic violation type. The solid black vertical line shows where LAPD's pretext policy began, in March of 2022. The dotted vertical lines separate each of the years. For moving violations, there are fluctuations in the number of stops month to month, but the yearly counts are relatively consistent. However, the number of non-moving violations decreased from 2021 to 2022 and then plateaued from 2022 onwards.

Figure 85. LAPD Pretext Policy Stop Counts by Race and Violation Type (Top 100 RFS Traffic Codes Only)

This figure presents the number of stops that involve the 100 most common traffic violation reason for stop codes at LAPD, from 2021 to 2024, separated by year, traffic violation type, and race/ethnicity. The dark blue, bottom section of the bars represents the number of moving violations and the orange, top section of the bars represents the number of non-moving violations. Generally, the number of moving violations has some fluctuation, but is relatively consistent year to year for every race/ethnicity. However, the number of non-moving violations generally decreases for each race/ethnicity from 2021 to 2024.

Searches Decreased While Discovery Rates Improved

The LAPD performed 15.16 percent fewer searches after the pretext policy was in place between the months of March and December 2022 (77,769 searches) compared to the same period during 2021 (91,661 searches). The LAPD performed 7.68 percent fewer searches between the months of March and December 2023 (84,621 searches) than it did during the same period in 2021. However, this represents an increase in searches from 2022. The LAPD performed 39.07 percent fewer searches during the months of March and December 2024 (55,849 searches) compared to the same period during 2021. This represents the smallest number of searches compared to the same periods in each of the prior years.[369] Additionally, the LAPD's search rate slightly increased year to year from 2021 (26.34% of stops involved a search) to 2023 (28.47%), with an almost 10-point decrease in 2024 (19.19%).

Figure 86. LAPD Total Searches by Race and Traffic Violation Type (Top 100 Codes Only)

This figure represents search counts (not including *Terry* frisks)[370] from the stops that involve the 100 most common traffic violation reason for stop codes at LAPD, from 2021 to 2024, separated by year, race/ethnicity, and traffic violation type. In general, the number of searches conducted in stops initiated due to a moving violation either fluctuated year to year or remained relatively consistent for each perceived race/

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369   This decrease could at least partially be explained by the introduction of *Terry* frisks as an option for officers to choose to separate from a search of a person or property in 2024.

370   As explained more fully in the Stop Data chapter, a *Terry v. Ohio* pat/frisk (hereafter *Terry* frisk) is a weapons patdown, occurring when an officer pats down an individual's clothing to determine whether based on the officer's reasonable suspicion the individual is armed. (See *Terry v. Ohio* (1968) 392 U.S. 1.)

ethnicity, with decreases in 2024 for several groups. The number of searches conducted in stops initiated due to a non-moving violation generally decrease across all races/ethnicities from 2021 to 2024.

Figure 87. LAPD Search Rates by Race and Traffic Violation Type (Stops with Codes in Top 100 Only)


This figure represents search rates (not including *Terry* frisks) from the stops that involve the 100 most common traffic violation reason for stop codes at LAPD, from 2021 to 2024, separated by race/ethnicity and traffic violation type. In the moving category, officers reported increases in search rates for stops of individuals perceived as Black, Hispanic/Latine(x), Middle Eastern/South Asian, and White from 2021-2023, with a decrease in 2024. Officers reported decreases in search rates for stops of individuals perceived as Multiracial and Native American from 2021 to 2024. And officers reported fluctuations in search rates for stops of individuals perceived as Asian and Pacific Islander year to year. In the non-moving category, officers reported increases in search rates for stops of individuals perceived as Asian, Hispanic/Latine(x), Middle Eastern/South Asian, and White from 2021-2023, followed by a decrease in 2024. Officers reported more fluctuations in search rates for individuals perceived as Black and Pacific Islander, with the lowest rates in 2024. Officers reported decreases in search rates from 2021-2024 for individuals perceived as Multiracial. However, these decreases in 2024 may be due to the addition of *Terry* frisks as an option officers can choose on the RIPA form separate from searches in 2024.

Figure 88. LAPD Monthly Discovery Rate (All stops)

This figure presents monthly discovery rates (not including *Terry* frisks) of all stops made by LAPD, from 2021 to 2024. The solid black vertical line shows where LAPD's pretext policy began, in March of 2022. The dotted vertical lines separate each of the years. Overall, discovery rate trends remained relatively consistent from 2021 through the end of 2023. There was a marked increase in rates of contraband discovery in 2024. However, this may be due to the inclusion of *Terry* frisks as an option officers can choose on the RIPA form separate from searches in 2024, especially because *Terry* frisks yield a much lower discovery rate compared to other searches (see Appendix Table A39 for *Terry* frisk discovery rates).

Figure 89. LAPD Discovery Rates by Race and Traffic Violation Type (Stops with Codes in Top 100 Only)

This figure represents discovery rates from the searches (not including *Terry* frisks) involved in the stops with the 100 most common traffic violation reason for stop codes at LAPD, from 2021 to 2024, separated by race/ethnicity and traffic violation type. In the moving category, for most races/ethnicities, discovery rates increase year over year from 2021 to 2024. In the non-moving category, discovery rates fluctuate year

to year for most races/ethnicities, with the highest discovery rate in 2024. However, this may be due to the inclusion of *Terry* frisks as an option officers can choose on the RIPA form separate from searches in 2024, especially because *Terry* frisks yield a much lower discovery rate compared to other searches (see Appendix Table B21 for *Terry* frisk discovery rates in LAPD).

Contraband discovery rates have continued to climb as reductions in pretextual stops occur. For instance, the LAPD discovered contraband during a higher percentage of RIPA-reported stops between March and December of 2022 (26.04%, 20,253 stops) compared to the comparison period in 2021 (25.59%, 23,454 stops).[371] The LAPD discovered contraband during a higher percentage of RIPA-reported stops between March and December of 2023 (26.40%, 22,340 stops) compared to the comparison period in 2021. The LAPD discovered contraband during a higher percentage of RIPA-reported stops between March and December of 2024 (32.59%, 18,203 stops) compared to the comparison period in 2021.

Pretextual stop bans appear to be reducing officer time spent on enforcing minor traffic infractions and improving efficiency and success rates in searches. As reforms on pretextual stops continue to show improved policing in Los Angeles, further reforms may prove beneficial. Further, Los Angeles County's successes in reducing officer time dedicated to traffic infractions and improving search rate percentages further support a state-wide limitation on pretextual stops.

2) Calls for More Reform

In 2023, the Los Angeles City Council created the Alternatives to Traffic Enforcement and Community Task Force to assess successes of the program and areas where the city can do more.[372] In response, the Task Force presented three key findings: 1) disparate traffic stops remain concentrated in three neighborhoods; 2) disparate stops and elevated police responses to racial minorities continue to be reflected in the data; and 3) targeting drivers for moving violations continues to disparately impact racial minorities — particularly Black drivers.[373]

The Task Force suggested a number of improvements: 1) increasing investments in self-enforcing infrastructure; 2) placing further limitations on pretextual stops; 3) finding alternatives to fines and fees; 4) identifying obstacles to discipline and accountability of officer misconduct (e.g., excessive use of force, racial profiling, and other violations) and identifying strategies to overcome these obstacles; and 5) creating a civilian response to traffic infractions with a focus on road safety and traffic- related calls for service.[374]

3. San Francisco: Policy No. 9.07.04(a) (2023)[375]

In response to several high-profile incidents of racial bias in its police force, in 2016 the mayor of San Francisco and its then police chief requested analysis by the U.S. Department of Justice to assess racial disparities in its policing.[376] The result was a 68-page report issued in 2016, which addressed five objectives and made 94 findings and 272 recommendations, including recommendations for robust data collection and analysis, community focused engagement on policing and feedback, and a change to policies which show disparate impact on police practices.[377] Additionally, in 2022, the nonprofit SPUR released a report analyzing 2019 stop data from San Francisco.[378] The report further confirmed that law enforcement

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371   Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2024 Report*, *supra* note 277, at p. 57.
372   Los Angeles Dep't. of Transportation, *City of Los Angeles Alternatives to Traffic Enforcement Study and Community Task Force Recommendations* (Sept. 2023) <https://tinyurl.com/49t29nt4> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
373   *Id*. at p. 4.
374   *Id*. at pp. 8-10.
375   San Francisco Police Dep't, *General Order*, Policy No. 9.07.04(A) (2023) <https://tinyurl.com/vdn3rusk> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
376   U.S. Dep't. of Justice, *Collaborative Reform Initiative: An Assessment of the San Francisco Police Department* (Oct. 2016) <https://tinyurl.com/mr2xf4pw> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
377   *Ibid*.
378   SPUR, *The High Cost of Traffic Stops: An Analysis of Traffic Stops in Seven Jurisdictions Across California* (Oct. 6, 2022) <https://tinyurl.com/y7w9xrcu> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

disproportionately stopped Black and Latinx drivers, specifically finding that pretextual stops "drive much of the racial disparity in traffic enforcement.[379] The report recommended changing all non-moving traffic violations to mail citation responses, removing non-safety violations from law enforcement purview, reducing fines and fees, and completely eliminating minor violations that have no impact on road safety.[380]

In response to the studies above, the San Francisco Police Commission passed Policy No. 9.07.04(a) in 2023 to de-prioritize stops for nine categories of low-level offenses, such as license plate illumination, display of registration tags, brake lights, and rear-view mirror obstruction.[381] The policy acknowledged most traffic enforcement stops as pretextual and that "pre-text stops are disproportionately carried out against people of color and return negligible public safety benefits."[382] The change in policy also acknowledged the "fiscal, human and societal costs" of racially disparate pretextual stops.[383] Labor negotiations challenging the new policy by the San Francisco Police Officer's Association delayed the implementation of policy 9.07 until its passage in 2024.[384]

Because of the relatively recent implementation of San Francisco's policy, the effects of the policy are difficult to ascertain, as shown in the below figures.

Figure 90. Monthly Stops Affected by SFPD Pretext Policy

This figure presents counts of most[385] stops affected by SFPDs pretext policy by month in 2023 and 2024. The solid black vertical line shows where SFPD's pretext policy began, in July of 2024. The dotted vertical line represents the end of 2023 and the beginning of 2024. There was an increase in stops that fell under the SFPD pretext policy in the first half of 2024 compared to the number of stops in the same months in 2023, followed by a decrease in the number of stops that fell under the SFPD pretext policy starting in June 2024. However, September and December were the only months post-pretext policy where the number of stops were lower compared to the same months in 2023. July, August, October, and November 2024 all had a higher number of stops compared to their same months in 2023.

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379   Denney, *Putting an End to Biased Traffic Stops in San Francisco* (Feb. 2023) SPUR <https://tinyurl.com/mh5z48fp> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
380   *Ibid*.
381   San Francisco Police Dep't, *General Order*, Policy No. 9.07.04(A), *supra* note 375.
382   *Ibid*.
383   *Ibid*.
384   Balakrishnan, *SF Police Commission Restricts Pretext Stops Over Union Objections* (Feb. 21, 2024) Mission Local <https://tinyurl.com/3n5fue9a> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
385   There were nine categories of stops SFPD identified in their pretext policy. However, RSB could only identify stops from eight of those categories because one of the categories involved San Francisco city offense codes that officers are not asked to report on RIPA forms. Additionally, these figures only include traffic violations and some of the offense codes SFPD identified in their pretext policy only applied to pedestrians.

Figure 91. Monthly Stops for SFPD (all stops)

This figure presents counts of all stops made by SFPD by month from 2023 to 2024. The solid black vertical line shows where SFPD's pretext policy began, in July of 2024. The dotted vertical line separates the years. Overall, there were more stops in every month in 2024 compared to the same months in 2023.

4. Berkeley: Report and Recommendations from the Mayor's Fair and Impartial Policing Working Group (2021)

In 2021, the Berkeley City Council approved its "Report and Recommendations from Mayor's Fair and Impartial Policing Working Group," a slate of policy changes designed to amend officer conduct in policy stops.[386] Officers are instructed to minimize or de-emphasize other forms of traffic-related stops that did not have statistically significant correlations with crashes and fatalities.[387] Conversely, officers are not prohibited from stopping individuals for safety violations such as speeding, failure to yield to pedestrians or other vehicles, red light or stop sign violations, or drivers showing signs of impairment.[388]

5. West Hollywood: Resolution No. 22-5516 (2022)

In 2022, West Hollywood introduced Resolution No. 22-5516, which declared certain low-level document and equipment defects such as registration, lighting, license plate issues and view obstruction stops to be considered low priority.[389] As such, the Resolution directed law enforcement to focus resources away from these low-level stops.

C. Pretextual Stops Should be Reduced or Eliminated in California

As noted above, and as discussed in prior reports, a wealth of information, data, and research shows that pretextual stops do not benefit the community. Their use does not assist officers in the prevention of crime;[390] searches flowing from such pretextual stops are generally unfruitful;[391] there are racial and identity disparities in who is subjected to such stops and searches;[392] and there are serious and unintended

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386   City of Berkeley, Motion Item # 1, Special Meeting, February 23, 2021 *Report and Recommendations from Mayor's Fair and Impartial Policing Working Group* (Feb. 23, 2021) <https://tinyurl.com/6zak4xwz> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Berkeley City Council, *Minutes, Special Meeting of the Berkeley City Council* (Feb. 23, 2021) p. 5 <https://tinyurl.com/46aecd3y> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
387   City of Berkeley, Motion Item # 1, *supra* note 387.
388   *Ibid*.
389   West Hollywood City Council, *Res. No. 22-5516* (2022) <https://tinyurl.com/mrspayzr> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
390   See also generally Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2023 Report*, *supra* note 268, at pp. 61-107.
391   See also *id*. at pp. 71-73.
392   *Ibid*.

consequences to their implementation, as demonstrated by the data showing the risk of serious bodily harm or death to drivers and passengers in traffic stops.[393] In contrast to these concerns, the available research shows that there are significant benefits to enacting policies limiting or eliminating pretextual stops, including an increase in public safety and a reduction in racial and identity profiling.[394] The Board will continue to recommend that the Legislature and local policymakers enact policies to reduce or eliminate pretextual stops for the benefit of all Californians.

VI.   Policy Recommendations

The Board makes the following recommendations based on the research and data discussed above:

1. The Legislature and local policymakers should enact legislation to prohibit or limit police agencies from relying on oversaturation policing, as defined in Section III above, in marginalized communities due to the negative effects of those practices on those communities.

This recommendation is supported by the recent research discussed above regarding the negative impacts of oversaturation policing on marginalized communities, and the absence of evidence that such practices reduce crime or increase public safety.

2. The Legislature should enact legislation to allocate resources to an entity with the needed capacity or expertise, such as a state commission or research institution, to study and make further recommendations on whether alternative enforcement technologies such as facial recognition, gunshot detection, and predictive policing technologies exacerbate existing bias or are deployed in ways that lead to oversaturation policing.

This recommendation is supported by the recent research discussed above demonstrating the disparate impact these technologies have on individuals in marginalized communities, and the absence of evidence that such technologies reduce crime or increase public safety. This recommendation is also consistent with some jurisdictions, such as San Francisco, that have enacted policies limiting their use.[395]

3. The Legislature and local policymakers should enact legislation, similar to policies in place in San Francisco,[396] West Hollywood,[397] Los Angeles,[398] North Carolina,[399] and Virginia,[400] to limit pretextual stops consistent with public safety.

This recommendation is supported by the recent research discussed above regarding the positive benefits to these communities, both in terms of crime reduction and increased public safety. It is also supported by the research discussed above regarding the inherent dangers of stops for traffic citations generally, both for those stopped and for the officers who stop them. Finally, this is consistent with the findings and recommendations of the Board in prior years.

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393   Kirkpatrick et al., *Why Many Police Traffic Stops Turn Deadly*, *supra* note 295.
394   See also Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2024 Report*, *supra* note 277, at pp. 53-55.
395   Conger et al., *San Francisco Bans Facial Recognition Technology*, *supra* note 193; San Francisco Board of Supervisors, Admin. Code - Acquisition of Surveillance Technology, no. 0107-19, Section 1(d), *supra* note 193.
396   San Francisco Police Dept, *General Order*, Policy No. 9.07.04(A), *supra* note 375.
397   West Hollywood City Council, Res. No. 22-5516 (2022), *supra* note 389.
398   Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners, Policy 240.06, *supra* note 331.
399   Kirkpatrick et al., *Cities Try to Turn the Tide on Police Traffic Stops*, *supra* note 328.
400   H 5058, Va. Acts of Assembly (2020 Special Sess.).

ACCOUNTABILITY

I. Introduction

Accountability in law enforcement is positively correlated with public safety because it builds public trust, encourages ethical conduct, and contributes to the public's perception of a law enforcement agency's legitimacy and effectiveness.[401] Civilian oversight agencies can play a significant role in increasing accountability, reducing racial profiling, and, by extension, enhancing public safety.[402]

This year, the Board builds on its prior discussion of civilian oversight by exploring the impact of civilian oversight agencies (COAs) on racial and identity profiling and public safety. This section begins with an overview of the history of civilian oversight in the United States, common goals of civilian oversight, principles for effective oversight, and four general types or models of COAs, then analyzes how COAs can reduce racial and identity profiling and increase public safety. This section also provides a high-level summary of the COAs that oversee the fifteen largest law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in California and provides recommendations to COAs regarding the use of RIPA data to identify racial and identity and remedy disparities in policing practices.

Finally, this section provides an updated analysis of officer decertification actions under Senate Bill 2 (SB 2), including an analysis of regional differences in SB 2 data and outcomes in California.

II. Civilian Oversight

Civilian oversight generally refers to the independent review of law enforcement agencies and officers by individuals who are not sworn officers.[403] Civilian oversight can take various forms, but the core purposes are to increase accountability, transparency, and public trust in policing; promote thorough, fair investigations; deter police misconduct; and ensure an accessible complaint process.[404]

In general, COAs share common objectives, including:

- Improving public trust in law enforcement;
- Ensuring accessible complaint processes;
- Promoting thorough, fair investigations of police misconduct;
- Increasing transparency and accountability;
- Deterring officers from engaging in misconduct;
- Holding law enforcement agencies accountable for officers' behavior;
- Promoting systemic changes in law enforcement; and
- Improving community-law enforcement relations and public trust in the complaint process.[405]

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401   See McLendon et al., *Improving Public Safety Through Better Accountability and Prevention* (May 16, 2024) Center for American Progress <https://tinyurl.com/74vhn9zv> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

402   See Robbins et al., *Promoting Independent Police Accountability Mechanisms: Key Principles for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement* (June 2021) Fair and Just Prosecution <https://tinyurl.com/3thuttbb> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

403   See DeAngelis et al., *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: A Review of the Strengths and Weaknesses of Various Models* ("*Strengths and Weaknesses*") (Sept. 2016) NACOLE, p. 3 <https://tinyurl.com/yb6432xz> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

404   *See ibid*.

405   See De Angelis et al., *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Assessing the Evidence* ("*Assessing the Evidence*") (Sept. 2016) NACOLE, pp. 33-34 <https://tinyurl.com/466spbnv> [as of Dec. 18, 2025], citing Walker, *Police Accountability: The Role of Citizen Oversight* ("*Police Accountability*") (2001) p. 55; Finn, *Citizen Review of the Police: Approaches and Implementation* ("*Citizen Review of the Police*") (2001) Office of Justice Programs, National Inst. of Justice, pp. 6-11 <https://tinyurl.com/m2vpwfbb> [as of Dec. 18, 2025]; Bobb, *Civilian Oversight of the Police in the United States* (2003) 22 St. Louis Univ. Pub. L. Rev. 1 <https://tinyurl.com/36brtmd6> [as of Dec. 18, 2025]; Harris, *Holding Police Accountability Theory to Account* (2012) 6 Policing 3, pp. 240-249 <https://tinyurl.com/mvve48f8> [as of Dec. 18, 2025]; Attard and Olson, *Overview of Civilian Law Enforcement in the United States* (2013) <https://tinyurl.com/yy562sj> [as of

Many of these objectives correlate with reductions in racial and identity disparities in policing *and* with increased public safety.[406]

The Board undertakes this detailed review of civilian oversight and its historical roots to assess how COAs can address civilian complaints relating to racial and identity bias and profiling and mitigate such practices through systemic reforms.

A. Emergence of Civilian Oversight Agencies

The first law enforcement oversight bodies took the form of internal police commissions, which were implemented by Progressive Era reformers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.[407] These commissions were designed to combat the political power that local political bosses had over police agencies, and not to address systemic issues of inequality in policing at the time.[408] As a result, most early commissions failed to provide meaningful oversight of local police departments, in part because commission members were political appointees, had little expertise in policing, and tended to become highly deferential to police executives when proposing or implementing reforms.[409]

Over time, the composition, function, and resources of COAs evolved to respond to those concerns about policing that were reflective of the time, such as the enduring racial tensions in the 1930s and 1950s, where race relations and police violence sparked urban riots; the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s; and subsequent protests over police treatment of African Americans through the 1980s.[410] By the 1990s, a new model of civilian oversight began to take shape, focused on systemic issues in law enforcement policies and procedures.[411] For example, in 1991, the Seattle City Council established an independent civilian auditor to audit and review civilian complaint investigations.[412] Two years later, the San Jose City Council proactively approved an ordinance creating an Independent Police Auditor, who was authorized to review the complaint investigations completed by the San Jose Police Department (SJPD), analyze complaint trends and statistics, and review and recommend improvements to SJPD policies and procedures.[413]

As before, the composition, function, and resources of COAs continue to evolve. This section examines how modern COAs function within California and how they can use RIPA data to monitor and reduce identity group disparities in policing.

Dec. 18, 2025]; King, *Effectively Implementing Civilian Oversight Boards to Ensure Police Accountability and Strengthen Police-Community Relations* ("*Effectively Implementing Civilian Oversight Boards*") (2015) 12 Hastings Race & Poverty L.J. 1 <https://tinyurl.com/3ys7arza> [as of Dec. 18, 2025]; Prenzler, "Democratic Policing, Public Opinion and External Oversight" in *Civilian Oversight of Police: Advancing Accountability in Law Enforcement* (Prenzler and den Heyer, edits., 2016); Alpert et al., "Citizen Oversight in the United States and Canada: Applying Outcome Measures and Evidence-Based Concepts" in *Civilian Oversight of Police: Advancing Accountability in Law Enforcement* (Prenzler and den Heyer, edits., 2016) pp. 179-204; NACOLE, *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, Its Principles and Role* (Sept. 10, 2020) <https://tinyurl.com/mr39ffzd> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

406 See Ali and Nicholson-Crotty, *Examining the Accountability-Performance Link: The Case of Citizen Oversight of Police* ("*Examining the Accountability-Performance Link*") (2020) 44 Pub. Performance & Mgmt. Rev. 3, pp. 7, 22 <https://tinyurl.com/2r965v6y> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

407 De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 6, citing Police Assessment Resource Center (PARC), *Review of National Police Oversight Models for the Eugene Police Commission* (2005) pp. 4-5 <https://tinyurl.com/xrfb7bpy> [as of Dec. 18, 2025]; Walker, *A Critical History of Police Reform: The Emergence of Professionalism* ("*A Critical History of Police Reform*") (1977); Walker, *Police Accountability*, *supra* note 405.

408 See De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 6.

409 *Ibid*., citing Walker, *Police Accountability*, *supra* note 405; Bobb, *Civilian Oversight of the Police in the United States*, *supra* note 406, at p. 4; Attard and Olson, *Overview of Civilian Law Enforcement in the United States*, *supra* note 405.

410 Vitoroulis et al., *The Evolution and Growth of Civilian Oversight* (2021) Cmnty. Oriented Policing Serv., U.S. Dept. of Just., pp. 4-5 <https://tinyurl.com/4m2hape6> [as of Dec. 18, 2025]; De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 7.

411 Vitoroulis et al., *The Evolution and Growth of Civilian Oversight*, *supra* note 410, at p. 5.

412 *Ibid*.

413 See *id*., at pp. 5-7; De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 6.

B. Modern Types of COAs

Although there is a high amount of variation in the structure and authority of COAs in the United States, researchers have classified civilian oversight into three primary models based on their core agency functions: the Investigative Model, the Auditor/Monitor Model (Auditor Model), and the Review Model.[414] Some COAs may be a hybrid of these three models.[415] This section analyzes the strengths and limitations of each model, including their potential to eliminate racial and identity disparities in law enforcement outcomes.

1. Investigative Model

Investigative COAs investigate complaints against law enforcement agencies to assess whether those complaints establish police misconduct, and generally, they operate separately from law enforcement.[416] These COAs generally employ professionally trained investigative staff, and may consist of a volunteer board or commission.[417] Although the structure, resources, and authority of investigative COAs may vary, these COAs generally have the ability to conduct investigations of alleged misconduct by officers independently of, and sometimes replacing the function of, the LEA's internal affairs unit.[418] Investigative COAs may serve as the intake point for public complaints against officers; review and classify civilian complaints; subpoena documents and witnesses; conduct independent interviews of complainants, officers, and witnesses; and issue findings to LEAs.[419] They may also have the authority to recommend and/or impose discipline of officers and generally have greater access to law enforcement records and databases than review-focused COAs.[420]

a. Potential Key Strengths

Investigative COAs with trained staff can complete thorough and impartial investigations and are the most independent forms of oversight.[421] Investigative COAs also tend to have greater resources and larger staff than other types of oversight, and their investigative staff are likely to have had highly specialized training.[422]

Investigation-focused models also have the ability to increase public faith in the integrity of the investigation process.[423] Most investigation-focused COAs utilize civilian staff to conduct fact-finding investigations and operate a multi-member community board that may hold hearings, issue findings and/or make recommendations to the LEA.[424] As a result, this model may reassure a community that investigations

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414   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at pp. 22-24 (consolidating research).

415   Vitoroulis et al., *The Evolution and Growth of Civilian Oversight*, *supra* note 410, at p. 8; De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 7; NACOLE, Models of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement <https://tinyurl.com/2s3uwby8> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

416   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 24.

417   NACOLE, Models of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, *supra* note 415; De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at pp. 24-25; Vitoroulis et al., *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement: Report on the State of the Field & Effective Oversight* ("*Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement*") (2021) Cmnty. Oriented Policing Servs, U.S. Dept. of Just., pp. 19-20 <https://tinyurl.com/mwm8jxd7> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

418   NACOLE, Models of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, *supra* note 415; De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 24, citing Finn, *Citizen Review of the Police*, *supra* note 405; PARC, *Review of National Police Oversight Models for the Eugene Police Commission*, *supra* note 405; Vitoroulis et al., *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement*, *supra* note 417, at p. 19.

419   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 25, citing Bobb, *Civilian Oversight of the Police in the United States*, *supra* note 405; King, *Effectively Implementing Civilian Oversight Boards*, *supra* note 405; Attard and Olson, *Overview of Civilian Law Enforcement in the United States*, *supra* note 405.

420   See De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at pp. 68-69; Vitoroulis et al., *Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement*, *supra* note 417, at p. 20.

421   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 25, citing Prenzler and Ronken, *Models of Police Oversight: A critique* (May 2001) 11 Policing & Soc'y 2, pp. 151-180 <https://tinyurl.com/2bmez7uj> [as of Dec. 18, 2025]; PARC, *Review of National Police Oversight Models for the Eugene Police Commission*, *supra* note 406; Walker, *Police Accountability*, *supra* note 405.

422   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 25.

423   *Ibid*.

424   *Ibid*.

are unbiased and thorough and that civilian perspectives are represented both within the complaint investigation process and upon review of completed investigations.[425]

b. Potential Key Limitations

Investigative COAs are more organizationally complex and expensive than other forms of oversight.[426] They require significant resources to conduct timely and thorough investigations, including professionally trained staff.[427] However, as discussed in Section II.D below, one of the most important potential indicators of effectiveness is the available resources of a COA, and the higher cost of the investigative COA can be mitigated by the reduction in personnel needed to conduct internal LEA investigations.[428]

Another potential limitation is that investigative COAs may face strong resistance from law enforcement personnel and police unions.[429] Over the years, some unions have argued that civilian investigators lack the professional experience and technical skills to investigate complex misconduct claims.[430] Likewise, some unions have also opposed full investigatory oversight, claiming the agencies would be biased against officers.[431] Some researchers have also argued that, while the public may have confidence in the full investigative model initially, the public may become disillusioned over time if community expectations for reform, such as more sustained complaints and stronger punishment, are not met.[432]

c. Investigative Model's Correlation with the Reduction of Racial and Identity Disparities in Law Enforcement

Research indicates that investigative COAs may be associated with reductions in racial and identity profiling. For example, one study found that investigative COAs are positively associated with reductions in racial disparities in disorderly conduct arrests and police homicides of civilians.[433] The same study found that those investigative COAs correlated with such reductions in racial disparities tended to have the same qualities indicative of a robust, independent COA — for example, the authority to conduct investigations independently, make investigation findings, and recommend discipline — and had full-time staff with adequate budgets.[434] Investigative COAs may also correlate with increased public safety, as they are associated with a reduction in violent crime rates and homicides of police officers.[435]

2. Auditor Model

In general, auditor COAs focus on promoting large-scale systemic reform of LEAs by conducting systematic reviews of LEA policies, practices, or training, and making recommendations for improvement.[436] These COAs are sometimes referred to as inspectors general or police monitors.[437]

Auditor COAs are generally authorized to audit, monitor, investigate, and review a wide range of law

425   *Ibid.*, citing PARC, *Review of National Police Oversight Models for the Eugene Police Commission*, supra note 406, at p. 11.
426   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at pp. 25-26.
427   *Ibid*.
428   *Ibid*.
429   King, *Effectively Implementing Civilian Oversight Boards*, *supra* note 405.
430   Prenzler and Ronken, *Models of Police Oversight: A critique*, *supra* note 421, at pp. 167-168.
431   King, *Effectively Implementing Civilian Oversight Boards*, *supra* note 405.
432   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 26, citing McDevitt et al., *Enhancing Citizen Participation in the Review of Complaints and the Use of Force in the Boston Police Department* ("*Enhancing Citizen Participation*") (2005) Inst. on Race and Justice, Northeastern Univ., p. 5 <https://tinyurl.com/bdh7far7> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].
433   Ali and Pirog, *Social Accountability and Institutional Change: The Case of Citizen Oversight of Police* ("*Social Accountability and Institutional Change*") (2019) 79 Pub. Admin. Rev. 3, pp. 416, 421, 422.
434   Ali and Pirog, *Social Accountability and Institutional Change*, *supra* note 433, at p. 422.
435   Ali and Nicholson-Crotty, *Examining the Accountability-Performance Link*, *supra* note 406, at p. 22.
436   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 30, citing Walker and Archbold, *The New World of Police Accountability* (2014); Olson and Attard, *Analysis of Police Oversight Models for the City of Pasadena* (2016) Change Integration Consulting, LLC, pp. 18-20 <https://tinyurl.com/mbsh8fst> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].
437   NACOLE, Models of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, *supra* note 415; De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 29.

enforcement policies, practices, and procedures, including the LEA's complaint investigation process.[438] Rather than focusing on reviewing or investigating individual complaints, they review broad patterns in complaints and focus on examining broad patterns in complaint investigations, including patterns in the quality of investigations, findings, and discipline.[439] Some auditor COAs may actively participate in or monitor open internal investigations.[440]

a. Potential Key Strengths

Given their focus on organizational reform, auditor COAs often have more robust reporting practices than other types of oversight.[441] Since they tend to focus on reviewing patterns in complaints, they may also have more access to LEA records, case files, and electronic databases than review-focused COAs.[442]

Auditor COAs may also be more effective at promoting long-term, systemic change in LEAs because they can focus on broader trends and patterns in complaints and make public recommendations for improvement.[443] These COAs also have the ability to track whether LEAs have implemented their recommendations and whether those recommendations have resulted in organizational improvement over time.[444] In cases where an LEA does not implement the COA's recommendations, the auditor COA can use its public reporting function to inform the public and policy makers about the LEA's decision.[445]

Auditor COAs are also often less expensive than investigative COAs, although they are still more expensive than review-focused COAs.[446]

b. Potential Key Limitations

Because auditor COAs focus on examining broad patterns in complaints rather than individual complaints, those who want discipline to be imposed in specific cases of officer misconduct may oppose this model of civilian oversight.[447]

Additionally, to achieve long-term reform, an auditor COA may reach compromises on individual cases with LEA officials to ensure a long-term relationship is developed between agencies.[448] In some cases, an auditor COA may choose to allow the LEA executive to take credit for the reform initiative to maintain long term relationships with LEA leadership.[449] While these actions may ultimately support positive reform, there may be a lack of understanding by the community as to the effectiveness of the oversight.[450]

Another potential limitation of auditor models is that conducting broad, systematic policy evaluations requires significant expertise, and their effectiveness is dependent on the quality of staff hired to do the work.[451]

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438   NACOLE, Models of Civilian Oversight, *supra* note 415; DeAngelis et al., *Accessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 30.
439   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at pp. 30-31.
440   *Id*. at p. 30, citing King, *Effectively Implementing Civilian Oversight Boards*, *supra* note 405, at p. 102.
441   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 30, citing Walker and Archbold, *The New World of Police Accountability* (2014).
442   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 30, citing McDevitt et al., *Enhancing Citizen Participation*, *supra* note 432, at p. 6; Olson and Attard, *Analysis of Police Oversight Models for the City of Pasadena*, *supra* note 436.
443   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 31.
444   *Ibid*.
445   *Id*. at p. 32.
446   NACOLE, Models of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, *supra* note 415.
447   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 31, citing Walker and Archbold, *The New World of Police Accountability* (2014).
448   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 31.
449   *Ibid*.
450   *Ibid*.
451   *Id*. at p. 32, citing Walker and Archbold, *The New World of Police Accountability* (2014).

c. Auditor Model's Correlation with the Reduction of Racial and Identity Disparities in Law Enforcement

Researchers have found that the existence of an auditor COA is not correlated with a reduction in racial disparities in law enforcement actions where the officer has a low degree of discretion, such as in officer homicides of civilians.[452] However, in high-discretion enforcement actions, such as disorderly conduct arrests,[453] auditor COAs (like investigative COAs) are positively associated with a reduction in racial disparities in policing.[454] Researchers have found that COAs that have a greater amount of oversight with broader authority (such as investigative COAs) are associated with reductions in racial disparities in low-discretion interactions like police homicide of citizens, and COAs with less oversight and authority (such as auditor COAs) are not associated with those reductions in low-discretion events.[455] Even so, given the high volume of discretionary stops that occur, such as officer-initiated traffic and pedestrian encounters, the auditor model's association with reduced racial disparities in high-discretion encounters is significant.[456]

3. Review Model

Review-focused COAs are the most common type of COA in the United States.[457] The review model generally focuses on reviewing the quality of an LEA's internal investigations.[458] These COAs provide community members who are unaffiliated with the LEA an opportunity to review the quality of misconduct investigations performed by the LEA.[459] Review-focused COAs may make recommendations to law enforcement executives regarding findings or request that further investigation be conducted.[460] They are commonly composed of citizen volunteers and hold public meetings to collect community input and facilitate law enforcement-community communication.[461]

a. Potential Key Strengths

Review-focused COAs have several strengths, including ensuring that the community has the ability to provide input into the complaint investigation process, which may increase public trust in the complaint

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452   Ali and Pirog, *Social Accountability and Institutional Change*, *supra* note 433, at p. 421. Researchers note that homicides of civilians, and particularly homicides with the use of a firearm, are "low discretion" actions because they "are almost guaranteed to attract scrutiny from internal accountability mechanisms and/or a COA." (*Id*. at pp. 414-415; see also Cordner and Scott, *Police Discretion and Its Control* in Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice (Bruinsma and Weisburd, edits., 2014), pp. 3875–3895; Fallik and Novak, *Biased Policing* in Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice (Bruinsma and Weisburd, edits., 2014) pp. 154-162.)

453   Researchers note that such actions are "high discretion because of their routine nature, which makes them less likely to attract scrutiny from the public, police supervisors, or a COA." Ali and Pirog, *Social Accountability and Institutional Change*, *supra* note 433, at p. 414.

454   Ali and Pirog, *Social Accountability and Institutional Change*, *supra* note 433, at p. 422 ("the greater the discretionary authority that [law enforcement officers] have, the greater the likelihood for bias to permeate their decisions"); Spencer et al., *Implicit Bias and Policing* (2016) 10/1 Soc. and Personality Psych. Compass 50, pp. 54, 59 <https://tinyurl.com/2k2jwb78> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

455   Ali and Pirog, *Social Accountability and Institutional Change*, *supra* note 433, at p. 31. In contrast to the high-discretion event of disorderly conduct, police homicides of civilians are "low discretion" events, as "police officers' discretionary authority in using deadly force against citizens is checked by internal and external accountability mechanisms," including the legal restrictions imposed by cases such as *Tennessee v. Garner* (1985) 471 U.S. 1, which prohibits police officers from using deadly force against fleeing suspects unless the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or physical injury to the officer or to others. (Ali and Pirog, *Social Accountability and Institutional Change*, *supra*, at pp. 414-415.)

456   Ramirez et al., *A Resource Guide on Racial Profiling Data Collection Systems: Promising Practices and Lessons Learned* ("*A Resource Guide*") (Nov. 2000) U.S. Dept. of Just., pp. 9-10 <https://tinyurl.com/486rhfzn> [as of Dec. 18, 2025] (noting that "officers have a wide discretion in selecting which cars to stop," and further, that high-discretion pedestrian stops involve those who may look suspicious but are not engaged in any specific criminal violation or activities); Grine and Coward, *Police Investigation: Stops, Searches, and Arrests* in Raising Issues of Race in North Carolina Criminal Cases (Sept. 2014) pp. 2-24 <https://tinyurl.com/5a93trty> [as of Dec. 18, 2025] ("Since violations of the traffic laws are commonplace, police have enormous discretion to effectuate stops of a very high number of cars").

457   NACOLE, Models of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, *supra* note 415.

458   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at pp. 27-28.

459   NACOLE, Models of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, *supra* note 416.

460   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 28, citing PARC, *Review of National Police Oversight Models for the Eugene Police Commission*, *supra* note 406, at p. 8.

461   DeAngelis et al., *Strengths and Weaknesses*, *supra* note 403, at p. 9, citing PARC, *Review of National Police Oversight Models for the Eugene Police Commission*, *supra* note 406.

process.[462] Review-focused COAs are also generally the least expensive form of civilian oversight since they typically rely on the work of volunteers rather than paid staff members.[463]

b. Potential Key Limitations

Since review-focused COAs typically address individual case investigations, their ability to promote broad systemic organizational changes may be limited.[464] Additionally, these COAs COAs tend to have limited authority and few organizational resources.[465] Review board volunteers may have significantly less expertise in law enforcement issues and limited time to perform their work.[466] Review-focused COAs also tend to have a smaller budget and may be more appropriate for smaller jurisdictions with a small budget.[467] These COAs also tend to report to the head of the LEA, meaning they may also be less independent from other forms of oversight.[468]

c. Review Model's Correlation with the Reduction of Racial and Identity Disparities in Law Enforcement

Like auditor COAs, review-focused COAs may correlate with a decrease in racial disparities in high-discretion interactions, such as disorderly conduct arrests. Specifically, one study found that COAs with a board composed of citizens appointed by a municipal district, which can include review-focused COAs, reduced the racial disparity in disorderly conduct arrests by as much as 41 percent.[469]

But, also like auditor COAs, review-focused COAs did not reduce racial disparities in police homicides of citizens to a statistically significant level.[470] This correlation of review-focused COAs to decreased racial disparities in high-discretion interactions remains significant because of the volume of officer-initiated traffic and pedestrian stops in the state, which are often high-discretion interactions.[471]

C. Civilian Oversight in California

This section provides an overview of civilian oversight for the fifteen largest LEAs in California. Many of these COAs already have the infrastructure and tools to address racial and identity disparities in their LEA's policing practices. These COAs can further strengthen their existing models by using RIPA data to develop and propose updated policies and practices that can help reduce racial and identity disparities and increase public safety.

1. Wave 1 and 2 Agencies

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462   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 28, citing Finn, *Citizen Review of the Police*, *supra* note 405; Attard and Olson, *Overview of Civilian Law Enforcement in the United States*, *supra* note 405; Walker, *Police Accountability*, *supra* note 405.

463   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at pp. 28-29, citing PARC, *Review of National Police Oversight Models for the Eugene Police Commission*, *supra* note 406.

464   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 29, citing Walker, *Police Accountability*, *supra* note 405; PARC, *Review of National Police Oversight Models for the Eugene Police Commission*, *supra* note 405.

465   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at pp. 28-29.

466   *Ibid*.

467   *Id*. at p. 29, citing Walker, *Police Accountability*, *supra* note 405; PARC, *Review of National Police Oversight Models for the Eugene Police Commission*, *supra* note 406; Olson, *Citizen Advisory/Review Board Spokane County Sheriff's Office: Oversight Review* ("*Spokane County Sheriff's Office: Oversight Review*") (2016) Change Integration Consulting, LLC <https://tinyurl.com/2v3yuzwd> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

468   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 29, citing Walker, *Police Accountability*, *supra* note 405; PARC, *Review of National Police Oversight Models for the Eugene Police Commission*, *supra* note 407; Olson, *Spokane County Sheriff's Officer: Oversight Review*, *supra* note 467.

469   Ali and Pirog, *Social Accountability and Institutional Change*, *supra* note 433, at p. 422.

470   Ali and Pirog, *Social Accountability and Institutional Change*, *supra* note 433, at p. 422.

471   Ramirez et al., *A Resource Guide*, *supra* note 456, at pp. 9-10 (noting that "officers have a wide discretion in selecting which cars to stop," and further, that high-discretion pedestrian stops involve those who may look suspicious but are not engaged in any specific criminal violation or activities); Grine and Coward, *Police Investigation: Stops, Searches, and Arrests*, *supra* note 456, at pp. 2-24 ("Since violations of the traffic laws are commonplace, police have enormous discretion to effectuate stops of a very high number of cars").

Five of the eight Wave 1 LEAs in California have formal, independent COAs. These five COAs use a hybrid of the three primary COA models.[472] All Wave 2 law enforcement agencies have COAs, which can be categorized as the Review Model, Audit/Monitor Model, or a hybrid of these. No Wave 2 COAs employ the Investigative Model.

Table 6. Civilian Oversight of Waves 1 and 2 Law Enforcement Agencies

Law Enforcement Agency	Oversight Agency	Classify Complaints	Independent Investigative Authority of Complaints	Access to Records and Evidence	Make Findings & Recommend Discipline
Wave 1					
California Highway Patrol	No formal, independent COA	✘	✘	✘	✘
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD)	Sheriff Civilian Oversight Commission[473] (COC)	✘	✘	✔ [474]	✘
	Office of Inspector General, County of Los Angeles (LASD OIG)[475]	✘	✘ [476]	✔ [477]	✘
Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)	Board of Police Commissioners (BOPC)[478]	✘	✘	✘	✘
	Office of the Inspector General (LAPD OIG)[479]	✘	✔ [480]	✔ [481]	✘
Riverside County Sheriff's Department	No formal, independent COA	✘	✘	✘	✘

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472   For purposes of this report, a COA is only classified as investigative if it conducts independent investigations of civilian complaints or actions of individual peace officers.
473   Sheriff Civilian Oversight Commission, County of Los Angeles <https://tinyurl.com/6wkh4eju> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].
474   COC may direct LASD OIG to issue subpoenas on COC's behalf. (Los Angeles County Code, § 3.79.032.)
475   Office of the Inspector General, Los Angeles Police Commission <https://tinyurl.com/46un7wch> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].
476   It may only investigate matters involving LASD, its employees, or others regarding matters within the authority of the COC or Probation Oversight Commission (POC) under certain specified conditions. (Los Angeles Cnty. Code, § 6.44.190.)
477   Los Angeles Cnty. Code, § 6.44.190.
478   Los Angeles Police Department, Police Commission <https://tinyurl.com/mr3a9hwh> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].
479   Office of the Inspector General, Los Angeles Police Commission <https://tinyurl.com/46un7wch> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].
480   Los Angeles Police Department, Police Commission, *supra* note 478.
481   Office of the Inspector General, About Us <https://tinyurl.com/47rjfkea> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

Law Enforcement Agency	Oversight Agency	Classify Complaints	Independent Investigative Authority of Complaints	Access to Records and Evidence	Make Findings & Recommend Discipline
San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department	No formal, independent COA	✘	✘	✘	✘
San Diego County Sheriff's Department (SDSD)	Citizens Law Enforcement Review Board (CLERB)[482]	✔ 483	✔ 484	✔ 485	✔ 486
San Diego Police Department (SDPD)	Commission on Police Practices (CPP)[487]	✔ 488	✔ 489	✔ 490	✔ 491
San Francisco Police Department (SFPD)	San Francisco Police Commission (Police Commission)[492]	✘	✘	✘	✔ 493
	Department of Police Accountability (DPA)[494]	✔ 495	✔ 496	✔ 497	✔ 498
Wave 2					

482   Citizens Law Enforcement Review Board <https://tinyurl.com/43euxc2c> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].
483   Citizens Law Enforcement Review Board, About <https://tinyurl.com/375n6jzk> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].
484   Notably, CLERB's scope is limited; it has the authority to investigate all incidents involving the discharge of a firearm, use of force resulting in great bodily injury, and the use of force at protests or other events, but not other agency actions. (San Diego County Code, § 340.9, subd. (b).)
485   San Diego County Code, § 340.11.
486   *Ibid.*
487   The City of San Diego, Commission on Police Practices <https://tinyurl.com/2tuy9abm> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].
488   CPP is required to receive and evaluate all complaints, except where the complainant requests that the Commission not investigate, or where there is no specified allegation/officer. (San Diego Mun. Code, § 26.1107, subd. (a)(4).)
489   CCP is required to independently investigate all custody deaths; deaths resulting from officer interaction, and all City police officer-related shootings, and make findings. (San Diego Mun. Code, § 26.1107, subd. (a)(2).) CCP also has authority to investigate/evaluate complaints that do not involve custody deaths, deaths resulting from officer interaction, or officer-related shootings. (San Diego Mun. Code, § 26.1107, subd. (a)(3).)
490   San Diego Mun. Code, § 26.1110.
491   San Diego Mun. Code, §26.1107, subd. (a)(2); San Diego Mun. Code, § 26.1107, subd. (a)(6).
492   SF.gov, Police Commission <https://tinyurl.com/mw76mb2a> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].
493   SF.gov, About the Police Commission <https://tinyurl.com/4jeywuzb> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].
494   SF.gov, Department of Police Accountability <https://tinyurl.com/uv53t4nn> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].
495   SF.gov, Investigation Division <https://tinyurl.com/yc2f5hff> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].
496   *Ibid.*
497   *Ibid.*
498   *Ibid.*

Law Enforcement Agency	Oversight Agency	Classify Complaints	Independent Investigative Authority of Complaints	Access to Records and Evidence	Make Findings & Recommend Discipline
Fresno Police Department	Fresno Commission for Police Reform[499]	✘	✘	✘	✘[500]
	Fresno Office of Independent Review (OIR)[501]	✘	✘	✘	✘[502]
Long Beach Police Department	Long Beach Office of Police Oversight[503]	✘	✔[504]	✘	✘
	Long Beach Police Oversight Commission[505]	✘	✘	✘	✘[506]
Oakland Police Department	Oakland Office of Inspector General[507]	✘	✘	✘	✘[508]
	Oakland Police Commission[509]	✘	✘	✘	✔[510]
	Oakland Community Police Review Agency (CPRA)[511]	✔[512]	✔[513]	✔[514]	✔[515]

499   City of Fresno, Mayor, City Council Announce Members of New Police Reform Commission <https://tinyurl.com/yz35hrpk> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].
500   City of Fresno Commission on Police Reform, Bylaws <https://tinyurl.com/4ayt83hm> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].
501   City of Fresno, Office of Independent Review <https://tinyurl.com/4yj573dc> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].
502   *Ibid*.
503   City of Long Beach, Office of Police Oversight <https://tinyurl.com/4w5bbhjd> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].
504   It should be noted that the Long Beach Office of Police Oversight can independently investigate complaints only against the Chief of Police and command staff as requested by the City Manager. (Long Beach Office of Police Oversight, What We Do <https://tinyurl.com/3dcvev72> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].)
505   City of Long Beach, Office of Police Oversight, *supra* note 503.
506   Long Beach Office of Police Oversight, Police Oversight Commission <https://tinyurl.com/kdmk3nkk> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].
507   City of Oakland, Inspector General <https://tinyurl.com/bdeh5zfb> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].
508   City of Oakland, About the OIG <https://tinyurl.com/4j4aes79> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].
509   City of Oakland, Community Police Review Agency <https://tinyurl.com/puw69uah> [as of Dec. 18, 2025]; Oakland Measure 86333 <https://tinyurl.com/yy9tw2yn> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].
510   Notably, the Oakland Police Commission only has the authority to issue final disciplinary recommendations when the Chief of Police and the investigative agency disagree. (City of Oakland Police Commission <https://tinyurl.com/3nn4e6d5> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].)
511   City of Oakland, Community Police Review Agency, *supra* note 509; Oakland City Council, Resolution No. 88237 <https://tinyurl.com/58s4jcst> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].
512   City of Oakland, Community Police Review Agency, *supra* note 509.
513   *Ibid*.
514   CPRA may issue a valid subpoena. (City of Oakland, *Community Police Review Agency 2020 Annual Report* <https://tinyurl.com/4k8y9fyz> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].)
515   City of Oakland, Community Police Review Agency, *supra* note 509.

Law Enforcement Agency	Oversight Agency	Classify Complaints	Independent Investigative Authority of Complaints	Access to Records and Evidence	Make Findings & Recommend Discipline
Orange County Sheriff's Department	Orange County Office of Independent Review (OC OIR)[516]	✖	✔ [517]	✖ [518]	✖ [519]
Sacramento County Sheriff's Office	Sacramento Sheriff Community Review Commission (SCRC)[520]	✖	✖ [521]	✔ [522]	✖ [523]
Sacramento Police Department	Sacramento Office of Public Safety Accountability[524] (OPSA)	✔ [525]	✖ [526]	✖ [527]	✖ [528]
San Jose Police Department	San Jose Independent Police Auditor[529]	✖	✖	✖	✖ [530]

D. Evaluating the Effectiveness of COAs and the Elimination of Racial and Identity Profiling by Law Enforcement

While there is research assessing the effectiveness of a COA in relation to public safety, public trust, and officer accountability for misconduct,[531] these outcomes often lack standardized definitions and metrics that make it difficult to measure the effectiveness of COAs in reducing racial and identity profiling. The

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516   Orange County Office of Independent Review, Welcome to the Office of Independent Review <https://tinyurl.com/muxhtdzh> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

517   Orange County Ord. No. 08-004 (Feb. 26, 2008) § 1; Orange County Ord. No. 15-022 (Dec. 15, 2015) § 2 <https://tinyurl.com/2bz58efb> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

518   *Ibid*.

519   *Ibid*.

520   Sacramento County, Sheriff Community Review Commission <https://tinyurl.com/52cajy5t> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

521   Sheriff Community Review Commission, Rules and Regulations (amended March 18, 2025) <https://tinyurl.com/4bfr7rdz> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

522   Notably, SCRC can subpoena witness or documents only within the Commission's jurisdiction. (*Ibid*.)

523   *Ibid*.

524   Office of Public Safety Accountability, Civilian Oversight for Sacramento Police and Fire Department <https://tinyurl.com/23jw6hf7> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

525   *Ibid*.

526   OPSA specifically tracks and monitors high profile or serious complaint cases to conclusion, reviews completed investigations, and advises the Chief of any deficient investigations. (*Ibid*.)

527   OPSA specifically tracks and monitors high profile or serious complaint cases to conclusion, reviews completed investigations, and advises the Chief of any deficient investigations. (*Ibid*.)

528   OPSA specifically tracks and monitors high profile or serious complaint cases to conclusion, reviews completed investigations, and advises the Chief of any deficient investigations. (*Ibid*.)

529   City of San Jose, Independent Police Auditor, City Charter <https://tinyurl.com/4nejf8vp> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

530   City of San Jose, Independent Police Auditor - About <https://tinyurl.com/ykzsmfnpt> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

531   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at pp. 36-44, citing Walker and Archbold, *The New World of Police Accountability* (2014) p. 199; Walker, *Core Principles for an Effective Police Auditor's Office* (2003) Univ. of Nebraska; Attard and Olson, *Overview of Civilian Law Enforcement in the United States*, *supra* note 405; King, *Effectively Implementing Civilian Oversight Boards*, *supra* note 405; see also Schaible, *Impediments and Challenges to Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement* (Jul. 19, 2024) Univ. of Denver, NACOLE, at p. 4 <https://tinyurl.com/mr3mpzct> [as of Dec. 18, 2025] (interviewing oversight professionals from all COA models regarding the critical components of COAs).

RIPA data can provide such metrics. Thus, the Board encourages COAs to utilize RIPA data, in addition to considering the following principles of effective oversight, to meaningfully address racial disparities in policing.

1. General Principles of Effective COAs

As discussed in the 2023 RIPA Report, NACOLE has identified thirteen principles for effective civilian oversight of law enforcement.[532] While each of these principles can significantly impact the effectiveness of a COA, several are especially important for a COA to address racial and identity profiling by law enforcement.

a. Independence

Independence refers to the absence of real or perceived influence from law enforcement, political actors, or other special interests.[533] In general, it is crucial for COAs to be structurally, politically, and operationally independent from the LEA they are monitoring in order to be effective and to establish and maintain legitimacy.[534] In other words, the more independent the COA, the more effective it is in overseeing the LEA.

In the context of RIPA, independence is a critical component of a COA dedicated to the elimination of racial and identity profiling. Recommendations and directions from the COA may necessarily be critical of an LEA's approach to addressing racial and identity disparities in its policing practices. However, a COA that is dependent upon the LEA — for staffing, funding, or resources — may not advance recommendations that criticize the work of the LEA, even if those recommendations are necessary to eliminate profiling. Accordingly, it is crucial that COAs are independent from the LEAs they oversee to effectively address racial and identity profiling.

b. Clearly Defined and Adequate Jurisdiction and Authority

Effective COAs must have adequate and clearly defined jurisdiction and authority to achieve their organizational goals.[535] This includes the ability to review allegations of misconduct from all sources, including the review of citizen complaints and the ability to handle and resolve allegations.[536] Subpoena power and the ability to administer discipline further enhance an agency's effective oversight.[537]

A COA dedicated to the elimination of racial and identity profiling must have clearly defined jurisdiction and authority to address and resolve complaints that an agency's practice of profiling is contrary to the law. In the context of RIPA, such authority should include the ability to implement structural policy reforms to eliminate racial and identity profiling, such as limiting officer discretion or eliminating pretextual stops.[538] Additionally, an effective COA in this space should have the authority to recommend discipline, up to and including decertification, as discussed more fully in Section II, below.

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532   See Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2023) ("*2023 Report*") p. 170 <https://oag.ca.gov/ system/files/media/ ripa-board-report-2023.pdf> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].)

533   Vitoroulis et al., *The Evolution and Growth of Civilian Oversight*, *supra* note 410, at p. 12; see also De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 36.

534   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at pp. 36-37; Vitoroulis, *The Evolution and Growth of Civilian Oversight*, *supra* note 410, at p. 12.

535   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 38, citing Attard and Olson, *Overview of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement in the United States*, *supra* note 405; Vitoroulis et al., *The Evolution and Growth of Civilian Oversight*, *supra* note 410, at p. 12.

536   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 38. Most of the civilian oversight agencies submitting data to NACOLE indicated that they have jurisdiction in relation to citizen complaints. A majority stated that they always or sometimes have jurisdiction in relation to officer-involved shootings, serious force, and in-custody deaths.

537   Schaible, *Impediments and Challenges to Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement*, *supra* note 531, at pp. 6-7.

538   More information on these policy reform proposals can be found in the Policies section of this year's report.

c. Timely and Adequate Access to Records and Facilities

One of the most important components of effective oversight is the ability of the COA to access law enforcement records and facilities,[539] including access to complaints alleging racial or identity profiling, as this evidence could establish whether an officer has a practice of engaging in profiling or biased conduct. An effective COA has access to law enforcement records (including officer discipline records), facilities (such as detention facilities or testing facilities), and all available evidence (including body-worn camera footage) and uses those records to make factual determinations and resolve allegations of misconduct.[540]

In the context of RIPA, access to the records, facilities, and evidence relating to allegations of biased policing is necessary for COAs to properly assess whether racial and identity profiling occurred. If the COA can demonstrate similar past allegations against the same officers, or even statistical data that indicates identity group disparities in policing by the same officers, a COA can identify a common pattern or practice of impermissible racial or identity profiling and can effectively recommend discipline or policy reforms that promote the elimination of such profiling.

d. Full Cooperation of the Law Enforcement Agency

Cooperation between COAs and LEAs is necessary for the COA to conduct thorough investigations and obtain sufficient information to carry out its work.[541] COAs may attempt to achieve voluntary cooperation by developing a working relationship with the law enforcement agency they oversee, or jurisdictions may build requirements for cooperation into the COA's enabling ordinance, charter, or statute.[542]

A COA dedicated to the elimination of racial and identity profiling requires the full cooperation of the law enforcement agency to which it makes discipline and policy recommendations, particularly where the COA may be critical of an LEA's approach to addressing racial and identity group disparities in its policing practices. A collaborative relationship is necessary for an effective COA because it increases the likelihood that the LEA voluntarily implements the recommended actions, without the need for public pressure or other external motivators.

e. Sustained Stakeholder Support

Sustained and meaningful support from key stakeholders is another important component of effective civilian oversight.[543] If not supportive, government officials and office holders can undermine and reduce the effectiveness of civilian oversight in a variety of ways, including by failing to provide the COA with adequate resources or authority or by appointing ineffective managers or board members to the COA.[544]

In the context of RIPA, a COA's sustained and meaningful support from key stakeholders is vital to its effectiveness and capability to resolve complaints. With this sustained support, a COA can better weather institutional and external challenges. Such sustained support is necessary to avoid impairing or delaying

539   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 39, citing PARC, *Review of National Police Oversight Models for the Eugene Police Commission*, *supra* note 406; Attard and Olson, *Overview of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement in the United States*, *supra* note 405; King, *Effectively Implementing Civilian Oversight Boards*, *supra* note 405; Walker, *Core Principles for an Effective Police Auditor's Office*, *supra* note 531; Walker and Archbold, *The New World of Police Accountability* (2014), p. 200; Vitoroulis et al., *The Evolution and Growth of Civilian Oversight*, *supra* note 410, at p. 13.

540   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 39; Vitoroulis et al., *The Evolution and Growth of Civilian Oversight*, *supra* note 410, at p. 13.

541   Vitoroulis et al., *The Evolution and Growth of Civilian Oversight*, *supra* note 410, at p. 13, citing Walker, *Core Principles for an Effective Police Auditor's Office*, *supra* note 531.

542   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 40, citing Miller, *Civilian Oversight of Policing: Lessons from the Literature* (2002) Vera Ins. of Just. <https://tinyurl.com/vwahk84s> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

543   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at pp. 40-41; Vitoroulis et al., *The Evolution and Growth of Civilian Oversight*, *supra* note 410, at p. 13.

544   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at pp. 40-41, citing Attard and Olson, *Overview of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement in the United States*, *supra* note 405, at p. 6; Vitoroulis et al., *The Evolution and Growth of Civilian Oversight*, *supra* note 410, at p. 13.

the COA's ongoing capacity to audit, investigate, or review investigations or policing trends that implicate identify group profiling.

f.   Adequate Funding and Operational Resources

Although no studies have specifically measured the impact that various budgets and staffing have on the effectiveness of oversight, a COA's resources, including adequate budget and staffing, is considered one of the most critical indicators of effectiveness.[545] If the COA is well-funded, it is more likely to achieve the goals set out for effective oversight.[546] A COA that is professionally staffed by dedicated employees who have the time and expertise to support the work of the COA is also more likely to be effective.[547]

An oversight body tasked with eliminating racial and identity profiling cannot succeed without a budget and staff proportional to its responsibilities. In the context of RIPA, under-resourced COAs are unable to conduct timely investigations, perform the systemic reviews of department-wide practices, and sustain the public reporting and community outreach necessary to build trust.

g.   Policy and Patterns in Practice Analysis

Analyzing and reporting on law enforcement policies, patterns, and practices in relation to complaint handling processes and outcomes is another critical function of effective oversight to identify inequities, areas for improvement, and to ensure compliance with legal and ethical standards.[548]

An oversight body tasked with eliminating racial and identity profiling should avail itself of systematic, comprehensive, and objective data — including RIPA stop and complaint data — to identify disparities, look for patterns by specific officers, investigate biased policing allegations, develop policies and practices intended to improve those outcomes, and to otherwise measure their own efficiency in reducing racial and identity profiling over time.

h.   Confidentiality, Anonymity, and Protection from Retaliation

For civilian oversight to be effective, COAs must ensure confidentiality, anonymity, and protection from retaliation for complainants and others who share sensitive information.[549] A fear of retaliation can have a chilling effect on those interested in disclosing misconduct or participating in an investigation.[550]

In the context of RIPA, a COA's capacity to ensure confidentiality, anonymity, and protection from retaliation for complainants and others who share sensitive information is pivotal to ensure that persons come forward as victims or witnesses of biased policing. This may also protect officers who wish to report misconduct committed by a colleague, and which would otherwise go undetected.

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545   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at pp. 41-42, citing Finn, *Citizen Review of the Police*, *supra* note 405; Walker, *Police Accountability*, *supra* note 405; Walker, *Core Principles for an Effective Police Auditor's Office*, *supra* note 531; Attard and Olson, *Overview of Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement in the United States*, *supra* note 405; Olson, *Spokane County Sheriff's Office: Oversight Review*, *supra* note 467, at p. 6; Vitoroulis et al., *The Evolution and Growth of Civilian Oversight*, *supra* note 410, at p. 14.

546   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at pp. 41-42; Vitoroulis et al., *The Evolution and Growth of Civilian Oversight*, *supra* note 410, at p. 41; NACOLE, Thirteen Principles for Effective Oversight <https://tinyurl.com/2uf5jndb> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

547   De Angelis et al, *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at pp. 41-42, citing Finn, *Citizen Review of the Police*, *supra* note 405, at p. 6; Walker, *Core Principles for an Effective Police Auditor's Office*, *supra* note 531; Olson, *Spokane County Sheriff's Office: Oversight Review*, *supra* note 467; Vitoroulis et al., *The Evolution and Growth of Civilian Oversight*, *supra* note 410, at p. 14.

548   De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 42; Vitoroulis et al., *The Evolution and Growth of Civilian Oversight*, *supra* note 410, at p. 14.

549   Vitoroulis et al., *The Evolution and Growth of Civilian Oversight*, *supra* note 410, at p. 15; see also De Angelis et al., *Assessing the Evidence*, *supra* note 405, at p. 44.

550   City of Oakland, Community Police Review Agency <https://tinyurl.com/puw69uah> [as of Dec. 18, 2025]; Oakland Measure 86333 <https://tinyurl.com/yy9tw2yn> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

2. RIPA Data Can Provide a Metric to Evaluate the Effectiveness of COAs in Eliminating Racial and Identity Profiling

The RIPA data is highly relevant to assess a COA's effectiveness in reducing racial and identity profiling in the aggregate of those stops. As an empirical record of all actions taken in police stops, RIPA data may provide a standardized and systematic dataset that could be used by COAs to assess and improve policing practices as it relates to racial and identity group bias. Because all LEAs in the state report this data, individual LEAs can conduct comparative analyses across the aggregate to identify high areas of disparity against particular racial and identity groups within their jurisdiction.

For example, the RIPA data distinguishes between officer-initiated stops and those resulting from calls for service. As such, COAs can assess whether certain racial and identity groups are overrepresented in officer-initiated stops compared to their proportion in the population and analyze contraband discovery rates from searches that occur through officer-initiated stops across different racial and identity groups to evaluate for potential disparities in search standards. COAs could also use RIPA data to assess longitudinal and annual trends; trends within the LEA as a whole, by units, and individual officers[551]; and compare the LEA-level racial disparities to statewide trends to identify gaps; and seek community input to interpret trends and address them. Additionally, COAs could use the RIPA data, both the reported data and the additional materials in LEAs' possession about encounters that are reported through RIPA, to assess how certain policies effect certain groups.

RIPA's collection of standardized stop data can therefore be used by COAs to identify group disparities, develop systematic reforms, and measure the outcome of those reforms in the LEAs they oversee. A COA that finds racial or identity disparities in their LEA's stop data could issue a recommendation to reduce or eliminate the discretion of officers in these high-discretion interactions — by, for example, eliminating pretextual stops[552] — in order to further reduce racial or identity profiling. LEAs and COAs would also benefit from engaging with the RIPA data to assess whether the LEA is properly addressing disparities among different populations and to develop systematic reforms that help reduce racial and identity profiling.

E. Recommendations for Civilian Oversight

As discussed above, COA models that emphasize broad discretion and authority are correlated to a reduction in racial and identity disparities in high-discretion interactions, such as disorderly conduct arrests. RIPA data contains standardized data from California LEAs during vehicle and pedestrian stops, which often involve a high-discretion interactions, particularly for officer initiated stops that do not originate from a call for service.[553] As such, RIPA data could and should be used by COAs to assess whether the LEAs are properly addressing and resolving disparities for the various identity groups that RIPA requires LEAs to measure, and to develop systematic reforms in their LEA.

The Board makes the following recommendations related to the use of RIPA data by COAs and LEAs:

1. COAs should explicitly incorporate the elimination of racial and identity profiling as part of efforts to increase public safety.

2. COAs should assess whether they possess the qualities of an effective civilian oversight entity, particularly the features of a robust COA that correlate with the elimination of racial and identity

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551   This data is in the LEA's possession as information related to incidents reported under RIPA, but is not made public through RIPA reporting.

552   For more discussion on how the elimination of pretextual stops provides benefits to public safety, please see the Policies section of this year's report.

553   Ramirez et al., *A Resource Guide*, *supra* note 456, at pp. 9-10; Grine and Coward, "Police Investigation: Stops, Searches, and Arrests," *supra* note 456, at pp. 2-9, 23, 24; Doyle and Nembhard, *Police Traffic Stops Have Little to Do with Public Safety* (Apr. 26, 2021) Urb. Inst. <https://tinyurl.com/5b523yey> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

group bias in both high- and low-discretion interactions and expand or implement those factors consistent with their own model.

3. COAs should have timely and unfettered access to their agency's RIPA data and citizen complaint data, both in relation to all vehicle and pedestrian stops and citizen complaints alleging racial and identity profiling, and other information related to the matter being reviewed, with all appropriate confidentiality protections in place.

4. COAs should analyze RIPA data to identify any racial and identity disparities in policing practices and, if any exist, propose changes to policies and practices aimed at remedying these disparities and continue to monitor those disparities over time.

5. COAs should develop additional ways to use the RIPA data in a way that is consistent with their model and mission and look for ways to strengthen their existing model.

III. SB 2 Peace Officer Decertification

Senate Bill No. 2 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (SB 2), the Kenneth Ross, Jr. Police Decertification Act of 2021, established a statewide system for the suspension or permanent revocation of a peace officer's certification due to serious misconduct, including officers who demonstrate bias or engage in racial and identity profiling.[554] Pursuant to SB 2, the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) reviews and investigates complaints of serious misconduct by officers and suspends or revokes an officer's certification in cases of serious misconduct.[555] In addition to investigating serious misconduct allegations, SB 2 requires POST to revoke the certification of a peace officer who has become ineligible to hold office because of a criminal conviction listed in Government Code section 1029.[556]

The SB 2 decertification process provides statewide public accountability for misconduct. SB 2 process data identifies the reports of misconduct received by POST and how the allegations have been resolved, providing a separate look into how peace officers interact with the public. Particularly relevant to the RIPA Board, information regarding bias in police conduct is tracked with SB 2 data.

Last year, the Board provided an overview of SB 2 and POST's process for decertifying peace officers who are found to have engaged in serious misconduct under SB 2 and analyzed data on certification actions initiated by POST against peace officers from January 1, 2023 - October 1, 2024. While this analysis focused on SB 2 data from a statewide- or agency-level perspective, large Southern California agencies appeared to be more represented in SB 2 decertification actions.

This Report provides updated data on certification actions POST has initiated against peace officers since 2023 and incorporates an analysis of regional differences in SB 2 data in California throughout. Additionally, this year's analysis looks separately at Northern and Southern California to better understand if there are regional differences of concern.

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554   Stats. 2021, c. 409 (S.B.2) eff. Jan. 1, 2022.
555   Pen. Code, § 13510.8, subds. (a), (c). The California Law Enforcement Accountability Reform Act ("CLEAR Act") provides for the investigation and adjudication of complaints regarding three categories of misconduct by peace officers: membership in a hate group, participation in a hate group activity, or advocacy of any public expressions of hate. (Pen. Code, § 13682; see also, *id*., § 13680, subds. (d), (e), (g).) The rulemaking process to adopt guidelines for the investigation and adjudication of complaints is pending. (See Department of Justice, Regulations Implementing the CLEAR Act (AB 655), <https://oag.ca.gov/ab655/regulations> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].)
556   See Pen. Code, § 13510.8; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 1212, subd. (a); POST, *Penal Code § 13512 Annual Report 2023*, at p. 4 <https://tinyurl.com/munfwsk2> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

A. POST Certification Actions by the Numbers

1. Misconduct Reports

From January 1, 2023, to December 1, 2025, POST received 41,586 misconduct reports from law enforcement agencies, as well as 3,066 public complaints submitted directly to POST. Of the misconduct reports by agencies, 17,916 cases (43.08%) related to an incident that took place prior to January 1, 2023.

As of December 1, 2024, 36,618 cases (88.05%) have been assigned to POST investigators, of which 28,541 cases (77.94%) have been closed.[557] This represents significant progress by POST in closing misconduct report cases since October 2024, when only 7,967 cases (20.64%) had been closed.[558]

When POST receives a report, complaint, or other allegation of serious misconduct from an LEA or directly from the public, it classifies the type of serious misconduct alleged into the following basis categories. Because a report can include different types of allegations, the number of allegations (47,363 allegations) is greater than the number of misconduct reports (41,586 reports). As shown in Table 7 below, of the serious misconduct allegations POST has received between January 1, 2023, and December 1, 2025, physical abuse/excessive force is the most common type of serious misconduct alleged, followed by demonstrating bias, abuse of power, dishonesty, acts that violate the law, and sexual assault.[559]

Table 7. Serious Misconduct Allegations Received by Basis (Up to December 1, 2025)

Basis[560]	Allegations Received[561]	
	Number	Percent
Physical Abuse/Excessive Force	17,055	41.01%
Demonstrating Bias	12,778	30.73%
Abuse of Power	7,466	17.95%
Dishonesty	3,577	8.60%
Acts that Violate the Law	3,178	7.64%
Sexual Assault	1,884	4.53%
Convicted of a Felony	680	1.63%
Other Serious Misconduct	745	1.79%

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557   A case is deemed closed only when there is a final decision regarding the case certification status. For example, if POST completes its investigation and determines there is "No Further Action (NFA)," this is a final determination, and the case is closed. If a notice of intent to revoke or suspend is sent to the subject officer and agency head, the case is still open pending the outcome. While the investigation phase may be closed, the case would not be considered "closed" until there is an outcome: surrendered, revoked, default revocation, suspension, stipulated settlement, or no action. POST closed cases may also include non-actionable retroactive serious misconduct cases pursuant to Penal Code section 13510.8, subdivision (g), cases where the evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence was not met, and cases that did not meet the statutory definition of serious misconduct pursuant to Penal Code section 13510.8, subdivision (b). (POST, *Penal Code § 13512 Annual Report 2023*, *supra* note 556, at p. 17.)

558   See POST, *Peace Officer Certification Reporting* <https://tinyurl.com/auncn9f6> [as of December 1, 2025].

559   See *ibid*.

560   A report or complaint of misconduct may include multiple types of misconduct.

561   Number of allegations is as assessed by POST. Any one report, complaint, and/or case may include multiple allegations, and reports, complaints, and/or cases may involve one or more officers. Allegations were received by POST starting January 1, 2023, and this data is current to December 1, 2025. (POST, *Peace Officer Certification Reporting*, *supra* note 558.)

2. Common Grounds for Certification Actions

As of December 1, 2025, POST has initiated certification actions against 651 peace officers. Actions were spread nearly proportionally between Northern and Southern California,[562] with SB 2 certification actions initiated against 259 officers in Northern California and 339 officers in Southern California. Additionally, fifty-three peace officers employed by a statewide agency like the California Highway Patrol or the California Department of Justice were the subject of SB 2 certification actions. 261 of the 651 proceedings against a peace officer involved the officer's eligibility for peace officer certification under Government Code section 1029.[563] For every thousand peace officers, there were about ten, seven, and five officers subject to a certification action among local Northern California agencies, local Southern California agencies, and statewide agencies, respectively.[564]

There was some described category of misconduct as a basis for decertification in 285 of the 651 proceedings against an officer. The most common categories of complaint, charge, or allegation resulting in a decertification action under SB 2 are egregious or repeated acts that violate the law, followed by physical abuse or excessive force, dishonesty, sexual assault, demonstrating bias, and abuse of power.[565] As of December 1, 2025, there have been no decertification actions relating to participation in a law enforcement gang or the failure to intercede when present and observing force that is clearly unnecessary.[566]

Table 8. Proportion of Serious Misconduct Bases Within Certification Actions (Up to December 1, 2025)

Serious Misconduct Basis[567]	Officers Subject to SB2 Actions with a Described Basis[568]	
	Number	Percent
Acts that Violate the Law	188	65.96%
Physical Abuse/Excessive Force	37	12.98%
Dishonesty	30	10.53%
Sexual Assault	26	9.12%
Abuse of Power	14	4.91%
Demonstrating Bias	12	4.21%
Failure to Cooperate	2	0.70%

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562   Southern California is defined as San Luis Obispo, Kern, and San Bernardino counties, and all counties south of those three counties. Northern California is defined as all other counties, including Monterey, King, Tulare and Inyo counties. Population of the two regions is approximately 24 million and 16 million, respectively. As of August 2025, there were approximately ten thousand peace officers employed by a statewide agency, forty-six thousand peace officers employed by a local Southern California agency, and twenty-seven thousand employed by a Northern California agency. (POST, *Agency Statistics* <https://tinyurl.com/5n839pr4> [as of December 1, 2025].) Information on Peace Officer Certification Actions is available at POST, *Peace Officer Certification Actions* <https://tinyurl.com/4vf39h2a> [as of December 1, 2025]. Data on Peace Officer Certification Actions in this report was collected from the POST website on and before December 1, 2025, as well as a separate report received from POST.

563   Government Code § 1029 provides, in part, that individuals who have been convicted of a felony, have been subject to other specified legal outcomes, or are listed in the National Decertification Index. (See Gov. Code § 1029, subd. (a).)

564   POST, *Peace Officer Certification Actions*, *supra* note 562.

565   See *ibid*.

566   *Ibid*.

567   The basis of allegations and certification actions may include multiple types of misconduct.

568   A certification action is a suspension or revocation of a certificate, or an officer being made ineligible pursuant to Government Code section 1029. A certification action may be the result of one or more allegations, and certification action with different bases may occur in the course of one SB 2 process. For example, an officer may be temporarily suspended after being discharged for demonstrating bias, then subsequently the officer's certification could be revoked following a voluntarily surrender. In that instance, the basis of the final action, revocation, would not be demonstrating bias. Certification actions began on January 1, 2023. This data is current to December 1, 2025.

Between Northern and Southern California, the basis of a complaint, charge, or allegations of serious misconduct did not vary significantly; there is a relatively higher proportion of the abuse of power basis in Southern California, and a relatively higher proportion of the dishonesty basis in Northern California.

Table 9. Regional Serious Misconduct Basis for Certification Actions (Up to December 1, 2025)

Basis	Certification Actions	
	Northern	Southern
Acts that Violate the Law	65.57%	68.49%
Physical Abuse/Excessive Force	12.30%	10.27%
Dishonesty	13.93%	8.22%
Sexual Assault	9.02%	9.59%
Abuse of Power	2.46%	6.85%
Demonstrating Bias	4.10%	4.79%

3. SB 2 Actions Within Agencies

In terms of the numbers of sworn officers, Southern California's largest law enforcement agencies are larger than Northern California's largest law enforcement agencies. Similarly, as of December 1, 2025, the five law enforcement agencies with the most officers subject to SB 2 certification actions, including those most recently previously employed by the agency, were in Southern California, with between 13 and 68 officers subject to such actions; in Northern California, the number of officers subject to SB 2 decertification actions is between 9 and 23. Generally, the most common type of serious misconduct involves egregious or repeated acts that violate the law.[569]

Table 10. SB 2 Actions by Agency (Up to December 1, 2025)

Last Employing Agency	Officers Subject to SB 2 Actions	Sworn Officers	Most Common Recent Certification Action[570]	Most Common Serious Misconduct
Los Angeles County SD	68	8737	21 Ineligible Pursuant to GC 1029	21 Acts that Violate the Law
Los Angeles PD	46	8518	14 Ineligible Pursuant to GC 1029	14 Acts that Violate the Law
Riverside County SD	29	3033	11 Temporary Suspensions	14 Acts that Violate the Law
San Bernardino County SD	18	2010	8 Revoked	6 Acts that Violate the Law
San Diego PD	13	1741	5 Revoked	2 Acts That Violate the Law
San Francisco PD	23	1792	8 Temporary Suspensions	6 Acts that Violate the Law
Alameda County SD	18	1004	7 Withdrawn by Order of the Executive Director	11 Acts that Violate the Law
San Jose PD	13	1002	7 Temporary Suspensions	5 Acts that Violate the Law
Contra Costa County SO	9	645	3 Temporary Suspensions	5 Acts that Violate the Law
Antioch PD	9	88	5 Revoked	5 Acts that Violate the Law
California Highway Patrol	40	7377	15 Surrendered	7 Physical Assault/Excessive Force

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569 POST, *Peace Officer Certification Actions*, *supra* note 562.
570 Multiple certification actions may occur in the course of one SB 2 process. Because temporary suspensions frequently precede more permanent SB 2 dispositions, only the most recent certification action is reported.

4. Temporary Suspensions

Last year, POST indicated that temporary suspensions made up around half of all most recent certification actions regarding a particular officer, but now temporary suspensions make up around one-third of those actions, demonstrating the resolution of those temporary suspensions.[571] As of December 1, 2025, POST data shows there are 125 temporary suspensions related to a pending criminal proceeding. They have been pending for an average of 473 days. Fifty-three temporary suspensions without collateral criminal proceeding have been pending for 365 days on average. Those proceedings are typically related to serious misconduct of a discharged or retired officer. As of December 1, 2025, 102 temporary suspensions reached a permanent disposition. Of those 102, 63 temporary suspensions with related collateral criminal proceedings took an average of 462 days to resolve. The other 39 suspensions — without collateral criminal proceedings — took an average of 264 days to conclude.[572]

IV. Vision for Future Reports

As with the Board's prior review of SB 2 decertification actions in the 2025 report, this year's report adds to the Board's understanding of the SB 2 process and POST's statutory obligations to address officer bias and, by extension, the ongoing concern of racial and identity profiling. Subsequent reports can build off of the data contained in POST's reports to give the Board a more complete assessment of emerging trends in the data, and will allow the Board to determine whether POST's decertification process can be improved to more effectively combat racial and identity profiling through that process.

The Board is mindful of, and reiterates, its stated goals of examining efforts to create a nationwide database for reporting officers who have been decertified or made ineligible due to substantiated complaints of bias or racial and identity profiling. Such a database would ensure that officers who have committed serious misconduct cannot continue to commit such misconduct in other jurisdictions. Indeed, at the state level, this was the purpose of SB 2: by passing this important legislation, offending officers in one area of California could not simply move to another county, city, or precinct to engage in the same serious misconduct again and again. The purpose of SB 2 is one the Board supported for California, as it improves the public safety of all Californians, and a similar, nationwide approach is one the Board would support for the public safety and welfare of all citizens nationwide.

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571   See Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *2025 Annual Report* (2025) ("*2025 Report*") p. 137 <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/ripa-board-report-2025.pdf> [as of Dec. 18, 2025].

572   POST, *Peace Officer Certification Actions*, *supra* note 562.

POST TRAINING AND RECRUITMENT

I. Introduction

The California Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training (POST) is required to consult with the RIPA Board regarding the development of training for all peace officers that "prescribes evidence-based patterns, practices, and protocols that prevent racial or identity profiling."[573] Since RIPA's enactment, the Board has reviewed eight POST courses and made recommendations to align those courses with the Board's goal of eliminating racial and identity profiling.

Table 11. POST Training Courses Reviewed by the RIPA Board

Name of Course	Course Type/Length	Year of RIPA Board Review
Basic Academy Learning Domain #3 Principled Policing in the Community	Academy – 26 hrs.	2022 Report
Basic Academy Learning Domain #42 Cultural Diversity and Discrimination	Academy – 16 hrs. * Museum of Tolerance (MOT) training required to facilitate this course	2023 Report
Principled Policing: Implicit Bias and Procedural Justice	In-Service Officers – 8 hrs.	2020 Report
Bias and Racial Profiling Video	In-Service Officers – 2 hrs. *MOT training required to facilitate this course	2021 Report
Beyond Bias Racial and Identity Profiling Online	Supervisors – 2 hrs.	2021 and 2022 Reports
PSP: Strategic Communications	In-Service Officers – 3 hrs.	2021 and 2022 Reports
MOT – Racial Profiling Train-the-Trainer	In-Service Officers – 24 hrs.	2023 Report
Guidelines on Racial and Identity Profiling	Optional Course	2024 Report
Field Training		2025 Report and 2026 Report (forthcoming)

This chapter discusses the Board's ongoing collaboration with POST, and has three primary sections:

In Section II, the Board details POST's response to prior recommendations from the 2025 RIPA Report, as well as POST's implementation of these recommendations. The Board's recommendations to POST, and POST's consideration of those recommendations in carrying out its work, is consistent with POST's statutory

573   Pen. Code, § 13519.4, subd. (h).

requirement to consult with the Board in creating evidence-based curricula to train law enforcement officers on issues relating to racial or identity profiling, including implicit bias.[574]

In Section III, the Board provides an overview of its participation in two POST-sponsored workshops: 1) POST's AB 953[575] Workshop on Guidelines on Racial and Identity Profiling, held in 2024, and 2) POST's AB 443[576] Workshop to develop a definition of "biased conduct," held in 2025. As discussed below, these workshops are important first steps to the further development of effective training on the law's prohibition of racial and identity profiling in police work going forward.

In Section IV, the Board discusses its two-year review of POST's Field Training Program (FTP), to take place in this and next year's Board Reports. The FTP is intended to "facilitate a peace officer's transition" from the police academy to their work as peace officers in the field.[577] Among other areas, POST measures whether peace officers have "impermissible biases"[578] through its FTP.[579] In this year's report, the Board begins its review by discussing what the FTP entails, the materials covered, and its approach to reviewing this important program. In the 2027 Board Report, the Board will discuss its review of the FTP and, depending on that review, provide recommendations to POST as to how the FTP can be modified to more effectively train law enforcement officers to reduce or eliminate racial and identity profiling.

II. POST's Response to the RIPA Board's 2025 Recommendations

On March 5, 2025, the POST Commission discussed its response to the Board's recommendations to POST in the 2025 RIPA Report.[580] POST staff presented a draft response during the "Consent Agenda" portion of the meeting, meaning the Commission did not vote on particular recommendations or the language of POST's response; the POST Commission only voted to approve the draft response as written.[581]

POST partially supported two of the five Board recommendations made to POST in the 2025 RIPA Report.[582]

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574   *Ibid*.
575   Assemb. Bill No. 953 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) <https://tinyurl.com/2w5nvbxv> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]. AB 953, also known as the Racial and Identity Profiling Act, is the bill that created RIPA and directed POST to develop evidence-based training and protocols designed to prevent racial and identity profiling in collaboration with the RIPA Board.
576   Assem. Bill No. 443 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) <https://tinyurl.com/tjkzatcz> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
577   See Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *Field Training Program Guide—Volume I: Overview & Appendices* ("*FTP Volume I*") (2024) p. 1-1 <https://tinyurl.com/3aydd4df> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
578   *Id*. at pp. 2-8.
579   See Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *POST Commission March 5, 2025 Agenda*, p. 494 <https://tinyurl.com/yxjw8y8f> [as of Dec. 17, 2025] (noting that "the most effective way to evaluate and measure a recruit on the topic of bias is in the Field Training Program, immediately following the Regular Basic Course").
580   *Id*. at pp. 487-497.
581   *Id*. at p. 3.
582   POST responded that the RIPA Board's remaining recommendations in the 2025 Report — to "evaluate the academic research underpinning trainings during the course certification process;" revise its process for evaluating law enforcement training "to include additional course criteria [to] incorporate training outcomes based on officer actions and behavior in the field" and to provide "guidance apprising officers and law enforcement agencies" regarding anti-retaliation and workplace whistleblower protections — were not required, as there was a lack of resources available, fell outside the scope of POST's work, or was already sufficiently covered. (See *id*. at pp. 487-497.)

RIPA Recommendation: Formally evaluate Learning Domain (LD) 3: *Principled Policing in the Community* **and LD 42:** *Cultural Diversity/Discrimination* **in the Regular Basic Course comprehensive module tests.**[583]

POST Response: Partially Support. POST stated that the Regular Basic Course requires a minimum of 26 hours on the topic of Principled Policing in the Community under LD 3 and 16 hours on the topic of Cultural Diversity/Discrimination within LD 24.[584]

POST believed this recommendation had already been addressed when the Board reviewed LD 42 in the 2023 RIPA Report.[585] POST stated it is researching and exploring how comprehensive testing could be included in LD 42.[586]

POST noted that objectives for LD 3 are tested in LDs 15 (Laws of Arrest), 16 (Search and Seizure) and 25 (Domestic Violence), and that, while POST previously included comprehensive tests for LD 3 in this learning domain, it determined this comprehensive testing "redundant," as it believed it performed such testing in other learning domains.[587] Because of this, POST ended testing on LD 3 in July 2018.[588]

POST opined that "the most effective way to evaluate and measure a recruit on the topic of bias is in the Field Training Program," and noted that the topic of bias is currently measured and tested in the FTP.[589]

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583   Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2025) ("*2025 Report*") p. 139 <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/ripa-board-report-2025.pdf> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; see also Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *POST Commission March 5, 2025 Agenda*, *supra* note 579, at p. 494.

584   *Ibid*.

585   *Ibid*.; see also Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *Annual Report* (2023) ("*2023 Report*") pp. 196-202 <https://oag.ca.gov/system/ files/media/ripa-board-report-2023.pdf> [as of Dec. 17, 2025] (recommending that POST implement "measures of effectiveness by which to evaluate course outcomes" with regards to racial and identity profiling).

586   Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *POST Commission March 5, 2025 Agenda*, *supra* note 579, at p. 494; see also Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *2023 Report*, *supra* note 585, at pp. 196-202 (recommending that POST implement "measures of effectiveness by which to evaluate course outcomes" with regards to racial and identity profiling).

587   Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *POST Commission March 5, 2025 Agenda*, *supra* note 579, at p. 494.

588   *Ibid*.

589   *Ibid*.

RIPA Recommendation: Develop guidelines to assist law enforcement agencies in developing procedures to conduct adequate investigations into complaints alleging bias and guidelines that assist law enforcement agencies with aligning their policies with Penal Code §13510.8. The guidelines should also apprise law enforcement agencies about how to educate the public in ways in which a complaint could be filed. In developing the guidelines for investigating complaints about demonstrating bias, POST could consult with the Board.[590]

POST Response: Partially Support. POST stated it "agrees in large part with this recommendation and has already identified subject matter experts, including those on the RIPA Board, to participate in a series of workshops directed to developing the definition of bias conduct for the purpose of guiding agencies in conducting investigations into allegations of improper conduct stemming from implicit or explicit bias."[591] POST noted that, pursuant to Assembly Bill (AB) 443,[592] it was required to establish a definition of "biased conduct" by January 1, 2026.[593]

However, POST noted that the definition of misconduct provided in Penal Code § 13510.8, subdivision (b) and further defined in Commission Regulation § 1205, subdivision (a)(5) is separate from Penal Code § 13510.6, which requires POST to guide law enforcement agencies in determining whether an officer's actions and motives are the result of implicit or explicit bias.[594] Therefore, POST found that while the actions and motives of an officer may result from underlying bias, it may not rise to the level of serious misconduct.[595]

POST noted that, as of January 2023, it received 1,500 complaints of serious misconduct, including biased conduct.[596] POST added that it will continue to make presentations to the public and work with subject matter experts on ways to educate the public.[597]

On May 21, 2025, POST representatives provided updates to the RIPA POST Subcommittee on actions taken by POST in response to past Board recommendations. POST stated it is adding guidance in its Background Investigations Manual and AB 443 guidance for law enforcement agencies to conduct social media investigations or inquiries in the hiring of dispatchers.[598] POST also revised its description of racial profiling in the LD 42 student workbook to include the statement, "Data and research show that racial profiling is not an effective means of policing."[599] POST also informed the Subcommittee that the Museum of Tolerance (MOT) incorporated the RIPA Board's recommendations, including adding a discussion of officer accountability in reporting and responding to biased practices observed by fellow officers.[600] POST informed the California Department of Justice on September 4, 2025, that MOT is still working on the expanded course and will advise when it is finalized. The RIPA Board looks forward to continuing working collaboratively with POST on identifying ways in which the Board can serve as a resource in POST's consideration or implementation of the Board's recommendations.

590   Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *2025 Report*, *supra* note 583, at p. 158; see also Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *POST Commission March 5, 2025 Agenda*, *supra* note 579, at p. 495.

591   Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *POST Commission March 5, 2025 Agenda*, *supra* note 579, at p. 495.

592   Assem. Bill No. 443 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) § 1, *supra* note 576. Assembly Bill 443 has since been codified as Penal Code section 13510.6.

593   Pen. Code, § 13510.6, subd. (a); see also Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, POST Commission March 5, 2025 Agenda, supra note 579, at p. 495.

594   Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *POST Commission March 5, 2025 Agenda*, *supra* note 579, at p. 495.

595   *Ibid*. As noted in the Complaints chapter of this year's report, the Board is concerned with the very low number of sustained complaints based on racial and identity complaints — just 3 of the 1,552 complaints that reached disposition in 2024. For more information on these statistics, please see the Complaints chapter.

596   It should be noted that as of Aug. 22, 2025, POST has received 11,916 complaints of biased conduct, although it is not clear whether this number also includes the 1,500 complaints received prior to January 2023.

597   Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *POST Commission March 5, 2025 Agenda*, *supra* note 579, at p. 495.

598   This addresses a 2023 RIPA Report recommendation. (See Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *2023 Report*, *supra* note 585, at p. 161.)

599   This addresses a 2023 RIPA Report recommendation. (See *id*. at p. 197.) POST's student workbooks are available here: <https://tinyurl.com/4hs9kcva> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

600   This addresses 2023 and 2024 RIPA Report recommendations. (See Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *2023 Report*, *supra* note 585, at p. 197; Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *Annual Report* (2024) (*"2024 Report"*) p. 219 <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/ripa-board-report-2024.pdf> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].)

III.   POST Workshops

A. POST's Guidelines on Racial and Identity Profiling (2024 Workshop)

In August 2023, POST agreed to the RIPA Board's recommendation to develop racial and identity profiling guidelines for all POST trainings related to AB 953.[601] Such guidelines are required by statute,[602] and, importantly, are an opportunity to align all law enforcement training and policy to more effectively tackle barriers to eliminating racial and identity profiling by individual officers and law enforcement agencies.

In May and October 2024, POST invited Board members and subject matter experts (SMEs) to attend its "AB 953 Workshop" designed to assist POST with creating these guidelines. Board members attended both workshops. In early September 2025, POST confirmed the revisions had been completed and, on September 9, 2025, the proposed Guidelines were presented during the "Consent Agenda" portion of the POST Commission Meeting. POST reported that since no feedback or comment was provided on the proposed Guidelines, it published the Guidelines on its website and issued a related Bulletin to the field on September 23, 2025.[603] The Board looks forward to reviewing the final version of POST's Guidelines on Racial and Identity Profiling and POST's implementation plan in the 2027 RIPA Report, to ensure that the Guidelines apply broadly to all racial and identity profiling courses, as the Board previously recommended.

1. Consistent with Prior Reports, the Board is Concerned POST and LEAs Do Not Measure the Effectiveness of Existing Trainings

Despite updated training on racial and identity profiling offered through POST, and trainings offered through law enforcement agencies, disparities in who is stopped and subjected to intrusive actions during traffic and pedestrian stops persist in California. Across all years of RIPA data collection (2018-2025), RIPA data show that individuals perceived as Black, as Hispanic/Latine(x), as having a disability, or as transgender are consistently treated in disparate ways.[604] The racial and identity profiling training purports to raise cultural awareness, but there is no data demonstrating the effectiveness of the training in reducing disparities in stops and actions taken by officers. These disparities reduce public safety, particularly for individuals of marginalized communities.[605]

Researchers recommend a combination of repeated anti-bias trainings and a shift in organizational policies towards fair and impartial policing for sustained changes in officer behavior and field outcomes.[606] Anti-bias interventions should therefore be woven into the culture and policies of police departments.[607] However, as noted in past RIPA Reports, AB 953 only requires that peace officers receive a refresher course on the prohibitions on racial and identity profiling once every five years.[608] Further, much of the mandated training on racial and identity profiling is concentrated in the basic academy, and the POST-certified refresher courses lack standardization; the trainings vary across agencies with differing legal standards, evaluation

601   Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2025 Report*, *supra* note 583, at p. 120.
602   Pen. Code, § 13519.4, subd. (a); see also Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2025 Report*, *supra* note 583, at p. 120.
603   Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *Bulletin No. 2025-37: RIPA Course Guidelines Approved by POST Commission* <https://tinyurl.com/3wkvu5bw> [as of Dec. 17, 2025.]
604   See Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2025 Report*, *supra* note 583, at pp. 24-31; Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2024 Report*, *supra* note 600, at pp. 6, 8-10; Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2023 Report*, *supra* note 585, at pp. 9-10; Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *Annual Report* (2022) (*"2022 Report"*) pp. 9-11 <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/ripa-board-report-2022.pdf> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
605   For more information, please see the Accountability Section of this year's Report.
606   Lai and Lisnek, *The Impact of Implicit Bias-Oriented Diversity Training on Police Officers' Beliefs, Motivations, and Actions* ("*Impact of Implicit Bias-Oriented Diversity Training*") (2023) 34 Psychological Science 1, 12 <https://tinyurl.com/sp6rx656> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; see also Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2025 Report*, *supra* note 583, at pp. 126-129.
607   Lai and Lisnek, *Impact of Implicit Bias-Oriented Diversity Training*, *supra* note 606, at p. 12; see also Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2025 Report*, *supra* note 583, at pp. 129-130.
608   Pen. Code, 13519.4 subd. (i). In the 2025 RIPA Report, the Board recommended more frequent, evaluated and evidence-based training on racial and identity profiling, at a minimum of every three years. (See Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2025 Report*, *supra* note 583, at p. 136.)

metrics, and materials on ethical and procedural guidelines. Addressing these issues could better align with the established research advanced by the Board in prior reports,[609] and could enhance the effectiveness of the training officers receive.

POST's Guidelines on Racial and Identity Profiling can contribute to impartial and effective policing by helping to standardize trainings across California law enforcement agencies and rooting those trainings in research-based pedagogy. POST has published Guidelines on Racial and Identity Profiling and indicated that it intends for these guidelines to be applied across all courses and learning domains. While this will help to standardize training relating to racial and identity profiling, the Board remains concerned that the trainings will focus too heavily on cultural sensitivity and the absence of mechanism to evaluate the effectiveness of POST's training will make it difficult to assess where modifications in the content or modality of trainings may be needed.[610]

The Board shared with POST concerns with the absence of training effectiveness assessments. POST's response was that "[m]easuring the effectiveness of any [POST] course has proven to be difficult. POST does not collect data and lacks legal authority to collect data on individual peace officer actions and performance unless it is related to serious misconduct."[611]

While it may be difficult for POST to measure course effectiveness with regards to training on racial and identity profiling than training in other areas, the Board believes that the issuance of POST guidance would assist law enforcement agencies in measuring the training effectiveness at the law enforcement level. The Board understands that POST does not employ individual peace officers, and thus does not set behavioral and performance metrics for employment purposes, unless it is related to serious misconduct, such as bias. However, POST could be instrumental in developing and issuing guidance to encourage law enforcement agencies to measure the effectiveness of courses using various behavioral and performance metrics. For example, POST guidance could encourage law enforcement agencies to: 1) administer pre- and post-course assessments to evaluate individual officers' understanding of relevant laws, implicit bias, and procedural justice before and after a course;[612] 2) administer attitude surveys to measure changes in attitudes toward race, identity, profiling, and bias;[613] 3) have newly assigned officers respond to hypothetical policing scenarios that reveal bias awareness or decision-making since their answers can become a diagnostic tool that exposes whether bias awareness is activated and whether decision-making reflects training goals;[614] 4) engage in body camera footage analysis by reviewing random samples of interactions that showcase respectful language, tone, and de-escalation practices since this connects training to real-world interactions and has the potential of reducing disparities in officer behavior;[615] and/or 5) monitor for shifts in the number and nature of citizen complaints related to racial and identity profiling and biased policing.[616] The Board looks forward to continuing to work with POST to explore ways to measure its course effectiveness.

2. Guidance to Support Law Enforcement Agencies

The Board acknowledges that factors beyond the existence of effective training can undermine the utility of courses since training does not operate in isolation. Structural and cultural conditions within law

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609   Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2025 Report*, *supra* note 583, at p. 136.

610   See Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2025 Report*, *supra* note 583, at pp. 119, 127; Racial and Identity Profiling Board, *2024 Report*, *supra* note 600, at p. 26.

611   Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *POST Commission March 5, 2025 Agenda*, *supra* note 579, at p. 491.

612   See Lai and Lisnek, *Impact of Implicit Bias-Oriented Diversity Training*, *supra* note 606, at p. 435.

613   See Worden et al., *The Impacts of Implicit Bias Awareness Training in the NYPD* (2020) Internat. Assn. of Chiefs of Police: Center for Police Research and Policy 1, 83 <https://tinyurl.com/38v93bnb> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

614   See Dube et al., *A Cognitive View of Policing* (September 2023) NBER Working Paper, No. w31651 <https://tinyurl.com/3e22znu9> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

615   See Hetey et al., *"When the Cruiser Lights Come On:" Using the Science of Bias & Culture to Combat Racial Disparities in Policing* (*"When the Cruiser Lights Come On"*) (2024) 153 Daedalus 123, 125 <https://tinyurl.com/3nepu5cv> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

616   See Camp et al., *Leveraging Body-worn Camera Footage to Assess the Effects of Training on Officer Communication During Traffic Stops* (2024) 3 PNAS Nexus 359, 360 <https://tinyurl.com/33cztbut> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

enforcement agencies can impact the effectiveness of training.[617] Examples of structural conditions include lack of accountability mechanisms;[618] promotion and reward structures;[619] inadequate data collection;[620] limited community oversight;[621] and short-term or one-off training models.[622] Examples of cultural conditions include an "us vs. them" mentality and workplace culture;[623] resistance to acknowledging systemic racism;[624] peer pressure and group allegiance;[625] leadership tone and example;[626] and the normalization of racialized policing.[627] Other relevant factors can also include the agency's institutional incentives to eradicate racial and identity profiling, and other partners, such as local government, that influence a law enforcement agency's priorities and culture.[628]

Still, the Board believes that POST can provide law enforcement agencies a framework for enhancing training and policies aimed at reducing racial and identity profiling. For instance, POST guidance could encourage law enforcement agencies to: 1) engage in more rigorous trainer selection and vetting so that facilitators have cultural competency, subject matter expertise, and credibility with newly assigned officers;[629] 2) ensure instructors are trained in adult learning theory and capable of facilitating dialogue on race, identity, and trauma-informed approaches;[630] 3) evaluate facilitators through anonymous participant feedback and periodic peer observation;[631] 4) normalize accountability by establishing clear expectations for behavior aligned with racial and identity profiling trainings and by communicating consequences for violations;[632] 5) change narratives by incorporating stories of successful community policing and ethical decision-making into training and communications;[633] 6) remove incentives for aggressive policing that correlate with profiling, such as formal or informal arrest or citation quotas, and institutionalize protections for whistleblowers;[634] 7) make performance data (e.g. racial and identity disparities in stops) part of performance reviews;[635] 8) provide mentorship and coaching by pairing newly assigned officers with senior officers who demonstrate equitable policing practices;[636] and/or 9) offer periodic racial and identity profiling training refreshers, simulations, or debriefs tied to real cases.[637]

617   See Worden et al., *Implicit Bias Training for Police: Impacts on Enforcement Disparities* (2024) 48 *Law and Human Behavior* 338-355 <https://tinyurl.com/ywx6rp27> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
618   See Hetey et al., *When the Cruiser Lights Come On*, *supra* note 615, at p. 124.
619   See Gau et al., *Looking Up: Explaining Police Promotional Aspirations* (2013) 40 Criminal Justice and Behavior 247, 250 <https://tinyurl.com/bdzzyjr9> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
620   See American Civil Liberties Union, *The United States' Lack of Comprehensive Federal and State Data Collection on Policing* (June 2022) pp. 1, 7, 12 <https://tinyurl.com/mrymftef> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
621   See Urban Institute, *Learning to Build Police-Community Trust* (Aug. 2019) p. 15 <https://tinyurl.com/4tzfuvvj> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
622   See Lai and Lisnek, *Impact of Implicit Bias-Oriented Diversity Training*, *supra* note 606, at p. 435.
623   See Thai, *Policing and Symbolic Control: The Process of Valorization* (2022) 127 Am. J. of Sociology 1183, 1213 <https://tinyurl.com/42wfv24x> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
624   See Worden et al., *The Impacts of Implicit Bias Awareness Training in the NYPD*, *supra* note 613, at p. 14.
625   See Hetey et al., *When the Cruiser Lights Come On*, *supra* note 615, at p. 127.
626   See Engel, *The Effects of Supervisory Styles on Patrol Officer Behavior* (2000) 3 Police Quarterly 262, 283 <https://tinyurl.com/3p2az3mx> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
627   See Camp, *Institutional Interactions and Racial Inequality in Policing: How Everyday Encounters Bridge Individuals, Organizations, and Institutions* (2023) 18 Social and Personality Psychology Compass 1, 5 <https://tinyurl.com/bduxjz8r> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
628   See Hetey et al., *When the Cruiser Lights Come On*, *supra* note 615, at pp. 126, 129.
629   While POST does take some steps in assessing trainer quality, such steps could be strengthened, for instance, through continuous quality control. (See also Baker, *Confronting Implicit Bias in the New York Police Department*, N.Y. Times (Jul. 15, 2018) <https://tinyurl.com/3csm7vtx> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; James, *Can Cops Unlearn Their Unconscious Biases*? (Dec. 23, 2017) The Atlantic <https://tinyurl.com/2s4z5ez3> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].)
630   See Baker, *Confronting Implicit Bias in the New York Police Department*, *supra* note 629.
631   See Carter et al., *Developing & Delivering Effective Anti-bias Training: Challenges & Recommendations* (2020) 6 Behavioral Science and Policy 57, 64-65 <https://tinyurl.com/586sfa8u> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
632   See Mosley and McMahon, *In Wake of George Floyd's Death, Psychologist Reexamines Racial Bias in Policing*, WBUR (May 29, 2020) <https://tinyurl.com/zxnpd3nz> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
633   See Lawrence and McCarthy, *What Works in Community Policing? A Best Practices Context for Measure Y Efforts* (2013) The Chief Justice Earl Warren Inst. on L. and Soc. Pol. 1, 2 <https://tinyurl.com/4zyjmjav> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
634   See Ghandnoosh, *One in Five: Disparities in Crime and Policing*, The Sentencing Project (Nov. 2023) <https://tinyurl.com/mrxa62mu> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
635   See Internat. Assn. of Chiefs of Police, *Starting with What Works* (Feb. 2017) p. 4 <https://tinyurl.com/2cpv5xfb> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
636   See Worden et al., *The Impacts of Implicit Bias Awareness Training in the NYPD*, *supra* note 613, at pp. 16-17.
637   See Baker, *Confronting Implicit Bias in the New York Police Department*, *supra* note 629.

By implementing POST's Guidelines on Racial and Identity Profiling and providing related guidance to law enforcement agencies — like the guidance suggestions listed under subsections 1 and 2 above — POST can help law enforcement agencies create an anti-bias culture, improve relationships with the public, reduce racial disparities, and enhance public safety.

B. POST's Definition of Biased Conduct Under AB 443 (2025 Workshop)

Assembly Bill 443, enacted in 2023, requires POST to establish a definition of "biased conduct" for purposes of law enforcement officer certification.[638] The bill, codified as Penal Code section 13510.6, requires that POST, as well as state and local law enforcement agencies, use that definition in pre-employment background investigations, as well as in any investigation into a bias-related complaint or an incident that involves possible indications of officer bias, and to determine if any racial profiling occurred.[639] The Legislature directed POST to establish this definition by January 1, 2026.[640]

Government Code section 1031 requires a pre-employment background investigation for peace officers.[641] As noted by POST in its *Background Investigation Manual: Guidelines for the Investigator*, "Backgrounds are among the most important investigations that a law enforcement agency will ever conduct. The manner in which a background investigation is conducted can make the difference between hiring an individual who will truly protect and serve, versus someone who may cause harm to oneself, the agency, and society."[642] Establishing a "biased conduct" definition to use in these pre-employment background investigations that involve bias assessments will therefore play a crucial role in preventing biased conduct and promoting accountability by: 1) identifying prejudicial attitudes and behaviors; 2) promoting a culture of integrity; 3) enhancing decision-making processes such as recruitment and promotions; 4) providing documentation for accountability; 5) supporting training and development; and 6) reducing legal and reputational risks.[643] Similarly, establishing a "biased conduct" definition to guide internal affairs investigations into biased conduct allegations will play a significant role in promoting accountability within law enforcement agencies (LEAs) by: 1) promoting thorough and objective fact-finding; 2) establishing consequences for misconduct; 3) promoting transparency and trust; 4) preventing repeat offenses; 5) informing policy and training improvements; 6) ensuring legal and ethical compliance; and 7) encouraging a culture of accountability.[644]

In March 2025, POST invited RIPA Board members and subject matter experts (SMEs) to attend its "AB 443 Workshop," designed to assist POST with drafting a definition of "biased conduct" pursuant to its statutory obligations. Most SMEs invited by POST represented members of the law enforcement community; Board members who attended the AB 443 Workshop noted the lack of community representation within the organizations the SMEs represented.[645] Nevertheless, attending Board members appreciated the collaborative and consensus-building process they undertook with the other SMEs to develop this important definition pursuant to AB 443.

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638   Assem. Bill No. 443 (2023-2024 Res. Sess.) § 1, *supra* note 576.
639   Pen. Code, § 13510.6.
640   *Ibid*.
641   Gov. Code, § 1031; see also Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *Background Investigation Manual: Guidelines for the Investigator* ("*Guidelines for the Investigator*") (2024) p. iii <https://tinyurl.com/24uecwas> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
642   Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *Guidelines for the Investigator*, *supra* note 641, at p. 1-1.
643   Cal. State Auditor, *Law Enforcement Departments Have Not Adequately Guarded Against Biased Conduct* (Apr. 26, 2022) pp. 72-85 <https://tinyurl.com/2s8u2vjc> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].
644   *Ibid*.
645   Out of about 15 SMEs, the majority represented law enforcement agencies, few represented academic and/or research institutions, and only one represented a community-based organization. SMEs included members of the California District Attorneys Association, the California State Sheriffs' Association, the Peace Officers Research Association of California, background investigators, and internal affairs investigators.

After much discussion and deliberation over a period of two days, the Board members and other SMEs developed the following definition of "biased conduct":

Any action or inaction by a peace officer, whether on duty or off-duty, that is motivated by bias, whether implicit or explicit, toward a person's actual or perceived protected class or characteristic(s).

The POST Commission convened on June 4, 2025, to finalize the definition of "biased conduct" pursuant to the mandates of AB 443. Despite the consensus reached by the SME working group, POST elected not to present the above definition to the POST Commission for adoption. Instead, POST provided the Commissioners with two alternate definitions of "biased conduct": Option A defined "biased conduct" using statutory language only.[646] Option B added some, but not all, of the language from the definition above to the statutory definition.[647]

The Commission discussed the main differences between the two; as noted by the Commissioners, Option B defined "biased conduct" as potentially resulting from action and inaction and potentially occurring on-duty or off-duty.[648] The discussion included concerns related to the fact that law enforcement does not always have a duty to act and, without context, adding the word "inaction" to the "biased conduct" definition presented in Option B could potentially lead to mislabeling inaction and linking it to bias.[649] While the Commission acknowledged that more context for any additions suggested by SMEs could be provided in future guidelines, and that the concerns related to the inaction language could be addressed with potential additional language that could help mitigate such concerns, ultimately, the POST Commission decided to adopt Option A.[650]

While the Board is disappointed that POST did not adopt the language and definition developed at the AB 443 Workshop, it is hopeful that revamped pre-employment background investigations that involve bias assessments will help LEAs demonstrate due diligence in preventing biased conduct and improve their decision-making in recruitment. An explicit definition to screen for biased conduct will also help law enforcement agencies reduce potential legal challenges or reputational harm resulting from hiring peace officers who then engage in prohibited conduct.

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646   Option A definition: "Pursuant to Penal Code section 13510.6[, subdivision] (a), when investigating any bias-related complaint or incident that involves possible indications of officer bias, a law enforcement agency shall determine whether the conduct being investigated constitutes 'biased conduct,' using the following definition: Biased conduct includes any conduct, including, but not limited to, conduct online, such as social media use, engaged in by a peace officer in any encounter with the public, first responders, or employees of criminal justice agencies, as defined in [Penal Code] Section 13101, motivated by bias toward any person's protected class or characteristic, whether actual or perceived, that is described in subdivision (b) of Section 51 of the Civil Code. For purposes of this definition: (a) Biased conduct may result from implicit and explicit biases. (b) Conduct is biased if a reasonable person with the same training and experience would conclude, based upon the facts, that the officer's conduct resulted from bias towards that person's membership in a protected class described in paragraph (1) of Penal Code [section] 13510.6[, subdivision] (a). (c) An officer need not admit biased or prejudiced intent for conduct to be determined to be biased conduct." (Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, *6/4/25 Agenda Item Report: Report on Establishing a Definition of "Biased Conduct" Pursuant to Assembly Bill 443 and Penal Code 13510.6* (Approved May 13, 2025), p. 3 <https://tinyurl.com/mrwbbzth> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].)

647   Option B definition: "Pursuant to Penal Code section 13510.6(a), when investigating any bias-related complaint or incident that involves possible indications of officer bias, a law enforcement agency shall determine whether the conduct being investigated constitutes 'biased conduct,' using the following definition: Biased conduct includes any conduct, including, but not limited to, conduct online, such as social media use, engaged in by a peace officer in any encounter with the public, first responders, or employees of criminal justice agencies, as defined in Section 13101, motivated by bias toward any person's protected class or characteristic, whether actual or perceived, that is described in subdivision (b) of Section 51 of the Civil Code. For purposes of this definition: (a) Biased conduct may result from action or inaction. (b) Biased conduct may occur on duty or off duty. (c) Biased conduct may result from implicit and explicit biases. (d) Conduct is biased if a reasonable person with the same training and experience would conclude, based upon the facts, that the officer's conduct resulted from bias towards that person's membership in a protected class described in paragraph (1) of Penal Code 13510.6(a). (e) An officer need not admit biased or prejudiced intent for conduct to be determined to be biased conduct." (*Id*. at pp. 3-4.)

648   Pen. Code, § 13510.6, subd. (a); see also Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *POST Commission March 5, 2025 Agenda*, *supra* note 579, at p. 495.

649   *Ibid*.

650   *Id*. at p. 149.

The Board also hopes consistency and transparency in internal affairs investigations involving allegations of biased conduct will send a strong message that biased conduct will not be tolerated in agencies. In addition to improving community trust and partnerships, this will encourage officers to report biased conduct without fear of retaliation and contribute to an LEA culture of accountability and ethical behavior. Addressing biased conduct through internal affairs investigations could also lead to improved community trust and public safety outcomes.

Proposed Definitions of "Biased Conduct"

AB 443 Workshop (developed by SMEs): "Any action or inaction by a peace officer, whether on duty or off-duty, that is motivated by bias, whether implicit or explicit, toward a person's actual or perceived protected class or characteristic(s)."

POST Option A (adopted): "Pursuant to Penal Code § 13510.6(a), when investigating any bias-related complaint or incident that involves possible indications of officer bias, a law enforcement agency shall determine whether the conduct being investigated constitutes 'biased conduct,' using the following definition:

Biased conduct includes any conduct, including, but not limited to, conduct online, such as social media use, engaged in by a peace officer in any encounter with the public, first responders, or employees of criminal justice agencies, as defined in [Penal Code] § 13101, motivated by bias toward any person's protected class or characteristic, whether actual or perceived, that is described in subdivision (b) of Section 51 of the Civil Code.

For purposes of this definition:

(a) Biased conduct may result from implicit and explicit biases.

(b) Conduct is biased if a reasonable person with the same training and experience would conclude, based upon the facts, that the officer's conduct resulted from bias towards that person's membership in a protected class described in paragraph (1) of Penal Code § 13510.6(a).

(c) An officer need not admit biased or prejudiced intent for conduct to be determined to be biased conduct."

POST Option B (rejected): "Pursuant to Penal Code § 13510.6(a), when investigating any bias-related complaint or incident that involves possible indications of officer bias, a law enforcement agency shall determine whether the conduct being investigated constitutes 'biased conduct,' using the following definition:

Biased conduct includes any conduct, including, but not limited to, conduct online, such as social media use, engaged in by a peace officer in any encounter with the public, first responders, or employees of criminal justice agencies, as defined in [Penal Code] § 13101, motivated by bias toward any person's protected class or characteristic, whether actual or perceived, that is described in subdivision (b) of Section 51 of the Civil Code.

For purposes of this definition:

(a) Biased conduct may result from action or inaction.

(b) Biased conduct may occur on duty or off duty.

(c) Biased conduct may result from implicit and explicit biases.

(d) Conduct is biased if a reasonable person with the same training and experience would conclude, based upon the facts, that the officer's conduct resulted from bias towards that person's membership in a protected class described in paragraph (1) of Penal Code § 13510.6(a).

(e) An officer need not admit biased or prejudiced intent for conduct to be determined to be biased conduct."

IV. Field Training Program: First Year Review

The Board is mandated to review and analyze the training courses certified by POST to assess the effectiveness of the training in eliminating racial and identity profiling by sworn officers.[651] Such training is an essential component toward eliminating the pernicious practice of racial and identity profiling by law enforcement.

At POST's AB 443 Workshop, subject matter experts from law enforcement identified that field training officers have a tremendous influence on shaping the behaviors of basic academy graduates.[652] Evaluating the POST-certified Field Training Program (FTP) is critical to understanding the context and regulation of peace officer training in California.[653] Field training is the only POST-identified course remaining for the Board to review before it turns back to prior courses to review any updates.

A. Overview of the Field Training Program (FTP)

Field Training is a continuation of the Basic Academy and a significant proportion of an officer's training overall. The Basic Academy is 664 hours, while Field Training is 440 hours and a minimum of 10 weeks under POST regulations.[654] The FTP is intended to facilitate a peace officer's transition from the academic setting (or custody assignment) to the performance of uniformed patrol duties of the employing LEA. Newly assigned officers and deputies must receive additional training in the field to bridge the gap between Academy training and solo patrol duty. The FTP covers at least 18 core "competency areas," including officer safety, use of force, report writing, search and seizure, crisis intervention, community relations, and more.[655]

To make new officers' field training as effective as possible, each officer is assigned to a Field Training Officer (FTO) in order to engage in supervised field work and real-world policing scenarios through actual calls for service.[656] The FTO must hold Basic POST Certification, have at least one year of patrol experience, be selected by the agency, and complete a 40-hour POST FTO training,[657] in addition to 24 hours of refresher training every three years.[658] POST also requires crisis-intervention training for FTOs.[659] The trainee's performance is evaluated by the FTO and monitored by the Field Training Program Supervisor, Administrator, or Coordinator (FTO SAC) through daily and/or weekly reviews.[660] FTOs typically use Daily Observation Reports (DORs) to track performance, remedial training, and formally document trainee competence.[661]

According to the POST FTP Guide, field training is "the most effective influence on the future direction of a department. The law enforcement department head and their field training staff must be certain that their FTP not only develops the necessary technical skills but also reflects the policing philosophy of the department and the community that it serves."[662]

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651   Pen. Code, § 13519.4, subd. (h).

652   See Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *Assembly Bill 443 Determination of Biased Conduct Workshop: Input from Subject Matter Experts* p. 3 <https://tinyurl.com/2k5wsux2> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

653   This is consistent with POST's response to the Board's recommendations in the 2025 Report. (See Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *POST Commission March 5, 2025 Agenda*, *supra* note 579, at p. 494.)

654   See Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *FTP Volume I*, *supra* note 577, at p. 1-3.

655   See Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *Option 1: Field Training Program* <https://tinyurl.com/3ewjzf3u> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

656   See Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *FTP Volume I*, *supra* note 577, at p. 1-1.

657   See Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *Field Training/Police Training Programs* <https://tinyurl.com/46wz8udy> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

658   See Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *FTP Volume I*, *supra* note 577, at p. 1-7.

659   *Ibid*.

660   *Id*. at p. 2-1.

661   *Id*. at p. 1-12.

662   *Id* at p. 1-1. Not all law enforcement agencies participate in POST-certified field training and next year's RIPA Report will discuss field training alternative for non-participating agencies.

Like many of POST's courses, the FTP has components that relate to the training of officers about the law's prohibitions on racial and identity profiling and the reduction or elimination of bias.

Given the size and importance of POST's FTP, the Board will conduct its review of this program over a two-year period. This year's review focuses on a) the materials comprising the FTP, b) the role of the FTO as it relates to the FTP, and c) research related to Field Training.

B. FTP Materials

To aid in the Board's review of the POST FTP and related course materials, DOJ retained two consultants: one with expertise in law enforcement academic research, including the study of bias, and the other a former California law enforcement executive with 37 years of operational experience. These consultants reviewed Basic Academy materials identified by POST as relating to the FTP and its training on racial and identity profiling: Learning Domain 3—*Principled Policing in the Community* (LD 3);[663] Learning Domain 42—*Cultural Diversity/ Discrimination* (LD 42);[664] and POST's *Field Training Program Guide*, Volumes I[665] and II.[666] The consultants also familiarized themselves with Penal Code section 13519.4 and its prohibition on racial and identity profiling, as well as the correlated California Code of Regulations implementing AB 953.

From those materials, the consultants prepared a course rating rubric for Board members to record their independent reviews and comments, and created summaries of two POST Basic Academy courses, LD 3 and LD 42. The consultants focused on these learning domains since POST has previously explained that, while officer training and guidelines on racial and identity profiling are scattered across various LDs, LD 3 and LD 42 provide the theoretical foundation trainees are expected to build on and apply during field training under the supervision of Field Training Officers (FTOs).[667] DOJ's consultants also reviewed materials on alternative law enforcement FTP models to assess the FTP and its parameters.[668]

After reviewing this information and preparing the rubric, the consultants developed field interview questions for law enforcement agencies who use POST's materials to conduct their own FTP programs at their agencies. DOJ's consultants then interviewed representatives from a number of mid- to large-sized law enforcement agencies from various locations throughout California, as well as a number of POST representatives overseeing the FTP. These interviews provided first-hand insight into how the POST FTP guidelines are being implemented by different LEAs throughout the State. Finally, the consultants gave a presentation on their progress and observations at the September 8, 2025, RIPA POST Subcommittee meeting.

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663   Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *Learning Domain 03: Principled Policing in the Community (Version 6.0)* ("*Learning Domain 03*") <https://tinyurl.com/mrytda6a> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

664   Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *Learning Domain 42: Cultural Diversity/ Discrimination (Version 7.0)* ("*Learning Domain 42*") <https://tinyurl.com/mwa8knxf> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

665   Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *FTP Volume I, supra* note 577.

666   Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *Field Training Program Guide, Volume II* <https://tinyurl.com/3ysawcwe> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

667   Racial and Identity Profiling Advisory Board, *2025 Report, supra* note 583, at p. 122.

668   See Fischer, *Best Practices Guide: Field Training for Today's Recruits* (2018) Internat. Assn. of Chiefs of Police: Smaller Police Depts. Technical Assistance Program <https://tinyurl.com/5ef4uytr> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; Thompson, *Field Training Program and Concerns with the San Jose Model,* Florida Department of Law Enforcement <https://tinyurl.com/2w9hy7e6> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; *The Reno Model: Reno Police Department's Police Training Officer Program Basic Manual* (2017) Reno Police Dept. <https://tinyurl.com/bdf8y2tm> [as of Dec. 17, 2025]; *A Problem-Based Learning Manual for Training and Evaluating Police Trainees,* Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) U.S. Dep't. of Just. <https://tinyurl.com/4j9nbmdd> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

C. The Role of the Field Training Officer (FTO) and the FTO Supervisor/Administrator/ Coordinator (FTO SAC)

As noted above, in the FTP, newly assigned officers are assigned a Field Training officer (FTO) selected and trained to conduct field training and an FTO Supervisor/Administrator/Coordinator (SAC).

1. Role of the FTO

FTOs have "significant" responsibilities to train new officers, over and above their standard law enforcement duties.[669] FTOs must guide trainees through a comprehensive curriculum, and at times, may be required to intervene during questionable or unsafe trainee behavior.[670] The FTO's role also includes setting a positive example and offering consistent encouragement and direction to the trainee,[671] as well as providing critical feedback and clear direction to guide the trainee to an acceptable level of competence.[672]

2. Role of the FTO SAC

The role of the FTO SAC is to ensure that the standards and objectives of the department's FTP are adhered to.[673] To meet these requirements, the FTO SAC must monitor the training activities of the FTOs and seek periodic feedback on the newly assigned officer's training progress from the FTOs.[674] In administering the FTP, the FTO SAC is responsible for ensuring that the department's program complies with the minimum standards established by POST.[675] FTO SACs must be trained in the various components of the FTP and should serve as the main resource for any field training concerns within the department.[676] FTO SACs are expected to develop, maintain, and oversee the selection process of FTOs in the FTP and serve as the academy course liaison in order to closely align field training with the Academy's Regular Basic Course.[677]

D. Field Training Research

During the first-year review of the FTP, the consultants also engaged in research related to alternative law enforcement FTP models, and reviewed related manuals, best practices, and scholarly articles. This informed their understanding of POST's FTP and related materials, and will inform potential recommendations developed during the second-year review of the FTP.

E. Second-Year Review of the FTP

Next year, in the 2027 RIPA Report, Board members will assess the FTP and, depending on that assessment, may provide recommendations to improve field training and related POST curriculum materials. The following questions will guide the Board's assessment and development of recommendations:

1. *What values does the FTP teach and do those values align with the goals of AB 953*?

The Board acknowledges that field training affects entire law enforcement agencies, not just individual newly assigned officers. During the September 8, 2025, POST Subcommittee Meeting, Board members noted how significantly the FTP can impact the culture of agencies since newly assigned officers witness and experience an agency's chain of command, leadership styles, disciplinary systems, and informal norms in action. Newly assigned officers can therefore internalize unit-specific customs, rituals, language, and professional conduct. In addition, the mentorship newly assigned officers receive (or do not receive) helps shape their sense of identity and belonging within the agency.

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669   Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *FTP Volume I, supra* note 577, at p. 1-9.
670   *Id*. at pp. 1-9–1-10.
671   *Id*. at p. 1-10.
672   *Id*. at p. 1-12.
673   *Id*. at p. 1-13.
674   *Ibid*.
675   *Ibid*.
676   *Ibid*.
677   *Ibid*.

In exploring this question, the Board will also consider current recruitment issues and generational differences impacting field training, as well as differences of approach between academy and field training officers in terms of quality of instruction.

2. *How well do the FTP materials cover potential for bias and racial and identity profiling?*

   a. *How do trainees learn about bias-reducing police tactics and community engagement?*

   b. *How are trainees evaluated on eliminating bias and engaging with community?*

In assessing the POST-certified FTP materials, the Board will also evaluate *Field Training Program Guide, Volume II, Competency 6— Community Relations/Professional Demeanor,*[678] with a focus on Sections 6.3: Cultural Diversity and 6.4: Racial Profiling. While reviewing such materials, the Board will identify the existence or absence of related rubrics; whether and how POST uses specific terminology (e.g. "procedural justice," "principled policing") related to racial and identity profiling; and how POST incorporates scenario-based and reality-based training (e.g. real-life simulations, role-playing exercises, use of virtual reality) to train its officers.

The Board will also examine FTO training in order to assess how POST-certified trainers relate concepts such as bias-reducing police tactics and community engagement to trainees, and how they evaluate trainees on eliminating bias and engaging with the community. FTOs should be experienced, exemplary officers with strong leadership skills. They should receive specialized training in adult learning, coaching, and evaluation methods. In reviewing the FTO training, the Board will consider how law enforcement agencies assess whether or not the FTO training is effective and how they measure such effectiveness.

3. *How well do FTP materials and training align with academy training in LD 3 Principled Policing in the Community or LD 42 Cultural Diversity/Discrimination?*

Completion of LD 3 and LD 42[679] is critical to a newly assigned officer's progression since they must demonstrate mastery of each course's learning objectives. The FTP is designed to provide newly assigned peace officers opportunities to apply the principles, knowledge and skills acquired in LD 3 and LD 42 classrooms, in real life call for service situations.

The RIPA Board has previously reviewed LD 3 and LD 42 and provided recommendations to POST in the 2022, 2023, and 2025 RIPA reports. In the 2027 report, the Board will focus on assessing how well POST's FTP aligns with the learning objectives articulated in LD 3 and LD 42.[680]

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678   Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *Field Training Program Guide, Volume II, Competency 6— Community Relations/Professional Demeanor* <https://tinyurl.com/mtan53nn> [as of Dec. 17, 2025].

679   *Ibid*.

680   These are materials identified by POST as relating to the FTP and its training on racial and identity profiling: Learning Domain 3—*Principled Policing in the Community* (LD 3), and Learning Domain 42—*Cultural Diversity/ Discrimination* (LD 42). (See Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *Learning Domain 03*, *supra* note 663; Com. on Peace Officer Stds. and Training, *Learning Domain 42*, *supra* note 664.)

As part of its review of the FTP, the Board will also look at the recently published POST Guidelines on Racial and Identity Profiling, and may also look to additional U.S.-based and/or international field training models to guide its development of potential recommendations.[681]

V. Vision for Future Reports

During the September 9, 2025, POST Commission meeting, RIPA Board Co-Chair Sierra provided the Commission with an overview of the RIPA statute, examples of findings from previous reports, and a preview of the work the Board is engaged in related to the Field Training Program.

Co-Chair Sierra also answered questions and received input from Commissioners. This presentation and dialogue highlight the fact that the Board and Commission aim to strengthen their partnership by working even more collaboratively in the future. For example, the Board hopes to engage in more targeted outreach to law enforcement agencies. During the September 8, 2025, POST Subcommittee meeting, Board members noted that this outreach would be beneficial since RIPA data is reported using non-identifying officer numbers, and peace officers have repeatedly expressed concerns with DOJ using RIPA data to identify individual officer information. Working with POST to provide outreach and better access to resources will address these concerns by ensuring that peace officers and law enforcement agencies throughout the State understand that DOJ does not use RIPA data to identify individual officers, nor does it disaggregate RIPA data for this purpose.

In addition to engaging with POST in these ways, over the next year, the Board looks forward to completing its review of the FTP, and in future reports, the Board will continue to review RIPA course updates. The Board will also further collaborate with POST regarding requests for input on guidelines, regulations, and training courses being developed and updated relating to racial and identity profiling.

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681   See off. of the Solicitor Gen., *Ontario Transforming Police Response and Training* (Apr. 3, 2018) <https://tinyurl.com/3zk7xpru> [as of Dec. 17, 2025] (discussing Ontario Police College in Canada training programs with emphasis on de-escalation techniques, communication skills, and conflict resolution); Joining the Police, *Apprenticeship (PCDA) Entry Route* <https://tinyurl.com/mxzhsnv9> [as of Dec. 17, 2025] (UK Police degree-based training integrates academic learning with practical training); Staller et al., *Police Recruits' Wants and Needs in Police Training in Germany* (2022) 36 Security J. 249, 250-251 <https://tinyurl.com/bddwu2er> [as of Dec. 17, 2025] (discussing the extensive German Police training program, which sometimes lasts 2-3 years with a strong focus on ethical training and legal education); Charle, *Tokyo (Japan) Police Academy* (1979) 2 Police Magazine 49, 49-53 <https://tinyurl.com/yc6h5c2z> [as of Dec. 17, 2025] (Japanese Police Academy training program focuses on legal studies, community engagement, and public service as well as physical fitness and discipline).

LEGISLATIVE UPDATES

This section highlights legislation enacted in 2025 that may impact the Board's work towards eliminating racial and identity profiling. Below is an overview of the primary changes resulting from the enacted legislation.

Senate Bill 734 – Prohibiting Punitive Actions or Other Discipline of Officers on the Basis of a Challenge Under the Racial Justice Act

The California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (RJA) prohibits an individual from being convicted on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin, and authorizes a defendant to file a motion to have their case dismissed or conviction reversed if the charges or their conviction was the product of racial bias, including systemic and institutional racial bias, racial profiling, and/or historical patterns of racially biased policing.[682]

Senate Bill No. 734 (2025-2026 Reg. Sess.) prohibits a peace officer from being subject to punitive actions or discipline on the basis of a court finding under the RJA, and would prohibit those court findings from being introduced for any purpose in any administrative appeal of a punitive action. Further, SB 734 prohibits Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) from decertifying a peace officer on the basis of a court finding under the RJA. However, a peace officer may be subject to punitive action, discipline, or decertification because of the underlying conduct forming the basis of the court's finding, and agencies may consider the actions and evidence upon which the court relied in making a finding under the RJA when deciding whether to discipline or decertify a peace officer.

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682   Pen. Code, § 745, subd. (h)(1).